The will and personal identity, as pertaining to the philosophy behind classical theism

If will is a personal property, it folllows that personal identity is located in freely willed actions. It means that a person is most fully herself when freely exercising the prerogative to initiate actions and make decisions. (Adonis Vidu, The Same God who works all things, p. 111)

What is a person? What is a person's identity? For one, it can be "tall, smart, black hair, male, Chinese," and for another, "eloquest, short, female, American." Personal identities, subjectively speaking, are intensively personal and pick up the traits that a person portrays as well as other distinguishing things about them. Objectively speaking, personal identities can cover all of the traits of a person, to identify that person against another.

Personal properties are of course the properties of a person, and thus key to their personal identities. So, in humans, if will is a personal property, is will part of their personal identity? For humans, of course not, because all humans have wills. The exercise of that will in action can form part of a person's identity (e.g. successful businessman), but that has nothing to do with the will per se but the will as acted out in the business actions he takes. Will we say that in humans, a person's identity is located in freely willed actions? No, because it is what is willed and what is done that identifies a person.

How then should we respond to Vidu's strange comment on will being a personal property? Vidu I think fails to differentiate being something being present, and something acted out. If will is a personal property, it can be said that a personal identity is that a person is a moral agent. However, the exercise of that will is an act, which the person can and does exercise. Therefore, it is a non sequitur to claim that "will" being a personal property implies that the personal identity is located in freely willed actions. The will is after all distinct from the act, though not separate from it.

There are of course more nuances when it comes to God, but the problem here is how Vidu, as with many of his Roman Catholic ressourcement friends, seem to think that a rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics and Aquinas is the cause of the problems with the world today (Modernism and Postmodernism). There are many problems with modernism and postmodernism, but making will a personal property has nothing to do with self-autonomy and the need for self-expression and self-actualization.

The corruption of Aristotelian metaphysics in classical theism: Exhibit B

Now, and this is the pivotal move in this argument, if the persons are identified with the relations, if these are relations that subsist in the unity of an intellectual substance, and if other relations, contingent and economic, were to obtain between the persons—where there would be a to and fro, a giving and a taking—then the very identity of the persons would also depend in some way upon these contingent and finite realities. (Adonis Vidu, The Same God who Works All Things, p. 100)

In hard classical theism, ressourcement classical theism, the persons are identified with the relations (paternity, begotten, proceeding). Note that we are not denying that the persons are relations in some sense. But in hard classical theism, the only distinction between the persons are the (eternal) relations. These relations are eternal, necessary and pertains to the very nature of the Godhead. To posit any other relation other than these is to make "the very identity of the person" to be dependent "in some way upon these contingent and finite realities."

The problem with this view is precisely at this fixation on "relations." Even if we were to hold to the identity thesis, who is to say that one kind of relations (the eternal kind) precludes other types of relations (the contingent kind)? Vidu is positing a univocity of the term "relation" in order to deny that God can form any type of non-ontic and/or non-eternal relations either within the Godhead or with anything in creation. It is the amphiboly fallacy. And why must a relation make "the very identity of the person" dependent on contingent and finity realities? All of us know that God is the Creator of the universe, so does this relation of "being a Creator" make God dependent upon the contingent and finite reality of the universe, or we are going to make inane arguments about what constitues a "real relation" or not?

While the doctrine of God is certainly hard and mysterious, as pertaining to the mysteries of the Almighty God, sometimes it seems that it is theologians who are busy making God more mysterious than He is. This is the kind of argument that creates all kinds of gnots for theologians to twist and turn in order to make themselves look smart and God more mysterious, as if God needs the help of Man to make Himmself beyond full comprehension! The persons of the Godhead are indeed defined by their personal relations (paternity, begotten, proceeding), but to therefore claim that they cannot have any other types of relations is an assertion not a proof.

The corruption of Aristotelian metaphysics in classical theism: Exhibit A

"A thing acts in so far as it is in act," Aquinas wrote. By no means an esoteric principle of the Common Doctor, this axiom merely expresses the simple idea that the activity of a particular thing is determined in its nature by the kind of thing it is. A rock can't speak, but it can break; water can flow, but it can't break; and so on. [Adonis Vidu, The Same God who works all things, 92]

The so-called "ressourcement" of classical theism has been treating Aristotelian metaphysics, as modified by Thomas Aquinas, as axiomatic. As I read through this book by Adonis Vidu, I would like to point out places where this has been done, to the detriment of common sense and biblical theism.

An action of a thing is determined by its nature? Now, if we are merely saying that actions cannot contradict the nature of a thing, then of course that is true. A human cannot naturally fly, because a human does not have the apparatus for flying (e.g. wings, hollow wing bones etc). But where Aristotle goes with it is a form of hard determinism, where a nature determines actions. Or, in the case of God, nature wills actions. "...the nature of the action is determined by the nature of the agent." (Ibid.) In other words, God Himself does not have libertarian free will. But this is nonsense. A human being can do good, but a good Calvinist will say that humans have a fallen nature incapable of doing good. A human being can and have invented lots of things, but is the nature of inventing an airplane (as opposed to being inventive) determined by the nature of human beings?

The natural sciences have in large part rejected this principle for the simple reason that it restricts scientific research. Science cannot be done if scientists are constantly being told what they can or cannot do according to metaphysical considerations. For Aristotle and Aquinas to say is before the scientific revolution is understandable. For people in the 21st century to say that is to be a Luddite.

A free being such as God can do anything not contrary to His nature. He is not restricted to what philosophers think He can or cannot do. Therefore, to claim something about the nature of God from His actions is not a good argument. Of course, God's actions may reflect on His nature, but that is an argument to be made, not assumed.

Debate: Gavin Ortlund versus RT Mullins

Gavin Ortlund and Ryan Mullins has done a sortof debate on whether the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is true, with Ortlund taking the affirmative position and Mullins the negative position. You can watch the debate below:

The problem with the new scholasticism - "Retrieval of classical theism"

According to the philosopher, the people on the first story have no visible stairway by which they may walk up to the second story and actually see the nature of who God is. They can look at pictures that God the owner has placed on the first story. Some of the pictures are very good and very beautiful. But it is still all the first story. The philosopher, however, is like the manager of the house. He knows about a secret, hidden back stairway, used only by the manager of the house.

He has been up the stairway, by means of reason and Aristotle’s categories. He has special qualifications. He can tell us what the actual situation is. The secret back stairway is an exciting discovery because of its intellectual power.

But does the secret back stairway actually exist? Or is the philosopher himself under an illusion? …

[Vern S. Poythress, The Mystery of the Trinity: A Trinitarian Approach to the Attributes of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 2020), pp. 336-7]

There is concealed a pride, a self-satisfaction, and a knowing superiority to ordinary Christians who have not achieved such heights of reverence for the Almighty. (p. 460)

The fourth response, classical Christian theism, attempts mediation by prioritizing transcendence, that is, prioritizing the second story. But to do this prioritizing, we must first have adequate knowledge of the second story itself. And so the back stairway enters the picture. (p. 487)

In his book promoting a form of "classical Christian theism," a phrase which up till now seems amorphous, Vern Pothress cautioned against the over-use of philosophy in understanding the doctrine of God. Without pointing out anyone today in particular, Poythress points out the problems with utilizing Aristotelian categories to understand God. Of course, the rest of us can be less restrained, and point out the arrogance and superiority mindset that infects modern day neo-Thomists, who insist that anyone rejecting Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of God are heretics who should be de facto excommunicated from the Church.

The main problem with the new scholasticism promoted by Matthew Barrett, Carl Trueman, Craig Carter et al. is not so much whether they think that a Thomistic doctrine of God is good, but that that is the only way one must conceive of God. While claiming the Creator-creature distinction, and holding the distinction between archetypal/ ectypal theology, they undermine it with what Poythress call their "secret, hidden back stairway," where they can behold God as He truly is. They are the only ones who truly know God; the peons must just bow down to their superior intellect, and don't you dare question the Great Tradition™ !

God is God; he is beyond all human comprehension, and that applies to philosophers and theologians. Instead of thinking that we must have it correct, Christians especially should understand that the only reason why we can know God is that God reveals Himself to us. Instead of trying to recover "Natural Theology," wwith the idea that Man can somehow grasp a knowledge of God by His own intellect, we should understand that total depravity extends to the intellect. We are sinners, even in and especially when we think, and the idea that somehow we can climb a hidden back stairway to understand God is a mockery of the God who reveals Himself to us.

Therefore, we should be humble in our assertions of who and what God is. By all means hold to Thomstic views if that is what one is convicted of, but do so with humility. A little less pride and more humility, more teachability, will go a long way in preserving the peace and unity of the Church.

See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ. (Col. 2:8)

John Damascene on energies

For activity is the natural power and movement of each essence. (St John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 147)

ἐνέργεια γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φυσικὴ ἑκάστης οὐσίας δύναμίς τε καὶ κίνησις (pp. 147-8)

And again: Natural activity is the innate movement of every essence. It is therefore clear that those things that have the same essence have the same activity, and those things that have different natures also have different activity. For it impossible for an essence to be without a natural activity. (p. 148)

Natural activity, again, is the power that makes each essence manifest. And again: Natural and primary activity is the ever-moving power of the intellectual soul, that is to say, its every-moving reason flowing out naturally from it. Natural activity is the power and movement of each essence; only non-being is without it. (p. 148)

One should know that the second way embraces both potentiality and actuality, for on the one hand, the latter is in potentiality, on the other, the former is in actuality. (p. 148)

Χρὴ οὖν γινώσκειν, ὁτι ὁ δεύτερος τρόπος κοινός ἐστι τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, δεύτερος μὲν τοῦ δυνάμει, πρῶτος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ (p. 148)

Far from the static view of the classical God, the Eastern tradition has preserved a more dynamic view of God through its preservation of the difference between "essence," "energies," and "acts." In John of Damascus' work, all essences must have energies, and part of these energies includes the actions being do. However, the main focus of "energies" is to manifest the essence, not the actions themselves. Actions are part of the energies, but are not all of the energies. That is why actions are discussed later, after discussions of the "natural and primary activity" of the intellectual soul. We note here that discussions of "actuality" and "potentiality," where the same term is used for "actualities," should be taken to mean that "actualities" is a subset of "energies," rather than the two being the same.

God is thus not the "unmoved Mover," but rather He constantly "moves" yet never changes. The Father loves the Son, yet neither change despite the dynamism of the relationship. God has His own movement, and it is we who are blessed because of it.

John Damascene's view on the will

One needs to know that here is a faculty naturally implanted in the soul that is appetitive of what is in accordance with nature and embraces everything that is essentially characteristic of nature. This is called the capacity for willing (θέλησις, thelēsis). For the essence of being and living and moving, both mentally and sensibly, has an appetency directed towards its own natural and full realization. For that reason, this natural will (θέλημα, thelēma) is also defined as follows: Will is a rational and vital appetency that depends solely on what belongs to nature. (St John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 144)

Θέλημά ἐστιν ὄρεξις λογική τε καὶ ζωτικὴ μόνων ἠρτημένη τῶν φυσικῶν (Ibid., 143)

Actual willing or wishing (βούλησις, boulēsis) is a natural capacity for willing of a particular kind, that is to say, a natural and rational appetency in relation to some specific thing. For there lies within the human soul a faculty of reaching out in a rational manner. Therefore when this rational appetency in relation to some specific thing is set in motion in a natural manner, it is called wishing. For wishing is an appetency and yearning for some rational specific thing. (p. 144)

One needs to know that the capacity for willing (θέλησις, thelēsis) is one thing and actual willing (βούλησις, boulēsis) is another, and that what is willed (τὸ θελητόν, to thelēton) is one thing, the faculty of volition (τὸ θελητικόν, to thelētikon) is another, and the agent of willing (ὁ θέλων, ho thelōn) is another. For the capacity for willing is the simple power itself of willing. Actual willing is the direction of the capacity of willing towards something. What is willed is the matter that is subject to the will, namely, that which we will. (For example, appetency is oriented towards food. Appetency on its own is a rational capacity for willing but when appetency is directed towards food it is actual willing, and the food itself is what is willed.) The faculty of willing is that which possesses the power to will, such as a human being, and the agent of willing is the one who exercises the capacity for willing. (p. 147)

Much has been made over whether God has one will or three wills. When one look at the Church Fathers on the issue, one of course know that they insisted that God has one will and that will is tied to nature not to the persons. But why is that the case?

When one reads carefully what they are saying, it is clear the Father are definining "will" in a very specific way. They are defining it not as how most of us today think of as a will. No. According to them, "will" (το θέλημα) is the "rational and vital appetency that depends solely on what belongs to nature." Put it another way, "will" is capacity. One does not "will" (θέλω) to do anything, but rather one chooses (βουλομαι), thus a distinction is made between "actual willling" (βούλησις) and "the will" (θέλησις).

The distinction works in its own way of course, and if one holds to these definitions, then most certainly God has one will, the Father and the Son do not have different wills but merely different βούλησις. If one wants to holds to Patristic terminology, then one should be able to say of the Trinity that there is one θέλησις, three βούλησεις. The problem of course is that the new classical theists do not go there even though that seems to what John of Damascus is moving towards.

That said, I would gladly hold to the technical difference between θέλησις and βούλησις, but not to calling θέλησις "will" as belonging to the nature. That is because that is not how the Enlish language works. "Will" is a dynammic term in modern parlance, not a static term in later patristics/ early medieval thought. Rather, it stands to reason in the modern context that we should translate θέλησις as "disposition" and βούλησις as "will," so as to better appreciate their use in the texts.

Confessions of a former Strict Confessionalist (Part 4)

The failure of strict confessionalism: Theological lies and the failure to tell the truth

It is not a secret that the American Reformed churches are extremely divided. After studying Reformed theology, it is my opinion that many divisions are not warranted and driven more by ego and the need to “prove oneself.” For example, the whole republication (of the Covenant of Works in the Mosaic Covenant) controversy, while interesting and worth of discussion, is in more opinion not worth the amount of heat and ink it generates. Readers can read the OPC report on this issue themselves and ask if the amount of sophistication is worth actual bickering and fighting over.

Now, it is true that some things are worth fighting over. John Gresham Machen was right to fight liberalism for example. But the amount of stuff American Reformed Christians fight over is shocking given the small proportion they have among professing believers.

This idea of fighting to establish themselves was brought to the fore in 2016, when first Todd Pruit and then Carl Trueman lobbed theological grenades accusing those who promote a doctrine called “Eternal Functional Subordination” (EFS) or “Eternal Submission of the Son” (ESS) of heresy. This set a firestorm that continues to have its embers even today. Now, charges of heresy are serious charges, and the first step of proving any doctrine is heretical is to actually represent it correctly. If one misrepresents what one is critiquing, then it does not matter how eloquent and how biblical one argues. One is engaging in a straw man and nobody should take what is said seriously.

The 2016 ESS controversy caused me to read up on the topics raised, and the more I read the more disturbed I feel. The initial feelings were one of astonishment and anger that these prominent pastors and theologians are hypocrites when they engage in the sort of slug fest that they deplore and attack in others. Evidently, when pastors and theologians told their congregants not to attack other Christians, or not to fight online, they mean only THEY can engage in attacking other Christians, and fight online. You see, only Reformed pastors and theologians can engage in the type of conduct other Christians should not engage in. For normal Christians to do so is sin I guess, but the clergy have privileges the laity do not!

As I read into the topic, I start to feel disturbed because what the critics are saying is not what the proponents of ESS are saying. Many critics are insisting that ESS necessarily imply this and that, which are heretical. But they do not prove this point, instead taking such implications as a given. This is just for the more honest critics. Then you have militant polemicists who just want to tar ESS any way possible, like Matthew Barrett who attacks ESS as tritheistic, Sabellian and Subordinationist. Barrett’s dishonesty is seen in his attacking ESS as both tritheistic and Sabellian. Just as something cannot be A and not A at the same time, something cannot be both tritheistic and Sabellian, given tritheism holds to three gods, while Sabellian holds so closely to the unity of the one God the persons are mere “appendages” or “manifestations” of the one unitary God.

Ironically, while it is among the hardcore anti-ESS “Reformed Confessionalists” that truth has gone missing and hatred festers, it is among the egalitarians that charity continues. Glen Butner, while a critic of ESS, is fair in his critique, and makes some points that ESS proponents should address. In my engagement with Butner on social media, I have found him charitable and willing to engage, while my engagement (where there is any) with Reformed Confessionalists has been either absent, or rude and condescending, just shy of hurling anathemas.

Just stand and ask yourself: From a human point of view, who would you be predisposed towards: a rude and condescending Reformed Confessionalist, or a supposed “biblicist”? I have interacted with Bruce Ware as well as Owen Strachan, and they have been extremely courteous. They have also consistently denied the positions attributed to them. Just on the issue of optics, which side is anyone more predisposed to think is in the right?

Of course, truth is one thing, and conduct another. This is where my reading comes in. In my own personal reading, while I do not think everything said under the banner of EFS is biblical, I find it to be not the monster, the heresy, that Reformed Confessionalists accuse it of being. Again, it means a big deal when these polemicists are busy burning straw men. Lying about one’s opponents, even after being called out on it, is a sure sign that one is probably in the wrong. The sheer venom that these Reformed men spit against “biblicists” and “Arians,” while lying over and over again about their opponents, does not endear me to them. But then, who cares perhaps, since I am a non-white and a non-American, so I am nobody to them?

Apophaticism and the limits of human reason

The divine, being incomprehensible, is also necessarily nameless. [St John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith: A New Translation of An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (Popular Patristics Series 62; trans. Norman Russell; Yonkers, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2022, 88]

… [God's essence - DHC] it is superessential and beyond beings, beyond the divine, beyond the good, beyond fullness, and is set apart from all principles and classes as a whole, and is superior to every principle and class, since it is more than essence, life, word, and concepts; it is light itself, goodness itself, life itself, essence itself, since it does not have its being, or anything in the category of existents, from another, being the source itself of the being of that which exists, of the life of that which lives, of the rationality of that which participates in reason, .... (Ibid., 71)

… ὡς ὑπερούσιον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα οὖσαν, ὑπέρθεον, ὑπεράγαθον, ὑπερπλήρη, τὰς ὅλας ἀρχὰς καὶ τάξεις ἀφορίζουσαν καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς και τάξεως ὑπεριδρυμένην ὑπερ οὐσίαν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔννοιαν, αὐτοφῶς, αὐτοαγαθότητα, αὐτοζωήν, αὐτοουσίαν ὡς μὴ παρ' ἑτέρου τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι, τοῖς ζῶσι τῆς ζωῆς, τοῖς λόγου μετέχουσι τοῦ λογου , … (Ibid., 71)

Apophatism is the manner of deriving truths about God through negation. God is stated as being "not X." Apophatism comes about through influence from Neo-Platonic philosophy as it meditates upon the one "beyond (or above) being" (ὑπερούσιον). Simply stated, Neoplatonic philosophy finds the inadequacy its philosophy to comprehend the One, which is appropriated by Christians as the one God.

There can be many things that a Christian can find problematic about apophaticism, since it seems to make God unknowable. Absolute apophaticism seems to imply agnosticism on the one side (we cannot know anything about God since "we cannot say anything true about God") and mysticism on the other (we cannot know anything about God so we must bypass the mind and approach God through mystical encounter). Or we can go the "classical theist" route and use apophaticism to reject any ideas or implications of cataphatic ("positive") theology that we do not like. Thus, in the case of much of "classical theism," certain dogmas of what they deem to be orthodoxy is maintained to be true. But if pressed and if any contradictions are shown, they retreat to "mystery" and apophatic language, claiming that the objector is being a "rationalist" and embracing "univocity," thus evading any examination of their system by attacking the opposition.

There is therefore a prima facie reason to reject apophaticism. But if one thinks about the issues, there is another way to embrace apophaticism despite its questionable legacy, and despite its origin in Neo-Platonism. If one sees apophaticism as the realization of the finitude of human reason and human philosophy to truly grasp the nature of God, thus needing the revelation of God to truly reveal who He is, then we can embrace this form of apophaticism. We can say that God is "beyond being," meaning by that He is beyond all philosophical discussions of ontology. God is thus sui generis in this sense: Any discussion of God and His being must be from Scripture, and Scripture alone. All objections based upon Man's philosophy are necessarily corrupted, including those found in "classical theism," a system which is very much Aristotelian in its philosophy. This is not to deny that we can "spoil the Egyptians" of their philosophical riches, both Platonism and Aristotelianism, but to deny that any one philosophy should be considered definitive for the Christian doctrine of God, and that includes both Plato and Aristotle.

James White DL: Response to Mike Riccardi and Derrick Brite

Christian apologist James White has recently done a Dividing Line podcast responding to Mike Riccardi's talk at the recent Shepherd Conference and the tweets of Derrick Brite.

On Theological Method: A Review and response to Matthew Emerson and Luke Stamps on "Trinitarian Theological Method"

In 2019, a book was written showcasing an in-house debate among Baptists on the doctrine of God. In that book, Matthew Emerson and Luke Stamps wrote a chapter on it promoting the concept of "trinitarian theological method."^[1] The reason for "departures from classical Christian doctrine," according to them, is due to faulty theological method.^[2] Fidelity to Scripture as sole and final authority alone is insufficient, unless paired with a theological method that they believe to be true. Those who do not accept the need of their theological method are "biblicists," defined as those who "seeks to interpret the biblical text, as far as is possible, without any outside any outside influence, particularly any undue creedal or confessional influence."^[3]

As someone troubled by this ressourcement happening within professing conservative Protestant circles, I read the chapter (and the book), and have written a review and response to Emerson's and Stamps' proposal. Briefly in response, I find their proposal vague and confusing, and liable to be interpreted either in an orthodox manner or a heterodox manner. Ultimately, I hold that Emerson's and Stamp's proposal is actually dangerous for Christians, as it opens them up to possible deception under the guise of theological retreival.

My review and response to Emerson's and Stamps' proposal can be found here. An exceprt:

Evangelicals are committed to Scripture as the sole and final authority. However, does this guarantee fidelity to biblical truth? Emerson and Stamps argue that it does not. Pointing to examples of what they see as departures from “classic Christian doctrine,” Emerson and Stamps assert that the reason for these departures is due to a difference in theological method. In other words, a commitment to Scripture as the sole and final authority is insufficient for any theology to be truly biblical unless it adopts a certain theological method which will ensure that it would be truly biblical.

[continued]

---

[1] Matthew Y. Emerson and Luke Stamps, “On Trinitarian Theological Method,” In Keith S. Whitfield, ed., Trinitarian Theology: Theological Models and Doctrinal Application (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2019), 95-128

[2] Ibid., 97

[3] Ibid.

Does God have libertarian free will?

(3) Issue: Is the Son free in his willing to obey the will of the Father? Some might think if the Son must embrace the Father's will, then he cannot truly be free in accepting to do the Father's will. ... Response: This objection stands only if the kind of freedom one is considering is libertarian freedom, the so-called power of contrary choice. That is, Butner's criticism works only if the freedom by which the Son is said to "freely obey" the Father is one in which he can equally obey or disobey the Father (i.e., The Son has libertarian freedom which requires the power of contrary choice). I have argued elsewhere that libertarian freedom is a failed concept that neither explains why moral agents choose precisely what they do nor accords with the strong sovereignty of God we see throughout the Scriptures. If we adopt instead the concept of freedom in which our freedom consists in our unconstrained ability to do what we most want or to act according to our highest inclination— sometimes referred to as a "freedom of inclination"—then this problem is resolved. The Son's willing submission is his free and unconstrained expression of what he most wants to do when he receives the authoritative will of the Fahter, which is always, without exception, to embrace and carry out precisely what the Father gives him to do. (Bruce A. Ware, "Unity and Discintion of the Trinitarian Persons," in Keith S. Whitefield, Trinitarian Theology: Theological Models and Doctrinal Application, pp. 49-50)

Does God have libertarian free will? Professor Bruce Ware would certainly reject the notion, as he uses his rejection of divine libertarian free will to respond to Glen Butner's objection to EFS based on the issue of the divine will. But in order to truly answer the question, we must ask what the idea of divine libertarian free will actually mean.

When it comes to God, who is omnipotent and sovereign, the "power of contrary choice" seems to be a vacuous concept, since by definition, God being sovereign means He can choose to do whatever He wants to do, and His omnipotence means He will most certainly have the ability to do whatever He chooses to do. What does "contrary choice" mean to an infinite and all-powerful being? Perhaps we might consider the issue from another angle. We could therefore focus not so much on God considered absolutely (Dei potentia absoluta), but rather the relation between God considered absolutely and God as He has revealed Himself, in the ordination of all things (Dei potentia ordinata). Is God free to do anything whatsoever even if it goes against His plan or His nature, and is there anything that constrains what God would do, not by force but by principle? Now, if God is the only true God who is a se, then nothing can constrain God at all from the outside, because God is before all things. Therefore, any constraint if present must be within God. Most people might think that God's nature would "constrain" God, and, speaking anthropomorphically, it does. In a certain sense, it is impossible for God to go against His own nature, because God is God, a simple being.

With two dead ends, is there a way we can talk sensibly about a "divine libertarian free will"? In order for that category to make sense, we must construe freedom differently. Freedom cannot refer to choice or nature in the case of God, but rather we must turn to the issue of modality. In other words, we must ask ourselves whether God is free to bring to pass any possible world that can be conceived, with any permutation He so chooses. In other words, it is not about God's choices, or His power, or His nature, but wholly on the circumstances that befit each possible world. God has "libertarian free will" only if He can make any possible world actual, and He does not have "libertarian free will" if there are certain constraints that restrict the existence of any possible world. The issue here is one of modality, not of actuality. Put mathematically, is the probabiity that God can make a possible conceivable world X not zero, or are there some mentally conceivable possible world of which its probability of existence is zero?

Phrased in this manner, we can see that God does not truly have libertarian free will, but not because He does not have the "power of contrary choice." Rather, God's plan and decree acts as further constraints on which conceivable world is a possibly actual world, above that exercised by the divine nature. In Butner's example here, the Son voluntarily and freely obeys the will of the Father. Being free, there is no compulsion for the Son to actually obey the Father. In Classical Theism, the unity of the singular divine will ensures that the Son and the Father are not at loggerheads with each other. In Ware's system on the other hand, the Son must obey the Father because the Son does not have libertarian free will, but His freedom of inclination ensures He always obeys the Father. In a certain sense, both explanations are correct. Yet, if we are to consider the issue of free will in a way that makes sense for a sovereign and omnipotent being, then the answer for why the Son always obeys the Father is this: That is the way God's plan will work in any possible existent world. The freedom of the Son means that it is mentally (hypothetically) conceivable for the Son not to always obey the Father, but that world can never exist. The Son always obey the Father because God's plan and decree acts as constraints upon what worlds are available to actualize.

Therefore, does God have libertarian free will? If we define it as the "power of contrary choice," then yes. If we define that as being able to act contrary to the divine nature, then no. These two definitions however are not helpful because it tells us nothing about the nature of divine freedom. But if we define it in terms of modality, then we can say profitably that no, God does not have libertarian free will, because God is not free to actualize all mentally conceivable worlds. Using the language of the divine energies, we can say that the divine energies act to restrict the exercise of the divine will. Thus, in conclusion, God does not have libertarian free will, but rather energetic free will.

Trinity Foundation Radio Podcast: Thomas Aquinas Hypnotizes the Reformed Church

Some time ago, the Trinity Foundation Radio podcast has an episode on Thomas Aquinas. In this episode, "Thomas Aquinas Hypnotizes the Reformed Church," host Steve Matthew interviews Stuart Quint of Berean Beacon Ministries on the growing influence of Thomas Aquinas in Reformed circles, especially his growing prominence on the doctrine of God. You can listen to it here.

The nature of "submission" in general

Sorry, should be "submission." Obedience is outward expression of submission, and thus only ad extra.

— puritanreformed (@puritanreformed) September 12, 2022

As it pertains to the word "submission," Western Christianity in particular seem to have an extremely negative reaction to the word. For some strange reason, "submission" is treated like a cuss word even in supposed Christian circles, a fact very strange in the light of biblical commands for various peoples to submit to others.

Is the word "submission" really a "four-letter" word? What does "submit" mean? According to Merriam Webster, the word "submit" has the meaning of "yield to government or authority." In other words, the word submission is an act or disposition towards someone over the person. Christians are to submit to God and to the governing authorities, and therefore "submission" should not have negative connotations for the Christian.

That said, is "submission" necessarily tied to a differential of authority? For the secular world, perhaps that is almost always the case. Yet, for the Christian, that is not true. An obvious example would be the call for "mutual submission" in Ephesians 5:21, which even egalitarians must admit that there is no differential of authority or hierarchy in it. But if there is no hierarchy in Ephesians 5:21, then it must be the case that "submission" does not have to be associated with differential of authority or hierarchy. Therefore, when wives are called to submit to their husbands (Eph. 5:22, Col. 3:18), then one should not presuppose there is any necessary differential of authority of hierarchy in the relationship between husbands and wives. One should likewise not read any form of hierarchy in any use of the word "submission" as it pertains to the Son either, for "submission" in the Bible is not necessarily the "submission" of the world.

But if Christian "submission" is not necessarily due to differential of authority or hierarchy, then what does "submission" mean in the context of the Christian faith? I would suggest that Christian submission is to be seen in the life of the man Jesus Christ. Christian "submission" therefore is to follow the leading of another, just as Jesus obeyed the Father fully during the incarnation. There is no hierarchy between the Father and the Son, yet the Son submitted to the Father and followed His leading. Therefore, as opposed to the secular "submission," Christian "submission" should be seen as a "disposition to follow the leading of another." In other words, while the world's definition seem to require hierarchy or differential authority, this definition does not require either, keeping at its core meaning the idea of following another's lead. The world requires the one submitting to be inferior to the one leading, while the Bible does not require this to be the case.

This has many implications for how we live our Christian lives. On the issue of husbands and wives, it means that husbands should not be bossing their wives around. Husbands lead by love, patience and self-sacrifice, not by demanding their wives to act subservient to them. The submission expected of wives is one done out of love for the husband who leads them in love. It is a true act of submission ("putting oneself under") not because one is truly beneath the other in being, but because that is how one acts in love. Needless to say, any husband using the Bible to browbeat his wife into "submission" needs to be rebuked. Women are not second-class citizens, and are to be cherised and loved.

Likewise, in the doctrine of God, to say that the Son submits to the Father is merely to assert that the Son follows the Father's leading. The Father initiates, the Son does likewise after the manner of the Father. The Father has authority over the Son in the sense of leadership, but there is no differential in authority in the sense of forcing one will over another (a most repugnant image). It is an act of who initiates, and who follows; not an act of the demands of a king forcing his subject to obey. Any authority or submission in the Godhead is therefore economic, in the internal acts of the Father, Son and Spirit as they interact with each other in eternity and from eternity.

Christians therefore ought to recover a biblical view of "submission." While there is nothing necessarily wrong with hierarchy and differential authority, "submission" exists independent of these created things. All Christians are to live lives of submission, because none of us have the right to be the Head. Within our lives of submission, some take the lead over others in various roles and vocations, but they never stop being submissive to God. "Submission" should never be seen as a cuss word, or a word that only applies to women and children, as if men do not need to submit to anyone! Let me just put it bluntly, the man who will not submit to anyone is a wild man in sin, and woe is any woman who is married to that wild man!

A Response to Glen Butner's 2017 journal article on EFS

In 2017, Glen Butner wrote a journal article in the Priscilla Papers, the academimc journal of the egalitarian promoting "Christian for Biblical Equaity" (CBE), attacking the doctrine of EFS (Eternal Functional Submission), primarily claiming it undermines the doctrine of penal substitutionary atonement. For those who are interested to read the article, you may search for it as follows: D. Glen Butner Jr., “Against Eternal Submission: Changing the Doctrine of the Trinity Endangers the Doctrine of Salvation and Women,” Priscilla Papers 31 No. 1 (Winter 2017): 15-21.

Butner's arguments are weighty, and so I have decided to analyze and respond to them. You can find my response here. An excerpt:

This journal article by Butner has given us weighty arguments against the doctrine of EFS. However, upon examination, Butner’s arguments are seen to be based upon faulty premises and thus unsound, based as they are on faulty philosophy. Regardless of one’s position on EFS, one should be wary of adopting Butner’s arguments and manner of argumentation.

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An exegesis of James 1:5: Response to Scott Swain’s interpretation of the same

4. ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω, ἵνα ἦτε τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι. 5 Εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας, αἰτείτω παρὰ τοῦ διδόντος θεοῦ πᾶσιν ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος καὶ δοθήσεται αὐτῷ. 6 αἰτείτω δὲ ἐν πίστει μηδὲν διακρινόμενος· ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος ἔοικεν κλύδωνι θαλάσσης ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ. 7 μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος ὅτι λήμψεταί τι παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου, 8 ἀνὴρ δίψυχος, ἀκατάστατος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ. … 17 πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ἄνωθέν ἐστιν καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, παρ᾽ ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγὴ ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα. (James 1:4-6, 17 - BGT)

And let perseverance works completion, in order that you may be complete and whole, [in a state of] lacking nothing. And if one of you lacks wisdom, let him ask from the giving God [who gives] to all simply and without reproach, and it will be given him. But let him ask in faith without self-doubt. For the one who self-doubts is like crashing waves of the sea, driven and blown by the wind. … Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, descending from the father of lights, from whom there is no change or shadow of variation. (James 1:4-6, 17. Own translation)

What does James 1:5 teaches? Dr. Scott Swain has recently suggested that James 1:5 teaches the doctrine of divine simplicity, focusing on the term ἁπλῶς there.^[1] But is the point of James 1:5 to teach about the simplicity of God?

James 1:5 exist in the larger context of James 2-18, where believers are called to persevere through trials, with God offering gifts to his people to endure. In the midst of trials, perseverance works the fruit of the Spirit in the believer, leading to a state of completion and lacking nothing. This completion (τέλειον) has a view of perfection, thus showing the goal of the Christian life as the believer perseveres through trials. Trials are difficult to endure though, and wisdom is required to navigate through them without sinning. Thus, verse 5 show us God’s gift to us in the midst of trials. God will give us wisdom in the midst of our trials when we ask him. Verse 6 continues this train of thought by asking the one asking not to doubt of this, with the idea that one should not judge on whether God has indeed given us gifts, wavering between faith and unbelief and thus being double-minded (verse 8: δίψυχος) in his faith. Finally, in verse 17, we are told that God gives us all every good and perfect gift, contrasting Him as the Father of lights with change, shadow and variation.

What then does ἁπλῶς mean in James 1:5? A word study does show it means simply, as seen in the LSJ lexicon, thus “simply” is the most generic meaning which is why I translated it thus. Yet at the same time, the context makes it clear that, whatever ἁπλῶς is, it is an adverb modifying the giving of gifts by God. It is also put alongside as its opposite, “without reproach” (μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος). Therefore, the best word meaning is “’sincerely.” God is sincere in his giving of gifts. His sincere giving of gifts is the opposite of the double-minded man who doubts. Thus, BDAG gives the meaning of the word ἁπλῶς in James 1:5 as “pertaining to being straightforward, simply, above-board, sincerely, openly.” Louw-Nida gives its functional use in the text as under “possess, transfer, exchange,” under “give,” as “pertaining to willful and generous giving.” Certainly, there is a connotation of God’s generosity there, yet I will say that “sincerely” seems to me the main focus of that word in the context of James 1:5.

In the NIGTC series, ἁπλῶς is taken to mean sincerely. Accordingly, “God is, then, one who gives sincerely, without hesitation or mental reservation. He does not grumble or criticize. His commitment to this people is total and unreserved: they can expect to receive.”^[2] Thus, this term is “a term for ‘generously’ that means ‘simple, open, sincere action.’”^[3] Therefore, James 1:5 is all about God’s sincere desire to give gifts to his people, giving us every good and perfect gift for our benefit as we persevere through trials in this life.

Read in the broader redemptive-historical context, this illustrates the unchanging goodness of God in providing for His people. God does not let us live this life on earth alone, in a deistic sort of way. Rather, He is our provider, and His devotion to His people the Church is as the most perfect husband to His bride, nurturing her and providing her with all she needs.

The question then comes: Does this passage support the doctrine of divine simplicity? Divine simplicity is the doctrine that God is simple and thus without parts of any kind. If God is without parts, then there can be nothing removed from God and yet God remains. All are therefore one in God. God is His essence, and God is His attributes. “Simplicity” here is a systematic theological category, not a biblical category. Yet, the question is not whether one can find the category in Scripture, but whether the Scripture teaches it. In a certain sense, the Scripture does not teach simplicity, in that one does not, I assert, find it taught anywhere in any one particular text of Scripture. At the same time, as the truths of Scripture is systematized, the doctrine of simplicity emerges as a way to show forth how God is necessarily everything that He is and only everything that He is. God cannot “un-god” himself so to speak.

That the truths of Scripture lead to the doctrine of divine simplicity is not an issue of dispute within much of the Reformed world, notwithstanding some hysterical grandstanding by various internet Thomists. The issue is not whether divine simplicity is true, but whether one can get it from any one text of Scripture. Swain asserts that it is possible to get simplicity from texts such as James 1:5 through the analogy of Scripture. But is that possible?

The analogy of Scripture compares passages of Scripture with each other to derive truths from them. In other words, it is the immediate precursor to both biblical and systematic theology. But in order for a mere comparison of texts to allow for truths to emerge, without having actually worked on the task of systematization, the truths must be close to the surface so to speak. Therefore, for any analogy of Scripture to bring forth divine simplicity, that doctrine must be close to the surface meaning of the text so that mere comparison can elucidate it. Is that the case with James 1:5 then? I would suggest not. James 1:5 with its focus on God’s sincerity is primarily focused on God’s steadfastness and unchanging trustworthiness and love. Thus, what emerges through comparison with other texts are the doctrine of divine immutability, the doctrine of God’s love in adoption, and the doctrine of God’s gifts to his people. Even the most abstract doctrine here, immutability, is a far cry from simplicity. Swain’s citation of 1 Jn. 1:5 likewise speak at most of immutability and goodness. Just because the word ἁπλῶς in 1 Jn. 1:5 can mean “simple” in the Platonic sense (see LSJ) does not mean that it teaches divine simplicity in James 1:5, for the meaning of the text must first be established (Grammatical-historical exegesis), then its canonical or redemptive-historical meaning exegeted, prior to any analogy of Scripture. In other words, one cannot short-circuit the interpretive process by going direct from word to philosophy. James 1:5 does not directly teach divine simplicity, and indirectly supports divine immutability only.

Therefore, in conclusion, Swain’s attempt to short circuit the theological process of arriving at the doctrine of divine simplicity fails. As one reads his article, one should take note of how many philosophical concepts he smuggles into the article (e.g. “God is light and nothing but light, God is essentially x and exhaustively x”). Now, there is a place for philosophical concepts, but that is only done in the systematizing phase, where the concepts themselves are to be examined before use, not used implicitly but explicitly. Swain’s article therefore fails to prove that divine simplicity can be easily seen merely through the use of the analogy of Scripture. Perhaps we should stop all the short cuts and wrestle with the actual systematization of biblical truths and the examination of philosophical concepts instead.

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[1] Scott Swain, “A biblical argument for divine simplicity: the analogy of Scripture,” Reformed Blogmatics (blog). Accessed https://www.scottrswain.com/2022/08/30/a-biblical-argument-for-divine-simplicity-the-analogy-of-scripture/

[2] P. H. Davids, The Epistle of James: a commentary on the Greek text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), 73

[3] K.A. Richardson, James (NAC; Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1997), 64

EFS and the issue of modality

(1) If Hard EFS is true, then the Son has the property being functionally subordinate in all time segments in all possible worlds.

(2) If the Son has this property in every possible world, then the Son has this property necessarily. Furthermore, the Son has this property with de re rather than de dicto necessity.

(3) If the Son has this property necessarily (de re), then the Son has it essentially.

(4) If Hard EFS is true, then the Son has this property essentially while the Father does not.

(5) If the Son has this property essentially and the Father does not, then the Son is of a different essence than the Father. Thus the Son is heteroousios rather than homoousios.

[Thomas H. McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology, 179-80]

In other words, because McCall has defined “essential property” according to Lowe’s definition, and was required by using that definition to equivocate on the term “essential property” when moving from premises (3) and (4) to premise (5), all McCall has demonstrated is the inadequacy of possible world semantics to provide an adequate account of the sui generis metaphysical distinctions that exist between the divine essence and persons, as well as among the three divine persons themselves. [Paul C. Maxwell, "Is there an Authority Analogy between the Trinity and Marriage? Untangling arguments of Subordination and Ontology in Egalitarian-Complementarian Discourse," JETS 59/3 (2016): 561]

Thomas McCall's argument against what he had termed "Hard EFS" has irked EFS proponents like Bruce Ware. It is rather natural to see the equivocation in the word "necessary" in statement 2, where the word "necessary" is equivocated between "belonging to its essence" and "must happen." On a second look however, it seems there is more to this argument than just the eqivocation part, but a use of modal logic that seems to makes his point clearer. Paul Maxwell in his paper seems to think that the problem in McCall's argument is due to a limitation of possible world semantics, but I do not believe such is the case.

Let us however start with looking at the modal parts of McCall's argument. McCall is basically using the concepts of possible worlds, where something that is necessary in all possible worlds is taken to have de re necessity, or necessity belonging to the essence of a thing. Since EFS states that the Son is functionally "subordinate" to the Father necessarily, therefore it would seem that using the logic of modality, such a necessity of "functional subordination" is de re, as pertaining to the nature of the Son. If the necessity is de re, then McCall's statement 2 makes sense. But why must it be de re necessity and not de dicto necessity? It is true that the sentence, "Necessarily, the Son submits to the Father" sounds odd, but I cannot see any reason why one should not interpret the necessity de dicto rather than de re, as "The Son exists as necessily submitting to the Father."

But if it is a de dicto necessity, what grounds the necessity if not the nature of a thing? After all, God is the only being that necessarily exists a se, so therefore one cannot ground necessity in anything else because none exists prior to God. This is where things get interesting, because if one really thinks about it using the idea of possible worlds, this necessity is not a true necessity at all, or is it?

One thing about God is that He is simple. Simplicity states that all of God's attributes are united as one in God, such that one cannot subtract any of them from God. When one considers why one would think the Son submits to the Father, one returns back to the decree of God. But can God decree otherwise? In a certain sense, God has free will and can decree whatever He wants. But God is at the same time one, and cannot decree against Himself and violate one or another of His attributes. Thus, we see the problems for possible world semantics when we consider the things of God. For if possible worlds for the Christian is one where God exists, then this God comes with all of His attributes. How then can we consider God's middle knowledge, if the reason why God does something or not may be because that does not fully show His holiness, or His love, or something else? Certainly, we can consider possible worlds where God does not express His attributes in a maximal manner, but if possible world semantics is supposed to work when considering all of God's free and middle knowledge, how can possible worlds semantics work there?

It would therefore seem that we must add new categories for possible world semantics if we want them to work in a world with a simple God. We need to add the concept of theologically impossible worlds, impossible not because it is logically inconsistent or incoherent, but seeemingly possible worlds that are imposssible because they somehow violate or temper with the expression of one of more of God's attributes (not the attributes themselves). Thus, there is an impossible world where God does not show His holiness at all. There is also an impossible world where the Father decided to take the place of the Son. If one takes on this category of theologically impossible worlds, then the issue of necessity and EFS becomes soluble in this modified concept of possible worlds. The necessity of EFS is a de dicto necessity that is necessary because God wants it so. It is not de re because it is not necessary in the impossible worlds where God did not create the world and have sinners to save. Therefore, in the impossible world where God is not the Savior, EFS is not necesary.

On Lane Tipton on classical theism and theistic mutualism

Some time back, Lane Tipton had done a program with Lutheran Jordan B. Cooper on the issue of "classical theism and theistic mutualism." Dr. Tipton is a Van Tilian and also a classical theist. With the reputation of some Vantillians as being slanted towards theistic mutualism, this discussion between Cooper and Tipton was a helpful one in this regard.

The main question here is, of course, what is "theistic mutualism." As stated by Tipton, "theistic mutualism" is the idea that God somehow changes in his being in reaction/ relation towards creation. Now, there may be someone who does hold to theistic mutualism as defined by Tipton here, but even Dr. Oliphant's book God with Us does not teach this definition of "theistic mutualism." (Having relational properties that are not essential does not imply change in being) Another unusual thing from Tipton is this idea that everywhere we read about Cornelius Van Til's criticism of pantheism, we need to read "theistic mutualism." While Van Til would most likely be against all forms of non classical theisms, I do not believe it is helpful to make anachronistic claims like these since "theistic mutualism" was not present during Van Til's time.

This discussion is certainly helpful in part for those interested in the doctrine of God. Yet, I truly wonder at its utility. There is no proof given that anyone holds to the type of theistic mutualism defined by Tipton, or that even if they are, their thoughts are properly and substantially addressed. All in all, this discussion is not all that helpful, and probably serves more to rally the troops than to have an honest discussion on the matter.

Ryan Mullins' roasting of Craig Carter's "Christian Platonism"

In a guest post on the London Lyceum, Dr. Ryan Mullins has posted a pointed critique of Craig Carter's project of "recovering" "Christian Platonism." I agree especially with sentiments like these:

As it stands, it looks like Christian Platonism is a gerrymandered category. As far as I can tell, Christian Platonism is to be defined as follows.

Christian Platonism: those views that Craig Carter agrees with.

The key point here is not that Dr. Carter is definitely wrong in his ressourcement trajectory. The key point here is the sloppy over-generalization and demonization that lies at the heart of such reckless rhetoric. It is profoundly unserious and serves more to demonize the other than to seek understanding. But then it seems this is the characteristic of a particular group of "confessionalists" these days.

London Lyceum Roundtable on Trinity and Simplicity

The London Lyceum has recently done an interesting rountable on the topic of trinity and simplicity. You can hear it here: