"Partitive Exegesis"?

"...partitive exegesis: the common patristic stratey of determining whether a biblical passage is speaking of the Son of God in terms of his deity or in terms of his humanity. (Matthew Y. Emerson and Luke Stamps, "On Trinitarian Theological Method," in Keith S. Whitefied, ed., Trinitarian Theology: Theological Models and Doctrinal Application, p. 116)

In the supposed modern retrieval of trinitarian orthodoxy, certain trends in academia has started to make its way into Reformed circles as they lure people to the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas. This supposed ressourcement in part seems to be a re-reading of classical theology using a Thomistic framework, and this fiters into one's hermeneutics and exegesis of the text of Scripture.

As defined by Matthew Emerson and Luke Stamps, "partitive exegesis," a word that was not present during most of Reformed history, is reading Scripture about Jesus Christ, then asking the question, "Is this talking about Jesus in his divine nature, or Jesus in his human nature"? In a certain sense, the question is innocent. After all, if you believe Jesus has two natures: one human and one divine, then certainly when you read for example that Jesus slept, you might want to ask whether this means the divine nature can sleep. But is the question really that innnocent?

Exegesis is the interpretive task whereby the meaning of a text is derived from the text itsef. It is a literary endaevor, as it deals with texts in contexts. In order for an interpretive process to be exegesis, the meaning of the text has to be read out of ("ex-") the text of Scripture. The oppposite of exegesis is eisesegesis, where meaning is read into ("eis-") the text of Scripture. Now, for a long time, the term used to describe Protestant exegesis of Scripture is "Grammatical Historical (G-H) Exegesis," where attention is paid to the grammar and the historical context of any text of Scripture. As God communicates in words through the Word, meaning is seen to be found in the words inspired by God, and G-H exegesis is the highest compliment paid to the primacy of the written word in Scripture. An expansion of G-H exegesis is Redemmptive-Historical (R-H) exegesis, where Reformed exegetes point out the progressive revelation of Scripture, with Scripture interpreting Scripture. All of such progression in one unified Word brings forward God's plan of redemption, the one plan in both the Old as well as the New Testaments. Through exegetes and bibical theologians such as Gehardus Vos and Herman Ridderbos, this canonical reading of Scripture can be indeed seen to emerge organically from Scripture itself. G-H and R-H are not, as some might think, competing methods of interpreting the Scripture. Rather, R-H expands upon the insights of the G-H method, emphasizing that Scripture's way of interpreting itself must be seen and utilized by us as well.

If exegesis is to read meaning from the text of inspired Scripture, then there are limits to what is exegesis and what is not exegesis. It is from the exegesis of Scripture that we arrive at fragments of biblical truth — what the Bible teaches in particular texts. While we acknowledge that God's truth is indeed whole, nevertheless, an examination of the text of Scripture itself does not grant us this whole truth. The discipline of systematic theology therefore is meant to eludicate biblical truths. Systematic theology builds upon the fragments of biblical truth, and seek to systematize them and in so doing smooth out any flaws in our exegeses. Systematic theology is necessary for the Christian to know the unity of God's (ectypal) truths, but it is itself not exegesis. One is not doing exegesis when one is engaged in systematic theology. Rather, one begins with truths arrived at via exegesis, and then synthesize the biblical system of truth, the "pattern of sound words" (2 Tim. 1:13), from them. In order for something to be truly biblical, founded on Scripture, sound exegesis must be at the base of one's systematic theology.

It is on this note that we look at this thing called "partitive exegesis." Does this "exegesis" derives its truths from the text of Scripture? The obvious answer is no. It calls us to ask a question that is not found anywhere in that text. On this answer alone, we must reject its label of being "exegesis." But I have said that the question is "in a sense innocent," haven't I? Yes, when we are trying to synthesize biblical truths into a coherent system. "Partitive exegesis" is therefore not exegesis but theologizing. But, if the question should be asked anyway, why the concern over terminology? The concern comes about because of how easy it is to confuse one's theology with Scripture. If it is seen as exegesis, then one has placed the usage of this "exegesis" beyond criticism. Anyone who criticizes any use of this "partitice exegesis" is seen to be not truly interpreting Scripture, being tarred with the slur "biblicist." But if the issue is over systematic theology, then no view is considered as a "default" view. Contested views have to be argued and debated, where both sides can appeal to Scripture, and Christians have to deliberate over which view is more faithful to Scriipture.

This adoption of "partitive exegesis" is therefore a scourge to the Reformed churches. Even if the views adopted by the promoters of "partitive exegesis" are true, the very concept should be rejected. It is a terrible practice to prejudice your views as the default "biblical" view, and demand that anyone who rejects your view must prove it on your own terms using your own prejudiced method. That is certainly one way to avoid debate, but it is not a way that glorifies God or His truth.

ADD: And just to show why Thomists do not get it, here is a tweet from Joshua Sommers:

Right, but to presuppose the nature of Scripture in reading Scripture is to necessarily presuppose something of the nature of God, since Scripture is what it is in virtue of God. Agreed?

— Josh Sommer (@1689Broadcast) October 29, 2022

Sommers confuses what the Reformed Scholastics term the Principium Cognoscendi (The beginning of knowing) and the Principium Essendi (The beginning of being). No, nobody "presuppose(s) something of the nature of God" when reading Scripture. We know who God is only from what Scripure tells us who He is. To believe something of God not taught by Scripture is called "idolatry."

Flirting with flavors of Nestorianism....

Yet, the same Person of the Son, according to His divine nature, remains omniscient throughout His humiliation and forevermore. And these two natures are simultaneously united in the one Person, the former never becoming the latter, nor the latter becoming the former.

— Josh Sommer (@1689Broadcast) August 27, 2022

Sommer wouldn't know kenitic Christology if it hit him on his head. The idea that you can have a "Son qua God" in the incarnate state is Nestorianism. There is only one person in the incarnate state, not two. https://t.co/CJLVd6EKX3

— puritanreformed (@puritanreformed) August 28, 2022

So you either posit that he loses it, it decreases, or it goes from actuality into potentiality (he stopped using it). All of those things, if true, are unworthy of the deity.

— 𝔍𝔬𝔟 𝔅𝔞𝔠𝔥𝔲𝔰 (@job_bachus) August 29, 2022

The Internet Classical Theists have been focusing their attention on trying to "maximize" the divinity of Christ. It is of course true that Jesus in his incarnate state continue to possess all the attributes of deity, possessing his full divine nature (contra kenoticism). But we know that Jesus did not always "act divine" and therefore in those many times throughout his 33 years on earth, at those instances he had set aside the use of his divine attributes. For example, it is inconceivable for Jesus to "act divine" while dying on the Cross, for immortality is a divine attribute. This idea that Jesus set aside the use of certain divine attributes from time to time during his incarnation is basic evangelical teaching about the incarnation, for if Jesus had it, and it was not expressed, it was not used.

Classical Theists however are not happpy with this teaching. They insist that Jesus as God always have these divine attributes. Most certainly, none of us will disagree with what they say, on the surface. But, at least for one such proponent, he states that for Jesus to not use his divine attributes is to have it go "from actuality into potentiality." I must say that is a very bizzare way of inserting Aristotelian metaphysics into Scripture, as if use or disuse has any correlation with actuality and potentiality in God, noting especially that everyone agrees that the incarnate state is something unique to the Son, not to the entire Godhead. More generally, there is a pushback against any supposed limits on the divine nature. Jesus according to these internet classical theists must express his divine nature all the time, while expressing the human nature also.

All of this comes to a head in the interpretation of Mark 13:32. When Jesus expressed his ignorance of future times, was he doing so out of his human nature? In a sense, everyone agrees that this was done according to the human nature. But the internet classical theists seem to think that Jesus was simultaneously knowing the future times "according to the divinity" even as he denied it in his mouth "according to his humanity." However, if one holds that Jesus is one person, we have a problem. Natures are not persons. Therefore, by definition, natures cannot do, act, or think. So if Jesus "according to his divinity" knows the future times while "according to his humanity" does not know the future times, the natures seem to acquire quasi-personal qualities. One can perhaps claim that Jesus both know and does not know in his one person, that natures do not truly know anything, but unless one is stating that as an indicative of split personality, that is a blatant contradiction. One's mental state cannot be both knowing and not knowing of the same thing at the same time, for such violates the law of non-contradiction.

It is in this light that the classical theists' strong assertions that seem to separate the divine nature and the human nature begin to acquire flavors of Nestorianism. Nestorianism (whether Nestorius actually believed it is irrelevant here) is the teaching that Jesus Christ is two persons: one divine, one human. In Nestorianism, because Jesus is two persons, one can easily do what Josh Sommers has done and clearly demarcate "the Son qua God" and "the Son qua Man." The Nestorian does not have to be concerned if the two natures are doing different things and thinking different thoughts even, for they are two natures of the two persons. This is not to say that the internet classical theists are Nestorians, only that what they are saying seems to be flirting with Nestorianism.

A solution that has been floated is the ideat that Jesus has two minds. But in response, how does that not look like split personality disorder? How do the two minds work together in the one person if they are thinking different things? Lastly, since minds are properties of persons, how does that not ultimately lead back to Nestorianism? I do not believe that this works either, and therefore the internet classical theists seem to be in a pickle: Either they can embrace Nestorianism, or claim paradox in their system without providing an explanation for the paradox. Perhaps there is some other way for them to proceed, but I do not see it.

The Communicatio Idiomatum and the person of Christ

The Communicatio Idiomatum helps inform us how predication works between the two natures of Christ, and the one person of Christ. Every other person has one nature, so there is no precedent for a person having two natures. Jesus Christ is sui generis in this regard. The Reformed version of the Commincatio makes predication in the direction of the natures to the person. What is true of the natures is true of the one person. The Lutheran version on the other hand asserts that there is a sharing between the two natures, thus the humanity of Christ can be ubiquitous allowing for the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation with the body of Christ being 'in, with, and under' the elements of the Lord's Supper.

The Communicatio is by and large a philosophical concept derived from centuries of trying to explain how the God-man. However, it is present in seed form in Acts 20:28, where the Church of God is obtained with God's own blood. But we know God is spirit and has no blood, so the only way to understand this is to predicate the divine nature here as true of the one person. Along this line, Jesus is both mutable and immutable, both passible and impassible, both glorious forever, and yet not glorious during His incarnation.

As what is true of the natures is predicated of the one person, it is clear that we can say things about the one person of Christ that we cannot say of God. Jesus hungered, Jesus thirst, Jesus prayed to the Father. While it is in the human nature that at least the first two is true, it is also true that it is the one person who did this. It is contrary to Reformed orthodoxy, and contrary to common sense, to claim that the human nature has agency to so something which the one person does not. In fact, it is fundamentally Nestorian to assert that the human nature has an agency that the "one person" does not, because it means that the human nature is a separate human person. This makes Jesus into two persons: one divine, one human, and that is contrary to Chalcedonian orthodoxy.

Classical Theists are more than welcome to argue for their case. However, being over-zealous to the point of rejecting Chalcedon certainly shows the inbalance on the side of many of these new Thomists. Put is simply, it is never right to be more Thomstic than Thomas, and more "orthodox" than Chalcedon. The minute you ascribe agency to the human nature that is not that of the one person, you have lost it, period.

Richard Muller on Communicatio Idiomatum

Communicatio idiomatum/ communicatio proprietatum: communication of proper qualities; a term used in Christology to describe the way in which the properties, or idiomata, of each nature are communicated to or interchanged in the unity of the person. The communicatio can be characterized as either in concreto or in abstracto (q.v.). The former qualification, in concreto, refers to the concretion of Christ’s person in the incarnation and personal union; the two natures are here considered as joined in the person, and the interchange of attributes is understood as taking place at the level of the person and not between the natures. This view was typical of the Antiochene Christology and of the Reformed Christology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The latter qualification, in abstracto, refers to the abstractive consideration of the relation of the two natures to each other distinct from their union in the person and to the exchange of properties between the natures, specifically, a communication of divine properties to the human nature.This view was typical of Alexandrian and Cappadocian Christology in the early church. Both views raise doctrinal problems: the Antiochene position, taken to an extreme by Nestorius, threatens the unity of Christ’s person; the Alexandrian doctrine, taken to an extreme by Eutyches, threatens the integrity of the natures. In addition, the logic of predication argues the illegitimacy of the use of abstractions as predicates. …

… (1) The genus idiomaticum, or idiomatic genus, indicates the predication of the qualities or attributes of both natures of the person of the Mediator, so that the God-man can be said, as one person, to suffer and die but also to govern and sustain the whole creation. The qualities of each nature (idiomata) belong to the person of Christ, but each nature retains its own idiomata, so that the qualities of one nature do not, according to the genus idiomaticum, become the qualities of the other. …

… we note that the Reformed view of the communicatio, which tend to be restricted to the genus idiomaticum, approaches the communication more as a praedicatio verbalis, or verbal predication, of idiomata from both natures of the person, whereas the Lutheran view insists that the person actually bears the idiomata of both natures. The Reformed, in addition, do not view the apostelesmata, or shared operations, of the natures as a genus of the communicatio idiomatum but as a separate communicatio apostelesmatum according to which the divine operations of both natures are brought to completion in the one work of Christ. Thus, the Lutheran teaching is a real communicatio while the Reformed, remaining at the level of a communicatio in concreto only, is quite accurately called antidosis onomatōn (ἀντίδοσις ὀνομάτων), a mutual interchange or reciprocation of names, rather than a transfer or communication of properties, … is… praedicatio vera, a true predication of attributes, but of the person only and not between the natures.

[Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1985), 72-4]

What is a "person"?

When you think about the word "person," what do you think it means? For us, it could refer to an individual human being whom we can see, touch, and converse. Legally, a "person" might be something that can be construed to act like one party, or it could mean someone who has "inalienable rights." So we can define a "person" as something akin to an individuated thing, something that is or is treated as a single entity.

When we deal with theological parlance, we need to extremely careful since the same word might have a different meaning from our current modern understanding. Furthermore, especially when dealing with the doctrine of God, we are dealing with the most sacred mystery and our language about God is indeed analogy. But in order for analogy to be a real analogy and not equivocity, there must be some correspondence between the word used and the actual reality. When we use the word "person" therefore as a depiction of the three in the Trinity, what are we saying? We cannot say each person is a separate single entity for example. But we also cannot say that the distinctions between the person of the Father and the person of the Son has absolutely zero correspondence to the distinction between me the author and you the reader.

So how we are to understand what a "person" means in theological parlance? We understand what a "person" means by looking at how the Father relates to the Son and to the Spirit, each of the persons to the other. So what do we see? We see the Son converse with the Father, the Son covenanting with the Father, and the Spirit working out the will of the Father and the Son. But they are all one God! So what in their actions in Scripture distinguishes them? They relate as one (the Father) to the other (the Son). In other words, they are different persons because they relate and communicate to each other differently. So how should we define "person" when we talk about the Godhead? From how Scripture portray the persons, we must say that a "person" should be defined as an individuation who relates and communicates with another.

If "an individuation of relations and communications" defines a "person" in the Godhead, then it stands to reason that each must have his own distinct will, for otherwise how can one communicate to the other? But since there is only one God and one essence, there is one will. Therefore, God has one will and three subsistent wills. And just as there is the Father, the Son and the Spirit, but one God, so there is the will of the Father, the will of the Son, the will of the Spirit, but one will.

This definition of "person" seems to me most productive, for it also works concerning the person of Christ. Since "person" is defined as an individuation of relation and communication, therefore Christ is one person, but with two wills. Christ is one person because the human will and the divine will are unified and do not contradict each other; they work in tandem. We cannot say that there is a mixed will, for a mixed will (mixture of human and divine willing) is neither human nor divine. But we can say the two wills are intertwined so tightly they function like one, and therefore Christ is one person.

It is in my opinion that the debate over the one will of God needs to deal with the issue of what a "person" is. Until those who focus on the one will of God can define a "person" in such a way that can satisfy the biblical data, I'm afraid what they are promoting sounds like modalism to me.

NT Wright wrong on the person and work of Christ?

Is NT Wright right on the person and work of Christ? While he strongly defends the resurrection, there may be more to Wright's Christology than meets the eye, as Rachel Miller muses.