Why did the Spirit come at Pentecost and not during the ministry of Jesus? The corruption of the biblical narrative by Adonis Vidu

Nevertheless, I tell you the truth: it is to your advantage that I go away, for if I do not go away, the Helper will not come to you. But if I go, I will send him to you. (Jn. 16:7)

Why did the Holy Spirit not come during the ministry of Jesus, but must only come at Pentecost? Why did Jesus say that it is to the disciples' advantage that He do away, so that He can send the Holy Spirit to them? I admit these were questions that I did not really think about when I first saw these questions. After all, Jesus said it, and that is how the ministry of the Gospel is to be done. Jesus came to live and die on the Cross for our sins. Once redemption is accomplished, then it can be applied to us who believe, and that is the "job" of the Holy Spirit, isn't it?

Upon consideration of the biblical narrative and biblical theology, a few more reasons came into focus. First, Jesus' role is that of the suffering servant, and the next time He will be present is when He comes again as King. Since now is the time of salvation, clearly Jesus had to ascend into the heavens, as the Final Judgment is not yet come. The Holy Spirit on the other hand has always been about changing of the heart (c.f. Ezek. 36:27, 37:1-14), and therefore comes at Pentecost. Second, Jesus because of His incarnation is has a body and is therefore local. While Jesus in His divine nature is omnipresent, that is through His Spirit, not His body which remains fixed in a specific space (we deny the Lutheran view of the ubiquity of the human nature). The Holy Spirit, as not having being incarnate, is everywhere without qualification. In the time of grace, the Holy Spirit will "function" better to call the elect from all nations without creating a new geopolitical presence in this world.

Perhaps other Christians can think of other reasons why the Holy Spirit only comes at Pentecost after the conclusion of Jesus' ministry. But I am certain nobody who is not trained in the intricacies of "classical theism" and the "Great Tradition" will ever come up with this reason provided by Adonis Vidu!

The growth of the capacity for the Spirit in Christ's human nature is predicated on the priority of the hypostatic union and therefore on the grace of union over Christ's habitual grace. That is to say, the operations of Christ do not flow from a quasi-independent human nature but specifically from the God to whom the human nature is united in the person of the Son. The hypostatic union is not constituted by the ongiong deification of Christ. Rather, the latter is the consequent of the former. That said, the terminus of this deification is a fully pneumatized life. (Adonus Vidu, The Same God who works all things: Inseparable Operations in Trinitarian Theology, 274)

We seem to be faced with an apparant contradiction in the teaching of the Scriptures. On the one hand Christ explains to the sorrowful disciples that he must leave to go to the Father and that unless he does to the Father the Spirit will not come. On the other hand we are promised the continued presence of Christ ot the end of the age!

The key lies in thinking through the ascension of Jesus Christ along the lines of the transfiguration and penumatization of his human nature.... (Ibid., 275)

As God, Christ could draw the Spirit at any moment; however, God had determined to pour the Spirit precisely through the humanity of Christ, as the "Spirit of His Son" (Gal. 4:6). This takes place through the progressive pneumatization of Christ's human nature. ... (Ibid., 278)

To rephrase it clearly, Vidu's answer to why the Holy Spirit did not come down during the ministry of Jesus is: The Holy Spirit was present already, "incarnate" in Jesus, and working to spirit-filled, to deify, to "pneumatize" Christ's human nature. This process of deification of the human nature begins with the hypostatic union and continues on till ascension, where Christ's human nature is fully fitted and spiritual. Only then can salvation come as the Spirit through Christ's humanity work in us.

I think it is safe to say that for most Christians who read the Bible, Vidu's explanation is so far out it should not merit consideration. When in the Scriptures is what Vidu is claiming to be true taught? Vidu is imposing a foreign concept on Scripture, and twisting it to fit his philosophical program. What does it mean for a human nature to be "pneumatized"? In what way is that still a human nature?

In pursuit of ressourcement, Vidu is reinterpreting classic evangelical doctrines on Christ and salvation. Christians should take note and reject this ressourcement, and ignore the cries of "biblicism" thrown our way.

The will and personal identity, as pertaining to the philosophy behind classical theism

If will is a personal property, it folllows that personal identity is located in freely willed actions. It means that a person is most fully herself when freely exercising the prerogative to initiate actions and make decisions. (Adonis Vidu, The Same God who works all things, p. 111)

What is a person? What is a person's identity? For one, it can be "tall, smart, black hair, male, Chinese," and for another, "eloquest, short, female, American." Personal identities, subjectively speaking, are intensively personal and pick up the traits that a person portrays as well as other distinguishing things about them. Objectively speaking, personal identities can cover all of the traits of a person, to identify that person against another.

Personal properties are of course the properties of a person, and thus key to their personal identities. So, in humans, if will is a personal property, is will part of their personal identity? For humans, of course not, because all humans have wills. The exercise of that will in action can form part of a person's identity (e.g. successful businessman), but that has nothing to do with the will per se but the will as acted out in the business actions he takes. Will we say that in humans, a person's identity is located in freely willed actions? No, because it is what is willed and what is done that identifies a person.

How then should we respond to Vidu's strange comment on will being a personal property? Vidu I think fails to differentiate being something being present, and something acted out. If will is a personal property, it can be said that a personal identity is that a person is a moral agent. However, the exercise of that will is an act, which the person can and does exercise. Therefore, it is a non sequitur to claim that "will" being a personal property implies that the personal identity is located in freely willed actions. The will is after all distinct from the act, though not separate from it.

There are of course more nuances when it comes to God, but the problem here is how Vidu, as with many of his Roman Catholic ressourcement friends, seem to think that a rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics and Aquinas is the cause of the problems with the world today (Modernism and Postmodernism). There are many problems with modernism and postmodernism, but making will a personal property has nothing to do with self-autonomy and the need for self-expression and self-actualization.

The corruption of Aristotelian metaphysics in classical theism: Exhibit B

Now, and this is the pivotal move in this argument, if the persons are identified with the relations, if these are relations that subsist in the unity of an intellectual substance, and if other relations, contingent and economic, were to obtain between the persons—where there would be a to and fro, a giving and a taking—then the very identity of the persons would also depend in some way upon these contingent and finite realities. (Adonis Vidu, The Same God who Works All Things, p. 100)

In hard classical theism, ressourcement classical theism, the persons are identified with the relations (paternity, begotten, proceeding). Note that we are not denying that the persons are relations in some sense. But in hard classical theism, the only distinction between the persons are the (eternal) relations. These relations are eternal, necessary and pertains to the very nature of the Godhead. To posit any other relation other than these is to make "the very identity of the person" to be dependent "in some way upon these contingent and finite realities."

The problem with this view is precisely at this fixation on "relations." Even if we were to hold to the identity thesis, who is to say that one kind of relations (the eternal kind) precludes other types of relations (the contingent kind)? Vidu is positing a univocity of the term "relation" in order to deny that God can form any type of non-ontic and/or non-eternal relations either within the Godhead or with anything in creation. It is the amphiboly fallacy. And why must a relation make "the very identity of the person" dependent on contingent and finity realities? All of us know that God is the Creator of the universe, so does this relation of "being a Creator" make God dependent upon the contingent and finite reality of the universe, or we are going to make inane arguments about what constitues a "real relation" or not?

While the doctrine of God is certainly hard and mysterious, as pertaining to the mysteries of the Almighty God, sometimes it seems that it is theologians who are busy making God more mysterious than He is. This is the kind of argument that creates all kinds of gnots for theologians to twist and turn in order to make themselves look smart and God more mysterious, as if God needs the help of Man to make Himmself beyond full comprehension! The persons of the Godhead are indeed defined by their personal relations (paternity, begotten, proceeding), but to therefore claim that they cannot have any other types of relations is an assertion not a proof.

The corruption of Aristotelian metaphysics in classical theism: Exhibit A

"A thing acts in so far as it is in act," Aquinas wrote. By no means an esoteric principle of the Common Doctor, this axiom merely expresses the simple idea that the activity of a particular thing is determined in its nature by the kind of thing it is. A rock can't speak, but it can break; water can flow, but it can't break; and so on. [Adonis Vidu, The Same God who works all things, 92]

The so-called "ressourcement" of classical theism has been treating Aristotelian metaphysics, as modified by Thomas Aquinas, as axiomatic. As I read through this book by Adonis Vidu, I would like to point out places where this has been done, to the detriment of common sense and biblical theism.

An action of a thing is determined by its nature? Now, if we are merely saying that actions cannot contradict the nature of a thing, then of course that is true. A human cannot naturally fly, because a human does not have the apparatus for flying (e.g. wings, hollow wing bones etc). But where Aristotle goes with it is a form of hard determinism, where a nature determines actions. Or, in the case of God, nature wills actions. "...the nature of the action is determined by the nature of the agent." (Ibid.) In other words, God Himself does not have libertarian free will. But this is nonsense. A human being can do good, but a good Calvinist will say that humans have a fallen nature incapable of doing good. A human being can and have invented lots of things, but is the nature of inventing an airplane (as opposed to being inventive) determined by the nature of human beings?

The natural sciences have in large part rejected this principle for the simple reason that it restricts scientific research. Science cannot be done if scientists are constantly being told what they can or cannot do according to metaphysical considerations. For Aristotle and Aquinas to say is before the scientific revolution is understandable. For people in the 21st century to say that is to be a Luddite.

A free being such as God can do anything not contrary to His nature. He is not restricted to what philosophers think He can or cannot do. Therefore, to claim something about the nature of God from His actions is not a good argument. Of course, God's actions may reflect on His nature, but that is an argument to be made, not assumed.

The American captivity of the Reformed Church

For me, the term "Biblicism" does not just mean holding a high view of Scripture.

Biblicism is the view that no nonbiblical words can be required for orthodoxy: "No creed but the Bible." It was taught by Arians (4th C), Socinians (16th C), & a fair number of modern Evangelicals.

— Craig A. Carter (@CraigACarter1) February 15, 2023

In his book, 'The Bible Made Impossible', Christian Smith outlines the core beliefs of biblicism. Beliefs 4-6 are most relevant to the current issues related to biblicism. They are listed as follows:

4. Democratic Perspicuity: Any reasonably intelligent person can read the Bible… https://t.co/zxsyA1SLOG

— Josh Sommer (@1689Broadcast) February 17, 2023

Those who think that they have no traditions, are often the ones who are most blinded by tradition. In the same way, those who think they are above culture, are often blinded by their own cultures.

While working on and completing a project, this tweet by Craig Carter, Mr. "Great Tradition," alongside the promotion of Christian Smith's understanding of "biblicism" in The Bible Made Impossible by Josh Sommers, has been fascinating, if only for the fact that the current crusade against "biblicism" has taken on a life of its own. As opposed to dealing with the term academically, the term has become a proverbial slur by certain Reformed people against the inferior "evangelicals" who are obviously "so stupid" they have no idea how to actually read the Bible correctly. An honest analysis of the term "biblicism" must deal with the term impartially. However, in the hands of certain "Reformed" and especially ressourcement polemicists, the term has become a slur in a culture war waged by the ressourcement "historical Christians" versus the rubes in what they see as "modern American Evangelicalism."

It is certainly a major blind spot, but it is surely illustrative that, in a time when cultural analyses of "evangelicalism" is in vogue, little attention is paid to the cultural elements of the war against "evangelicalism." This is not to suggest that "evangelicalism" is spotless. Rather, it is to make the claim that the reaction to "evangelicalism" however defined has also its cultural elements, and this particular reaction is very American. Of the various cultural movements in American Christianity, perhaps nothing is more tied to culture than that of the current ressourcement movement, influenced by the Roman Catholic impetus of ressourcement, mediated by Hans Boersma to Craig Carter, and fueled by Richard Muller's disciples. It is also noted that the animus against "Evangelicalism" is mostly centered in America, where a backlash against "Evangelicalism" driven partly by partisan American politics provides the impetus to inweigh against "Evangelicalism" in America. In other words, it has become cool to be against "evangelicalism" in America.

Now, there is nothing wrong to analyze American Evangelicalism and notes its flaws. There is certainly nothing wrong with analyzing "biblicism." But it is surely revealing that the critiques of Evangelicalism and of "biblicism" in the American Reformed churches nowadays are less about doctrine and history, and more about cultural animus. "Evangelicals" and "biblicism" are attacked, misrepresented, and spat on with vitriol, showing forth that, for all the vaunted ideas of being "historical," "scholarly" and "churchly," many parts of the Reformed churches in American are in fact under cultural captivity, unable to see things objecticely and totally ignorant of global Christianity.