Lossky on Will and choice

The nature wills and acts, the person chooses, accepting or rejecting that which the nature wills. (Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 125)

In the Christology controversies of the 6th-7th centuries, monothelitism asserts that Jesus Christ has only one will, while the 5th and 6th Councils (Constantinople II and III) assert that Christ has two wills. The dyothelite position asserts that because Christ has two natures: one human, one divine, therefore he has two wills, for the will is a property of nature. The argument proceeds on through the category of energies, for energies come from the nature. Two natures imply two energies which imply two wills.

Whatever the merits of such an argument, the interesting part is this relation of "will" to "nature." If the nature is the one that wills, then does that mean the person does not will anything? Here, we see Vladimir Lossky coming up with an interesting solution to the problem. Since it is the nature that wills, a distinction is made between "will" and "choice." It is undeniable that the human person is the one that chooses one thing or the other, so Lossky asserts that the choice is made by the human person, AFTER the nature wills and acts. That way, Lossky can seemingly do justice to both Constantinople II and III, and the common sense notion of how human beings actually decide one way or the other. Such a solution would seemingly solve the problem of Pelagianism and the Eastern view of Synergism. If a distinction is made between "will" and "choice," then the human person can have no "will" not totally affected by sin, and yet he is free to choose God or reject Him.

Such a view of the doctrine of man would certainly be strange, and contrary to the Augustinian and Calvinist view of Man. Yet it seems necessitated if one wants to hold to the philosophy behind dyothelisim and also hold that the person chooses. That leads us to a problem: If we hold to the philosophy of will behind Constantinople II and III, we must either reject the view that a persons wills, and reject the Calvinist and Augustinian view of Man. Alternatively, we could hold to the philosophy of will behind Constantinople II and II, reject dyothelitism, and we can continue to be Calvinist and Augustinian in our doctrine of Man. Or, we could be dyothelites, reject the philosophy behind Constantinople II and III, and continue to be Calvinist and Augstinian. I think the third option is a more viable project to explore, and one I intend to look into in the future.

From a modern perspective, it is weird to assert that the nature wills following which the person then chooses. What does it even mean in saying that the person rejects what the will wants, since what I want is what I will to want? Is "willing" to be equated to "desire"? Such a move would make the concept plausible in the context of discipline and self-denial, yet "will" as "desire" is not how "will" is normally understood. "Desire" is normally understood in the context of the emotions, not the will. It is therefore unclear just what exactly is meant by stating as Lossky does that "the nature wills and acts," with "the person chooses, accepting or rejecting that which the nature wills." It sounds positively incoherent, but who knows?

Book Review of Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Parts 6-8)

The final installment of my book review of the book Sapiens: a Brief History of Humankind, consisting of Parts 6-8, is now on The Daily Genevan website here. In this 3-parter, I re-engaged the sciences from a presuppositional point of view, focused our attention on Yuval Noah Harari's fixation on humankind as opposed to real humans, and through that and his futurism exposes his idolatry, up to and including repeating the lie of the serpent "You shall be as God" (Gen. 3:5).

Harari's history of humanity is indeed a fascinating book, but it is also disturbing because of what it tells us about the anti-Christian vision of the futurist. Do read more about it in the review.

Why defining immutability according to Aristotelian categories is problematic

Those are all still changes. It takes a state, be it ontological or metaphysical, and changes it to something else. God does not change, even within the Godhead. If it's a simplistic view, it's because it's a simplistic concept. Divine Simplicity doesn't allow change whatsoever.

— Travis W. Rogers - author (@ReformedPhotog) November 25, 2021

In Aristotelian (meta)physics, "motion" is a change of state. A moving ball has motion, just as a piece of burning wood which is in motion from being wood to becoming ash. Basically, anything is motion is changing in some form or another. This use of the word "motion" is alien and confusing to those of us trained in the sciences, which presumably should include most educated people in this modern 21st century world. Nevertheless, one must conceptually split the word "motion" into is older, Aristotelian meaning, and the modern (and what I would think correct) meaning. I will use motion(A) for the Aristotelian sense of "motion" and motion(M) for the modern sense of motion. A moving ball has motion(A) because moving implies change. A moving ball has motion(M) because its displacement is changing over time. However, a moving ball according to Aristotelian metaphysics is constantly changing because it is moving (A). Whereas, a moving ball in the modern sense is not changing because it is in constant motion (M).

This concept of "motion" is important because much of classical theism draws upon Aristotelian philosophy and Aristotelian categories, even centuries after the modern world has consigned them to the realm of archaic history. It is therefore hard for the modern man to understand classical theism, seeing as how they have to learn not just a different philosophy but also to experience cognitive dissonance in the different definitions and concepts of terms. Grasping the Aristotelian notion of "motion" is like a gestalt switch—seeing things differently from how most people normally think. And for those who continue to want to live in the modern world and especially treasuring the sciences, even teaching the sciences, one has to learn how to hold two almost incommensurable concepts simultaneously, switching from one to the other when the situation demands it.

In classical theism, immutability is the doctrine that God does not change, and change is defined in terms of motion in the Aristotelian sense of the term. Thus, immutability is not the same as immotility (no movement (M)), since immotibility is built upon motion (M). That said, by sticking to the Aristotelian sense of the term, motion cannot do justice to the Scriptures, as I will show now.

We note in the beginning that for a moving ball, the ball is moving in both the Aristotelian and modern sense. However, the moving ball is changing according to motion (A), while not changing according to motion (M). The reason why the ball is not changing according to motion (M) is because there is no resultant unbalanced external force acting on the ball (assuming a ball moving at constant velocity). In other words, the ball continues to move because it does not change. For the ball to stop moving, it experiences a change. Since modern physics is a much better approximation of how the world works, we know that motion (M) is the correct notion of motion, and motion (A) is intesting conceptually but it does not reflect anything in the real world.

In the doctrine of God, the doctrine of immutability focuses on the fact that God does not change. But is Aristotelian physics, inadequate for the real world, adequate for one's doctrine of God? Since it is not applicable to the real world, we should be skeptical that it would be applicable here. But let's look further into the matter. Let us look at how immutability works in the Bible concerning God. Now, we say that God is love. Immutability as it is applied to God teaches us that God is always love. He does not change to be less loving, or more loving. That applies to all the attributes of God. But note one thing: "love" is an action attribute. "Love" is always to be expressed from the lover to the beloved. In other words, "love" is like a moving ball. As we remember, in Aristotelian physics, a moving ball has motion because it is moving. For a ball to not have motion, it must be stationary. But if love is like a moving ball, in that both are actions, then surely to asseert that there is no motion (A) in God is for God's love to cease? But if God's love does not change to be more or less loving, then there is no change in God's love according to motion (M). So which idea of "motion" is suitable when we deal with immutability and the love of God, if not the modern notion of motion, not the Aristotelian notion of motion?

Thus, we see here that definiting immutability according to Aristotelian categories is indeed problematic. While I will not claim that the immutability of classical theism is immotility, I will assert that the Aristotelian notion of "motion" is incompatible with the immutability of God's active atttributes. Aristotelian metaphysics, when applied to God's love, must say that God is immutable only when he has not love ad intra. Since that is not true, Aristotelian metaphysics about motion must be false, at least when applied to God's love.

Should we therefore change to the modern notion of motion and change? That is an interesting proposition to explore, but I will not claim that this is the path we should necessarily take. Rather, define immutability as God not changing, let the Bible informs us what change would be like if applied to God, and hold one's philosophy about what constitues "change" or "motion" at arm's length.

[Note: I know many classical theists believe God is love. This article is asserting that it is inconsistent to hold to Aristotelian metaphysics of motion and still believe God is love. So one has to decide whether to follow Scripture, or follow Aristotle. Thankfully, classical theists follow Scripture where it counts, however inconsistent that is with their Aristotelianism.]

Mika Edmonson: Facts are irrelevant to the narrative

In the wake of today’s verdict in Wisconsin, let’s pray for the families of the victims,for the safety of peaceful protestors, for laws that protect the right to peaceably assemble, the grace to remain peaceful, for an end to racial vigilantism & for gun reform that protects life

— Mika Edmondson (@mika_edmondson) November 19, 2021

Mika Edmonson, a black pastor who was formerly pastoring in the OPC, is the husband to race hustler Christina Edmonson. In this tweet that alludes to the Rittenhouse incident, he prays for "an end to racial vigilantism," parroting one accusation of the left. Nevermind that the three people shot by Kyle Rittenhouse were all white. A white man shooting other white men in self-defence is considered "racial vigilantism."

A major problem with those calling for "racial justice," the supposed moderates who claim to reject CRT (Critical Race Theory) in the Evangelical and Reformed camp, is its aversion to facts. I have shown that in my brief response to Justin Gibony's video over at TGC. The fact of the matter is that these supposed moderates lie about the facts. Just like the American mainstream media, they seem to be pathological liars. Mika Edmonson lies about the Rittenhouse incident, and unfortunately nothing will happen to him. He is supposed to be a minsiter of the Gospel, so that makes his sin all the more egregious. Sad to say, but unrepentant lying and misrepresentation is not the disqualifying sin it once was for the ministry in the United States of America.

Christina Edmonson is a racist

Critical Race Theory (CRT) is a racist theory. Those who embrace CRT are at least theoretically racist. Those who promote CRT as a living are race hustlers. One such race hustler is Christina Edmonson, wife of a pastor who was at one time in the OPC. Here are two analyses of Edmonson's racism:

Some stuff on CRT in Singapore

Critical Race Theory (CRT) is a racist, divisive ideology that is metastasizing throughout the world. It is appearing in Singapore, creating needless division and dissension. Recently, the rapper Subbhas Nair has been charged with "attempting to promote ill will over religion, race", and he does so by dealing with social issues through the lens of CRT. While one can discuss CRT academically, the toxic fruit of CRT is clear in its promotion of racism and racial division through its "antiracist" praxis.

Regarding CRT in Singapore, here are two articles (from a Singapore perspective) analyzing CRT by Reckless.Sg:

What's the Big Deal with Critical Race Theory (Part 1)
What's the Big Deal with Critical Race Theory (Part 2)

It is hoped that CRT will be rejected as the racist garbage that it is, but the growing (il)liberalism in Singapore is cause for worry.

Lossky on the term "person" with regards to the Trinity

Purged of its Aristotelian content, the theological notion of hypostasis in the thought of the eastern Fathers means not so much individual as person, in the modern sense of this word. Indeed, our ideas of human personality, of that personal quality which makes every human being unique, to be expressed only in terms of itself: this idea of person comes to us from Christian theology. The philosophy of antiquity knew only human individuals. The human person cannot be expressed in concepts. It eludes all rational definitions, indeed all description, for all the properties whereby it could be characterized can be met with in other individuals. Personality can only be grasped in this life by a direct intuition; it can only be expressed in a work of art. (Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 53)

On the doctrine of God, some of the new Thomistic Classical Theists have stated that the term "person" as used in the Trinity is different from the modern notion of "person." Whether that is so is an interesting question to be explored. What we can say however is that, according to Eastern Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky, the modern notion of "person" comes from Christian theology when "purged of its Aristotelian content." If what Lossky says is true, then the current attack against so-called "Social Trinitarianism" may be robbed of one of its argument concerning what a "person" is in the persons of the Trinity.

The shift towards medievalism?

Uh yeah, pope/trentless roman catholicism is called protestantism

— Gnoisome Gnoll 🦃⚓🦃 (@gnoisomegnoll) November 12, 2021

In response to critics of EFS/ ERAS, Own Strachan had released a podcast episode decrying the shift towards "popeless and Trentless Catholicism." This shift has come about as much of Evangelical academia has shifted towards Thomism in its metaphysics. Strachan's charge of popeless and Trentless Catholicism is a charge that Evangelical academia has become like Roman Catholicism with the exception of having no pope and having the Gospel. In response to Strachan, at least one person claims that Protestantism is indeed a popeless and Trentless Catholicism. But is Protestantism merely Roman Catholicism with the Gospel and without the Pope?

The 16th century Reformation did not happen in a vacuum. It was preceded by the Renaissance, where new forms of learning and innovation came onto the scene. Most of the Reformers came from the (Renaissance) humanist tradition, as opposed to the establishes scholars steeped in medieval scholasticism. Calvin for example wrote against the scholastics of the Sorbonne, and much of the Protestant Reformation began with a rejection of Medieval Scholasticism.

Now, it is correct to say the none of the Reformers thought to thoroughly reject scholasticism, and that later Reformed scholasticism did not see the Protestant faith and the methods of Scholasticism as being incompatible. This is not a rehash of the discredited "Calvin versus the Calvinist" historiography. It is also not to claim that the first two generations of Reformers would disagree with Medieval Scholasticism on the doctrine of God; they did not. The key point here is to note that the initial point was not that of scholasticism. When Reformed Scholasticism began to take shape, the Reformed theologians of that era thought that the tools of scholasticism could be used in service of explicating the truths of the Christian Reformed faith. Generally, none of them thought that scholasticism in itself would become THE method the way medieval scholastics did. Does the method change the message? That can be discussed but none of the Reformed theologians thought it did, or they would not embrace scholastic methods as tools in theology.

The key point to observe here is to assert that Protestantism is not a "popeless and Trentless Catholicism," at least consistent Protestantism (we can exclude the via media Anglicans from the discussion). Protestantism did not just reject the pope or get the Gospel right. Without rejecting tradition, they nonetheless were willing to question it and dissent from it if they believed it to be false. They held to what Jaroslav Pelikan called "Tradition 1," treasuring tradition while keeping it at arm's length. They did not see any tradition as necessarily sacrosanct, unlike the way today's "Evangelical academia" seem to treat the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which is basically slipping into a form of Tradition 2.

Is there a movement in church history that corresponds to "popeless Trentless Catholicism"? Yes, there has been such movements. The 17th and 18th century Jansenists in France is one such movement. But even bigger than that is Eastern Orthodoxy, which has no pope neitther does it hold to Trent. The fact is that Protestantism is more than just "popeless" and "Trentless." A major issue of the Reformation was also on the nature of authority, and this unfortunately is the major issue of our time as well, as American Evangelical academia flirts with Tradition 2 in its embrace of Thomas Aquinas.

Owen Strachan and the Trinity on the Antithesis podcast

We evangelical theologians are being led today toward a Popeless and Trentless Catholicism: natural theology, natural law, Thomistic metaphysics & apologetics, methodological Traditionalism.

Brand-new podcast episode: "The Biblical Godhead."

Listen: https://t.co/Nt4htLBmLY pic.twitter.com/XE0tR9vlnf

— Owen Strachan (@ostrachan) November 12, 2021

Dr. Owen Strachan has just released an episode on his podcast The Antithesis (available on Spotify and iTunes and RedCircle which you can access through the tweet above or through searching on those platforms) on the topic of the Trinity, specifically on the issue of EFS (Eternal Functional Submission), or, as he prefers, ERAS (Eternal Relations of Authority and Submission).

I find the podcast informative, even though I do not agree with Strachan on everything. First, I am a confessionalist so I do treat the Creeds and Confessions as a secondary authority. Second, I hold to the Pactum Salutis, not just a plan of salvation.

Thirdly, I do not think we have the same definition of "economic." "Economic" has to do with what God does, so for me it encompasses more than just the Incarnation, but all extra-Trinitarian works in eternity as well. Strachan says that it is more than just economic, but his view of "economic" seems to be related to God in relation and act to creation. Strachan obviously does not mean God in his being, because he denies ontological inequality, and therefore he does not believe in subordination in the imminant (ontological) Trinity. If we are dealing with something that cannot be well fitted as God's works but neither is it of God's being, may I suggest exploring the categories of "energies," and the Eastern view of the Monarchy of the Father?

That said, I have been much edified, and reminded, of the Reformation doctrine of Sola Scripture. It is very easy even for us who believe in the doctrine to not practice it when we deal with such high and lofty philosophical and theological concepts. There is a tendency for us, for me, to drift away from Sola Scriptura as we explore and think through different philosophies and different conceptual lenses to deal with objections on a topic where the use of philosophy is necessary. This is not to reject the use of those different philosophies and conceptual lenses, but rather, it is easy for us to not practice Sola Scriptura and become proud in our philosophical knowledge in service of theology and God—the bane of all theologians everywhere.

God as pure act, and actions

In the tradition we are considering it was taken almost for granted that God’s knowing is His doing, or put the other way around, God does things through His knowing. (Katheryn Rogers, "The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity," Religious Studies 32:2 (June 1996): 174)

The question remains: How can God, Who is a person, possibly be an act? If actions are what people do, it seems obvious that a person cannot be an action. (Ibid.: 172)

In this journal article by Katheryn Rogers (which you can only access if you have ATLA or some other method to access the article), Rogers made some interesting points concerning the doctrine of divine simplicity as understood by her. What is rather interesting to me is how she takes the classical theist view that God is pure act and puts it with the idea that in God there is only one single act (assuming simplicity), which means God's actions are one and immutable. I do not believe that is how classical theists actually understand purus actus, but I could be wrong. In my view, there seems to be a categorical confusion on Rogers' part.

To my understanding, God as pure act (purus actus) has to be understood in the way it is formulated. It is based on Aristotelian ideas of actuality and potentiality. God being pure act means there is no potentiality in God. Any potentiality has the potential to become actual, thus the presence of a potential implies mutability and imperfection. God as pure act simply means that God is fully actual, with no potential.

There is no doubt that the words "actual" and "act" are cognate words. Nevertheless, that does not imply that one is always related to the other. The ideas of actuality and potentiality, while related to action, deals with the nature of a being. Actualization is the process by which what is potential become actual. But if action merely refers to doing, then it seems that action as a "doing verb" can have no relation to actualize as a "being verb." Again, there seems to be an assumption that act follows being, which seem to come from Aristotelian final causation, but what if we reject that? Then act does not necessarily follow being, and as such God's actions is independent of the issue of God being purus actus.

Own Strachan on the factious charge of semi-Arianism

In light of the resurrection of the EFS controversy on social media, Owen Strachan has published a response denying semi-Arianism on his substack here. Pertinent portions are as follows:

Some of these people agreed with my view, and some did not, but many have recognized—long ago—that this “debate” is more an attempted purge than a genuine conversation.

...

First, equating Arianism with ERAS is fundamentally unsound. There is much conversation around authority and submission, and there are born-again Christians on all sides of this issue. But in both biblical and historical terms this charge will not hold; ERAS is a viable view, even a well-supported one, against the stereotypes.

Second, equating Arianism with ERAS is a zero-sum game. Either ERAS-affirming theologians like me are heretics, or else the other side is leveling a slanderous and divisive charge, the most damning there is. These are the only options available; the accusers apparently wanted to play a game of chicken, and they got it.

Third, equating Arianism with ERAS means that numerous theologians must be seen as heretics. Packer, Hodge, Hilary, and others never have been treated as heretics, but now—if the accusers are correct—they must be (see 1 John 2:22-23). I am no one’s huckleberry, but I am eager to see that case be made in public: I. Packer, Heretic. Charles Hodge, Heretic. Hilary of Poitiers, Heretic.

Fourth, equating Arianism with ERAS means the preceding theologians are in hell. Heretics do not live eternally with God. They suffer God’s just wrath for all eternity. This means that Packer, Hodge, Hilary, and others are in hell. It also means that Wayne Grudem and John Frame are headed for hell. I can scarcely type such blasphemous and evil words, but this is what these charges entail. Of course, these charges also entail that I am right now, at this moment, a child of wrath surely bound for destruction (Ephesians 2:3).

Fifth, equating Arianism with ERAS shows just how off the rails a handful of anti-ERAS voices are. Praise God, the super-majority of evangelical pastors and theologians have not made the case sketched in this piece. They understand that ERAS has many trusted advocates; whether they hold this view or not, they understand—biblically and historically—that it is a viable view, one worthy of study and careful consideration. Perhaps some of this number end up disagreeing with ERAS, and yet they follow two millennia of Christian tradition in honoring brothers who hold this view and not anathematizing them.

I will add this: The anti-ERAS/ EFS/ ESS crowd are not truly interested in dialogue. So far, all I have seen are pontifications and denunciations, with no desire to actually engage their opponents. I challenge any of the anti-EFS crowd to do one simple thing: Actuallly engage one of us! You can try it with me anytime.

Eastern Orthodox view of the persons of the Trinity with regards to the monarchy of the Father

The Latins think of personality as a mode of nature; the Greeks think of nature as the content of the person. (Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Easatern Church, 58)

The Father—πηγαία θεότης, source of all divinity within the Trinity—brings forth the Son and the Holy Spirit in conferring upon them His nature, which remains one and indivisible, identical in itself in the Three. (Ibid., 59)

What does Eastern Orthodox believe concerning the monarchy of the Father? One way to think about it from a Western perspective is to believe that the Son and the Spirit have derivative being from the Father, a form of subordinationism. However, given that the East rejects subordinationism, that is obviously not the way they think of the Trinity, so how do they conceive of the Trinity?

To this, Eastern theologian Vladimir Lossky, when speaking of the Trinity, asserts that the monarchy of the Father teaches that the "source of all divinity within the Trinity" is the Father. But since nature is the content of the person, this merely asserts primacy of the Father within the Trinity, a "functional subordination" if you will speak anachronistically. The "being" in Western thought is untouched by this doctrine. The person can be said to consist of the content of the person (the "what") and alongside the person as hypostasis (the "who"). The conferrence of the nature of the Father deals with the content of the Son which derives from the Father.

If that is truly what the Eastern view of the Trinity is, as Lossky asserts and I make inferences based upon what is said, then it seems that the Eastern view of the Monarchy of the Father is way superior to any Western view of the Trinity.

Gregory Palamas versus followers of Thomas Aquinas

Hence the formulation of the doctrine as an antinomy: the energies express by their procession an ineffable distinction—they are not God in His essence—and yet, at the same time, being inseparable from His essence, they bear witness to the unity and simplicity of the being of God. The opponents of St. Gregory Palamas—eastern theologians who had been strongly influenced by Aristotelianism (in particular the Calabrian monk Barlaam who had received his theological training in Italy, and Akindynus, who quotes the Greek translation of the Summa theologica)—saw in the real distinction between the essence and the energies a derogation of the simplicity of God, and accused Palamas of ditheism and polytheism. Having become alienated from the apophatic and antinomical spirit of eastern theology, they set up against it a conception of God which saw Him, primarily at any rate, as a simple essence, in which even the hypostases assumed the character of relations within the essence. The philosophy of God as pure act cannot admit anything to be God that is not the very essence of God. From this point of view, God is, as it were, limited by His essence; that which is not essence does not belong to the divine being, is not God. Thus, according to Barlaam and Akindynus, the energies are either the essence itsself; that which is not essence does not belong to the divine being, is not God. Thus, according to to Barlaam and Akindynus, the energies are either the essence itself, understood as pure act, or are produced by the outward acts of the essence, that is to say, the created effects which have the essence for their cause—creatures, in other words. The adversaries of S. Gregory Palamas recognized the divine essence, they recognizes also its created effects; but they did not recognize the divine operations or energies. [Vladamir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Creswtood NY: St Vladamir's Seminary Press, 1957), 76-7]

In his time, Gregory Palamas was charged by followers of Thomas Aquinas to be a ditheist or polytheist due to his belief in the essence- energies distinction. In 2021, those who do not follow Thomas Aquinas are likewise charged by Matthew Barrett to deny the simplicity of God. Matthew Barrett is the modern day Barlaam and Akindynus, attacking Christians with charges and arguments based upon the faulty philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.

Book Review of Simply Trinity by Matthew Barrett

Chapter 8 of Matthew Barrett's book is where he goes after the teaching of EFS (Eternal Functional Submission). How is the book Simply Trinity in general? There are positive things to note for sure, but there are also problems, in fact many problems with the book. Here is my review of the book. An excerpt:

Christianity believes in a triune God, a God who is both three and one. Most of the earliest controversies in the church have been over the doctrine of God, as pastors and theologians wrestle with the notion that there is one God, yet there are three persons who are God – the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. How that is possible is a serious question since it deals with the object of our worship. If we get the doctrine of God wrong, we are not worshiping the true God but a false idol of our own imagination.

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Contra Barrett on the Issue of EFS

Chapter 8 of Matthew Barrett's book Simply Trinity is where he viciously attacks and misrepresents the doctrine of EFS (Eternal Functional Submission). I have reworked all my responses into a coherent article, which can be read here. Here is an excerpt from the new introduction:

Matthew Barrett, an associate professor at Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, has written a book that claims to be all about a recovery of Nicene Orthodoxy, and in particular the doctrine of simplicity of the Trinity. The blurb at the back calls it a “groundbreaking book,” although how groundbreaking it truly is is a matter up for debate. What it does however is to dig down hard on a strong version of Thomistic Classical Theism, and label all alternatives as doctrines that manipulate the Trinity, “recreating the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in our own image.” ...

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