On the nature and will of God

Clark’s solution is to distinguish human responsibility from God’s causative agency. This is certainly a helpful solution which the Reformed world should utilize, yet I do not see it as solving the question completely. (from my review of The Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized Biography of Gordon H. Clark, here)

The distinction between "will" and "nature" in the doctrine of God is properly basic...

— puritanreformed (@puritanreformed) March 19, 2017

Chalcedonian theism marks the high point of orthodoxy with regards to the doctrine of God. This catholic (small "c") tradition defines God as one being/ essence, three persons, and this one God has one will and one nature in His being. Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, is one person with two natures (human and divine), and thus two wills. In traditional theism, a nature has a will, and thus Christ's two natures necessitates the existence of two wills. One could also extrapolate that to mean Christ has two minds, as indicative of the fact of Him having two wills.

What, then, is nature? What is will? What is person? Such questions should not be difficult to answer, especially when one looks at the Greek words behind these concepts: nature (φυσις), will (θελημα), person (προσωπον). "Nature" is an ontological terms defining what a thing is. "Will" originates decisions and actions. "Person" is more complicated and much confusion reigned over the term, but in association with the term hypostasis (ὑποστασις), a "person" is a subsistence, an instantiation. To simplify things, I would use the term "individuated consciousness." Note here that I did not say "individual consciousness," or "individuated center of consciousness," in order to keep the definition generic, since the three persons of the Trinity are one and the same being.

A "nature" is what a thing is. A "will" originates decisions and actions. What a thing is is separate from what a thing decides. Socrates is a man; that is his nature. Socrates ate his dinner; that is his will originating a decision to eat, and his body obeying his will to eat. Such is basic English and basic philosophy 101. A "nature" is never a "will," and, as we can see in recent times, it is possible for people to will something (transgender surgery) contrary to their nature (humans as inherently male and female).

God has His own nature, which is who He is ad intra. God wills, and acts accordingly, ad extra. Whatever God wills has its origin ad intra, but is manifested ad extra, where it then effect His works. There should be no question whatsoever that God's nature and God's will is distinct. To be sure, God is consistent, as God is one and simple. Therefore, according to traditional theism, God's will should be consistent with God's nature.

Since we never know God's nature simpliciter, in the history of theology, we come across the debate between realism and voluntarism, in the debate over the potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata (power of God absolute and ordained). Is the power of God absolute, in the sense that He can will anything including alternate past events, round squares and evil as good (divine voluntarism). Is it the power of God restricted to what He ordained to come to pass, and thus is not "absolute" in that sense (realism). Radical divine voluntarism, as held to by the nominalists, have God's power extending over contingency (possible past events), logical contradictions (round squares) and moral contradictions (evil as good). The orthodox position would deny the latter two (at least in their crude form) since they make no sense, but debate remain over contingency. As an example, can God create a world where He can forgive sins without the atonement of Christ? Those who hold to voluntarism might answer yes, while the realists would definitely say no.

So what does this obscure medieval debate has to do with Gordon Clark's theodicy? This "obscure" debate is relevant only because it brings up the same issues concerning God's nature and God's will. It must be noted that we are not talking about whether Clark's solution to the problem of theodicy is helpful. We are speaking concerning those who think that Clark's solution to the problem of theodicy is THE solution. Those who think that appeal to a fiat declaration that God is by definition good and therefore the entire question of theodicy is solved have not begun to scratch the surface of the problems it creates within the doctrine of God. In Clark's solution, we have the following propositions:

(1) God (by definition) is good

(2) God wills evil things

(3) God is ex lex (outside the law) and thus cannot be judged by His law.

Conclusion: Therefore, God is good even though He wills evil

As ONE solution, it is helpful. But we note here there are two propositions concerning the doctrine of God that we need to take note also:

(4) God is one and simple, therefore His will and His nature within Him are one and the same.

(5) God's law is a reflection of His nature

Putting propositions 1-5 together will create a problem, which shows that theodicy is not as easily solved just by Clark's solution. For, yes, God is ex lex in the sense that God is not culpable of evil just because He wills evil. But what is the law? What does willing evil say about the nature of God? For since God is one and God is simple, then His will (as originating ad intra) is equivalent to His nature, but if His will is His nature, then does willing evil things mean that God's nature is evil? But then it is protested that God by definition is good? Well then, you have a contradiction between proposition 1 and 4, and merely repeating proposition 1 does not solve the contradiction you will have. Unless of course, you do not mind throwing away the doctrine of divine simplicity. The same problem will arise when we ask how we can square propositions 3 and 5.

The radical followers of Clark will just assert propositions 1-3 over and over again, and either ignore or deny propositions 4 and 5. Such an emphasis on the divine will as dissociated from the divine nature is a characteristic of divine voluntarism. To be sure, they do not affirm clear logical or moral contradictions, but their emphasis on the divine will blind them to the problems such voluntarism have concerning one's doctrine of God. Perhaps they wish to deny propositions 4 and/or 5? But for those of us who do not reduce everything to "will" alone, we can affirm Clark's solution solve the moral aspect of theodicy, but acknowledge it leaves untouched the ontological problem of theodicy. (For those wanting to know how to solve that latter problem, a pointer would be to distinguish God's will concerning evil as primarily good, while secondarily evil.)

Review: The Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized Biography of Gordon H. Clark by Doug Douma

Douglas Douma has recently published a biography of the Presbyterian philosopher Gordon Haddon Clark (1902-1985), entitled The Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized Biography of Gordon H. Clark. I have just finished reading it, and here is my review of the book. An excerpt:

Gordon Haddon Clark (1902-1985) was a prominent American Presbyterian philosopher and churchman in the 20th century, yet one would not know it by living in many contemporary 21st century American Presbyterian and Reformed circles. In this biography of this neglected American thinker, Douglas Douma does us all a great service by opening a window into the life of this man, helping us to understand his situation in life, and especially into the major controversy that has played a big influence in the formative years of one Presbyterian denomination, the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC) — the “Clark-Van Til Controversy.”

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Turretin on reason and theology

III. The question is not whether reason has any use in theology. For we confess that its use is manifold both for illustration (by making clear divine mysteries from human and earthly things); for comparison (by comparing old things with new, versions with their sources, opinions of doctors and decrees of councils with the rule of the divine word); for inference (by drawing conclusions); and for argumentation (by drawing forth reasons to support orthodoxy [orthodoxian] and overthrow heterodoxy [heterodoxian]). But the question is simply whether it bears the relation of a principle and rule in whose scale the greatest mysteries of religion should be weighed, so that nothing should be held which is not agreeable to it, which is not founded upon and cannot be elicited from reason. This we deny …

IV The question is not whether reason is the instrument by which or the medium through which we can be drawn to faith. For we acknowledge that reason can be both: the former indeed always and everywhere; the latter with regard to presupposed articles. Rather the question is whether it is the first principle from which the doctrines of faith are proved; or the foundation upon which they are built, so that we must hold to be false in things of faith what the natural light or human reason cannot comprehend. This we deny.

What is the Reformed view on reason? Is any emphasis on reason (and logic) "rationalism" which we ought to reject? To hear some of the charges against the whole idea of systematic theology today, one would think that rational thinking along the line of foundations (axioms) and syllogisms is unbiblical. But was that what the Reformed tradition historically taught?

The Reformed Orthodox used syllogisms, plenty of them. After all, Logic was important to them for the process of intellectually rigorous thinking. Even those who reject Aristotle for people like Ramus are merely attempting to substitute one system of thinking for another, not eradicating reasoning altogether. Who were those who reject reason? It was the mystics who rejected reason for the idea of an unmediated direct encounter of the soul with God, through the practice of spiritual disciplines. Such was found in Medieval and Tridentine Roman Catholicism, as well as major segments of Anabaptism, but they were not a hallmark of the best of the Reformed tradition.

The rise of rationalism with the Socinians was a threat to the Reformed Orthodox because they use reason to argue against the doctrines of the faith. But the Reformed Orthodox do not therefore throw out the baby with the bathwater. Turretin distinguishes between the instrumental use of reason and the foundational use of reason (1.VIII.7), ascribing the former to true Christian theology and the latter to the error of the rationalistic Socinians. Reason, which is probably better termed "logic" since "logic" describes the laws and processes of reasoning, is meant to be used as a tool, not to create new propositions from thin air (the foundational view). Rather, the propositions are Scripture, and reason merely infers from them to their consequences.

Does human sin and human depravity therefore means that any focus on reason as an instrument is a compromise of the doctrine of total depravity? Does it mean that one must argue for a "qualitative" difference between the truth known by God (ectypically) and what we can come to know as truth as revealed to us? Turretin would not have agreed with such arguments. Rather, this is what Turretin wrote:

VIII. The darkness of the human intellect does not hinder sound reason from judging of the truth of connections and so contradictions. We allow indeed that it cannot judge of the truth of propositions (as ignorant of it per se and which it must seek from the law and testimony). But it does not follow from this that it cannot judge of the contradiction of the expositions, opinions and interpretations which men give of these mysteries. [1.X.8]

'Sound reason' seems almost to be autonomous and unaffected by the Fall, but that is because it is not the human faculty of reason Turretin speaks of here, but rather the laws of logic, which are laws and not human faculties. The transcendent law of non-contradiction for example does not care whether the human seeking to utilize it is sinless or fallen, as long as it is used properly. The problem with our human minds that are affected by total depravity is not that the laws of reason have been altered, for these laws are outside of us, but rather that we are unable to properly use these laws correctly all the time. Just like Pharisaism distorts the revealed holy law of God, so rationalists distorts the laws of logic. Pharisaism and the Judaizers did not cause the holy law of God to be unholy, for the fault is with them not with the law! Likewsie, the many forms of rationalism are not manifestations that reason is totally corrupted and unfit for spiritual uses, but rather the fault lies with the users (Man) rather than the instrument of reason.

Thus, in the Clark-Van Til controversy, Turretin's position will be much closer to Clark's. Turretin is of course clearer in teaching that we cannot comprehend God, and the archetypal/ectypal distinction is clearly maintained, BUT on the main issue of the place of reason, he stands with Clark on the instrumental use of reason and the possibility of sound reason even in depraved minds (whether depraved Man wants to use sound reason is another question altogether).

Warfield on Truth and Propositions

There are many theologians to whom truth in propositional form is in like manner distasteful, and half, or all, its life seems dissipated, for the same reason—because they too are afflicted with a "lamentable and constitutional inaccuracy." No wonder that upon such minds exact statement seems to act like an irritant, and theology appears to be an enemy of religion. ... Men who have no faculty for truth will always consider an appeal to truth an evil. [B.B. Warfield, "The Right of Systematic Theology", in Selected Shorter Writings, 2:230]

We can actually know God's truth

One source of skepticism stems from certain understandings of Vantillian epistemology. Now, after reading concerning the Reformed Scholastics and Van Til's works, I can see where Cornelius Van Til was trying to be orthodox. Nevertheless, my concern here is that I think he is not a good communicator of Reformed doctrine concerning the knowledge of God, in my opinion. The idea of "God's knowledge" and "Man's knowledge" being qualitatively different, with "no point of contact" between the two, seeks to convey historic Reformed doctrine on the difference between God and Man, yet it does so in such a way that I believe obfuscates the true doctrine it desires to convey. While those with background in Reformed orthodoxy might interpret such language correctly (in an orthodox manner), yet for those without such a background, I fear what such words and phrases convey skepticism concerning the Christian faith. The reasoning by such people is that, if God's knowledge and Man's knowledge have no point of contact, therefore we cannot know anything about God, since all we have is necessarily "always false." While some in the Reformed orthodox camp can stay in their ivory towers, they just might want to see how the careless words and phrases they use are (mis)understood by people on the ground, especially by those without any background in theology or the Reformed tradition!

Coming from a Clarkian background, reading the works of Gordon H. Clark, I have found Willem Van Asselt's article on the theology of Franciscus Junius to be illuminating. Unlike Van Til, van Asselt and Junius write clearly. After reading that, I have found a way of understanding the core orthodox truth that Van Til was trying to defend, and put it in a way that I believe is much more understandable and certainly orthodox. Thus, I had written an article here, in which I have striven to show how Clark's concerns could be synthesized with the concerns of Van Til and the Reformed orthodox so that both sides can be assured that the dangers they perceive in the other side are eradicated. Do I believe that proponents from both sides can be persuaded to put down their weapons? That would be rather naive, but at least there should be a way forward, to produce light instead of heat.

The archetypal/ ectypal distinction preserves the Creator/ creature distinction. There is no "point of contact" between the archetype in God and the ectype in Man. Yet, this model safeguards against skepticism as well. For we note that there are actually two "points of contacts," but these are not between the archetypal knowledge of God and the ectypal knowledge of Man, for such would compromise the Creator/ creature distinction.

The first point of contact is within God Himself. God's archetypal knowledge and God's ectypal knowledge meet as one is a reflection of the other. The two meet ... in the person and mind of God. Quite obviously, since they meet in the mind of God, we finite human beings are not privy to how that happens. But the meeting is important, if just to show that God is not schizophreniac. God does not have an ectypal knowledge that is contradictory to His archetypal knowledge, but rather His ectypal knowledge is in some sense a faithful reflection of His archetypal knowledge. The two bodies of knowledge do not conflict with each other, for there is perfect harmony in God. We do not have to worry that, even though we cannot know God's archetypal knowledge, therefore God's archetypal knowledge will contradict His ectypal knowledge, for that will never happen at all.

The second point of contact is between God's ectypal knowledge with our human ectypal knowledge. God communicates, God reveals to us, knowledge. Truth is the correspondence of our ectypal knowledge with a section of God's ectypal knowledge that He Himself reveals to us. We do not have a point of contact with God's archetypal knowledge, but we do have a point of contact with God's revelation. When God reveals that Jesus Christ is the propitiation of our sins, we actually can know the proposition "Jesus Christ is the propitiation of our sins." With this point of contact, we do not have to worry that our knowledge is false. Yes, it is not archetypal knowledge, but it corresponds to God's ectypal knowledge, and therefore it is true. God's word is truth, and we do not have to worry that we are believing in falsehood just because our knowledge is ectypal.

Therefore, we should not have to worry about skepticism based upon intemperate language about how our language about God is always false. No, our knowledge and language about God can be trusted. We CAN know God's truth! Do not be deceived by pious nonsense about how we are to know our place as creatures, for God has spoken and we can know that! Is it faith or the lies of the Devil that will cause us to doubt the possibility of knowing God who is communicating to us His words? Surely it is the latter! When God gives us His Word, He actually intends for us to be able to understand it, and whoever says otherwise is a tool of the Devil!

Gordon Clark on the "Author of Sin"

Summarizing the Scriptures, the [Westminster] Confession says here that God is not the author of sin; that is God does nothing sinful. Even those Christians who are not Calvinists must admit that God in some sense is the cause of sin, for he is the sole ultimate cause of everything. But God does not commit the sinful act, nor does he approve of it and reward it. Perhaps this illustration is faulty, as most illustrations are, but consider that God is the cause of my writing this book. Who would deny that God is the first or ultimate cause, since it was he who created mankind? But although God is the cause of his chapter, he is not its author. ...

The Scripture references show clearly that God controls the wills of men. ...

This does not mean that violence was done to the will of the creatures. It was not as if [in the case of Absalom and his men choosing a war plan] the men wanted to adopt Ahithophel's plan and were forced to follow Hushai against their desires. ... But it must be noted that God established psychological processes just as truly as he established physical processes.

This ties in with the next phrase, "nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

In the case of Absalom the secondary causes were the psychological proceses. The decision the men of Israel made was not made in opposition to those processes, nor even without them. God has established such processes for the purpose of accomplishing his will. He does not arrange things or control history apart from secondary causes.

To mention other examples, God decreed to bring the children of Israel out of Egypt; but they had to do the walking themselves. God decreed that Solomon should build the temple; but Solomon had to collect the materials. God dos not decree the end apart from the means. He decrees that the end shall be accomplished by means of the means. [Gordon H. Clark, What Do Presbyterians Believe? (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2001), 37-8]

None of these can be affirmed by Vincent Cheung and his drones, who claim that (1) God is the Author of sin, (2) God is the primary cause of everything, (3)Second causes are mere occasions, not actually and truly real processes in which God is in control but not directly working

Clark versus Robbins: On the Church

[This is in response to a question from a friend]

The September/October 1989 Trinity Review by the late John Robbins has an article on it simply entitled The Church. In this article, Robbins writes concerning what a church is and should do. As Robbins is supposed to be Gordon H. Clark's successor (although I have no idea how such non-apostolic succession is supposed to be calculated), the impression may be given that such is the Clarkian position on the church. However, is that really the case? In this post, I will like to summarize Robbins' view of the Church, put forward Clark's view of the Church, and analyze Robbins' view closer.

Robbin's view of the Church

Robbins' view of the Church is extremely simple. According to Robbins, "If once we understand what the purpose of the church is, all the rest of the doctrine of the church falls neatly into place. But if we do not know what the purpose of the church is, then we cannot understand how the church is to be organized and operated" ("The Church," 1). In other words, what the church is is determined by its purpose and that only. Teleology governs ontology. The purpose of the Church is education in the truth. Utilizing 1 Timothy 3:15 as proof-text, Robbins states that the church is the pillar of the truth and thus that is her purpose and goal, citing John Calvin's commentary on that passage with approval. Another text utilized by Robbins is John 21:15-17, with Robbins remarking that feeding the lambs is "figurative language for educating them in the truth" ("The Church," 2). Robbins rounded up his tour through the Scriptures by looking at Matthew 28:19-20, noting the focus on teaching. Apologetically, Robbins next launched into a polemic against those who attacked the idea of propositional truth and thus use "idolatry, ritual, invitations, dance, drama, and music" as instruments to convey truth ("The Church," 3).

Having established in his article what the Church is, Robbins then moved to apply this theory of the Church to particular situations. Robbins excoriated single elder churches and hierarchy among teachers, the latter aimed specifically at the distinction between teaching and ruling elders in Presbyterian circles. He advocates for the election of teachers from within the local church, rejects women leadership, attacks the idea of excommunication, promotes the idea of all the elders having a part-time secular job outside, and calls for sermons discussions after sermons so that believers could be edified after the service instead of the sermon being a mere monologue. All of such is to be done for the purpose that there would be much teaching within the Church.

Clark's view of the Church

For Clark's view, I have chosen to look at his book What do Presbyterians believe? The Westminster Confession Yesterday and Forever (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 1965, 2001). Now, the material for this work was written earlier in Clark's life and career, and I do not discount the possibility that he might have changed his views since then, although I have no reason to believe that had happened. This book is Clark's brief commentary on the Westminster Confession of Faith, and serve more to illuminate Clark's understanding of the Confession than what the Confession itself teaches.

Here are some citations from the book which illuminate Clark's understanding of the Church:

The local congregations, of course, exist chiefly for the purpose of public worship and at all regular meetings should engage in prayer, praise, reading and preaching the Word, as well as at stated intervals administering the sacraments. … (p. 198; Commentary on Chapter XXI Of Religious Worship and the Sabbath-Day)

The invisible Church, or more accurately a part of it, becomes the visible church as those who confess Christ, together with their children, are organized into congregations. … (p. 220; Commentary on Chapter XXV Of the Church)

In opposition to Rome the Presbyterian and Reformed churches without compromise exalt the Word rather than the sacraments. In fact, it may be said that the Word is essential and the sacraments unessential. Let there be no superficial misunderstanding here: God’s commands to baptize and to celebrate the Lord’s Supper ought to be obeyed. Any theory that omits the sacraments from the regular observance of the church is not Biblical. And any individual who refuses or neglects to participate in the sacraments is in open rebellion against God. The sacraments are means of grace, instituted by Christ for our spiritual advancement. Only at our own risk and our own loss can we despise them. At the same time, if by reason of necessity, like the thief on the cross, or even if by reason of unjustifiable carelessness, a person is not baptized and does not eat of the Lord’s Supper, this omission does not render his sincere faith of none effect. Fortunately, God forgives the sin of neglecting the sacraments, as he forgives other sins. But the forgiveness is granted to those whose faith is sincere; and faith can come only by hearing the Word. (p. 235; Commentary on Chapter XXVII Of the Sacraments)

It can be clearly seen that Clark does not write about the Church like Robbins does. Clark has the public worship of God as the central focus of the Church (p.. 198), which is gathered together for confessing the faith (p. 220). Clark prioritizes the Word, or the preaching of the Word, above the Sacraments, for a person does not need to partake of the sacraments to be saved. However, Clark does believe that the sacraments are necessary for the Christian life, and are means of grace for our spiritual advancement. Neglecting or despising the sacraments of God is "rebellion against God," not just a lifestyle choice. Elsewhere in the book commenting on the issue of church censures, Clark agrees with the necessity of church discipline even up to excommunication from the church (pp. 252-5).

Clark as such is an orthodox Presbyterian, with the ministry of the Church focused on both Word and Sacrament. Comparing Robbins' view of the Church to Clark's view of the Church, does anyone think the two look even remotely the same? I would hope not! How then can Robbins claim to be a Clarkian and yet promote such views? It is most likely that Robbins pick up on Clark's main focus and made it the main point. Clark to be certain was often engaged in controversy. In the growing anti-intellectual climate of his time, Clark's emphasis has always been on recovering the rationality (note: I did not say rationalISM) of Christianity. The importance of doctrine and teaching within the Church are thus bound to be emphasized over and over again, and it is likely that Robbins picked up on this emphasis and ran away with it to create an entire system of thought. What was one of the motifs in Clark's view of the Church was taken, blown way out of proportion, and made THE central motif of one's doctrine of the Church

Analysis

The problems with Robbins' view are present at the very beginning. Robbins first assumes that teleology determines ontology; the purpose of the Church determines the nature and activities of the Church. Such however is a premise not taught by Clark, neither is it found in Scripture. Teleology is not ontology, and that is why for example, on a completely different topic, I reject the idea of dominion being part of the Imago Dei. Teleology does of course have bearings for the activities of the Church, and something to say concerning the nature of the Church, but it does not determine both the nature of the Church and all the activities of the Church.

Secondly, Robbins is a reductionist. Yes, one purpose of the Church is teaching, but does it therefore mean that the Church has only ONE purpose? Such a reductionistic understanding of the Church runs throughout Robbin's entire article, and everything is funneled through that one lens. It is however illuminative that Robbins managed to make some logical leaps in his application, for it is not evident how having only the one purpose of teaching necessitates the denial of hierarchy among leaders, or even that there should be no paid full-time ministers. The applications Robbins make seem at times to be a logical leap from his idea of the Church to Robbins' personal opinions of what a church should look like. Robbins' attack on the distinction between teaching and ruling elders for example does not flow from his one purpose of teaching, for ruling elders do teach, just in general not preach. Also, the idea that elders do not require seminary training and should all have secular jobs suffer from too low an estimation of the demands of what pastoring a church actually requires. Not all elders know Greek and Hebrew, or have the time to study and prepare sermons and write articles for the flock. Yes, seminary training is not required, if by that it is meant that one does not need to undergo an ontological elevation to become a "seminary grad" in order to preach and teach. But it is required, if by that it is meant that training in exegesis and theology is necessary for the vocation of the ministry. It is certainly possible for someone not a seminary grad to study exegesis and theology and church history etc by oneself, but highly unlikely.

Another application Robbins has made concerns the election of teachers from within the local congregation. The problem with Robins here is not that it is not good if someone within the local congregation rises up to be the pastor, but that Robbins sees this as the only acceptable practice. This application does not flow from his doctrine of the church, and does not even flow from his exegesis of Acts 14:23 and Acts 6 in the paragraph where he discussed the matter. It is a logical leap to move from the claim that office bearers are elected by a show of hands, to asserting that office bearers must come from within the local congregations. Even more fundamentally, Robbins merely asserts without argumentation that the congregation elects first before the apostles appointed the office bearers, instead of things happening the other way around. This application of Robbins is thus without any basis and does not even need to be taken seriously.

Conclusion

Clark versus Robbins. As I have shown, Robbins' view of the Church is not the same as Clark's view of the Church. Robbins' view is severely lopsided and based upon a single truth blown way out of proportion. Yes, there ought to be teaching in the Church. But teaching is not the be all and end all of the Church. As Clark said, the local congregations "exist chiefly for the purpose of public worship" which includes administration of the sacraments. The ministry of the Church is Word and Sacrament, not just mere intellectual teaching and learning of doctrine. On the doctrine of the Church, it is Clark versus Robbins, and the Scriptures and the Reformed tradition side with Clark on this one. Clark 1 Robbins 0.

Paper: Fiducia and the Anatomy of Faith

What is faith? In a recent paper of mine here, I have decided to interact on the issue of the definition of faith, interacting with Gordon H. Clark's definition of faith in dialogue with the Reformed tradition. An excerpt:

What is faith? Faith can refer to the objective faith to be believed (fides quae creditur), or the subjective element of faith (fides qua creditur) believers are to exercise. In the Reformation, the description and definition of the subjective element of faith was a matter of contention between the Reformers and the Roman Catholics. Traditional Roman Catholicism with its view of fides implicita or implicit faith made faith out to be a mere unknowing assent to whatever the church teaches. ...

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Verbal Plenary Inspiration and the charge of worshiping the Bible

The charge against a biblical view of the verbal plenary inspiration (VPI) of the Scriptures has been that such makes the Bible a "paper pope," and therefore those who hold to that position worship a book. Against this charge, Gordon Clark has excellently refuted it as follows:

This caricature [by the VPI-denying liberals] stems from their materialistic turn of mind; a naturalism that may not be apparent in other discussions, but that which comes to the surface when they direct their fire against fundamentalism. They think of the Bible as a material book, with paper contents, and a leather binding. That the contents are the thoughts of God, expressed in God's own words, is a position to which they are so invincibly antagonistic that they canot even admit it to be the position of a fundamentalist [i.e. Bible-believing Christian].

[Gordon H. Clark, "The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark," in The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark Vol. 7 (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2009), 60]

Presupositionalism and Sense Experience

The Vantillian attack against Clarkian epistemology has so far seem to be based upon blatant misrepresentation and failure of logical thinking. One direction of attack which Vantillians such as Greg Bahnsen has advocated is the objection of sense experience.

According to Greg Bahnsen:

ARGUMENT I — Clark contends:

P1. Any position that leads to skepticism is false

P2. Empiricism leads to skepticism.

C1.: Empiricism is false.

ARGUMENT II — Furthermore, Clark argues:

P3. Man cannot know anything through his senses (from C1).

P4. Human knowledge is limited to the contents of divine revelation (The Bible).

P5. But man cannot know the content of the Bible save through his senses.

C2. Therefore, man cannot know the truths God has revealed in the Bible.

ARGUMENT III

P6. The only knowledge available to man is contained in the Bible (from P4).

P7. But, for Clark, man cannot attain this knowledge (from C2).

C3. It follows that Clark's view reduces to skepticism.

C4. It follows further that Clark's view is false (from P1).

[Greg Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended (ed. Joel McDurmon; Powder Springs, GA: American Vision & Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media, 2008, 2011), 194]

The issue arises from premise 5. If Bahnsen has accurately represented the problem, then of course he is right in his argument.

Leaving aside discussion of premise 4 for now and granting its truth for the sake of argument, the main problem with premise 5 comes about through the confusion between senses functioning as the instruments and as the grounds. Bahnsen's error is that he does not differentiate between the two. For example, in justification the grounds of justification is Christ's merit, and the instrument of justification is faith. To confuse the two would be fatal, for making faith the ground would imply that our faith is meritorious towards our salvation.

Likewise, if we claim that the senses are instruments for knowing and not the grounds for knowing, that implies that knowledge is not dependent upon the use of the senses; only our process of knowing is dependent upon the senses. Therefore, both Bahnsen's premise 5 and conclusion 2 are amphibolies.

To clarify Clark's argument, we should amend the argument as follows:

ARGUMENT II

P3*. Man cannot know anything based upon his senses (from C1).

P4. Human knowledge is limited to the contents of divine revelation (The Bible).

P5*. Man cannot know the content of the Bible save through the instrument of his senses.

C2*. Therefore, man cannot come to know the truths God has revealed in the Bible without his senses. But man can know the truths of the Bible without grounding it in his senses.

With this amended argument, we can see that Bahnsen's criticism is invalidated.

The Vantillian critique should lead us to ask of Vantillian presuppositionalism some questions. Do the Vantillians mean to say that sense experience can help us to know the truth? If sense experience in some sense functions as part of the ground for knowledge, then Vantillianism does not have Scripture as its ultimate authority epistemologically.

To be sure, Vantillianism and Greg Bahnsen in particular claim that one must presuppose God and Scripture in everything. How this works out however is an ontological presupposition not an epistemic presupposition. In other words, all manner of knowing (e.g. sense experience, science etc) are legitimate tools to gain true knowledge. What Vantillianism teaches however is that these grounds must be ontologically corrected by a Christian worldview. In other words, a "Christian worldview" as an ontic entity, for the knowledge that comes from treating Scripture as the principium cognoscendi, norms all knowledge (viewed ontologically). But epistemologically, how one knows something is pretty much irrelevant.

Clarkian thought is true and proper presuppositionalism. Vantillian thought is presuppositional only in its ontological view of knowledge. In its epistemic grounds however, it is not truly based upon Scripture but regards all grounds and methods as legitimate as long as they are normed by a Christian worldview and thus presupposed God.

Christianity, Verification and Falsifiability

[Greg Bahsen in criticizing Gordon Clark's alleged rationalism] The regulative demands of logic provide an atmosphere that envelops both Creator and creature. Hence if God should wish to speak to man, His revelation should be testable by the fourth book of Aristotle's metaphysics. He should be able to pass the test honorably. As Clark sees it, the sinner is not furthering his hostility against God and His Word by calling His revelation into question and subjecting it to the criterion of logic, but rather has the right and obligation to scrutinize any claim to revelation. (p. 151)

The very notion of proving God's existence is inherently misguided; God alone is adequate to witness to Himself. All of man's interpretive and discursive reasoning must be self-consciously subordinated to God and the authoritative direction of His Word. If the truth of God's Word were Clark's absolute presupposition, he would not consider it needing verification, or God's existence needing proof. (p. 154)

We are led to believe that Christianity would be undermine if certain proofs could be verifiably formulated. However, Clark should have maintained that Christianity salvages logic, not vice versa. (p. 150)

[Greg L. Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended (ed. Joel McDurmon; Powder Springs, Georgia: American Vision, 2008, 2011)]

Now if Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. For if the dead are not raised, not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are of all people most to be pitied. (1 Cor. 15:12-19)

In Greg Bahnsen's posthumously published book, Bahnsen attempts to critique Gordon Clark's epistemology. In the process, Bahnsen showed an appalling ignorance of logic, misrepresentation of Clark's epistemology, and a misunderstanding of how Scripture argues.

One main critique Bahnsen has is that Clark promotes the fact that one can verify the claims of Christianity. According to Bahnsen, by making Christianity verifiable by logic, Clark places logic above revelation and thus is a rationalist. Scripture is no more the ultimate authority in Clark's system but reason is. But has Bahnsen even begin to understand Clark's epistemology, and even the basic concepts of logic?

The problem that Bahnsen has is that he fails to differentiate between verification and falsification. Verification means that one proves that something is right. If done via deduction, the form of the argument is some form of modus ponens. Applied to Christianity, verification would give an argument of such a form:

If X, then Christianity is true

X

Therefore, Christianity is true

Falsification however follows the form of modus tollen. Applied to Christianity, falsification would give an argument of the form:

If Christianity is true, then X

~X (?)

Therefore Christianity is false

The process of verification would make Christianity dependent upon truths discovered via either the empirical or rational methods or both. In other words, the process of verification would certainly make Scripture not the final authority. If Clark was indeed promoting verification, then certainly Bahnsen's critique would be valid.

The problem comes when we see that Clark is actually promoting falsification not verification. We can see this even from a quote used by Bahnsen to argue to the contrary. Clark is quoted as saying:

If the Biblical doctrine are self-consistent, they have actually met the only legitimate test of reason. This test of logic is precisely the requirement that a set of propositions be meaningful, whether spoken by God or man.

[Gordon Clark," Special Divine Revelation as Rational," Revelation and the Bible (1959, 37). As cited in Bahnsen, 151)]

We note here that Clark is arguing for the logical coherency within a system. Clark's argument can be described as follows:

P1: If [belief system A] were true, then propositions X, Y, and Z

P2: If X were true, then ~Z

IC1: Therefore, if [belief system A] were true, then propositions ~Z

[Consequentia Mirabilis!]

C: Belief system A is false

In form, such a reductio ad absurdum follows the similar form of modus tollens. In other words, even from the quote cited by Bahnsen, we can see that Clark is actually advocating for falsification and not verification.

In falsification, one can make Scripture one's final authority. In fact, unless Scripture is totally disconnected with the real world, Scripture must be falsifiable. Scripture in fact gives us a perfectly clear falsifiable criterion for Christianity in 1 Cor. 15: 12-19. The complex argument there can be boiled down to the argument that if Jesus is not raised from the dead, then Christianity is false and so on. The logical argument of this passage of Scripture therefore is as follows:

If Christianity is true, then Jesus rose from the dead

[Jesus did not raise from the dead]?

Therefore, if [Jesus did not raise from the dead], Christianity is false

The problem with evidentialism is that they argue based upon verification principles. Thus, they argue as follows:

If Jesus rose from the dead, then Christianity is true

Jesus rose from the dead

Christianity is true

Such an argument makes something other than God's revelation the ultimate authority, and is in fact false since the first premise is not necessarily true.

Christianity therefore must be a falsifiable religion. Clark is perfectly consistent in stating that Scripture is the final authority and also claiming that Scripture could be tested for its consistency.

Bahnsen's critique simultaneously reveals the problem with the Van Tillian approach. If one claims that one must subordinate logic to revelation epistemology (as opposed to ontologically), then one is saying that Christianity is non-falsifiable. For revelation to be primary epistemologically means that Scripture is beyond all means of testing. In other words, Van Tillians such as Bahnsen are logically committed to saying that even if Jesus did not rise from the dead, Christianity is still true, since after all we cannot elevate "facts" above Scripture. This sort of fideism makes Christianity no different from all other mystery religions that are disconnected from this world. Of course, Van Tillians are not consistent with their professed epistemology, and still believe the teaching of 1 Cor. 15:12-19.

Bahnsen's critique of Clark at this main point is totally without any basis at all. Bahnsen misrepresents Clark, ignores the arguments of Scripture in 1 Cor. 15:12-19, and fails his logic. Christianity is a rational (not rationalistic) religion, and it can be be subject to tests for disproval but never proved.

The essential difference between Vantillian and Clarkian epistemology

Epistemology is almost always a complicated subject. To complicate matters, [Cornelius] Van Til is not easy to understand, and both [Gordon] Clark and Van Til do not speak at the same level and use the same terms differently. So in an effort to simplify things, I offer this as my understanding of the issue. [Those who want some documentary proof check out my other posts on Clark or Van Til]

According to Van Til, the Trinity is the archetype for all knowledge. According to Clark, the Trinity is a vital part of revelation but not the archetype for knowledge. Rather, the Scriptures is the principium and basis for all knowledge.

In Vantillian epistemology, since the Trinity is the archetype for knowledge, therefore all knowledge is by definition analogical. This is because there is a qualitative difference between God and Man with no univocal point of contact, as the Creator is distinct from the creature. All of Man's knowledge is creaturely and therefore cannot be univocal. "Univocal knowledge" in the Vantillian system refer to knowledge that erases the Creator/creature distinction and make the knower knowing truth as God knows it. Such a univocal knower may not know everything that God knows, but the part of the truth that he knows, he knows it to the same comprehensive detail that God knows that truth.

In Clarkian epistemology, which I am convinced IS the biblical and Reformed epistemology, we definitely agree that the Trinity is basic for Christianity. But the Trinity is basic in terms of ontology, in terms of grounding the world and everything that exists in its being. God in the Trinity is the principium essendi (beginning of being), and therefore without God nothing exists least of all [the being of] knowledge.

On top of this however, we realize that the Trinity is revealed to us humans by the Scriptures. Apart from Special Revelation in the Scriptures, no one can know the Trinity. The Trinity is not something that even a Christian can know intuitively and mystically apart from reading the Scriptures and internalizing the biblical data and worldview. Since this is the case, the Trinity cannot be properly basic for epistemology, for the Scriptures is the source for our knowledge of the Trinity.

The Scriptures is God's ectypal revelation to us. Since it is already accommodated to us humans, knowledge is univocal between God's intended revelation (ectypal theology simpliciter dicta) and our grasped knowledge (in subiecto). We can only know what God reveals. Even the Trinity is known to us only inasmuch as Scripture reveals it to us, either overtly or by good and necessary consequence.

As it can be seen, the two systems start off from very different foundations, and the divergence shows up in confusion as the two sides often misunderstand the other. I offer this of course to aid in some small manner to clear the fog.

Why do I not hold to Van Til's epistemology? As mentioned, I do not believe that the Trinity can be known apart from Scripture. I believe in a two track system differentiating between ontology and epistemology, with the Triune God as the principium essendi (beginning of being) and Scriptures as the principium congnoscendi (beginning of knowledge), and the two do not collapse into each other. Van Til's epistemology is also very problematic in making room for speculation on the Trinity, although of course Vantillians do not necessary do so. But if we place the Trinity prior to Scriptures, then why should our theories about the Trinity be necessarily tied to Scripture, since the former after all determines the latter in the Vantillian system? What safeguard is therefore in the Vantillian epistemology to stop speculations concerning the internal essence of the Trinity for the promotion of theories such as Social Trinitarianism, or making the Trinity the archetype for whatever three-fold relations we have concocted?

Such is why I am a Clarkian not a Vantillian.

Response to Warren Cruz: The Great Minds fallacy

Van Tillian Warren Cruz continues on promoting Vantillianism, this time around stating that "Great Minds Reject Univocity." It always amuses me how Vantillians argue, this time even more so.

First of all, the whole post is logically fallacious. Great minds think a lot of things, but their thinking so does not make it right. The logical fallacy is called appeal to authority. Great minds promote evolution as truth (ie the late Stephen Jay Gould), but I don't see many Reformed Christians using the same logic and capitulating to the embrace of evolution, at least not yet.

Secondly, we have a total lack of what exactly "univocity" is. The whole Vantillian polemic on univocity becomes an exercise in superior linguistic bashing. There is a certain type of jargon to use, but as long as "univocity" is condemned, everything is fine. No one bothers to define what "univocity" actually means, except that it has the connotation of denying the Creator/ creature distinction. How exactly that is the case is always not spelt out, and one has to attempt to understand this cliquish group in understand their elitist jargon.

I have tried in this respect to understand Van Til, and the result has been this post of mine. As I have written, Van Til distorts language in order to attempt to defend an important truth — the Creator/ creature distinction. The problem therefore with Van Til and Vantillians is their manifest distortion of language. It is almost like a cult in this sense — that unless one agrees as to their special jargon one cannot understand them.

Unfortunately, I prefer to use normal English, as I am sure most people do. I therefore reject the Vantillian novelty, and prefer the imperfect but mostly true teachings of Gordon Clark.

P.S.: As an aside, the quote by Trueman says nothing about "univocity" and nothing that a Clarkian does not accept.

Univocity and Analogy: Van Til and the distortion of language

Thus every bit of knowledge on the part of man is derivative and reinterpretative. This is what we mean by saying that man's knowledge is analogical.

— Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 2nd Ed. (ed. by William Edgar; Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), p. 34

Van Til's concept of analogy is alluded to throughout his writings. Because God is the Creator, we cannot know univocally (as he does), yet neither do we know equivocally (never the truth). Instead we know analogically, by thinking God's thoughts after him. This is quite different from Thomas's [Aquinas] use of analogy, which amounts to a middle way between univocal and equivocal knowledge, whereby we may climb up closer to God's being without ever knowing his essence.

— Editor, Ibid., p. 97 footnote 41

As indicated at the outset of this work, we speak of all forms of reasoning in which man is assumed to be the final or ultimate reference point of predication in univocal reasoning. In contrast to this we speak of the form of reasoning employed by the Christian who recognizes that God is the ultimate reference point of predication as analogicalreasoning. Univocal here describes thinking that is exactly the same as God's thinking, a clear impossibility.

— Ibid., p. 178 footnote 6

=

u-niv-o-cal (adj): Having only one meaning, unambiguous [Dictionary.com]

The issue of analogy and univocity has plagued the Clark-Van Til controversy since it occurred. What does Van Til means by analogy, and how should we think of the concept?

The quotes above from Van Til's book I think sufficiently aids us in understanding what Van Til meant by analogy. In Van Til's system, there is a huge emphasis on the Creator-creature distinction. That is of course well and good, but it is what one does with this that need to be evaluated.

The Creator-creature distinction in Van Til's thought means that one should not reason like Man in order to reach God. In order to know anything at all, Van Til asserts that one should reason from a Christian perspective.

Van Til accordingly defines his terms as follows: "Univocal" reasoning is to him thinking in the exact same manner as how God thinks. "Equivocal" thinking is to not-reason. "Analogical" thinking Van Til defines as thinking derivative thoughts re-interpreting what God has interpreted.

The funny thing here is that as a Clarkian, I absolutely agree that Christians are to think "derivative thoughts re-interpreting what God has interpreted," and Clark does too. According to Van Til's definition, most Clarkians would reason analogically.

The problem comes however with definitions. Clark and Clarkians in general use plain English as much as possible. As a sample definition in dictionary.com shows, the term "univocal" means "having only one meaning, unambiguous." It has to do therefore with the intended meanings of words and sentences. Therefore, using plain speech, the term "univocal" cannot refer to the manner of reasoning, but the content of propositions (not the form because the same sentence can mean two or more different propositions depending on factors including the socio-cultural environment)

Van Till's distinct philosophy and his definition of "univocal" is therefore contrary to the actual meaning of the word in English. This is especially when the adjective "univocal" is modifying the noun "knowledge." The term "univocal knowledge" means that the content is the same. In other words, instead of "univocal knowledge," we can substitute it for the phrase "literal" or "unambiguous knowledge."

As an adverb ("univocally"), the word could be used in the way Van Til uses it. However, this then is the difference between "univocally knowing X" and "knowledge of X is univocal." The former expression has the adverb "univocally" modifying the manner of "knowing" X, and therefore could convey the meaning that Van Til desires it to have. The latter however describes the content of X that we are knowing, viz that there is an overlap of sorts between the content of what God and what Man knows.

In this way, the univocity of knowledge ensure revelation is possible. It means that if God intends for us to know that "Justification is by Faith Alone," the truth would be conveyed to us and we would receive it. No doubt it may be the case that God's revelation is much more richer than what we have discovered so far with regards to this vital doctrine, but the key issue is that we have at least perceived part of what God intends to convey.

Van Til therefore creates de novo his own definitions of English words , and then uses his newly-fangled words to define what orthodoxy is. But such a tactic is entirely illegitimate, and as such we should reject the entire "univocal" and "analogy" terms altogether when describing the manner of our knowing anything. It is no thanks to Van Til therefore that we have confusion and the misrepresentation of Gordon Clark. After all, since when did a theologian get to judge the orthodoxy of another person based upon whether they agree with the form of his phrases made up of redefined words? Therefore, we should reject this redefinition of words, and use proper English.

Debunking the Vantillian myth: Gordon Clark on Reason and Faith

Here are two choice quotes directly from the pen of Gordon Clark, as written about in a previous post:

... The important question is not whether or not the Bible is true, but whether or not all knowledge is deducible by reason, i.e. by logic alone.

Now, the history of philosophy ... have convincingly answer in the negative.

...

.. reason without faith not only provides no religion, it supports no knowledge of any kind. ...

[Gordon H. Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation. In The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark, Vol. 4 (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2004), 143]

Any discussion of man's mind and powers, to be at all Biblical, must take into account the effects of sin. Calvin, Hodge, and Machen were keenly aware of this. ...

[Quoting Machen with approval] ... So our reason is certainly insufficient to tell us about God, unless he reveals himself; but it is capable (or he would be capable if it were not clouded by sin) of receiving revelation when once it is given.

[Clark, Religion. In Works Vol. 4, 179]

As we can see from these two quotes, Van Til's charge that Clark thinks that reason is unaffected by sin whatsoever is entirely baseless. Perhaps if Van Til and the Van Tillians aren't so eager to demonize Clark then we they would be able to more critically engage the writings of Gordon Clark instead of putting up strawmen and misrepresentation of "the enemy."

Unlike them, I hope to do justice to Van Til's writings. Although analyzing Van Til's thought would not be a high priority, when I critique Van Til, I will attempt to represent him correctly, most definitely much better than the misrepresentation of Clark by Vantillians.

A response to Van Tillian Warren Cruz: Logic, Rationality, and the Fall

Over on his blog, Van Tillian Warren Cruz has posted a recent post attempting to defend the Van Tillian notion of the ontological defect of the reason of Man caused by the Fall. Judging by its temporal proximity to my post critiquing Van Til on this topic, the post seems to be a response to mine. I guess that would most definitely merit a response from me.

As I have read Van Til, the major problem with Van Til is that he is not systematic. It can be clearly seen that Van Til is influenced by the Reformed scholars of his day like Bavinck and Kuyper. This however means only that he uses the terms they use and to some extent embrace what they teach. What is required however for apologetics and interaction with detractors is a sharp mind good at systematizing truths and making the proper distinctions, as well as humility to seek to understand the terms and position of your detractors. That is what makes Reformed Scholasticism the highest peak of Reformed theology so far. Sadly, all of these qualities are lacking in Van Til, and it shows here in this post by Cruz.

The main thrust of the argument by Cruz is that Turretin believes in the same position as Van Til. Van Til, per his hagiographical image, was a solid Reformed scholar merely restating the truths of Reformed theology and applying them to the realm of apologetics. Cruz first states the issue at hand and his belief that the Reformed view is that the effects of sin on reason is more than ethical. Cruz then quotes Turretin with the belief that Turretin's work confirms his Van Tillian position on the effects of sin.

The problem with Cruz's post though is that I as a Clarkian agree 100% with what Turretin wrote, yet I disagree with Cruz's and Van Til's distortion of Turretin's views. That is why I have said earlier that proper definitions of terms and humility to seek to understand the positions of detractors is necessary. It is no use like Van Til to merely state the Reformed view without further systematizing, clarifying and reformulating how the truths held by the Reformed tradition are to be applied to the present day and time. [Of course, Van Til did "build on" the Reformed tradition, if building a straw roof on top of a concrete building while rearranging the concrete pillars is considered "building upon it."]

It is possible to say that "reason" is not affected by the Fall as per Clark, and also hold that "reason" is affected by the Fall as per Turretin. The issue here as always has been definitions, definitions and definitions. What do we mean by the use of our terms? What does Turretin mean by the use of his term? Van Tillians it seems ignore this entire issue, and merely parrot the same objection again and again. Of course, it may well be the case that they have never heard a refutation of this canard, but I seriously doubt that to be the case.

What does Clark mean by "reason"? Does he mean by that the reasoning processes of Man? No. Clark is abundantly clear that the Image of God in Man is the mind and logic. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that is irrelevant for this topic. The main point here is that Clark defines "reason" in this area as the rules of reason, or logic.

We will digress here to a short course in basic logic. Let us start with the simple logical argument: "All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is moral." What does logic assert as to this statement? Logic merely shows us whether this argument is valid or invalid (whether the consequence necessarily flows from the premises). It does not supply the premises for the argument, neither does it tell us whether the premises are true or false. Logic furthermore does not even tell us what arguments to evaluate. It is a mere tool. If one inputs true premises into the arguments, logic can tell us whether it is valid, and if it is valid, then the argument is sound. However, if one inputs false premises into the arguments, logic cannot disprove the argument if the structure of the argument is valid. Which is to say, "Rubbish in, rubbish out."

For example, let us look at this argument: "All unicorns are cats. I have seen a unicorn. Therefore I have seen a cat." Logic can only tell us that this argument is valid, but we all know that this argument is nonsensical because unicorns do not exist, unicorns are not cats, and we and everyone else have not seen a unicorn. In other words, the premises of this argument are false and the argument unsound despite the fact that it is valid in form.

Therefore, when Clark states that "reason" is unaffected by the fall ontologically but affected only ethically, it means that unregenerate men after the Fall still use the same logical apparatus as Adam and Eve did, and as regenerate believers still do. Adam and Eve believed in for example the principle of modus tollens as much as Aristotle the pagan did, as much as the Medieval theologian Aquinas did, as much as John Calvin did, and as we do so today. The problem with the unregenerate mind is not their logical apparatus is different, but the way in which they use it. The unregenerate mind is incapable of providing the proper premises for the right argument towards knowing God, and incapable of judging whether the premises of any such arguments to be truth or false correctly.

This brings us to Turretin's quote. When Turretin uses the word "reason," he means the entire reasoning process including the choosing of premises and the assessment of their truth value. Using this definition, Turretin rightly attacks blind reason and the Rationalism of the philosophers, and deny that "sound reason is its [the faith's] principle." In other words, if we talk about the reasoning process as a whole, then of course "reason" defined in this way is very much affected by the Fall. As Cruz kindly reminded us, the bifurcation between reason [understood as the reasoning process] and will is "undue and coerced."

As it can be seen, Clarkians stand in the Reformed tradition with Turretin. It is however Van Til who distorts the Reformed teaching by adding to it the ontological effects of reason in the Fall, something none of the Reformers and Reformed scholastics ever did. In fact, the Reformed scholastics embraced Aristotelianism to a very large extent in its form and vocabulary (though not so much content), so it would be indeed strange, even impossible if their minds which were shaped by Aristotelian categories would reject one of those categories.

As a last word, Van Tillians really need to stop reading Van Til into the writings of the Reformers and their successors. It is manifestly unscholarly and anachronistic, and those of us who DO read the works of the Reformed tradition are not impressed with the mangling of the primary sources in the service of an ideology based upon the veneration of one sinful man.

A critique of Van Til's analogy of the fallen mind

[Because of the Fall] The intellect of fallen man may, as such, be keen enough. It can therefore formally understand the Christian position. It may be compared to a buzz-saw that is sharp and shining, ready to cut the boards that come to it. Let us saw that a carpenter wishes to cut fifty boards for the purpose of laying the floor of a house. He has marked his boards. He has set his saw. He beings at one end of the mark on the board. But he does not know that his seven-year old son has tampered with the saw and changed its set. The result is that every board he saws is cut slantwise and thus unusable because [the board is] too short except at the point where the saw first made its contact with the wood. As long as the set of the saw is not changed, the result will always be the same.

— Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 4th Ed. (ed. by K. Scott Oliphant; Philipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 97

In this interesting book, Cornelius Van Til came up with an analogy to describe what he thinks is the Reformed view of the noetic effects of sin. Van Til's point that he is trying to prove here is that sin affects the intellect, and therefore unregenerate men cannot reason alright of the things of God. In this light, Van Til and his supporters critique Gordon Clark as being a "rationalist" because Clark believes that the thinking apparatus is not affected by the fall.

With this in mind, let us analyze this analogy. We note here that the carpenter in Van Til's analogy has a nice working saw, which is analogous to reason. However, his saw has been tampered with, so that he cannot cut the boards alright. This is supposed to be analogous to the Fall causing Man's reason to be defective so he cannot properly reason. Man's reason is therefore still working but fundamentally defective because of Man's fall into sin.

We note however that in this analogy, the carpenter tries to cut the board correctly. The problem is in his tampered saw which is not working as it should. The carpenter it seems genuinely attempts to cut straight boards, but his task is forever doomed to failure because of his defective instrument.

Translated into the picture of Man and reason, this is analogous to fallen Man being genuinely desirous to know God, but his reason is defective thus he cannot do so no matter how much he desires it.

Is this the picture of Man that we want to have? Scripture is clear that the problem with Man is ethical, something which Van Til did agree with in principle. If the problem with Man is ethical, then the inability of Man to know God is not because he is trying to know God and fails to do so because of his defective reason, but because Man does not want to know God and tries as much as possible to excise God from his world. It is therefore Man who uses his intellect to reject God, not that his defective intellect is trying to do the impossible task of knowing God.

Van Til's analogy is severely defective, and does not express the Reformed and biblical view of the effects of sin on Man. To think of reason as being a good saw with a defective set is to make the effect of the Fall in reason an intellectual defect; an ontological defect of reason.

If we believe that the Fall affected Man's reason ethically and not ontologically, then we must insist, using the same analogy, that the saw and its set are fine. The problem lies with the carpenter not his tools. The carpenter is in rebellion against his boss who has called upon him to cut wood boards in a certain way. The carpenter therefore [willingly] alters the set or just cut the wood boards any way he wants, so that the cut boards are not what they were supposed to be.

So deep is Man's rebellion against God from the time of conception that such rebellion may be done even at the subconscious level. Thus, Man may be deluded by his own intellect to believe he is "merely following the evidences" and therefore seen to be someone who objectively rejects God because his intellect has "deduced" that the Christian God does not exist. God and His truths are rejected a priori and then the unregenerate man's sharp intellect is left to figure out a working system that seems at least on the surface to be logical and consistent.

Van Til's analogy of the fallen mind is therefore flawed. Upon such flawed analogies, Van Til and his followers have attacked the teachings of Clark on this and other subjects. The reason of Man however is not ontologically flawed in unregenerate Man. Rather, the noetic effects of the Fall refer to the usage of reason contrary to its intended goal of receiving the revelation of God. There is nothing ontologically wrong with reason per se, and we should in this light reject Van Til's analogy of the fallen mind and the novel teaching behind it.

Of course, it may be asked, didn't Van Til say explicitly that the effect of the Fall on reason is ethical? Indeed, he did. But the issue is not whether Van Til said it, but whether his more detailed teaching on the topic supports his profession that the effects of the Fall pertain to the ethical aspect only. To attempt to hold to two contradictory position is impossible, yet Van Til it seems has no problems with believing in two contradictory things.

Analytic and synthetic thought, Deductivism and the philosophy of Gordon Clark

Two methods can be applied in both the discovery and the presentation of knowledge: either one proceeds from the causes to the effects, or else one begins with the end and from there traces back to the causes. The first option, from cause to effect, Zabrella [an Aristotelian] called the way of composition or synthesis. The second option, from the end back to its causes or the means to that end, he called the way of resolution or analysis... The analytical method proceeds inductively. It does not begin with what comes first, but with the effect or outcome.

The contemplative sciences, such as philosophy, are rather concerned with knowledge itself. Here one reasons from cause to effect, and the synthetic or composite method that follows a deductive process is used. The movement is from universal (universalia) to particulars (particularia).

These two methods can be illustrated by comparing them with the building of a house. With an analytical method, one first considers the building itself in general; the point of departure is the whole. From there each element is considered, brick by brick, in order finally to arrive at the foundation. The synthetic method, on the other hand, implies that one first consider the foundation. Then all the other parts follow until one has an impression of the entire building.

— Willem J. Van Asselt, Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), 95-6

There is a small but growing interest in Reformed Scholasticism among the Reformed circles. This is of course a good thing since it is at that time that the fruits of Reformed theology were thriving.

It can be seen from Van Asselt's excellent book that Reformed Scholasticism borrowed greatly in form and method from Aristotelianism, yet without deriving its content from Aristotle. All of this is understandable. However, does the familiarity with Aristotelian categories blind those who are familiar with Reformed Scholasticism to ideas that do not depend on those categories?

Let us consider the philosophy of Gordon Clark. Vantillians have [falsely] accused Clark of many theological crimes — from being a [Cartesian] Rationalist, to denying the Creature/ Creator distinction, to believe that Man can become like God in knowledge etc. Of course, such attacks are totally baseless and only show the ignorance of Vantillians who read almost everything including the Reformers according to Vantillian lenses. In many cases, their idolatrous and un-Christian behavior deserve sharp rebuke as they persistently slander Clark and some Clarkians. (I am not denying however that some Clarkians turn into the caricatures their opponents paint of them.)

Nevertheless, it may be the case that some people unwittingly read Clark through the lens of Aristotle, and because of that they are confused over Clark's philosophy. It is with this in mind that I would like to address some of the basic Aristotelian categories that are used in Reformed Scholasticism.

According to Van Asselt's discussion of Reformed Scholasticism above, what is considered "analytic" is done inductively, reasoning from effect to cause. What is considered "synthetic" on the other hand is done deductively, reasoning from cause to effect. "Analytic" has to do with particulars, while "synthetic" has to do with universals, since after all reasoning from the foundation onwards should imply one universal foundation for everything (with the exception of postmodern thought) and then different structures (particulars) are build upon the same foundation.

Clarkian philosophy however ruins the entire Aristotelian landscape. According to Clark, the first axiom or presupposition of all thinking is revelation [Gordon H. Clark, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy. In The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark, Vol. 4 (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2004), 298]. In fact, as Clark said, "the notion that God can be known only through revelation seems to be essential to the very concept of God" (Clark, 299). With this one thought, Clark claims for revelation in Scripture to be both the foundation AND the house, and that house is most certainly particular. According to Aristotle, any focus on the foundation must be synthetic and universal, and focus on the house must be analytic and particular. Clark's philosophy dashes Aristotelian categories by making the particular the universal standard of judgment. All other systems, which in Aristotle's category would be deemed as other houses build upon the same type of foundation, are in Clark's system houses build in mid-air without true foundations.

According to Clark's philosophy, we can say that Christianity is discovered analytically in terms of human experience, but it is synthetic in terms of epistemic discourse. It is a particular philosophy which claims universality by denying all other philosophies and religions epistemic reality. Along this same line, we can say that Christianity is experienced inductively while rationally discussed deductively. This should be helpful in for us in seeing and appreciating the differences between the Heidelberg Catechism (inductive-analytic) and the Westminster Standards (deductive-synthetic).

Many have alleged that Clark held that reason in Man is untouched by sin, or that it could still sufficiently reach God in and of itself. As we have said, these accusers either have not read Gordon Clark, or have read his books with Vantillian lenses. Here is what Clark says about reason:

... The important question is not whether or not the Bible is true, but whether or not all knowledge is deducible by reason, i.e. by logic alone.

Now, the history of philosophy ... have convincingly answer in the negative.

...

.. reason without faith not only provides no religion, it supports no knowledge of any kind. ...

(Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation. In Clark, Works, 143)

Any discussion of man's mind and powers, to be at all Biblical, must take into account the effects of sin. Calvin, Hodge, and Machen were keenly aware of this. ...

[Quoting Machen with approval] ... So our reason is certainly insufficient to tell us about God, unless he reveals himself; but it is capable (or he would be capable if it were not clouded by sin) of receiving revelation when once it is given.

(Clark, Religion. In Works 179)

As we can see, Clark does teach that the mind is very much affected by sin. What Clark teaches on reason is that in the event that our minds are able to reason properly (due to regeneration etc), it is perfectly capable of receiving the revelation of God. Just because Clark teaches that we share the principle of reason with unbelievers in common does not imply at all that unbelievers' minds are capable of utilizing the principles of rational thinking when it comes to addressing the things of God.

In conclusion, while certainly we must keep in mind the use of Aristotelian categories in Reformed scholastic thought, which is not all bad either, we should not try to pigeon-hole other philosophies and theologies into these same Aristotelian categories. Attempting to do so with Clark's philosophy is probably the error that lead to the slanderous accusations against Clark by the Vantillians. Clark's philosophy while dated is still pertinent today, and it is my opinion that a combination of Reformed Scholasticism and Clarkian thought could very well solve most of the problems we face in philosophical thought.

The Archetypal/ Ectypal distinction and Clarkian epistemology

I have managed to finish my main intended project for this term break: an article interacting with parts of Dr. R. Scott Clark's article on the Well-Meant Offer in the book The Pattern of Sound Doctrine, a fetscrift for Dr. Bob Strimple edited by Dr. David VanDrunen. My article is entitled The Archetypal/Ectypal distinction and Clarkian epistemology, and can be found here.

An excerpt:

The distinction between archetypal and ectypal knowledge as promoted by the 17th century Reformed theologian Franciscus Junius is vital in Reformed scholastic thought. In this short article, I would like to interact with it as it is presented in Willem J. Van Asselt’s article in the Westminster Theological Journal of 2002, and tie that in with Clarkian epistemology. It is my opinion that there is no necessary conflict between the two, contrary to Dr. R. Scott Clark’s opinion that the denial of the archetypal/ectypal distinction is foundational to Clark’s epistemology and his denial of the Well-Meant Offer.

In this article therefore, I would first present the archetypal/ectypal distinction as presented by Van Asselt, and evaluate how that can tie in with Clarkian epistemology. Lastly, I would interact with some of Scott Clark’s criticism on the subject and show that it does not apply to Gordon Clark either in his epistemology or his denial of the Well-Meant Offer.

[cont]

[Note: An article is not a(n) [academic] paper. Unfortunately, almost all of my Gordon Clark books are back in Singapore so I can't reference them]

Van Till's misrepresentation of Gordon Clark

The misrepresentation of Gordon Clark's thought goes back all the way to Cornelius Van Till. In his book In Defense of the Faith Vol. 1: The Doctrine of Scripture (Ripon, California, USA: den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1967), in pages 62-72, Van Till interacts with Clark's view on the relation of special and general revelation, and totally misrepresents Clark in the process.

On page 63, Van Till accuses Clark of setting "God's general revelation given by thought" and "word communication" against each other. As proof, Van Till quotes Clark as follows:

"When Adam was created and placed in the Garden of Eden," says Clark, "he did not know what to do. Nor would a study of the Garden have led hm to any necessary conclusion. His duty was imposed on him by a special divine revelation. Thus moral norms, commands and prohibitions were established by a special and not a general revelation" (Special Divine Revelation as Rational in Revelation and the Bible, ed. Carl F. H. Henry, p. 29)

I would leave it to others who may want to check out the context. However, how does this quote exactly prove Van Till's point of contention? From the quotation itself, all that is affirmed is that General Revelation by its own apart from Special Revelation cannot prove anything. Rather, God needs to tell Adam (Special Revelation) what to do. Van Till's contention that Clark "overlooks the fact that from the beginning God spoke to man" misses the point altogether. Of course in the beginning God spoke to man! The quoted sentence did not establish or deny whether there was ever a time when God did not speak to man. All that is said or affirmed is the inadequacy of General Revelation by itself to inform Man of his duty. Furthermore, in writing about "the study of the Garden", empiricism is thus denied.

General Revelation does show us that there is a God and we ought to seek Him (Rom. 1:18-23), but it does not show us who God actually is and what He demands of us. Van Till essentially says the same thing in pages 63-64, and while the quote given does not mention it, neither does it deny it.

Van Till's next misrepresentation of Clark is with regards to the idea of philosophy of science. In this, Van Till thinks that just because Clark states that science "must not be regarded as cognitive" (p. 68), quoting Clark's book The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, so therefore Clark

... does not tell the unbelieving scientist that nature clearly reveals the ownership of God the creator-redeemer. Clark simply gives up asking the natural man to recognize the revelational character of the field of facts in which he makes his research. (p. 68)

In other words, Van Till sees Clark as denying General Revelation by his denial that science is cognitive.

Yet this is nothing like what Clark is actually advocating. Van Till himself has earlier state that "the inadequacy of general revelation" means that "it is inadequate for men as sinners" (p. 63). Clark in his book on the philosophy of science does not even mention the topic of General Revelation but the scientific methodology itself. Science is not the same as General Revelation, unless one wants to say that General Revelation is not present in the pre-scientific era! However, even if we grant the equivocation, General Revelation as Van Till puts it is inadequate for men as sinners. How does appealing to an inadequate revelation apart from its use in conjunction with Special Revelation supposed to function as an adequate apologetic?

The misrepresentation of Clark and Clarkian thought starts with Van Till. If there is to be any resolution to the Van Till-Clark controversy, both sides have to stop misrepresenting the other side and understand what the other side actually is saying.