Adult Catechism series on the Heidelberg Catechism (in Chinese)

In my current church, I have been teaching Adult classes (in Chinese) on the Heidelberg Catechism. As Reformation Day 2026 has passed, and with a substantial number of lessons done, I have decided it is a good time to share it. You can find the lessons here.

Original sin and imputed guilt

In the book edited by Michael Allen and Scott R. Swain, Christian Dogmatics, an author Oliver D. Crisp wrote the chapter on the topic of sin. In his chapter, he defended what he took to be a "Zwinglian" model of original sin. As opposed to the federal model of the transmission of sin, Crisp took the realist model, which Zwingli supposedly taught, that sin is transmitted by a real union between Adam and his progeny (p. 216). Needless to say, such a model would require holding to traducianism, the belief that the souls of human beings are transmitted to their descendants, in order for it to work. Without dealing with traducianism here, let us look at Crisp's objections to the federal model of the transmission of sin, that sin is transmitted to all humans because of covenantal identification with Adam, and answer them.

Crisp raised three distinct objections to the federal model of the transmission of sin. First, the "arbitrary divine will objection" states that the act of God in ordaining that original sin is transmitted is unfair and arbitrary. Second, the "authorization objection," which states that Adam's progeny did not authorize Adam to be their representative. Third, the "fiction objection," that the imputation of sin to Adam's progeny because of federal identification is a moral and legal fiction. Due to these three objections, which Crisp deemed insurmountable. Crisp rejected the federal model for a realist model of the transmission of sin.

In response to the first objection, the answer is that God is sovereign and this is how the world he had created is. The objection is basically reduced to "Why did God make the world in such and such a way?." Why did God make the world such that Adam sinned in the first place? Why did God make the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil? This objection fails because the whole idea of God being God is that He is God and we are not. God does all things according to His good pleasure, and there is simply no reason or right why He must explain anything to us.

The second objection is similar to the first, and the answer is similar to the first answer. Who authorized Adam to be our federal head? Well, God did! When you were a little child, who authorized your parents to sign as a parent on your behalf for camps and other activities? Did you as a three year old authorize your parents to be your parents? Or how about nations and war? If a country goes to war, which individual citizen authorized the war? What if the citizen does not want to fight in the war when mandatory draft is instituted?

Therefore, the second objection fails as well. Such an objection smacks of radical individualism, and fail to recognize the corporate nature of human societies. It is true that we did not authorize Adam and Eve to be our head in the first test of the Covenant of Works, but who is better to face such a test? It almost seem like the objectors think that they, as fallen creatures, would easily pass the test that our sinless parents failed, an exercise in hubris.

The last is essentially the same objection as the argument against justification by faith alone, which has also been called a "legal fiction." But that is to ignore that the imputing of Adam's guilt actually changes something, i.e. that all Man are sinful from birth. It is not a "legal fiction" because the imputation of Adam's guilt actually make fallen men sinners, just as the imputation of Christ's righteousness actually make believers righteous in the eyes of God. If imputation of sin is unfair, then so is imputation of Christ's righteousness to us. Grace is "unfair," but few seems to be complaining about that! The "legal fiction" objection is therefore void, and the federalist model stands.

The first man Adam sinned, and this sin is imputed to his posterity by virtue of federal headship. But we can thank God, for in the "unfairness" of this system is the exact same federal system that brings us God's grace in the person and work of our Lord Jesus Christ. Salvation is free, and all of grace, to set us free from our bondage to sin and give us eternal life.

Turretin on Natural Law

VI. But the orthodox speak far differently. They affirm that there is a natural law, not arising from a voluntary contract or law of society, but from a divine obligation being impressed by God upon the conscience of man in his very creation, on which the difference between right and wrong is founded and which contains the practical principles of immovable truth (such as: “God should be worshiped,” “parents honored,” “we should live virtuously,” “injure no one,” “do to others what we would wish them to do to us” and the like). Also that so many remains and evidences of this law are still left in our nature (although it has been in different ways corrupted and obscured by sin) that there is no mortal who cannot feel its force either more or less. Now they wish this law to be called natural, not because it has its origin from bare nature (since it depends upon God the supreme lawgiver), but because it becomes known from the aspect of creatures and the relation of man to God, and the knowledge of it is impressed upon the mind by nature, not acquired by tradition or instruction. [Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 2.11.I.7]

VIII. Thus the origin and foundation of this law ought not to be sought (as the Jews falsely seek it) from “the seven precepts” which they maintain were given to Adam and Noah …

IX. But it must be drawn from the right of nature itself, founded both on the nature of God, the Creator (who by his holiness must prescribe to his creatures the duties founded upon that right), and on the condition of rational creatures themselves (who, on account of their necessary dependence upon God in the genus of morals, no less than in the genus of being, are bound to perform or avoid those things which sound reason and the dictates of conscience enjoin upon them to do or avoid)

X. The right of nature … strictly and properly for that which has reference only to rational creatures. The lawyers include this under the laws of nations. It is rightly described by common practical notions, or the light and dictation of conscience ..[Ibid., 2.11.I.8-10]

XXII. If it is asked how this natural law agrees with or differs from the moral law, the answer is easy. It agrees as to substance and with regard to principles, but differs as to accidents and with regard to conclusions. … [Ibid., 2.11.I.22]

Looks like Turretin is far from a Neo-Kuyperian on the issue of natural law.

Warfield on Truth and Propositions

There are many theologians to whom truth in propositional form is in like manner distasteful, and half, or all, its life seems dissipated, for the same reason—because they too are afflicted with a "lamentable and constitutional inaccuracy." No wonder that upon such minds exact statement seems to act like an irritant, and theology appears to be an enemy of religion. ... Men who have no faculty for truth will always consider an appeal to truth an evil. [B.B. Warfield, "The Right of Systematic Theology", in Selected Shorter Writings, 2:230]

Bavinck, historical theology and natural theology

[On the supposed inability of the Reformers to transcend the medieval natural/ supernatural dichotomy concerning revelation] As a result, reason again achieved some measure of authority alongside of faith. It seemed reason did not always have to be guided by faith and was in fact, be it in an ever so small and indifferent area of life, free and independent. With this right being granted to it—at least not seriously contested—reason turned to its own advantage and gradually expanded its domain. First in civil matters, then in science, soon also in philosophy reason elevated itself to a position alongside of and over against faith. Alsted, who published an independent "natural theology" ... Many Reformed theologians followed suit, especially when Cartesian philosophy gained more influence.

As a result of English deism and German rationalism, "natural" or "rational" theology so increased in power and prestige that it rejected revealed religion as totally unnecessary. ... But after it had banished revealed theology, natural theology was itself judged in turn. [Immanuel] Kant asserted in his Critique of Pure Reason that the latter is restricted to phenomena of sense perception and can neither penetrate to the supersensible nor to the supernatural. ... [Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:306]

It seems that Herman Bavinck is asserting that the focus on natural theology (as opposed to a supernatural theology of nature) leads one to (capital "r") Rationalism and the destruction of the faith.

Common grace and ultimate ends

One of the polemical arguments by the PRCA crowd against the doctrine of Common Grace is that, since all things work together for the damnation of the reprobate since they wickedly abuse without thanksgiving the gifts of God in this world, therefore whatever good things given to them will result in their damnation. Therefore, if the ultimate end is damnation, how can we say that whatever God gives is indeed gracious, since damnation is certainly not gracious?

The problem with this argument is that it confuses ultimate ends with penultimate goals. What do I mean by this? Let's take the issue of evil for example. The Bible clearly teaches that God is sovereign over evil. All things work together for the good of those who love God (Rom. 8:28). That means evil in the ultimate scheme of things is "good," in the sense that it results in the good of God's people. But do we therefore say that evil is good simpliciter? NO! Evil is evil. When someone does a wicked deed, that deed is indeed evil. God meant it ultimately for good for the elect, true, but that doesn't diminish its wickedness. So here we see that evil is penultimately evil, even though God intends it ultimately for our good.

Likewise in the issue of common grace, what the orthodox version of the doctrine of common grace (there might be other versions of "common grace" that I think are unbiblical) states is that God's kindness is indeed genuine, in the same way as evil is indeed evil even when God meant it for good. God's kindness is genuine even though ultimately the abuse of God's gifts will result in greater damnation. It is a genuine kindness, in the penultimate this-worldly sense. It is God's universal benevolence from His status as the Creator, and manifests His goodness to all He has made.

On John Henry Newman and doctrine and development

This process, whether it be longer or shorter in point of time, by which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form, I call its development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a large mental field. On the other hand this process will not be a development, unless the assemblage of aspects, which constitute its ultimate shape, really belongs to the idea from which they start. [John Henry Cardinal Newman, Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 29]

But the whole Bible, not its prophetical portions only, is written on the principle of development. As the Revelation proceeds, it is ever new, yet ever old. St. John, who completes it, declares that he writes no "new commandments unto his brethren," but an old commandment which they "had from the beginning" And then he adds, "A new commandments I write unto you." The same test of development is suggested in our Lord's words on the Mount, as has already been noticed, "Think not that I am come to destroy the Law and the Prophets; I am come to destroy, but to fulfill." He does not reverse, but perfect, what has gone before. ... If then the prophetic sentences have had that development which has really been given them, first by succeeding revelations, and then by the event, it is probably antecedently that those those doctrinal, political, ritual, and ethical sentences, which have the same structure, should admit the same expansion. Such are, "This is My Body," or "Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build My Church," or "The meek shall inherit the earth," and "Suffer little children to come unto Me," or "The pure in heart shall see God." (Ibid., pp. 48-9)

John Henry Newman is perhaps the most famous person associated with the the 19th century Oxford Movement or Tractarianisn, its adherents also known as Pusseyites after its prominent member Edward Bouverie Pussey. As a reaction to Enlightenment changes and the growing pluralism in Britain, the Oxford Movement began as an attempt to reform the Church of England and England itself along apostolic lines, and it ended with the conversion of Newman into Roman Catholicism and the creation of the Anglo-Catholic party within the Church of England.

The Oxford Movement stands at the cusp of Modernity. Even as it reacted against certain aspects of Modernity, it also assimilated other aspects of Modernity in it, since Modernity is the air in which Europeans of that time breathed. The reason for my interest in this movement is that of the issue of adaptation to change. How do people react to change when it arrives? If we as Reformed (and small "e" evangelical) reject the Solo Scriptura of Primitivism, then we need to look at past conflicts and how different peoples have struggled with the issue of change, even Liberals who did not begin with the intention to destroy Christianity but had desired to "save" it.

Liberalism or Progressivism destroys the Christian faith. On the opposite extreme are the Restorationists or Primitivists who want to go back to the "pure" times of the early Church, as if that were possible! As the book The American Quest for the Primitive Church, edited by Richard Hughes, shows, the restorationist/ primitivist ideal is an illusion since every single restorationist movement tend to baptize certain aspects of their times as being true to the early church, when they are probably not. In our times, we see this in the "Organic Church" of Frank Viola which baptized anti-institutionalism and communitarianism as being part of the "early Church." Every restorationist movement disagrees with the next one, and so we see that positing some form of eternalism is flawed. So on the one hand it seems, eternalism is unworkable. On the other hand, the idea of development as posited by Liberalism is not where we want to go, for a "development" that results in a denial of the Faith is not Christian.

Newman, besides his controversial Tract 90 on the topic of Justification, wrote and published a treatise on the development of dogma, which I have just read. However we might disagree with Newman, his arguments warrant examination, and it is this idea of development that I would like to look at. Of course, it is to be noted here that Newman's idea of development seemed to be codified in some form in Vatican II, which means that it is certainly relevant for interacting with contemporary Roman Catholicism as well.

Before Newman, there wasn't much thought within Christendom and Roman Catholicism concerning the philosophy of time and history. Tradition in Tridentine Roman Catholicism was accepted on the partim-partim model (Part of revelation is in the Scriptures, another part of it is in Sacred Tradition). Newman however proposed a different way of looking at doctrines. Scripture and Tradition are like the seed and the tree. Scripture provides the source material (seed), which is then developed into various dogmas by the [Roman Catholic] Church. Tradition is the artifact of history, an artifact of the progress of time as Christian doctrine develops. Thus, one does not have to find any particular doctrine in Scripture. Rather, according to Newman, one merely has to prove that this doctrine can be derived from a teaching found in Scripture. Therefore along this train of thought, the need for continual repentance of sin is the seed for the doctrine of penance, and the doctrine of transubstantiation is found in seed form in the doctrine of Christ's presence in the Supper.

Newman argued for the principle of development by appeal to the progressive nature of revelation in the Scriptures themselves. Now, it is certainly to be admitted that there is a progression in revelation within the pages of Scripture. But agreeing with a progression of redemptive revelation is far from agreeing with Newman's theory of doctrinal development. Scripture according to its own witness is a close canon. As Hebrew 1:1 states, the finality of revelation is in Christ, and thus in the Scriptures as the Logos Engraphon (Inscripturated Word) which corresponds to the Logos Ensarkos (Incarnate Word). Viewed canonically, the closing words of Revelations 22:18-9 wraps up the Scriptures as a whole. The Canon of Scripture is closed; there is to be neither addition nor subtraction from it. Since it is closed, revelation has been completed in the 66 books of the Bible. The progression of revelation therefore is limited to the main theater of redemptive-history, not after it. Revelation is complete, the Canon is closed, and therefore appeal to the progressive nature of revelation WITHIN redemptive history proves nothing whatsoever regarding whether there is any kind of development of doctrine within the history of the Church. In point of fact, the finality of revelation and the Canon is prima facie proof that Newman is wrong.

That said, we should acknowledge some form of development, but it is a development in understanding rather than a development of doctrines. The Church grows in her understanding of the Truth. In this light, there is similarity between Newman and what seems to be the right view in our understanding of how the Church grows in understanding the truth, at least as it pertains to the development of Trinitarian thought. The difference, and the key difference, is that for us, we have a fixed deposit of doctrine, whereas for Newman, since development pertains to doctrines themselves he argued for fixed principles rather than fixed doctrines. For us, the Trinity is something implied in Scripture; for Newman, the Trinity is the developed doctrine from facts and principles in Scripture.

The divergence is only made evident when we move from the Trinitarian controversies into the Medieval and later periods. Here, the Protestant argument is that there was a departure from the Faith by segments within the Medieval Church, while Newman of course denied such a departure. We claim evidence for the departure based upon appeal to Scripture, and it is in Newman's response to the Protestant stance that we see the major problem with his view.

The Protestant's development of understanding compared with Newman's development of doctrine look very similar on the surface in its reaction to changes in the early church, but once we reach the Medieval period where we throw allegations of corruption, the difference are revealed. Newman in response to this posits seven notes to differentiate legitimate development from corruption. First, there is the preservation of type. Second, there is a continuity of principles. Third, developments have the power of assimilation of opposing ideas, while corruptions decay and disappear. Fourth, it flows from the previous thought through logical sequence. Fifth, the previous thought anticipates its future development. Sixth, the development has a conservative action upon its past. Seventh, developments have chronic vigor which is to say that it persists through time. (Ibid., pp. 124-148).

All of these sound reasonable on the surface, but do they actually work? We note here in passing that these notes are not arrived from a study of Scripture but rather through reason. Newman it seems loves [the philosopher Joseph] Butler's analogies, and he arrives at these notes through the use of analogies. We note here the first note: preservation of type. Now, how does one even know whether the "type" has been preserved? It seems here that Newman is rationalistically categorizing the type of both the previous and the "developed" iteration of Christian doctrine, and thus by virtue of casting the categories, he can prove or disprove as he wishes what a "preservation of type" looks like. For example, he castigates Calvinism as being of the principle of Private Judgment, and thus Unitarianism is its proper development (Ibid., pp. 126, 130), a charge which is simply laughable. Now just because Newman cannot understand and misrepresents the principle of Sola Scriptura, as if every person's autonomous reading of the Scriptures is key, should not give him the right to misrepresent Calvinism. Sola Scriptura means that Scripture is supreme in its authority, not that every man can come up with his own interpretation as he wishes. In the case of the supposed "preservation of type" from Calvinism to Unitarianism therefore, we see how this first note is basically a self-serving device since the categorization of types is arbitrary and can prove just about any relation between anything that has some resemblance to each other.

The same criticism can be leveled at the second note of "continuity of principles." We should reject any "criterion" of development where the enemy basically smuggles their own categories as if they were brute facts. Here, we reject also the fifth note of anticipation of its future, since how one determines "anticipation" is clearly subjective. Thus, Protestantism using the note of "anticipation" can claim similarly to be the development of the early church.

The third note of assimilation is laughable, because when one worldview assimilates others it is clearly syncretism, not true development. This feeds into the seventh note of chronic vigor, since whether one worldview dominate has more to do with the political-social climate than with spirituality It is a strange reading of providence indeed when one thinks the truth depends on the actions of humans. Furthermore, practically how does one differentiate between different religions, different sects, which have "chronic vigor." Surely Newman and Roman Catholicism wouldn't countenance Eastern Orthodox as a development based upon their "chronic vigor" despite harsh persecution by Islam.

The fourth note of logical sequence seems valid in the sense that what validly follows from the premises partake of the truth value(s) of the premises. However, it is one thing to state logical sequences, another to prove it. When we look at what Newman means by "logical sequence," we note that it has little to do with the actual process of logical reasoning and instead of any form of reasoning both deduction and induction, and what to him seems logical. It is for example illogical to argue for purgatory from Scripture, but for Newman he thinks that is logical. It is of course too much to expect an actual logical proof from Newman in such a brief section, yet its brevity shows that the idea of "logical sequence" has little to do with actual logic and more to do with the mere act of reasoning per se.

Last but not least, the sixth note on conservative action upon its past sounds laudable, except that the past itself is subject to reinterpretation in Roman Catholicism. Thus, we have the idea that Peter is the first pope of Rome, even though we have no record of Peter ministering in Rome. And just what kind of "conservative action" upon its past is this when Rome sided with the innovative Jesuits against the French Jansenists who were following the teaching of Augustine concerning grace? The fact of the matter is that Rome spins the past, then claims that her version of the past shows that she is conservative and in continuity with her past. So this note is unworkable since Rome reorders the pieces to suit her.

But let us just use the "notes" advocated by Newman for the sake of argument. How does Rome reconcile the "conservative action upon its past" note from Vatican I to Vatican II. How does one accept as truth the statements against Modernism and Socialism hurled by Pope Pius IX in the Syllabus of Errors, and the teachings of Roman Catholicism at Vatican II and beyond? How does one reconcile the idea that there is no salvation outside the Roman Church and that heretics and infidels will go to hell promulgated at the Council of Florence, with Vatican II's teaching of Jews and Muslims being in the plan of salvation and that Protestants are no more heretics but "separated brethren"? Whither these changes? Inclusivism is overwhelmingly rejected by Rome and Protestants and Christianity down through the ages, except for Origen whose views were condemned as heresy, so upon what basis can Vatican II's changes be seen as a "development" in light of Newman's notes?

Now, most of the changes postdate Newman, so Newman cannot be held accountable for that. But these should show that contemporary Rome cannot claim real development of Christian doctrine if Newman's seven notes are consistently applied.

The progress of time and change is something of importance. Despite his many errors, Newman is probably the first one to wrestle with the issue of change, at least on the Roman Catholic side. His work on the topic therefore is interesting and could help us know how better to interact with time and deal with changes in society when they come

What is heresy?

The term "heresy" is seen in our times as an odious term, a term of bigotry and intolerance. Even in professing Christian circles, some like Alister McGrath see the term as limited in scope referring to errors concerning certain views of God and Christ in the early church which were declared "heretical" in church councils. In other words, "heresy" is a formal term; an ecclesiastical term. Under such a definition, only errors like Sabellianism or Monophysitism are considered heresies. Other errors like Socinianism and Liberalism are presumably not "heresies" since no ecumenical council has ever declared them heresies.

I am strongly against such a historical definition of heresy. Of course, such a definition is "helpful" in the sense that it makes the category of "heresy" easier to manage, and is congruent with the ecumenical spirit of the age. But it also relegates "heresy" as a past historical artifact, something which was historically decided and of which the present church has nothing to add. The question then is: What has changed from the past to the present? Did the church change such that she could declare certain false teachings as heresies in the past, whereas she somehow loses the authority and power to do so today? What exactly has changed?

Furthermore, the implications of making "heresy" merely an ecclesiastical term lead us to some rather strange conclusions. Prior to Nicea, were the Arians orthodox and non-heretical, since the Council of Nicea (325AD) has not yet commenced? If the claim is made that "heresy" is an ecclesiastical term, then the answer given should logically be yes. Such a view should entertain the strange notion that the Arians were orthodox before the Council of Nicea, and heretics after the Council. In other words, their statuses were changed at the council itself. And since heretics cannot be saved, does that mean that an Arian dying before the convening of the Council could expect to go to heaven, while an Arian dying after the conclusion of the Council could expect an eternity in hell?

These are the strange conclusions that those who advocate for defining "heresy" as a historical and ecclesiastical term should embrace. I guess they could choose to bite the bullet, but it seems to me such strange conclusions is an indication that defining "heresy" so narrowly is wrong.

If instead we define "heresy" as serious doctrinal errors that imperil the salvation of those who believe it, then it seems that we have a definition that does not leave us with such strange conclusions. Of course, that means that defining what is and what isn't heresy is going to be a messy business, but I think that such messiness is preferable to the strange conclusions that follow from using the formal, ecclesiastical definition.

Stellman and the failure to distinguish terms

I have come to understand the gospel in terms of the New Covenant gift of the Spirit, procured through the sacrifice and resurrection of Christ, who causes fruit to be borne in our lives by reproducing the image of the Son in the adopted children of the Father - Jason Stellman [Source]

Stellman's apostasy from the Faith has been saddening. In this quote, one sees the failure to properly distinguish terms and the different stages of redemption.

The Holy Spirit does give us the "New Covenant gift of the Spirit" and so on. But the fruits of the Gospel is not the same as the Gospel itself. Stellman does not seem to be properly distinguishing terms and concepts, but just mix everything into one big blur.

Terms are important in theological discussions. For example, Christians have always believed in salvation by works — Christ's work, not ours. Our Spirit-wrought works are a posteriori evidence of faith, and therefore it can be said that it is a posteriori necessary for salvation, while for Romanists Spirit-wrought works are co-terminus with grace unto salvation. The usage of terms and the order of the stages of salvation make all the difference between orthodoxy and heresy.

It is not enough for Stellman to say that the Gospel includes all these spiritual things which he mentioned. Stellman has to show that this constitute the crux of the Gospel and not the fruit of the Gospel. If Stellman merely shows that the Gospel message includes all these in the text of Scripture, it would only go to show that he continues to fail to properly distinguish terms.

The issue of hell and eternal punishment

Over at the Cripplegate, Jesse Johnson reviews the impact of Rob Bell's heretical book Love Wins, one year on. Johnson makes some interesting points. What I would like to focus on here, however, is his claims on the issue of hell as follows:

If sound and biblical thinkers could be persuaded out of believing in hell, they would abandon the doctrine. Most people who hold to the doctrine do so not because they want to, but they have simply been overwhelmed by the biblical evidence. For me at least, this is how my thoughts go: “I don’t want to believe in hell, and I can’t imagine the horrors of it, and I can’t imagine how and why it would endure forever and ever, but the Bible is so clear that this is the case, and I am bound to believe what the Scripture teaches.”

Johnson's reasoning is true as far as it goes. However, I would like us to consider one very much omitted aspect to the entire doctrine.

Most of the time, discussion on hell hovers around the aspect of God's love and the necessity of the fulfillment of divine justice. But should we not consider another aspect, the wickedness of Man deserving justice?

God's justice is no mere abstract principle. Damnation is God's rightful and just response to wickedness. God is not merely someone who reluctantly just *has* to send people to hell because they have *unfortunately* broken God's law and thus justice must be served. No, Man fully deserve damnation. Wickedness is absolutely abhorrent to God, and wicked men are an abomination to God.

We shudder at the thought of eternal punishment, and to some extent we should. But do we likewise shudder at the wickedness of sin? Do we recognize how abominable wickedness is to God and thus God relishes to get rid of the sinners who are in their sins? Just as those in pain relish to remove the source of their pain, so likewise God relishes to remove sinners in their sins from His presence. Do we recognize how disgusting all mankind is, apart from Christ, to God?

If we cannot grasp this essential aspect of the faith, we will always struggle to make sense of hell. And without it, we do not understand why God seem to be so "cruel," and our foundation for a belief in hell will always be shaky.

Theonomy, Reconstructionism and Dominionism

What is the relation between Reconstructionism, Theonomy and Dominionism? It depends on who you ask. According to Marcus Pittman, Reconstructionism is not the same as what he calls "Seven Mountain Dominionism," which is basically the Dominionist position of the NAR.

I have not much interest in the entire Reconstructionist issue, except to say that one must accurately represent the other position and not conflate the two. The two positions are not the same although they are very similar in form.

A critique of Van Til's analogy of the fallen mind

[Because of the Fall] The intellect of fallen man may, as such, be keen enough. It can therefore formally understand the Christian position. It may be compared to a buzz-saw that is sharp and shining, ready to cut the boards that come to it. Let us saw that a carpenter wishes to cut fifty boards for the purpose of laying the floor of a house. He has marked his boards. He has set his saw. He beings at one end of the mark on the board. But he does not know that his seven-year old son has tampered with the saw and changed its set. The result is that every board he saws is cut slantwise and thus unusable because [the board is] too short except at the point where the saw first made its contact with the wood. As long as the set of the saw is not changed, the result will always be the same.

— Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 4th Ed. (ed. by K. Scott Oliphant; Philipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 97

In this interesting book, Cornelius Van Til came up with an analogy to describe what he thinks is the Reformed view of the noetic effects of sin. Van Til's point that he is trying to prove here is that sin affects the intellect, and therefore unregenerate men cannot reason alright of the things of God. In this light, Van Til and his supporters critique Gordon Clark as being a "rationalist" because Clark believes that the thinking apparatus is not affected by the fall.

With this in mind, let us analyze this analogy. We note here that the carpenter in Van Til's analogy has a nice working saw, which is analogous to reason. However, his saw has been tampered with, so that he cannot cut the boards alright. This is supposed to be analogous to the Fall causing Man's reason to be defective so he cannot properly reason. Man's reason is therefore still working but fundamentally defective because of Man's fall into sin.

We note however that in this analogy, the carpenter tries to cut the board correctly. The problem is in his tampered saw which is not working as it should. The carpenter it seems genuinely attempts to cut straight boards, but his task is forever doomed to failure because of his defective instrument.

Translated into the picture of Man and reason, this is analogous to fallen Man being genuinely desirous to know God, but his reason is defective thus he cannot do so no matter how much he desires it.

Is this the picture of Man that we want to have? Scripture is clear that the problem with Man is ethical, something which Van Til did agree with in principle. If the problem with Man is ethical, then the inability of Man to know God is not because he is trying to know God and fails to do so because of his defective reason, but because Man does not want to know God and tries as much as possible to excise God from his world. It is therefore Man who uses his intellect to reject God, not that his defective intellect is trying to do the impossible task of knowing God.

Van Til's analogy is severely defective, and does not express the Reformed and biblical view of the effects of sin on Man. To think of reason as being a good saw with a defective set is to make the effect of the Fall in reason an intellectual defect; an ontological defect of reason.

If we believe that the Fall affected Man's reason ethically and not ontologically, then we must insist, using the same analogy, that the saw and its set are fine. The problem lies with the carpenter not his tools. The carpenter is in rebellion against his boss who has called upon him to cut wood boards in a certain way. The carpenter therefore [willingly] alters the set or just cut the wood boards any way he wants, so that the cut boards are not what they were supposed to be.

So deep is Man's rebellion against God from the time of conception that such rebellion may be done even at the subconscious level. Thus, Man may be deluded by his own intellect to believe he is "merely following the evidences" and therefore seen to be someone who objectively rejects God because his intellect has "deduced" that the Christian God does not exist. God and His truths are rejected a priori and then the unregenerate man's sharp intellect is left to figure out a working system that seems at least on the surface to be logical and consistent.

Van Til's analogy of the fallen mind is therefore flawed. Upon such flawed analogies, Van Til and his followers have attacked the teachings of Clark on this and other subjects. The reason of Man however is not ontologically flawed in unregenerate Man. Rather, the noetic effects of the Fall refer to the usage of reason contrary to its intended goal of receiving the revelation of God. There is nothing ontologically wrong with reason per se, and we should in this light reject Van Til's analogy of the fallen mind and the novel teaching behind it.

Of course, it may be asked, didn't Van Til say explicitly that the effect of the Fall on reason is ethical? Indeed, he did. But the issue is not whether Van Til said it, but whether his more detailed teaching on the topic supports his profession that the effects of the Fall pertain to the ethical aspect only. To attempt to hold to two contradictory position is impossible, yet Van Til it seems has no problems with believing in two contradictory things.

VFT Book Review: Magnifying God in Christ by Thomas Schreiner

One of the interesting things that WSCal seminary students can do is to write book reviews for our seminary blog. It seems that in the heat of flying back to Singapore I missed out one of the book reviews which I have done and was posted sometime back - on June 7th. Without further to do, here is the link to my review of Thomas R. Schreiner's book Magnifying God in Christ: A Summary of New Testament Theology, here.

An excerpt:

The book by Thomas Schreiner, Magnifying God in Christ: A Summary of New Testament Theology, is Schreiner’s summary of his earlier nine hundred page work of the same title, published in 2008. The book takes a panoramic look at the entire New Testament (NT) and seeks to cover various major themes taught in the text of the NT, and in so doing helps the reader come to know and understand the New Testament better.

[more]

James White on Rob Bell's Nooma 15

Dr. James White with a rebuttal of Rob Bell's teaching on Mithra and Attis

Debate: Does Rom. 11 promise the salvation of ethnic Israel?

WestCal students Nathanael Taylor and Ben Rochester had engaged in an interesting debate regarding the future of ethnic Israel as seen in Rom. 11:25-26. Nate argues that Rom. 11:25-26 teaches a future salvation for ethnic Israel, while Ben denies that there is such a future salvation promised in Rom. 11. The debate is recorded in the following audio files (unfortunately not fully captured):

• Part 1: Debate (73min, 12.5MB)
• Part 2: Q&A (29min, 5.0MB

Here is the introduction by the moderator:

Welcome to Hoagies & Stogies; or for all you regulars, welcome back. Since the last two events were Open Mic Night, and the one-man interview with David Zadok about Israel, it’s been Nine Long Months since we had an actual two-man debate according to our typical format. So again, to all of you I say Welcome Back.

Tonight’s topic is the hotly-contested passage of Rom 11:25-26: “a partial hardening has come upon Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles has come in. And in this way all Israel will be saved.” In the most straightforward reading (at least of this English translation–the ESV) it would seem that God has yet a future for the nation of Israel; and yet this is a difficult concept to reconcile with, say, the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple in A.D. 70, and the entire book of Hebrews.

In the history of H&S, we’ve had a wide variety of speakers; ranging from pastors to professors to just plain laymen. But this time we’re really scraping the bottom of the barrel, because all you get is seminary students. But on the plus side, since they haven’t accomplished anything in life, that makes introductions easier. This is Nate, this is Ben.

At this point, I must confess that tonight you probably will not hear the debate you expected to hear. Nate Taylor, who will be arguing that there is a future for Jews, will not be arguing that this has anything to do with Judaism: not the Temple, sacrifices, circumcision, or the political state formed on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean in 1948.

Ben Rochester, on the other hand, when he argues against a future for Israel, is not arguing that God hates the Jews, and they are all condemned to hell.

Nate and Ben are in full agreement that Jews have the same right as Gentiles to be God’s people by claiming the promise of forgiveness of sins and imputed righteousness due to the perfect life, sacrificial death, and glorious resurrection of Jesus Christ.

So the question becomes, how many Jews will be saved through Christ? Nate says that “Romans says ‘all’”, and Ben (like a good Calvinist), says “all doesn’t always mean all”.

[Source]

The whole faith is essential

Over at the Valiant for Truth blog, Dr. Mike Horton has posted an interesting article (Part 1, Part 2) contending that the whole faith is essential. This is in response to the much abused dictum traceable to Augustine: "In essentials, unity; in non-essentials, liberty; in all things, charity." While certainly we understand what truth it is probably is trying to convey, the dictum itself is problematic. Horton writes as follows:

First, who decides what essentials and non-essentials are? Rejecting the Anglican and Puritan consensus on justification, Baxter forged under this banner what fellow-Puritans branded as “neo-nomianism”: that is, turning the gospel into a new law. Yet in doing so, Baxter thought he could unite not only Protestants (Arminians, Lutherans, and Calvinists) with each other, but also with Rome. So he definitely had a horse in this race.

...

The point is not to endorse slippery-slope arguments, but to remind ourselves that “essentials” have to be defined—and are defined in the ecumenical creeds and in the confessions of our churches. When it comes to “essentials,” I often wonder, “Essential for what?” Usually, my evangelical brothers and sisters mean something like “essential for salvation.” There may be a doctrine test, so like any nervous student, we want to know how much we have to get right to pass. However, this is “salvation by doctrine”—another form of works-righteousness. We are not saved by how well we know and can articulate Christian truth, but by trusting in Jesus Christ alone for our salvation. That involves knowledge, of course, but it’s the fact of trusting in Christ, not the degree of our knowledge, assent, or trust, that is at issue.

...

The division between essentials and non-essentials has allowed evangelicals of various stripes to focus on the central articles of the Christian faith (identified by the Nicene Creed) while many of their denominations were evaporating into the smog of liberalism. Yet it has also had a tendency to foster reductionism. The best examples of evangelical cooperation were inter-denominational and inter-confessional. Anglicans, Baptists, Lutherans, Reformed and Presbyterians, Methodists, and others came together with all of the depth of their own distinctive convictions. They defended their shared creed, but with the resources of actual churches and traditions over centuries. Even their strong differences and sharp debates contributed to this deepening of their common witness. Non-denominational evangelicalism is a different matter. Now, “evangelical” becomes the tradition—the most important identification. Yet “evangelical” was meant to identify people of various churches and traditions who didn’t cross their fingers when they said the Creed. It seems that the tie that binds is no longer the content of what we believe, but the methodological consensus regarding “essentials” and “non-essentials.” And as the statistics bear out, most American Protestants (including evangelicals) today cannot even summarize what they think are the actual “essentials” that would have been recognized and articulated by their forebears only a couple of generations ago.

In this setting, an evangelicalism that is nothing more than agreement on “essentials” (and what exactly those are is changing now) is shallow even in its defense and articulation of a minimial [sic] creed. We may still differ—we do still differ—over what Scripture teaches, but even going back to that Word together in the confidence that it reveals the deposit of truth is itself a remarkable source as well as sign of unity. Furthermore, our shared witness to the core of apostolic teaching can only be strengthened by confessing and teaching everything that Christ has delivered to his church. This means, of course, that we have to belong to churches that shape us over a lifetime, not merely get people to sign a tract or a statement of faith and then move on to more important things like marriage-and-family seminars. Not everything in Scripture is equally plain or equally important, but everything is essential to be taught, to understand, and to live out—always with charity toward all and malice toward none.

Amen.

Truth and Regeneration

For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written,

“I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the discerning I will thwart.”

Where is the one who is wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? (1 Cor. 1:18-20)

Yet among the mature we do impart wisdom, although it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are doomed to pass away. But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glory. ...

The natural person does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned. The spiritual person judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one. “For who has understood the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?” But we have the mind of Christ. (1 Cor. 2: 6-7, 14-16)

In many circles in professing Evangelicalism, the idol of academic intellectualism holds sway. In the world, unregenerate "biblical" scholars produce "scholarly" academic theological articles and books. The viewpoint of the Bible is sneered at as being anti-intellectual, backward and outdated. While it may be possible for them to condescendingly look kindly on those from a former era who hold to these views, Christians who do so in this so-called mature era are sneered at as idiots and fools, no different from flat-earthers and those who continue to hold on to Ptolemaic astronomy.

What does Scripture say however to the world of unbelieving academia? In the first two chapters of 1 Corinthians, we can see that Scripture categorically denies that those who are not of Christ can accept the truths of Scripture. They most certainly can cognitively understand biblical truths, but they cannot accept them as true, instead seeing them as foolishness (1 Cor. 1:18, 2:14). It should come as no surprise to us therefore when unregenerate academia treats the biblical viewpoint as being unscholarly, outdated and foolish. The Bible has already told us that such would be the case, so we shouldn't be too surprised when the Bible proves itself true.

The passages in 1 Corinthians go on to show the reversal engineered by God. The wisdom of the world God would show to be actually foolishness in His sight (1 Cor. 1:20). All the accolades and applause by the world's elite would mean nothing when the scholarship of unbelieving academia is tested and shown to be found wanting in real scholarship as judged by the King of the universe. They are instead exposed to be nothing but intellectual trash, fit to be burned in the fires of hell where they have originated.

Conversely, for those who humbly believe in God, their seeming foolishness is actually heavenly wisdom (1 Cor. 2:7, 16). Building upon the axioms of the revelation of God's Word, they have a firm foundation which is Christ the eternal Word (Jn. 1:1, 14). While not many believers have the capacity to build vigorously on the foundation to produce scholarly material, their lot is much better than any of the unregenerate biblical scholars. After all, a small non-discrete house built on a strong foundation would stand, while a giant edifice complete with ingenious designs rivaling anything the world has ever seen would not stand if such was build on a foundation of sand.

Unregenerate scholarship, being alienated from Christ and thus bereft of the mind of Christ, cannot produce anything of spiritual truth, for no one produces any work which they themselves think is foolish. Therefore, they have nothing to contribute to true theological reasoning. Their only contribution can only be in areas that are not doctrinal in nature like languages and ancient cultural studies, but they have absolutely nothing to contribute in terms of the doctrines of the church. From Schleiermacher to Barth/ Brunner/Bultmann to Wright and Pannenberg and the Torrances, because they are not of Christ, they have nothing to say to the church with regards to doctrine. Intellectual trash is still trash no matter how academic it sounds, in the same way fallen humans are still depraved no matter how "cultured" they are brought up to be.

As Anselm of Cantebury states: Credo ut Intelligam — I believe so that I may understand. Faith which comes by regeneration is required before eternal truths can be properly understood and accepted as the heavenly truth that they actually are. It is because of this that the truths of God are "secret" and "hidden" (1 Cor. 2:7), not that God is actually hiding something but that the spiritually blind cannot see the truths even when they are placed directly in front of him. As it is written:

In their case the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God. (2 Cor. 4:4)

Unbelievers are blinded to God's truth and cannot perceive them. The only way to perceive God's truth therefore is by faith which comes about by regeneration as God opens the eyes so that the spiritually blind may see.

We therefore should not give credence to these so-called scholarship from those who are clearly unregenerate. A good tree bears good fruit and a bad tree bears bad fruit. In the same way, unregenerate scholars will always produce unsound teaching. A leopard can never changed its spots (Jer. 13:23). What truths these scholars have is occasional, in the same way as a broken clock shows the correct time twice per day.

Let the New Evangelicals continue to worship the idol of academia. True Christian scholarship is determined by the Scripture, not by the elites in academia. By all means, let them mock, for they know not what they are doing. In actual fact, their scholarship viewed in light of God's Word is simply laughable, as seen in for example the so-called "Documentary hypothesis" — a fantasy that liberals invent out of the wildness of their own imaginations that is riddled with all manner of logical and reasoning fallacies.

In conclusion, let us not give credence to these false teachers with academic degrees. Rather, let us rather respect teachers of God's Word who earn their academic degrees through building on the foundation of Scripture. An MDiv from bible-believing seminaries like Westminster Seminary California for example is of much more spiritual value than a PhD in theology from Yale or Harvard. In fact, I would venture to say that degrees from these places are of no true worth at all, and the churches should despise these degrees as being essentially worthless for true Christianity. Such degrees have as much spiritual value as PhDs in other religions, since liberalism is in fact another religion altogether anyway, which is why John Gresham Machen entitled his book Christianity and Liberalism, thus showing even in the title that Liberalism is NOT Christianity.

Eternity and Time: A brief look

[continued from here and here]

The third main pillar of the Hyperists, which informs their error of Eternal Justification, is the [Neo-Platonic] theory of Timeless Eternity. In this post, we would briefly look at this theory, and show from Robert Reymond's magnum opus, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith 2nd Ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1999) why the idea of eternity being timeless is untenable according to the biblical data and the concept of eternity being "everlasting" rather a better understanding of God and his ways in the world.

The issue of hermeneutics

When addressing the issue of eternity, it must first be acknowledged that Scripture is not explicit regarding this issue. Scripture affirms that God is "eternal", but whether eternity includes the concept of timelessness or everlasting is rather inferred from the text of Scripture. It is therefore simply eisegesis of the worst order to assume that eternity must include the concept of timelessness based upon extra-biblical concepts such as the scientific concept of time being the 4th dimension in the created order. Certainly since the dawn of Einstein's theories of Special and General Relativity, space and time and velocity (most noticeably the speed of light at 3× 10⁸ ms^-1 in vacuum), and gravity in the case of General Relativity, are seen as intricately related to each other such that [perceived or situational] time can be altered by increasing velocity near light-speed (Special Relativity) or positions/movements at or through gravitational fields of huge magnitudes (General Relativity). Through Einstein's theories of relativity, the assumption of time as a created order may enter into the discussion of such issues.

The main contention from theologians and philosophers however would not come from science bur rather [obviously] from philosophy. While we would look at some of the contentions later, the issue here we need to beware of is precisely what Scripture itself mentions:

See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ (Col. 2:8)

While philosophical enquiry is not evil per se, if Sola Scriptura means anything at all, it is that our theories and doctrines about the faith are to be primarily deduced from Scripture, while philosophical enquires come later. It may be said that the idea of the mind being a tabula rasa such that one can come to the Scripture without a priori ideas derived from the world and philosophy is well neigh impossible, which is indeed true. Yet, it is precisely because of this that Christians are called to be renewed in their minds according to God's Truth (Rom. 12:2), and through meditation on Scripture, remove the ideas they have which are not biblical while embracing those taught in Scripture, as the Scripture interprets itself. Semper Reformanda — Always being reformed!

Now, since the concept of eternity is not explicitly taught in Scripture, it must certainly be the case that all other major doctrines in the Scriptures must be prioritized. In this instance for example, the concept of eternity must be settled only after we have settled according to Scripture the doctrine of justification. Instead of interpreting the doctrine of justification according to one's concept of eternity, shouldn't we not do the reverse and interpret the non-explicit concept of eternity based upon what Scripture has already plainly taught about the doctrine of justification?

The Hyperists in the Predestinarian Network are to be congratulated for attempting to be consistent in their worldview. There is nothing wrong with attempting to be consistent, since God after all is not irrational. The problem with the Hyperists is that they refuse to interpret the concept of eternity according to the other doctrines explicitly taught in Scripture, and thus reverse the order of interpretation of the Scripture; they are simply not critical enough. Granting their argument that "If p, then q", whereby p = 'the concept of timeless eternity is true' and q = 'eternal justification is true', they insist on arguing along the lines of modus ponens (p → q; p, therefore q) instead of modus tollens (p → q; ~q, therefore ~p).

As I have mentioned in the first post refuting the Hyperists, we use the framework of Scripture to interpret all of Scripture. We therefore do not use an "Absolute Predestination" framework or a "Timeless Eternity" framework to interpret Scripture. In their usage of the modus ponens form of argument and thus the "Absolute Predestination" and "Timeless Eternity" hermeneutical frameworks, the Hyperists have shown themselves to be violating the basic principles of biblical exegesis. It is therefore no wonder that they go astray and embrace such abominations as the heresy of Eternal Justification. While other Christians whom they claim are inconsistent [1] may indeed be inconsistent, at least they understand the basics of hermeneutics and are thus blessedly inconsistent, instead of being consistent at the expense of sound doctrine.

Disposing of the argument from science

The first objection (and the one that to scientific minds is more pertinent) is the argument according to Relativity. While one can legitimately argue regarding the validity of science to attain truth, let us assume for the sake of argument that the theory of Relativity or some form of it is indeed correct. Does this therefore mean that time is a created being of which therefore God, being apart from the creation, does not partake of.

If must be stated that God is definitely apart from created time. God in this sense is eternal, for God is present before the world (Gen. 1:1 - In the beginning ...), and will be around after the end (cf Rev. 21-22). In this sense, God is above time. Time as how we chronologically experience it is thus foreign to God. However, what this cannot prove or disprove is that there is a form of "divine time", separate from created time, in which God functions. The argument from science therefore is limited by the subject matter of this cosmos in which the empirical methods apply, and thus has no bearing at all on the topic of God, eternity and time.

Disposing of a few arguments by the Hyperists

In the piece "The Eternal God" [2], the author with the pseudonym "Forester07" has made some interesting points. The quoting of Is. 57:15 is certainly a peculiarity in its own right, for the passage does not makes clear whether when it is predicated of God that he "inhabits eternity" that it is referring to a state of time or a state of place that God inhabits.

More pertinent to our discussion here is this particular objection laid against the idea of God not being timeless. In his own words: "To say God does not exist outside of time makes time god and God not really God". This is astonishing since many things are predicated of God and God cannot function outside of these parameters. God is rational, so can we say that "To say God does not exist apart from rationality is to make rationality god and God not really God"? Can we say that "To say God does not exist outside of morality makes morality god and God not really God'? Or what about the case of any of God's other attributes?

In dealing with the idea of the relationship between God and Logic, C. Matthew McMahon in his book The Two Wills of God (New Lenox, IL: Puritan Rublicatios, 2005), p. 24 footnote 5, states thus: "Epistemology, logic precedes God. Ontologically, God precedes logic". In other words, God is most definitely before all things, and all things thus owe its existence to Him. Yet, God does not exist in a vacuum apart from His attributes (a most ridiculous idea). Logic being the manner of God thinking [3] proceeds ontologically from God, yet it is just as eternal as God and in fact precedes God in our way of knowing Him.

Likewise, in the case of time, it may be the case that "divine" time ontologically proceeds from God. If such is indeed the case, then "forester07" 's objection with its negation of God being in time is baseless.

We have been mentioning the word "time" often. However, what exactly IS time? If God is not apart from time so to speak, does this therefore mean that He is mutable?

Here, we would have theologian and pastor Robert Reymond to engage the issue and show us the way forward.

... it is a non sequitur to conclude from the fact of God's omniscience that God has no idea of succession, that is, that relative to his own existence he has no knowledge of a past, present, and future applicable to his own existence. This is to confuse the notion of the succession of ideas, which is surely not true of God if one means by this notion that God learns new facts, with the notion of the idea of succession which I submit God surely has. Robert Lewis Dabney observes:

If ... the divine consciousness of its existence has no relation to successive duration, I think it unproved, and incapable of proof to us. Is not the whole plausibility of the notion hence; that divines ... infer: Since all God's thoughts are ever equally present with Him, he can have no succession of His consciousnesses; and so, no relation to successive time. But the analysis is false and would not prove the conclusion as to God, if correct. ... In all the acts and changes of creatures, the relation of succession is actual and true. Now, although God's knowledge of these as it is subjective to Him, is unsuccessive [I take him to mean here that God does not first learn about them as the creature thinks and acts these changes — author], yet it [his knowledge] is doubtless correct, i.e. true to the objective facts. But these [the objective facts] have actual succession. So that the idea of successive duration must be in God's thinking. Has He not all the ideas which we have; and infinitely more? But if God in thinking the objective, ever thinks successive duration, can we be sure that His own consciousness of His own subsistence is unrelated to succession in time?

I concur with Dabney's analysis. Not to do so and to insist that God is timeless, that is to say, that the distinctives of time and hence existence with succession have no reference to him, lies behind much theological mischief. For example, Charles Hodge, who stands in the classical tradition, writes that "with [God] there is no distinction between the present, past and future, but all things are equally and always present to Him. With Him duration is an eternal now," that "to Him there is neither past nor future ... the past and the future are always and equally present to Him [as an eternal now (or present)]," and that "to Him there is neither past nor future, neither before nor after."

But such words seem to go too far, first, in that, if taken literally, they reduce to zero significance the temporal reference in every finite Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek verb form God employed in his revelational description to us of his thoughts, words, and actions, and virtually transform them all into timeless participles. [4]

Time has to do with succession. However, as what Reymond has pointed out, the advocates of timeless eternity confuse the "idea of succession" with the "succession of ideas". The idea of "divine time" therefore has to do with the "idea of succession". God never does learn anything new nor change in any way, yet that does not mean that He does not have an [epistemic] idea of succession in which He knows every single event in successive detail. To make it simpler, God knows everything past, present and future, but these past, present and future events do happen successively in chronology before God.

Reymond continues:

.. as well as the significance of the proposition προ, pro, in "foreknew" (προγινωοσκω, proginosko) and "predestine" (προοριζω, proorizo) in Romans 8:29 and in the expresson, "He chose us in him before [προ, pro] the creation of the world" (Eph. 1:3; see also John 17:24). Does not God inform us in these verses that he had a plan (his "eternal purpose") before he created the world? Does this data not mean that before the creation of the world God could have said, indeed, woud have had to say as the God of truth if an angel had asked him about the "when" of the world's creation: "I have not yet created the world. Its creation is still in the future"? And does he not now have to say as the God of truth: "I have created the world; its creation is no longer in the future, it is now in the past"? It would certainly seem that the past is past for God, the present is present for God, and the future is future for God as surely as they are for us! And while he certainly and infallibly knows the future because he ordained it, it is still as the future that he knows it. It is odd, to say the least, to argue as does E.L. Mascall that all of God's acts are dipolar, and that a given act at the creature's end is temporal (either past, present or future), while at the Creator's end the same act is timeless. If God's "time-words" to us respecting his plans and actions do not mean for God the same as they mean to us, then for him the creation of the world may not have actually occurred yet, for him Christ's second coming may be a thing of the past, ... In short, if God is timeless and if all of his acts are for him timeles acts, then we can have no true and certain knowledge of anything except pure mathematics.

Third, there seems to be an inherent contradicton in saying that a timeless person lives in the "eternal present" because the referent of the word "present" has significance only in the ordering category wich includes past and future as well. Nicholas Wolterstorff points out:

In order for something to be timeless, none of these ordering relatonships [past, present, or future[ can be applicable to that being. If a being is truly timeless, it should be impossible for it to exist simultaneously with anything else, or before anything else, or after anything else. Once it is established [or argued, as Hodge does — author] that a being does occupy one of the ordering relations, thn that being is clearly temporal.

For these three reasons it would seem that the ascriptions to God of the attributes of timelessness (understood as the absence of a divine consciousness of successive duration with respect to his own existence) cannot be supprted from Scripture nor is it self-consistent. At best, it is only an inference (and quite likely a fallacious one) from Scripture. These reasons also suggest that the Christian should be willing to affirm that the ordering relationships (before, now, after) that are normally represented as relationships of time are true for God as well as for man. [5]

The idea of a God who is immanent and works out His decrees in time is completely inimical to the concept of timelessness in God. For all these reasons, the Neo-Platonic idea of timeless eternity cannot be predicated of the biblical God. Rather, God in eternity is everlasting — without beginning or end. God knows all things past, pesent and future, and remains the same throughout all time, yet God does have an idea of succession within Himself, and His decrees and the events that are caused by the decrees have a chronological ordering to them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Neo-Platonic idea of timeless eternity is distinctly not supported by Scripture and in fact inimical to its teachings. The Hyperists therefore are in error in their view of eternity and time. Not only is their choice of hermeneutical framework in error, even the basis of their framework is in error, substituting the doctrines of God for the philosophies of Man. May God show them their errors so that they would return back to the truths of God's Word and abandon their cryto-hyper-Calvinism. Amen.

---

References:

[1] "Forester07" , The Eternal God - "However, it seems that in reality most people who claim that God is eternal do not truly understand the many implications this has on understanding Christian doctrine and practice".

[2] Ibid.

[3] W. Gary Crampton, The Scripturalsm of Gordon H. Clark (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 1999), p. 25]

[4] Robert Reymond, pp. 173-174

[5] Reymond, pp. 175-176

Credo500 -Short article

Credo500 (Chinese Reformed Evangelical Discussion Online-500) is a blog conference organized by Reformed-minded Chinese Christians in commenmoration of John Calvin's 500th birthday. The blog conference, of which I am still rather clueless how it will be done, will occur in May 2009, focused on 9 articles written by various peoples on various subjects related to the Reformed faith.

In an apparent reminder to us that the submission deadline is drawing near, a new post has been posted on the blog, which in itself is really interesting. Here is the article (in Chinese):

16世纪宗教改革的贡献, 相当于4世纪尼西亚会议中所奠定有关三位一体和基督二性的信仰基础, 以及1054年东西教会在和子论争议上的神圣分裂, 无疑是基督教教义史在近500年最重要的分水岭.

显然，改教运动可以追溯至早期教父，特别5世纪奥古斯丁对罪与恩典之成熟的观念。马丁路得在其根基上特然醒悟到因信称义之真理, 加尔文跟着建立起神主权的教义系统, 为当时及往后的教会开辟了一条回归圣经之正统路线.

然而, 随着人本主义的崛起, 自由主义, 反智主义，福音主义, 后现代主义, 灵恩运动, 普世合一运动, 新兴教会运动, 新正统神学, 新保罗神学云云后宗教改革现象的发展顺流而出, 逐渐地绕过宗教改革的宝贵信仰遗产，因而模糊了当时一些关键的核心教义.

另一边厢, 以神为本的思想路线随着17世纪英国的清教徒运动, 18世纪北美的属灵大醒觉运动, 20世纪初西敏斯神学院的护教运动, 以及20世纪末海内外华人教会兴起的归正福音运动, 则一脉相承地把今日教会与改教神学及历代正统基督教传统联系起来.

欣逢2009年,全世界归正群体在纪念加尔文诞辰500周年之际, CREDO500 由一群受归正神学造就的网友发起, 志在依循神本体系之旧路上继承发扬，故以<从加尔文看今日华人教会>的主题, 将在5月4-8日, 于部落格会议中发表并讨论参与者所呈上的一系列文章.

And here is my [attempt at] translation:

The 16th century Reformation is undoubtedly the greatest watershed movement in the last 500 years of the history of the Church. In its contribution to theology, it ranks near the 4th century Council of Nicea which codified the foundational doctrine of the Trinity and of the two natures of Christ, and also the Great Schism of 1054 between the Eastern and Western churches due to disagreement on the doctrine of the Procession of the Spirit from the Son.

This movement of reformation however can be traced back even to the early Church Fathers, especially to the 5th century where Augustine puts forward a mature view of sin and grace. Similarly, Martin Luther build upon that Augustinian foundation in coming to understand the true doctrine of Justification by Faith Alone, while John Calvin followed through with the setting up of a system of theology centered on the Sovereignty of God. Through their efforts, the way of reforming and returning back to the Orthodox truth of Scripture has been opened up for churches both then and now.

However, with the rise of Humanism, Libertarianism, Anti-intellectualism, Evangelicalism, Postmodernism, Charismatism, Ecumenism, Revivalism, Neo-Orthodoxy, the New Perspective on Paul and many other religious reform and restoration movements, the precious legacy of the Reformation has been slowly but surely neglected. Such results in the obscuring of certain foundational Christian doctrines which took center stage in that era, to the detriment of the Church.

On the other hand, the theocentric thread of theology runs through 17th century English Puritanism, the 18th century Great Awakening, early 20th century Westminster Seminary with its contention for the faith and the late 20th century revival of the Reformed faith in Chinese congregations around the world. All of these work together to link the modern Church to Reformation theology and the Historic Orthodox traditions of the Church.

With the advent of 2009, Reformed communities around the world are commemorating the 500th birthday of John Calvin. CREDO500 was started by a group of web-friends who are all impacted and nurtured by Reformed theology. God willing, through walking in the old paths, we will discuss under the theme "Calvin in perspective on today's Chinese congregation" the papers prepared by the contributors in the blog conference scheduled for May 4th-8th.

Hope the translation is suitable. Please inform me if there are any errors in it.

P.S.: I am better at translating Chinese to English; the converse is not as good.

Posts on Apostasy

Over at Pyromaniacs, Phil R. Johnson has posted two posts (here and here) on the issue of apostasy with regards to a former commentator called 'Touchstone'. Certainly very sobering words for thought, and shows us how apostasy starts with moral failures and/or coupled with disbelief in the Word of God and substituting it with the wisdom of Man's philosophy.