On the epistemic value of intuition

If, however, we cannot calibrate intuition by appeal to sense perception, then, presuming there are no other calibrating faculties in the offing, it would seem that we cannot calibrate intuition and so we have no good (i.e. independent) reason at all for taking intuition to be reliable. We arrive, then, at an apparently defensible skeptical conclusion about intuition.

Such a conclusion, however is not defensible. … This because we can just as easily argue, as countless skeptics have, that sense perception is itself incapable of independent calibration and so we have no non-epistemically-circular reason to treat its offerings as reliable evidence. The calibration concern is, after all, a completely general one.

[Joel Pust, Intuition as Evidence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000, 2016), 105-6)]

This is because any attempt to calibrate sense perception must take its corroborating premises only from the deliverances of some other faculty, and in the case envisaged, intuition would be the basis of such a calibration of sense perception. (p. 106)

The problem of epistemic circularity is also deeper than the discussion to this point has revealed. (p. 107)

I do think Reid is right to insist that, in light of our inability to non-circularly justify any basic faculty, some reason needs to be given by those who would rely upon one faculty and yet reject the testimony of others. Absent such a reason, the empiricist’s refusal to accept intuition without independent calibration seems entirely unjustified and epistemically arbitrary. (p. 110)

Therefore, if she is to avoid complete skepticism, and its attendant cognitive suicide, but retain a principled skepticism about intuition, the empiricist must start by trusting all our faculties equally and then show that intuition can still be shown an unreliable source of evidence. (p. 111)

Supposing I have succeeded in showing that the epistemic credentials of intuition are no worse, ultimately, than those of sense perception, it is easy to take my means of showing this as indicating how little can actually be said for sense perception or for any of our basic faculties. My epistemic parity argument, then, might be said not to show why we actually have good reason to treat intuitions as evidence, but merely why we have no good reason to treat sense perception as evidence. (p. 122)

In his dissertation, Joel Pust attempts to show the validity of intuition in its utility in philosophy. Intuition as evidence is no more and no less valid than the use of the senses in gaining knowledge about the world. The alternative is a general epistemic skepticism.

Now, whether Pust has indeed succeeded in making his case can be argued. But in tying the validity of intuition to the senses, I do think Pust is on the right track for sure. Skepticism about intuition seems to merit skepticism in the senses as well. This seems to show, from where I stand, the failure of human philosophy to ever get out of skepticism. It seems to me that revelation from God must undergird all knowledge, for otherwise we are left with general skepticism. Yes, general skepticism cannot be proven, but if all systems fail, then that is what we are left with. General skepticism is therefore not so much proven, but stated in light of the failures of human philosophy.

Intuition therefore, is like the senses. Just as the senses can make sense of the world and yet are fallible and liable to deception, so likewise our intuitions about the world. From a Christian perspective, both derive their general validity from God's general revelation not from themselves, for apart from God's revelation, it is impossible for anyone to know anything of the world.

Does Adam have "natural theology"?

Adam therefore possessed these principles uncorrupted, just as they belong to nature. At that time he was able by comparing these principles with his reality and with signs to assemble in order the works of reasoning, to take them apart, to draw conclusions, and to decide, also according to nature, whatever nature could accomplish in divine matters by its ability. Finally, he was able to acquire some knowledge of divine matters according to the limit of his intact nature. (Franciscus Junius, A Treatise on True Theology with the Life of Franciscus Junius, 152)

What is "natural theology"? Franciscus Junius, a theologian in the 16th century, claimed a certain form of natural theology which is not autonomous but that comes from God through nature. In that sense, it is definitely better than the normal version of "natural theology." But where exactly is the proof that there is such a thing as "natural theology"?

"Natural theology," in order to be natural theology and not general revelation, must utilize reason. General revelation is what God reveals to Man, whereas natural theology must be inferred by man from nature in some manner. In other words, what differentiates general revelation from "natural theology" (in Junius' sense of the term) is whether God's revelation in nature is mediated by reason ("natural theology") or not. Therefore, Romans 1:19-20 cannot be used as a proof-text for natural theology, or Psalms 19 either, because all that is taught in those passages is General Revelation.

It is in this sense that I am not convinced of any case for any form of "natural theology." The idea that Adam prior to his fall had true natural theology is far fetched only because we know that God talked with Adam in the Garden of Eden. Adam did not "acquire" some knowledge of divine matters, as God directly interacted with him! Adam did not wake up in the Garden, looked at the world around him and deduced with his (at that time) sinless reason that God exists. No! Adam woke up to God his Creator already with him, and thus he knew God personally, not through inference.

It is for such reasons that "natural theology" is defective, no matter how well it is dressed up. We should reject the entire notion that reason, even one aided by God, can arrive at God even imperfectly. Without special revelation, reason cannot reach God, and this is what we should believe.

Hodge and Natural Theology

Those who deny that natural theology teaches anything reliable concerning God, ... (Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:22)

The Scriptures clearly recognize the fact that the works of God reveal his being and attributes. This they do not only by frequent reference to the works of nature as manifestations of the perfections of God, but by direct assertions. (1:24)

Not only the act of this revelation, but its clearness is distinctly asserted by the Apostle [Paul] ... It cannot, therefore, be reasonably doubted that not only the being of God, but also his eternal power and Godhead, are so revealed in his works, as to lay a stable foundation for natural theology (1:25)

Natural theology. It seems strange to me that people think that natural theology is actually a biblical and worthwhile endaevor, as opposed to just staying with a Biblical Theology of Nature. Natural theology, in its Reformed variant, is limited in scope yet it seeks truths from nature about God. Using Romans 1:20-21 as one of its base texts, it declares that Man can from nature know something about God, namely His eternal power and divine nature. The basic Biblical Theology of Nature, or Doctrine of Created things, on the other hand, tells us what God intends Nature to convey to us. The former (Natural Theology) looks to nature for God's revelation in nature, while the latter (Biblical Theology of Nature) looks to Scripture for God's revelation in nature.

Hodge, as part of his background in some form of Scottish Common-Sense Realism, believes that one can just trust one's senses as they are. Thus, he claims that Nature's revelation is plain enough on its own to give us a natural theology. But it is one thing to believe, with Scripture, that General Revelation is enough to condemn people through some knowledge of God, and another to claim that Nature itself reveals those aspects of Nature. The two propositions are not the same, and in my opinion it is a leap to jump from the biblical teaching that God reveals in General Revelation through Nature, to God reveals in Nature. Of course, it might be argued that the first leads to the second, but that is what is under dispute here.

General Revelation is what Scripture teaches. But the mode is not explicitly mentioned. Relying on empirical data and sense experiences, or even cognitive experiences, presupposes that these are necessarily reliable for the perception of truth. But if that is the case, why is it that none of the theistic arguments are foolproof? Even the teleological argument, or the argument from design, merely proves the existence of a cosmic designer(s). Now God is certainly who we believe the designer is, but I don't think it is clear enough from that argument that there is one Designer who is the Christian God.

Hodge claims the "most obvious" and "most effective" argument "in support of the truths of natural religion" comes from "the constitution of our own nature." (1:22). But what does this even mean, since there is no consensus on the constitution of Man in philosophy? Of course, if one interprets reality through Christian lenses, then the Imago Dei certainly shows us an aspect of General Revelation, but what if one does not interpret through Christian lenses?

Hodge lives in a much more Christian environment, but for those of us who have been exposed to non-Christian thought from cultures that never had Christian influences until the modern time, we can see how pervasive Christian theological and philosophical thought patterns have pervaded the West such that even much of Western unbelief borrows from the conceptual world of the Christian worldview. What Hodge thinks are "obvious" are not actually obvious to everyone. It is not so much that the arguments are inconclusive, as that the axioms undergirding the arguments are disputed as well. Therefore, it seems to me that arguments for natural theology are undermined at the conceptual level. For example, the ontological argument assumes that perfection of being in all aspects is possible, or that just because something can be mentally conceived means that it could exist in a possible world. All such assumptions can be questioned, and it seems that unless one brings in the Christian worldview, there is no way to establish the arguments for natural theology at all.

God does reveal aspects of Himself, His eternal power and divine nature, through General Revelation. At the same time, I deny that there is actually Natural Theology of any kind. It would seem that General Revelation is mediated by daily living as opposed to philosophical arguments, for after all General Revelation is accessible to everyone including the non-philosopher. The man on the street watches the stars, and encounters God's General Revelation there, without the necessity for analysis. General Revelation therefore is by intuition through daily living in God's world, and not by philosophical arguments and empiricism or science.

God reveals Himself to us... in Scripture

Long ago, at many times and in many ways, God spoke to our fathers by the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world. (Heb. 1:1-2)

And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth. (Jn. 1:14)

And we have the prophetic word (προφητικὸν λόγον) more fully confirmed, to which you will do well to pay attention as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in your hearts, knowing this first of all, that no prophecy of Scripture comes from someone's own interpretation. For no prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit. (2 Peter 1:19-21)

God reveals Himself to His people. Yet, what is the nature of this revelation? From Hebrews 1:1-2, we can see that God has indeed utilized a variety of ways in times past to reveal Himself and His will, like through theophanies and even the casting of lots (Lev. 16:8, Prob. 16:33). But NOW all God's revelation is found in His Son, and the former ways of revelation have now ceased, as the Westminster Confession of Faith 1.1 so beautifully states as a deduction from this passage.

The only way to get to this revelation of both the "former ways" and the final revelation of Christ however is through the Scriptures, for we would otherwise have no other way to access God's revelation than for it to be recorded for us, since God's revelation is given in history (thus the contrast between the former times in history and the "now" in history). From 2 Peter 1:19-21, we can see that the written revelation that is the prophetic word or Scripture is given to us as a more sure way of revelation, even in comparison to the glory of our Lord's Transfiguration. In other words, written revelation trumps even the most glorious revelatory experiences. The supremacy of the written Word is expressed earlier in redemptive-history in Isaiah 8:20, "To the teaching and to the testimony! If they will not speak according to this word, it is because they have no dawn."

The relation of Christ and the Word is that Christ IS the Word, at least the Word Incarnate. As Christ who is the final revelation reveals God to us as the Word Incarnate (Logos Ensarkos), so the Scriptures which is the God-breathed-out Word (logos theopneustos) reveals what God in Christ reveals. Christ is the ontological revelation of God, and Scripture the epistemological revelation. God is not a schizopreniac, so obviously the two are one and the same revelation, differing only in kind. Whatever Scriptures teaches, Christ teaches, and whatever Christ teaches, Scripture teaches. God does not have two different logoi (words), but one logos (Word). The Word became flesh (Jn. 1:14), the prophetic word (2 Peter 1:19) breathed out (2 Tim. 3:16), are the one and the same Word.

We do not live in the "former times" of the Old Testament, or even the foundation times of the New Testament. We live in the "last days" where God's revelation is found in Christ and thus in Scripture, the written prophetic word. Scripture is thus the only revelation for us from God today; it is sufficient for us. Therefore, since Scripture is sufficient, it must be clear for us to understand since God intends His revelation to be understood.

Since Scripture is sufficient and clear, therefore any theory that concludes that Scripture is unclear (because of the limits of language or other such arguments) must be in error. This is the argument form known as modus tollens (If p, then not q; q, therefore not p). It doesn't matter how sounds the other theory is. For if the theory (p) will result in a denial of what we already know, the "conclusion" that Scripture is sufficient and clear (not q), then our knowing from Scripture that Scripture is indeed sufficient and clear (q) necessitates a rejection of the theory no matter how true that theory (p) sound to us. The question to be asked for someone who doubts is not whether any particular theory (p1, p2, p3) (that would lead us to conclude that Scripture is unclear) is true, but rather whether the conclusion q is true. If the conclusion q is true, then those theories (p1, p2, p3 etc.) are rendered false by default.

On the other hand, some may ask concerning natural revelation. The biblical answer in Romans 1:18-23 is that there is indeed a natural revelation, yet by itself it only leads to condemnation. Can one grow "close" to God through nature? The Psalmist certainly broke out in praise after seeing the work of God in creation (Ps. 19:1-4) so in this sense we can say that one can "grow close" to God through nature, yet such is done through the lens of Scripture, for we read in Romans 1:18-23 that natural revelation in itself leads the sinner to idolatry and rejection of God. So yes, there is a natural, or general, revelation by God outside of Scripture, yet (1) it reveals only condemnation, (2) in itself it cannot reveal God in grace to us and thus will not bring us to praise Him and fellowship with Him. The Psalmist is only able to write Psalms 19 out of a regenerate heart already in communion with God, something only God can accomplish through His Word. Therefore, while there is a revelation of God outside of Scripture, it is limited and unable to reveal God in grace to us.

God reveals to us, in a way for our good, in Scripture. We are to look at Scripture therefore for our knowledge of God in order to know Him, and even to Scripture in order for us to interpret Nature and General Revelation alright. Above all, Scripture reigns supreme as the source and final authority for our faith, and where we should go to to have communion with God (alongside the sacraments, which are another form of the Word, but those are dependent on Scripture and are another topic altogether).

We can actually know God's truth

One source of skepticism stems from certain understandings of Vantillian epistemology. Now, after reading concerning the Reformed Scholastics and Van Til's works, I can see where Cornelius Van Til was trying to be orthodox. Nevertheless, my concern here is that I think he is not a good communicator of Reformed doctrine concerning the knowledge of God, in my opinion. The idea of "God's knowledge" and "Man's knowledge" being qualitatively different, with "no point of contact" between the two, seeks to convey historic Reformed doctrine on the difference between God and Man, yet it does so in such a way that I believe obfuscates the true doctrine it desires to convey. While those with background in Reformed orthodoxy might interpret such language correctly (in an orthodox manner), yet for those without such a background, I fear what such words and phrases convey skepticism concerning the Christian faith. The reasoning by such people is that, if God's knowledge and Man's knowledge have no point of contact, therefore we cannot know anything about God, since all we have is necessarily "always false." While some in the Reformed orthodox camp can stay in their ivory towers, they just might want to see how the careless words and phrases they use are (mis)understood by people on the ground, especially by those without any background in theology or the Reformed tradition!

Coming from a Clarkian background, reading the works of Gordon H. Clark, I have found Willem Van Asselt's article on the theology of Franciscus Junius to be illuminating. Unlike Van Til, van Asselt and Junius write clearly. After reading that, I have found a way of understanding the core orthodox truth that Van Til was trying to defend, and put it in a way that I believe is much more understandable and certainly orthodox. Thus, I had written an article here, in which I have striven to show how Clark's concerns could be synthesized with the concerns of Van Til and the Reformed orthodox so that both sides can be assured that the dangers they perceive in the other side are eradicated. Do I believe that proponents from both sides can be persuaded to put down their weapons? That would be rather naive, but at least there should be a way forward, to produce light instead of heat.

The archetypal/ ectypal distinction preserves the Creator/ creature distinction. There is no "point of contact" between the archetype in God and the ectype in Man. Yet, this model safeguards against skepticism as well. For we note that there are actually two "points of contacts," but these are not between the archetypal knowledge of God and the ectypal knowledge of Man, for such would compromise the Creator/ creature distinction.

The first point of contact is within God Himself. God's archetypal knowledge and God's ectypal knowledge meet as one is a reflection of the other. The two meet ... in the person and mind of God. Quite obviously, since they meet in the mind of God, we finite human beings are not privy to how that happens. But the meeting is important, if just to show that God is not schizophreniac. God does not have an ectypal knowledge that is contradictory to His archetypal knowledge, but rather His ectypal knowledge is in some sense a faithful reflection of His archetypal knowledge. The two bodies of knowledge do not conflict with each other, for there is perfect harmony in God. We do not have to worry that, even though we cannot know God's archetypal knowledge, therefore God's archetypal knowledge will contradict His ectypal knowledge, for that will never happen at all.

The second point of contact is between God's ectypal knowledge with our human ectypal knowledge. God communicates, God reveals to us, knowledge. Truth is the correspondence of our ectypal knowledge with a section of God's ectypal knowledge that He Himself reveals to us. We do not have a point of contact with God's archetypal knowledge, but we do have a point of contact with God's revelation. When God reveals that Jesus Christ is the propitiation of our sins, we actually can know the proposition "Jesus Christ is the propitiation of our sins." With this point of contact, we do not have to worry that our knowledge is false. Yes, it is not archetypal knowledge, but it corresponds to God's ectypal knowledge, and therefore it is true. God's word is truth, and we do not have to worry that we are believing in falsehood just because our knowledge is ectypal.

Therefore, we should not have to worry about skepticism based upon intemperate language about how our language about God is always false. No, our knowledge and language about God can be trusted. We CAN know God's truth! Do not be deceived by pious nonsense about how we are to know our place as creatures, for God has spoken and we can know that! Is it faith or the lies of the Devil that will cause us to doubt the possibility of knowing God who is communicating to us His words? Surely it is the latter! When God gives us His Word, He actually intends for us to be able to understand it, and whoever says otherwise is a tool of the Devil!

Bavinck and sensate "knowledge"

It could therefore almost be called a fresh discovery when Francis Bacon returned to sense perception as the only source of knowledge. Only it was not a new discovery, but a necessary rejuvenation of science, for science always has to go back to the sources. Truth must not be drawn from books but from the real world. [Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1: 226]

Empiricism, however, is compelled to deny the name of "science" to all sciences except the exact sciences. But this restriction is impossible for two reasons. First, because aside from the purely formal sciences (logic, mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, chemistry), and then only in a certain sense, there can be no science without a philosophical element. In every science, inventiveness, intuition, imagination, in a word, genius ... play a most important role. And second, because then the name of "science" can finally be reserved only for a few subsidiary disciplines, and precisely the knowledge that is most important to human beings and that in their research is their primary interest is banished from the domain of science. ...

In addition to this, the world of nonmaterial things, the world of values, of good and evil, law and custom, religion and morality, or all that inspires love and hatred in our hearts, lifts us up and comforts us or crushes and grieves us, that whole magnificent invisible world is as much a reality to us as the "real world" that we perceive with our senses. Its impact on our lives and on the history of humankind is still much greater than that of the visible things about us. ... [Bavinck, 1:221]

The Reformed theologian Herman Bavinck promotes the uses of the sense for the gaining of knowledge. He critiqued empiricism, in the sense that it excludes philosophical elements from knowledge. Besides that criticism however, his epistemology focuses on empirical data which are grasped and organized by the intellect philosophically.

Bavinck's critique of empiricism however is strange. He claims that empiricism should be rejected because (1) aside from the "purely formal sciences," all sciences require philosophical elements, (2) things such as "inventiveness, intuition, imagination," "genius" play a most important role in science, (3) if empiricism were true, only a few subsidiary disciplines would qualify as sciences, while the most important disciplines would not qualify as science, and (4) the impact of nonmaterial things are much great than that of the visible things to us. But all this sounds really self-serving, as in "if empiricism is true, my discipline would be worthless" means that therefore I must reject empiricism because "my discipline" cannot be seen as worthless.

With regards to reason number 3, the counter can be made that yes, all other "disciplines" are in fact not most or even more important disciplines but only the empirical sciences are in fact the only sciences. After all, the empiricist does not accept the fact that these disciplines are in fact important at all. Thus with regards to reason number 1, the empirical sciences do not require philosophical elements in their normal operations. Reason number 2 is irrelevant because the entire focus of the scientific method is that all subjectivity be rendered irrelevant for the truth claims of the empirical sciences. Yes, we do know now about the influence of paradigms upon the empirical sciences, but the notion of paradigms is a second-order claim about the nature of science, not a first-order claim with regards to the use of "genius." In response to reason number 4, that itself is disputed by empirical naturalists. The existence of nonmaterial things can be said to be an artefact of material realities, emerging from them.

Bavinck's arguments against Empiricism are singularly unconvincing. When Bavinck claims that "sense perception" is to be the main reservoir for our knowledge (not foundation), there is simply no reason why anyone taking Bavinck's position on the senses should reject Empiricism. For if the senses are the reservoir for knowledge, then Empiricism AND only the empirical sciences are knowledge. That is the position of much of the modern world with its trumpeting of the triumphs of science over "superstition." And if one concedes that the senses are to be our reservoir, our source for knowledge, how exactly does one observe God? That is why "religious studies" today are basically studies of myths and mythopoetry, for that is what "religion" is seen to be in an empirical scientific paradigm!

Bavinck's version of Realism therefore cannot hold. Those who talk so much about the "senses" and sensate knowledge cannot hope to escape the problems of empiricism. For if the senses are the reservoir for knowledge, then there cannot be a God, for God is not perceived by or revealed through the senses but only through the Holy Spirit. Yes, they might claim that philosophical elements are necessary for the use and interpretation of sense data, but the emergentist view explains the emergence of philosophical elements rather well.

Now, some might appeal to the sensus divinitatis, or "sense of the divine." But that there is such a sense is itself disputed. More importantly, the biblical view is that the sensus divinitatis is part of God's General Revelation to Man, and therefore it is to be considered revelation, not "sense." Furthermore, it cannot be a "sense" as we understand "sense" because it does not receive data in external stimuli for us to interpret, but rather it is something placed in humans as revelation from God. It is a fixed deposit, not something that grows in opinions and knowledge. And for those who may claim otherwise, the counter-examples can be easily seen in people like me who do not feel it as a "sense" but rather as a fixed deposit of revelation. Surely the sensus divinitatis not only operates in all men, but especially in Christians who acknowledge its existence, so therefore it should not be possible for those who acknowledge it to deny it as a true "sense" if it were in fact one! Also, what are the new opinions and knowledge we are constantly learning using this "sense," if it were in fact a "sense"?

In conclusion, sensate knowledge is not much different from empiricism. For one to hold on to the former while denying the latter is the unstable position of Bavinck's Realism. and it seems to me all other forms of common-sense type realisms. Far better to start with revelation as not just the foundation for knowing God, but also the foundation and reservoir for gaining any knowledge at all.

Law, rationality and God

Scientists in practice believe passionately in the rationality of scientific law. We are not dealing with an irrational, totally unaccountable and unanalyzable surd, but with lawfulness that in some sense is accessible to human understanding. Rationality is a sine qua non for scientific law. But, as we know, rationality belongs to persons, not to rocks, trees, and subpersonal creatures. If the law is rational, which scientists assume it is, then it is also personal.

...

Scientific law is clearly like a human utterance in its ability to be grammatically articulated, paraphrased, translated, and illustrated. Law is utterance-like, language-like. ... Language, like rationality, belongs to persons. It follows that scientific law is in essence personal. [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 20]

Vern Poythress in his book Redeeming Science attempts to deal with science and scientific issues from a "God-centered" perspective. At the beginning, Poythress attempts to show that science presupposes the existence of God through focusing on scientific law. Now I for one do believe that science requires God to have a foundation for its operation, but does Poythress' argument actually holds?

According to Poythress, science must be personal, or rather, scientific laws must be personal, because it is rational and rationality involves people. I am singularly unimpressed by such argumentation. What is presupposed here is that of a transcendent basis for law, whereas that has not yet been proven. In an emergentist and descriptive view of law and rationality, law and rationality originate "from below." In other words, the reason why the laws are what they are could be because (1) laws must take on one of the many possible forms, and (2) we discover these forms "from below," through our experimentation. Therefore, in this view of law and rationality, scientific laws are not subjectively (i.e. as the subject) rational but rather they are rationally perceived by rational actors. In other words, rationality is not to be predicated of law but of persons, the people doing the discovering. Therefore, law is not personal.

Now, one could conceivably claim a higher view of law, such that certain scientific laws could not be otherwise (i.e. not contingent). Of course, such is rather impossible to prove. But even if one is to concede this for the sake of argument, an absolute principle is still not subjectively rational but rationally perceived. And this is the problem with Poythress' argument here: Law is objectively rational, but it is not subjectively rational. One can claim that an objective law requires a law-giver, but that cannot be merely assumed, or the argument short-circuited by jumping from objective law to the law-giver as the subject.

So how should the argument be framed? It should be framed based upon the constancy of law, and that there should be no reason why law should be constant apart from an unchanging principle supporting it, which is the workings of God. That law is held by scientists to be constant is besides the point, since there is no reason why a scientific law that "holds true" for the last millennium even should the next day operate in the same manner (which is the fallacy of induction). In other words, it is not rationality that points towards God, but constancy.

In conclusion, while I agree with Poythress' conclusion that science requires God to function, I disagree with his sloppy reasoning. This sloppiness will come up again in dealing with other aspects of science, which we will look at very soon.

Justifying beliefs

Let us say that a belief is justified for a person at a time if (a) he is violating no epistemic duties and is within his epistemic rights in accepting it then and (b) his noetic structures is not defective by virtue of his then accepting it. [Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1983), 79]

"Reformed Epistemology" is a system that claims to be based upon truths in the Reformed tradition, particularly as articulated by John Calvin. In a short article dealing with the existence of God as a properly basic belief, Alvin Plantinga wrote against Classical Foundationalism and introduced his idea of properly basic beliefs, of which the existence of God is one of them. In this post, I would like to deal with Plantinga's twin criteria for justification of beliefs.

Plantinga's criteria for justification, as presented here, deal with a person's epistemic duties and a working noetic structure. I would definitely agree that one should hold to be true what is congruent with the other truths one holds to, and thus one ought to not violate his epistemic duties, but that does not help us deal with foundational beliefs, for we are just beginning to ascertain what actually are foundational beliefs. As examples of properly basic beliefs, Plantinga brings up beliefs that one acquires through sense experiences like "I see a tree," but these circumvent the issue of whether the senses are indeed reliable. Whether the senses are generally reliable or not reliable is something that has not been decided yet in the building up of one's epistemology; one cannot assume they are generally reliable from the start unless one is an empiricist (and empiricism is wrong since empiricism itself is not empirically proven to be true).

Now, of course the question might be posed as to why anyone should want to believe that the senses are unreliable. But that is besides the point here. Most people will agree, as do I, that the senses are generally reliable. But one could believe that the senses are generally reliable because of other prior beliefs that are deemed to be more basic. In other words, it is not the case that those who do not accept sense experiences as foundational would therefore distrust the senses. Thus, to posit the criterion that one's noetic structures are not defective by virtue of accepting a belief is to beg the question. How exactly does one define whether one's noetic structures is or isn't defective?

Plantinga's justification criteria for properly basic beliefs are, in this sense, properly basic, yet totally worthless. They are true to the point of tautologies, yet worthless for judging whether any belief X is properly basic, since one cannot know if one is actually violating one's epistemic duties or if one is having a defective noetic structure by holding to belief X. One can be subjectively justified to be sure, sure that one has actually fulfilled those criteria, but since the question of whether belief X truly and objectively conforms to the criteria remains, one can never be objectively justified in holding to any "properly basic belief."

Rome, authority and Argumentum Ad Infinitum

An objection, however, is often made to the doctrine of infallibility, in limine, which is too important not to be taken into consideration. It is urged that, as all religious knowledge rests on moral evidence, not on demonstration, our belief in the Church's infallibility must be of this character; but what can be more absurd than a probable infallibility, or a certainty resting on doubt?— I believe, because I am sure, and I am sure, because I supposed. Granting then that the gift of infallibility be adapted, when believed to unite all intellects in one common confession, the fact that it is given is as difficult of proof as the developments which is to prove, and nurgatory therefore, and in consequence improbable in a Divine Scheme. The advocates of Rome, it has been urged, "insist on the necessity of an infallible guide in religious matters, as an argument that such a guide has really been accorded. Now it is obvious to inquire how individuals are to know with certainty that Rome is infallible... how any ground can be such as to bring home to the mind infallibly that she is infallible; what conceivable proof amounts to more than a probability of the fact; and what advantage is an infallible guide, if those who are to be guided have, after all, no more than an opinion, as the Romanists call it, that she is infallible?" 81.1

This argument, however, excepted when used, as is intended in this passage, against such persons as would remove all imperfection in the proof of Religion, is certainly a fallacious one. For since, as all allow, the Apostles were infallible, it tells against their infallibility, or the infallibility of Scripture, as truly as against the infallibility of the Church; for no one will say that the Apostles were made infallible for nothing, yet we are only morally certain that they were infallible. Further, if we have but probable grounds for the Church's infallibility, we have but the like for the impossibility of certain things, the necessity of others, the truth, the certainty of others; and therefore the words infallibility, necessity, truth, and certainty ought all of them to be banished from the language. But why is it more inconsistent to speak of an uncertain infallibility than of a doubtful truth or a contingent necessity, phrase which present ideas clear and undeniable? In sooth we are playing with words when we use arguments of this sort. When we say that a person is infallible, we mean no more than that what he says is always true, always to be believed, always to be done. The term is resolvable into these phrases as its equivalents; either then the phrases are inadmissible, or the idea of infallibility must be allowed. A probable infallibility is faith and obedience towards a person founded on the probability of his never erring in his declarations or commands. What is inconsistent in this idea? Whatever then be the particular means of determining infallibility, the abstract objection may be put aside. 81.2 [John Henry Cardinal Newman, Essays on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 58-9]

Before there was Catholic Answers, there was John Henry Newman, the apostate from Anglicanism. On the issue of the infallibility of the Roman Church, there is surely some continuity between the two. Protestants, in response to Roman claims on the infallibility of the Church, rightly ask how one can be infallibly certain of that. Newman's response is to say that this same argument can be used against the infallibility of the Apostles and the Scripture, the former probably as a polemic against Anglicanism and the latter against Protestantism as a whole. Since the same argument can be used against other views, either one has to abandon all usage of the words "infallibility, necessity, truth and certainty," or the argument is to be discounted altogether.

Newman's move, while an interesting play on his part, does not actually solve the problem. One can use the same argument to argue for the infallibility of the apostles or the infallibility of Scripture, or basically any authority. Put that (X is infallible) as the thesis, then when one's opponents inquire how one knows that (X is infallible) is true, then claim that either the thesis X is infallible (e.g. Scripture is infallible) is true, or that these words (infallibility, necessity, truth, and certainty) have no meaning whatsoever. Once the form of the argument is recognized, we see that Newman's argument is begging the question. It works only to the extent that his thesis is seen to be the default by which all others are to be judged, but since the thesis itself is questioned, one cannot claim that as the default.

So Rome's claims of authority is circular, and in the end it is no more certain than other claims. That it is circular does not necessarily make it wrong, but it must be admitted that the reason why Romanism is right is because one bases one's faith on the claimed authority of the Roman church (i.e. Sola Ecclesia). The major problem for Romanism now is the inconsistency of its authority figure. Ever since Vatican II, the Roman church has been ever shifting in its positions on all manner of Christians doctrines. Where once heretics and schismatics were anathemized, now Protestants are regarded as "separated brethren" and Muslims and Jews part of the plan of God (Vatican II Document Lumen Gentium). If one's authority is ever shifting, how can it function as the axiom of one's system?

Against Laudian Anglicanism, it is impossible to see the Church Fathers as being authoritative for understanding the Christian faith, since one does not have the entire corpus of Patristic writings and there is always the possibility, and indeed there are, divergences between the various church fathers. As for apostles, the only way we know what the apostles have taught is in the Scriptures. Supposed apostolic tradition mediated to the church fathers always have the question how much is actual mediation, and how much is addition, and thus one cannot appeal to the church fathers as necessarily indicative of apostolic tradition.

Scripture alone can stand as its own authority. The canon of Scripture is fixed and it is closed. Textual variants, because of the multitude of textual evidences, can be evaluated and the original text more or less arrived at. We therefore can know what Scripture teaches and it wouldn't change from age to age, pace Rome, and there wouldn't be problems of incompleteness and divergences, pace Laudian Anglicanism. Scripture is autopistos, authenticating itself as the supreme authority. Can one be "infalllibly sure" of the authority of Scripture? No, in the same way as one cannot be infallibly sure of anything. But one can be sure of its infallibility, while one cannot be sure of the infallibility of any others.

So this Romanist apologetic fails because (1) it cuts all ways, (2) the authority contradicts itself often, (3) Only Scripture is autopistos, while the rest are not. We do not have to fear Rome's promotion of Sola Ecclesia, for it is a broken reed wounding all who rely on it.

Creationism and alternate foundationalisms

Critical realism seeks to chart a third way between the epistemologies of both modernism and postmodernism. It is critical because it accepts the postmodern emphasis on the provisional and always contingent or mediated aspect of knowledge, yet realist because it insists upon the objectivity of the world we encounter and so the possibility of more or less truthful ways of talking about the properties of this world ...

... Postfoundationalists agree with foundationalists that our worldviews can have greater or lesser correspondence with reality, including both scientific and theological truth. They agree with antifoundationalists (and nonfoundationalists), though, that the attempt to build a system of knowledge from a base of indubitable, infallible certitude that somehow stands on its own (whether this base is said to be the "plain" words of Scripture or human sensory experiences or something else) is an utterly failed epistemological project well past its sell-by date.

The postfoundationalist picture of knowledge has often been described as a "net" or "web" of truth, The strength and stability of a net does not depend upon any one of its nodes but upon the entire field as a unified whole. [Ronald E. Osborn, Death Before the Fall: Biblical Literalism and the Problem of Animal Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2014), 118-20]

A key point in debates concerning epistmology has been the sticking of foundationalism with modernist versions of foundationalisms, whether of the Cartesian project, the empirical project, or some fusion of the two. In these modernist epistemologies, the ground is to be some indubitable, transcendent timeless truths that form the foundation for building up the edifice of human knowledge. Needless to say, such foundationalisms even at the time of Descartes were not acceptable to the Christian faith. In this sense, Osborn is right to reject "foundationalism." The problem is whether such modernist foundationalism should be affixed to creationism at all. I would say not.

There are two main streams of creationism: the Fundamentalist and Evangelical stream, and the Reformed stream, and two interact with each other. Among Fundamentalists, the focus is on the reading of Scripture in a biblicistic manner, thus "God says it, it is true." There is always a tendency to read one's culture and assumptions into the text, yet to claim it as "foundationalist" in the modern sense is absurd, because the Fundamentalis are mostly not philosophers thinking about "indutible transcendent timeless truth." Their biblicism is a distortion of Sola Scriptura, yet because they are just treating the text naively, they function basically like premoderns in their epistemology rather than modernist foundationalists. Premoderns do not think about "indubitable transcendent truths," so while Fundamentalists are influenced by culture, it is one thing to claim influence by modernity, and another to claim a modernist epistemology. Osborn's accusation of Fundamentalists as "foundationalist" (in the modernist sense) is therefore in error.

Among the Reformed camp, many YECs embrace creation like premoderns too, as a look at the case for YEC in the 2004 OPC Creation Report, and also in the book The Genesis Debate, shows. These essays were primarily appeals to the traditional teaching of the church that believes in 6-24 creation, and thus Osborn's accusation of "foundationalist" also is in error. There is after all a difference between premodern naive realism and the much-maligned "common sense realism," because the latter consciously sticks to common sense readings and reasonings while the former does not.

I doubt there is therefore one epistemology for creationism. There are obviously many of the most vocal creationists who are empirical foundationalists. They are however others who are presuppositionalists, which is another version of Foundationalism. Presuppositionalism, both Vantilian and Clarkian, are different from the mainstream "modernist" foundationalisms. Vantilian foundationalism puts God as the foundation, while Clarkian foundationalism puts Scripture as the foundation. Both of them are "foundationalist" to the extent that the foundation are the basis for all of truth, and both of them are "critical" in the sense that they recognize the situatedness of all truth claims.

The problem with Osborn is that he does not recognize the difference between Reformed versions of foundationalism and the mainstream modern foundationalisms. Thus, he wrongly tars all creationists with the charge of modern Foundationalisms, while failing to recognize the alternate foundationalisms that some creationists hold to.

Simon Chan and the assault upon the sufficiency of language

... The very being of the church cannot be understood apart from the narrative of the God who reveals himself by sending Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit

This point needs to be reiterated in our postmodern context. The problem is particularly acute for postmodern theologians who, having quite rightly done away with a positivistic view of doctrines as universal timeless truth, end up without any particular truth claims to make. (p. 12)

Perhaps Kevin Vanhoozer's idea of doctrine as drama provides a better way of understanding the relationship between the scriptural text and the ecclesial community that uses the text. According to Vanhoozer, "Doctrine is not merely a proposition, or an expression, but a prompt; a spiritual direction for one's fitting performance of the script."... (p. 13)

To use a different analogy, Scripture sets the initial trajectory for the subsequent development of doctrine in the Christian tradition. There is no separation between Scripture and tradition since Scripture is apostolic tradition. ... (p. 14)

As we have seen in the previous post, Simon Chan follows formally in the footsteps of the Roman Catholic Nouvelle Theologians in the way he goes about interacting with Scripture and tradition. We have a hint already in the manner by which he will discount Sola Scriptura through his framing of ressourcement as not just return to the past but creative engagement with those sources, or in other words interaction without necessary agreement with anything the sources say. All of this comes about through the postmodern linguistic skubalon Chan embraces.

Chan's philosophy of language is nihilistic to the core. He start off by denying doctrinal propositional truths through an attack against "positivism" as stating "eternal, timeless truths." First of all, propositions are not necessarily eternal or timeless, and they might not be true (there are after all false propositional statements). Chan and Vanhoozer and those like them doesn't even seem to understand what propositions are. Propositions are merely statements with a truth claim, which could be contingent or timeless. Chan's book is made up of all manner of propositions, like the statement quoted from Vanhoozer "Doctrine is not merely a proposition, or an expression, but a prompt; a spiritual direction for one's fitting performance of the script." Technically, it is four different propositions in one sentence. It is simply ludicrous when Chan attacks propositions when he is using propositions to do the job. Or does he even understand what the definition of "proposition" is?

As I have written, logic is epistemologically prior to even God, for one cannot even begin to say a single word without presupposing the basic laws of logic. Call me a "rationalist" if you so desire, but that is a fact. The minute you open our mouth or write a single word, you are already presupposing the rules of logic. Likewise, the mere act of refuting propositions requires the writing of propositions to do so. Even if one does not attempt a refutation of propositions, the mere act of stating what one believes uses propositions. Only postmodern linguists are so blind to what they are doing that they commit linguistic suicide over and over again. Chan, while disavowing postmodernism, does not seem to realize that he is doing the very same thing they do when he attacks propositions.

So yes, Scripture has poetry, and drama, and others. But all of these are conveyed using propositional sentences. Propositions stand behind the literary genres as the means through which they are expressed. The failure to recognize this is the fault of all who attack propositional truths, and as such deny the sufficiency of language to convey truth. Behind it all is the devil who first did the same when he questioned, "Has God said?".

Reductio Ad Absurdum and Common Sense

[Previous post here]

The issue of "common sense" and "properly basic beliefs" is surely astonishing in light of the post-modern revolution. It seems that a more sophisticated natural theology and philosophy of sorts for some people is preferable to staring down the abyss of the failure of human philosophy of any kind. The failure of postmoderneity to construct a positive system does not imply that their negative critiques can be discarded. One cannot discount skeptical arguments just because skepticism fails to form a coherent philosophy (and it can't).

The problem with "common sense" is not that "common sense" is at some times useful, or that it should be discounted altogether. To discount "common sense" in toto is self-refuting. The question is not whether "common sense" is valid in some instances, but whether it can be used in reasoning about the grounds of knowledge and of knowing. In other words, to deny the validity of "common sense" for all instances is not self-contradictory.

The problems with appeal to "properly basic beliefs" is that it eliminates questions concerning these beliefs. Such beliefs, being "properly basic," cannot be questioned. However, upon what basis can we not question such beliefs? This is where some appeal to "common sense" is brought in. But as I have repeatedly pointed out, "common sense" is no proof for anything. To extrapolate from the usefulness of "common sense" in some instances to its usefulness in others is unwarranted. This is not to mention that "common sense" changes depending on one's expectations. Before the advent of quantum physics, what is "common-sensical" in science is different from what is "common-sensical" now. Nobody now bats an eyelid in speaking about photons or matter waves, but it was almost inconceivable for those reared in the Newtonian mechanical paradigm. So what exactly is "common-sensical"?

Speaking about "properly basic beliefs," it borrows a lot from Christianity and the Christian-influenced Western zeitgeist. None of this talk about "properly basic beliefs" will make sense in a non-Western culture, where for example a denial of the reality of the external world is considered "common-sensical." In this light, it should be interesting for "Reformed Epistemology" if they would get out of its cultural zone and actually engage (not just discount) Eastern philosophers, NOT Western-influenced Eastern philosophers. Such an engagement should prove that "properly basic beliefs" don't exist as such.

Presupositionalism and Sense Experience

The Vantillian attack against Clarkian epistemology has so far seem to be based upon blatant misrepresentation and failure of logical thinking. One direction of attack which Vantillians such as Greg Bahnsen has advocated is the objection of sense experience.

According to Greg Bahnsen:

ARGUMENT I — Clark contends:

P1. Any position that leads to skepticism is false

P2. Empiricism leads to skepticism.

C1.: Empiricism is false.

ARGUMENT II — Furthermore, Clark argues:

P3. Man cannot know anything through his senses (from C1).

P4. Human knowledge is limited to the contents of divine revelation (The Bible).

P5. But man cannot know the content of the Bible save through his senses.

C2. Therefore, man cannot know the truths God has revealed in the Bible.

ARGUMENT III

P6. The only knowledge available to man is contained in the Bible (from P4).

P7. But, for Clark, man cannot attain this knowledge (from C2).

C3. It follows that Clark's view reduces to skepticism.

C4. It follows further that Clark's view is false (from P1).

[Greg Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended (ed. Joel McDurmon; Powder Springs, GA: American Vision & Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media, 2008, 2011), 194]

The issue arises from premise 5. If Bahnsen has accurately represented the problem, then of course he is right in his argument.

Leaving aside discussion of premise 4 for now and granting its truth for the sake of argument, the main problem with premise 5 comes about through the confusion between senses functioning as the instruments and as the grounds. Bahnsen's error is that he does not differentiate between the two. For example, in justification the grounds of justification is Christ's merit, and the instrument of justification is faith. To confuse the two would be fatal, for making faith the ground would imply that our faith is meritorious towards our salvation.

Likewise, if we claim that the senses are instruments for knowing and not the grounds for knowing, that implies that knowledge is not dependent upon the use of the senses; only our process of knowing is dependent upon the senses. Therefore, both Bahnsen's premise 5 and conclusion 2 are amphibolies.

To clarify Clark's argument, we should amend the argument as follows:

ARGUMENT II

P3*. Man cannot know anything based upon his senses (from C1).

P4. Human knowledge is limited to the contents of divine revelation (The Bible).

P5*. Man cannot know the content of the Bible save through the instrument of his senses.

C2*. Therefore, man cannot come to know the truths God has revealed in the Bible without his senses. But man can know the truths of the Bible without grounding it in his senses.

With this amended argument, we can see that Bahnsen's criticism is invalidated.

The Vantillian critique should lead us to ask of Vantillian presuppositionalism some questions. Do the Vantillians mean to say that sense experience can help us to know the truth? If sense experience in some sense functions as part of the ground for knowledge, then Vantillianism does not have Scripture as its ultimate authority epistemologically.

To be sure, Vantillianism and Greg Bahnsen in particular claim that one must presuppose God and Scripture in everything. How this works out however is an ontological presupposition not an epistemic presupposition. In other words, all manner of knowing (e.g. sense experience, science etc) are legitimate tools to gain true knowledge. What Vantillianism teaches however is that these grounds must be ontologically corrected by a Christian worldview. In other words, a "Christian worldview" as an ontic entity, for the knowledge that comes from treating Scripture as the principium cognoscendi, norms all knowledge (viewed ontologically). But epistemologically, how one knows something is pretty much irrelevant.

Clarkian thought is true and proper presuppositionalism. Vantillian thought is presuppositional only in its ontological view of knowledge. In its epistemic grounds however, it is not truly based upon Scripture but regards all grounds and methods as legitimate as long as they are normed by a Christian worldview and thus presupposed God.

Christianity, Verification and Falsifiability

[Greg Bahsen in criticizing Gordon Clark's alleged rationalism] The regulative demands of logic provide an atmosphere that envelops both Creator and creature. Hence if God should wish to speak to man, His revelation should be testable by the fourth book of Aristotle's metaphysics. He should be able to pass the test honorably. As Clark sees it, the sinner is not furthering his hostility against God and His Word by calling His revelation into question and subjecting it to the criterion of logic, but rather has the right and obligation to scrutinize any claim to revelation. (p. 151)

The very notion of proving God's existence is inherently misguided; God alone is adequate to witness to Himself. All of man's interpretive and discursive reasoning must be self-consciously subordinated to God and the authoritative direction of His Word. If the truth of God's Word were Clark's absolute presupposition, he would not consider it needing verification, or God's existence needing proof. (p. 154)

We are led to believe that Christianity would be undermine if certain proofs could be verifiably formulated. However, Clark should have maintained that Christianity salvages logic, not vice versa. (p. 150)

[Greg L. Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended (ed. Joel McDurmon; Powder Springs, Georgia: American Vision, 2008, 2011)]

Now if Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. For if the dead are not raised, not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied. (1 Cor. 15:12-19)

In Greg Bahnsen's posthumously published book, Bahnsen attempts to critique Gordon Clark's epistemology. In the process, Bahnsen showed an appalling ignorance of logic, misrepresentation of Clark's epistemology, and a misunderstanding of how Scripture argues.

One main critique Bahnsen has is that Clark promotes the fact that one can verify the claims of Christianity. According to Bahnsen, by making Christianity verifiable by logic, Clark places logic above revelation and thus is a rationalist. Scripture is no more the ultimate authority in Clark's system but reason is. But has Bahnsen even begin to understand Clark's epistemology, and even the basic concepts of logic?

The problem that Bahnsen has is that he fails to differentiate between verification and falsification. Verification means that one proves that something is right. If done via deduction, the form of the argument is some form of modus ponens. Applied to Christianity, verification would give an argument of such a form:

If X, then Christianity is true

X

Therefore, Christianity is true

Falsification however follows the form of modus tollen. Applied to Christianity, falsification would give an argument of the form:

If Christianity is true, then X

~X (?)

Therefore Christianity is false

The process of verification would make Christianity dependent upon truths discovered via either the empirical or rational methods or both. In other words, the process of verification would certainly make Scripture not the final authority. If Clark was indeed promoting verification, then certainly Bahnsen's critique would be valid.

The problem comes when we see that Clark is actually promoting falsification not verification. We can see this even from a quote used by Bahnsen to argue to the contrary. Clark is quoted as saying:

If the Biblical doctrine are self-consistent, they have actually met the only legitimate test of reason. This test of logic is precisely the requirement that a set of propositions be meaningful, whether spoken by God or man.

[Gordon Clark," Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible (1959, 37). As cited in Bahnsen, 151)]

We note here that Clark is arguing for the logical coherency within a system. Clark's argument can be described as follows:

P1: If [belief system A] were true, then propositions X, Y, and Z

P2: If X were true, then ~Z

IC1: Therefore, if [belief system A] were true, then propositions ~Z

[Consequentia Mirabilis!]

C: Belief system A is false

In form, such a reductio ad absurdum follows the similar form of modus tollens. In other words, even from the quote cited by Bahnsen, we can see that Clark is actually advocating for falsification and not verification.

In falsification, one can make Scripture one's final authority. In fact, unless Scripture is totally disconnected with the real world, Scripture must be falsifiable. Scripture in fact gives us a perfectly clear falsifiable criterion for Christianity in 1 Cor. 15: 12-19. The complex argument there can be boiled down to the argument that if Jesus is not raised from the dead, then Christianity is false and so on. The logical argument of this passage of Scripture therefore is as follows:

If Christianity is true, then Jesus rose from the dead

[Jesus did not raise from the dead]?

Therefore, if [Jesus did not raise from the dead], Christianity is false

The problem with evidentialism is that they argue based upon verification principles. Thus, they argue as follows:

If Jesus rose from the dead, then Christianity is true

Jesus rose from the dead

Christianity is true

Such an argument makes something other than God's revelation the ultimate authority, and is in fact false since the first premise is not necessarily true.

Christianity therefore must be a falsifiable religion. Clark is perfectly consistent in stating that Scripture is the final authority and also claiming that Scripture could be tested for its consistency.

Bahnsen's critique simultaneously reveals the problem with the Van Tillian approach. If one claims that one must subordinate logic to revelation epistemology (as opposed to ontologically), then one is saying that Christianity is non-falsifiable. For revelation to be primary epistemologically means that Scripture is beyond all means of testing. In other words, Van Tillians such as Bahnsen are logically committed to saying that even if Jesus did not rise from the dead, Christianity is still true, since after all we cannot elevate "facts" above Scripture. This sort of fideism makes Christianity no different from all other mystery religions that are disconnected from this world. Of course, Van Tillians are not consistent with their professed epistemology, and still believe the teaching of 1 Cor. 15:12-19.

Bahnsen's critique of Clark at this main point is totally without any basis at all. Bahnsen misrepresents Clark, ignores the arguments of Scripture in 1 Cor. 15:12-19, and fails his logic. Christianity is a rational (not rationalistic) religion, and it can be be subject to tests for disproval but never proved.

The essential difference between Vantillian and Clarkian epistemology

Epistemology is almost always a complicated subject. To complicate matters, [Cornelius] Van Til is not easy to understand, and both [Gordon] Clark and Van Til do not speak at the same level and use the same terms differently. So in an effort to simplify things, I offer this as my understanding of the issue. [Those who want some documentary proof check out my other posts on Clark or Van Til]

According to Van Til, the Trinity is the archetype for all knowledge. According to Clark, the Trinity is a vital part of revelation but not the archetype for knowledge. Rather, the Scriptures is the principium and basis for all knowledge.

In Vantillian epistemology, since the Trinity is the archetype for knowledge, therefore all knowledge is by definition analogical. This is because there is a qualitative difference between God and Man with no univocal point of contact, as the Creator is distinct from the creature. All of Man's knowledge is creaturely and therefore cannot be univocal. "Univocal knowledge" in the Vantillian system refer to knowledge that erases the Creator/creature distinction and make the knower knowing truth as God knows it. Such a univocal knower may not know everything that God knows, but the part of the truth that he knows, he knows it to the same comprehensive detail that God knows that truth.

In Clarkian epistemology, which I am convinced IS the biblical and Reformed epistemology, we definitely agree that the Trinity is basic for Christianity. But the Trinity is basic in terms of ontology, in terms of grounding the world and everything that exists in its being. God in the Trinity is the principium essendi (beginning of being), and therefore without God nothing exists least of all [the being of] knowledge.

On top of this however, we realize that the Trinity is revealed to us humans by the Scriptures. Apart from Special Revelation in the Scriptures, no one can know the Trinity. The Trinity is not something that even a Christian can know intuitively and mystically apart from reading the Scriptures and internalizing the biblical data and worldview. Since this is the case, the Trinity cannot be properly basic for epistemology, for the Scriptures is the source for our knowledge of the Trinity.

The Scriptures is God's ectypal revelation to us. Since it is already accommodated to us humans, knowledge is univocal between God's intended revelation (ectypal theology simpliciter dicta) and our grasped knowledge (in subiecto). We can only know what God reveals. Even the Trinity is known to us only inasmuch as Scripture reveals it to us, either overtly or by good and necessary consequence.

As it can be seen, the two systems start off from very different foundations, and the divergence shows up in confusion as the two sides often misunderstand the other. I offer this of course to aid in some small manner to clear the fog.

Why do I not hold to Van Til's epistemology? As mentioned, I do not believe that the Trinity can be known apart from Scripture. I believe in a two track system differentiating between ontology and epistemology, with the Triune God as the principium essendi (beginning of being) and Scriptures as the principium congnoscendi (beginning of knowledge), and the two do not collapse into each other. Van Til's epistemology is also very problematic in making room for speculation on the Trinity, although of course Vantillians do not necessary do so. But if we place the Trinity prior to Scriptures, then why should our theories about the Trinity be necessarily tied to Scripture, since the former after all determines the latter in the Vantillian system? What safeguard is therefore in the Vantillian epistemology to stop speculations concerning the internal essence of the Trinity for the promotion of theories such as Social Trinitarianism, or making the Trinity the archetype for whatever three-fold relations we have concocted?

Such is why I am a Clarkian not a Vantillian.

Back and forth on Meek's "Personal Knowledge"

Some time back, I have had a short exchange with another guy over my Amazon.com review of Esther Meek's [Polanyian] epistemology as seen in her book Longing to Know. You can read the entire exchange here. Here is an excerpt from one of the last comments:

The denigration of certainty is inconsistent with the Christian faith because it posits a false dichotomy between certainty and confidence. We are to have both - certainty because of the surety of God's autopistos revelation. and confidence because of our relationship with Jesus Christ. As I have said, the problem with Meek is not that trust and confidence is wrong, but that she denigrates certainty, and she deals with the fiducia part of faith instead of the cognitio and assentia which is what epistemology is supposed to deal with.

Polanyi and Personal Knowledge: A brief analysis

... I think we may distinguish between the personal in us, which actively enters into our commitments, and our subjective states, in which we merely endures our feelings. This distinction establishes the conception of the personal, which is neither subjective nor objective. In so far as the personal submits to requirements acknowledged by itself as independent of itself, it is not subjective; but in so far as it is an action guided by individual passions, it is not objective either. It transcends the disjunction between subjective and objective.

— Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 1962), 300

Post-critical philosopher Michael Polanyi in his book on personal knowledge seeks to come up with a philosophical system that solves the problems present in modern philosophy since Kant. In the discussion of personal knowledge, as can see from the quote above, Polanyi states that personal knowledge is neither subjective nor objective, but instead occupies a category of its own. However, is that truly the case?

One thing which we can see from Polanyi's book is his progressive reasoning from the psychological processes involved in articulation, knowing and persuasion. The primary thrust of Polanyi's philosophy therefore is an argument from the psychological and physical processes involved in knowing, knowledge acquisition and communication/ persuasion. It is in this light that we can come to know what Polanyi means by "personal knowledge."

According to Polanyi, knowing is neither subjective nor objective, but personal. As proof, Polanyi states that it is not subjective because the knowing process submits to "requirements acknowledged by itself as independent of itself." The question we have to ask therefore is: Why does the presence of this psychologizing necessarily make it not subjective? Certainly, it is a problem for the justification of persuasion, but an expressivist (one anti-realist counterpart to subjectivism) view of knowledge and morality can easily explain the psychological process involved. Someone can think that there is a standard independent of himself without there actually being a real standard independent of itself.

Polanyi's argument therefore on it not being subjective therefore is not valid. But we do agree that an expressivist view is not viable either because it does not properly account for the act of persuasion (the Moral Problem).

Next, we would look at Polanyi's denial of it being objective in nature. According to Polanyi, it is not objective because it is "guided by individual passions." Here, we can see clearly the main error in Polanyi's thought on personal knowledge. What exactly is objectivity? Objectivity refers to the value of something being true regardless of persons. In other words, objectivity has respect to the thing believed, not the person believing it. The only way for Polanyi to think that guidance of individual passions necessitates the denial of the objectivity of things believed is to postulate an anti-realist ontology whereby things are not truly real. In this scheme, everything is real only to the extent it is personally appropriated.

We can see therefore that the denial of the objective-subjective dichotomy is predicated on the denial of ontologically objective reality — the denial that there is anything outside of the knower; extra nos. For if we admit of ontological objective reality, then Polanyi's system will collapse into anti-absolutist objectivist epistemology, as psychology given an ontologically real word is merely descriptive not explanatory.

The Christian however must admit that there is something outside of us, namely God. God is the one who determines the world (ontology) and determines meaning (epistemology). Since God is extra nos, there is objective reality in the world that does not depend on us perceiving it to be so. And objective reality implies that our knowledge is similarly objective, with psychology being merely descriptive never explanatory. Our "personal knowing" do not determine the world and its meaning. Instead, God is the one who determines meaning and He reveals that to us. Articulation, knowledge and knowledge acquisition, and persuasion are done (however imperfectly) because truth is real and objective, based upon the standards of God revealed to us.

Therefore, we who are Christians are to reject Polanyi's idea of personal knowledge as being anthropocentric, of committing the "is-ought" fallacy (by turning psychology from being descriptive to explanatory) and of seriously begging the question (assuming empiricism and then use inductive arguments which are always fallacious). Polanyi's philosophy is therefore logically fallacious and unbiblical, and Christians therefore ought to avoid it.

[See review of Esther Meek's book Longing to Know here.]

Christianity and Metanarratives

[Jean-Francois Lyotard's] problem with metannaratives has nothing to do with the scope of their claims — that they are "large-scale" stories of "universal scope" — but the nature of their legitimation. (p. 126)

As such, modern [as oppose to postmodern] legitimation has recourse to a universal criterion: Reason. It is this mover that generates what Lyotard famously describes as "metanarratives": appeals to criteria of legitimation that are understood as standing outside any particular language game and thus guarantee "universal" truth (p. 130)

... the biblical narrative and Christian faith do not claim to be legitimated by an appeal to a universal, autonomous Reason, but rather by an appeal to faith (or, to translate, "myth" or "narrative"). (p. 131)

— James K.A, Smith, A Little Story about Metanarratives. In Myron B. Penner, ed., Christianity and the Postmodern Turn: Six Views (Grand Rapid, MI: BrazosPress, 2005)

Also:

...in philosophical discourse, "meta" signifies a difference of level and not primarily of size. A metanarrative is a metadiscourse in the sense of being a second-level discourse designed to legitimize one or more first-order discourses (p. 148)

— Merold Westphal, Onto-theology, Metanarrative, Perspectivism, and the Gospel. In Idem.

Is Christianity a metanarrative? Theologians like Kevin Vanhoozer and Michael Horton would suggest not. Rather, Christianity is a "meganarrative" as the the Bible is a grand narrative depicting the historical progression of God and His workings in the world.

The postmodernist Jean-Francois Lyotard famously declared that "I declare postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives". But what are metanarratives as decried by Lyotard, and is Christianity a legitimate target for incredulity?

In the essay by Smith, metanarratives are distinguished by the fact that they appeal to a "universal criterion of Reason". According to Smith's interpretation of Lyotard, metanarratives are not defined by the scope of their claims but rather the grounds of their legitimacy or authority. Therefore, Christianity according to Smith is not a metanarrative because it is based upon "faith".

In response, one wonders what Smith means by stating that Christianity is based upon "faith". Certainly, if by "universal criterion of Reason" one means a Platonic and Cartesian view of rationality, then Christianity is most definitely not grounded on "Reason". But it is one thing to deny Cartesianism, it is another thing to deny rationality; one does not imply the other.

What exactly is "faith"? Is it a Kierkegaardian existential idea of the "leap of faith"? The problem with throwing around the word "faith" is that one appears pious without actually defining what one means by the term, for after all which Christian is against faith?

In the second quoted statement, Smith seems to equate "faith" with "myth" or "narrative". This is troubling. It brings to mind some of the use of the phrase "mythopoetic language" as it relates to the teachings of Scripture, especially when used by non-literalists to interpret Genesis 1. How does this "faith" or "myth" or "narrative" relate to truth and reality? Is the Christian story intending to set forward universal claims which however is wholly subjective and isolated from reality? Of course, one can embrace a constructivist view of reality, but if so is God then a constructed reality for the needs of Man? It does not help to adopt Merold Westphal's method of inviting others to see and enter into the Christian story (p.234) if Christianity itself is a narrative linguistic construct. What we instead have is the reduction of Christianity to a myth on par with other myths like the Gilgamash Epic. If Christianity is not transcendentally real, the "meganarrative" is mere subjectivism.

It can be argued that the ground of legitimacy is in the evidences for the empty tomb and others like them, in other words Evidentialist Apologetics. By itself however, this does not seem to be protected from Smith's interpretation of Lyotard's criterion of what constitutes "metanarratives". While certainly history is the domain of God's working in the world, empirical data are not self-interpreting. Furthermore, are we to think that the same criterion that Lyotard used against Rationalism is benign against Empiricism, seeing that Lyotard has in mind the entire Modernist enterprise?

If Smith's interpretation of Lyotard in his attack on Modernism is correct, and we mean by "universal criterion" the idea of universal self-evident truths known to Man, then Christianity is not a "metanarrative", but not because it is based upon "faith" (contra Smith). Rather, Christianity is based upon the universally true but externally revealed criterion of revelation, especially in the particularly rationally revealed Word of God. It is not "universally known" but it comes to us extra nos, from outside us. It is also not based upon the naked empirical data of history but the interpretation of the data that comes through God's [General] Revelation described by His Special Revelation.

Smith's interpretative definition of Lyotard's term "metanarrative" seems not to be unanimously held to. Merold Westphal primarily defines "metanarrative" from the sum of its parts, and hence metanarrative is a second level discourse on narratives. Therefore we have metaphysics (discourse on being). metaethics (discourse on being and knowing of ethics), and of course metanarratives, which in his view is discourse to legitimize one or more narratives. According to this modified definition, Christianity must indeed be consider a "metanarrative". To deny that Christianity is not a "metanarrative" in this sense suggest that Christianity is made up of mere stories of which the truth values are irrelevant. So while Christianity as "kerymatic" deals with what it teaches and speaks to the first-level discourse on matters pertaining to church practice and Christian living (p. 239), it has nothing to say about reality. One wonders how Eschatology functions in such a system, since how can Christ be said to come again in the last judgment which is universal and real in scope? Christian eschatology in this system can only function as literary and poetical devices, not as something that will happen again. Ditto for creation too, since both events impinge upon second-level discourses. In fact, the idea of redemptive history is itself a second level discourse, and true fidelity to only usage of first level discourse should logically result in biblical atomism.

So according to Westphal's definition, Christianity is a "metanarrative", notwithstanding his argument against it. To appeal to faith is simplistic for the same reason why Smith is wrong. In fact, the idea that Heilgeschichte (lit. "holy history") is kerygmatic not apologetic is itself a second level discourse statement on the Christian faith (p. 150). That by itself is enough to discount Westphal's attempted synthesis of postmodernism and Christianity.

So in conclusion, is Christianity a metanarrative? Yes and no. In the strict definition of the term, it is indeed one. However, if we adopt Smith's interpretation of Lyotard's definition, then no. Christianity while universal is not universally known but particularly revealed. For our purposes therefore, in apologetics, it would help to know what particular individuals mean by the term "metanarratives" before answering if Christianity is indeed one.

Paper: The Apologetic Import of the Autopistia of Scripture

I have just received my other paper back. The paper is entitled The Apologetic Import of the Autopistia of Scripture. Barring formatting changes, the paper is presented as submitted, here.

An excerpt:

In apologetic endeavors, the question of authority or the ground of knowledge is an important one. How can one know what is the truth? For a Christian, not only do we ponder over the question of how we can know what the truth is, but the question of how truth and Scripture relate to each other is equally pertinent.

In this paper, I would like to defend the thesis that the doctrine of autopistia or the self-authenticating nature of Scripture substantiates the proper foundation or ground of knowledge which is the Scriptures themselves, and that this can be used profitably in the realm of apologetics. To this end, firstly, I will put forward the proposition that the foundation for the framework of all knowledge is the Scriptures themselves. Secondly, I would show how the doctrine of autopistia can be used to substantiate it. Thirdly, I would proceed from there to suggest a method to apply this fact in the realm of apologetics.

[cont]

These would be extremely pertinent I think:

There is therefore no shame and no need to hide the fact that the Christian epistemology is circular, for all epistemologies are likewise circular. ...

...

What is the import of this doctrine [of autopistia] in apologetics? Since all epistemologies are circular, the fact that the ultimate authority of the faith appeals to itself is actually self-consistent with its own claim to be the ultimate authority. Although it is most definitely not sufficient to prove the faith, as if apart from the work of the Spirit anyone can be argued into the kingdom, the coherency of the Christian system is a work of beauty indeed.

Along these lines, we have a platform to critique rival epistemologies. Empiricism can be critiqued because there is nothing in empiricism to validate empiricism as a valid epistemology. Rationalism can be similarly critiqued since formulae such as Cogito Ergo Sum (I think therefore I am) are not inherently found in reason but reasoned out in order to support rationalism. In other word, reason itself never claimed to be an ultimate authority in any sense. Rather, it is fallen men who cling on to reason as their ultimate authority since that is internally all they have, and they therefore make reason their ultimate authority by an irrational leap of faith.

The Archetypal/ Ectypal distinction and Clarkian epistemology

I have managed to finish my main intended project for this term break: an article interacting with parts of Dr. R. Scott Clark's article on the Well-Meant Offer in the book The Pattern of Sound Doctrine, a fetscrift for Dr. Bob Strimple edited by Dr. David VanDrunen. My article is entitled The Archetypal/Ectypal distinction and Clarkian epistemology, and can be found here.

An excerpt:

The distinction between archetypal and ectypal knowledge as promoted by the 17th century Reformed theologian Franciscus Junius is vital in Reformed scholastic thought. In this short article, I would like to interact with it as it is presented in Willem J. Van Asselt’s article in the Westminster Theological Journal of 2002, and tie that in with Clarkian epistemology. It is my opinion that there is no necessary conflict between the two, contrary to Dr. R. Scott Clark’s opinion that the denial of the archetypal/ectypal distinction is foundational to Clark’s epistemology and his denial of the Well-Meant Offer.

In this article therefore, I would first present the archetypal/ectypal distinction as presented by Van Asselt, and evaluate how that can tie in with Clarkian epistemology. Lastly, I would interact with some of Scott Clark’s criticism on the subject and show that it does not apply to Gordon Clark either in his epistemology or his denial of the Well-Meant Offer.

[cont]

[Note: An article is not a(n) [academic] paper. Unfortunately, almost all of my Gordon Clark books are back in Singapore so I can't reference them]