Middle Knowledge and Theodicy

In the debate between James White and William Lane Craig, the question was asked by Craig if counterfactuals (the content of middle knowledge) should be logically prior or posterior to the decree of God, arguing that if counterfactuals are posterior to the decree of God, that makes God the Author of Sin. Unforunately, the objection was not really answered by Dr. White. I would like to take a shot at the question here.

How does Craig's argument work? If counterfactuals are posterior to God's decree, then they depend on God's decree. Therefore, if there are counterfactuals where evil is present, God must have made these counterfactuals where evil is present, therefore God has made the evil in the counterfactuals. If God made evil, then He is the Author of Evil. Therefore, since we know God is not the Author of Evil, therefore counterfactuals must be prior to God's decree so that evil in the counterfactuals are not determined by God. If counterfactuals are prior to God's decree, then they are not under God's purview.

Before I analyze the argument, we must first define our terms. "Counterfactuals" are hypotheticals that can be expressed in second conditional "if ... then" statements, using the subjunctives in the antecedent clause. Thus, the condition is hypothetical, denoting a possibility in a possible world which is not true in the present world, i.e. it is possible in a world where a real or unreal condition is fulfilled. "Author of evil" implies direct causation and thus responsibility for the emergence of evil, and therefore God cannot be the Author of Evil.

What now of Craig's argument? It definitely seems to be a valid argument. It is also certain that there are counterfactuals in the Bible. But let's follow Craig's argument. Yes, if counterfactuals are posterior to God's decree, then God made these counterfactuals where evil is present. It is therefore also true that God made the evil in the counterfactuals. However, the next step does not follow, for the simple reason that we have not asked what do we mean by the phrase "making the evil in the counterfactuals." We must remember that God is the Author of Sin only if He directly makes evil. If however, He decrees evil to be but He Himself does not do evil, then He is not the Author of Sin, and Craig's argument falls apart.

Is it possible to have God be decreeing evil yet not being the Author of Sin? Is my assertion about Author of Sin being only due to direct causation a false claim? First, it must be said that all positions will struggle with defining the phrase "Author of Sin." Even in Molinism, which holds to traditional theism, the phrase "Author of Sin" must exclude the idea that God instantiates a counterfactual that has evil in it. What Molinism does is that God is in a sense making the best out of the available counterfactuals at hand. So God cannot not instantiate a counterfactual without evil, because such a counterfactual does not exist. Therefore, in Molinism, God is not the "Author of Sin" despite the fact that he instantiates a world where evil is present, because He cannot remove evil altogether. The problem of evil is solved by God's helplessness to fully remove evil, and thus even directly "making evil" under the parameters of Molinism would not make God the Author of Sin.

As opposed to having no problems with God directly doing evil, Calvinism resolves it by asserting human free agency. The divine agency does not do evil, whereas human free agency does. God does not directly do evil, and thus the evil is done by free humans, despite the fact that it is God sovereigly making it happen. Human agency is a form of real second causes, and therefore theodicy is partly resolved by having divine and free human agencies working on two different planes of agencies.

As stated, Molinism solves theodicy by making God limited by the counterfactuals. Since the counterfactuals are prior to God's decree, then their mere presence undermines God's sovereignty, in that one class of concepts is beyond God Himself. That is the main problem with Molinism, and why while Molinism "solves" the problem of theodicy, it does so by undermining God's sovereignty. Molinism can claim to happily resolve the problem of theodicy, while it undermines God's sovereignty. Calvinism on the other hand can and does resolve the problem of theodicy, and it upholds the sovereignty of God while doing so.

The Sovereignty of God and our emotions

In light of my opposition to Vincent Cheung, I received a feedback concerning this post. Specifically, this sentence was singled out: "We live in a fallen world, not in the realm of God's decrees and sovereign will." How can that sentence make sense if one believes that God is sovereign over the world?

Seen out of context, such a sentence does in fact undermine God's sovereignty. But this sentence has to be read in context. When I use the words "world" and "realm" here, I am not using this to be referring to the world in its cosmological sense. Rather, as it should be seen in context, the focus is on the world as conceptually perceived, the way "world" is used in Thomas Kuhn's analysis in his epistemic anti-realism. We do not live in the conceptual world of the decrees of God, in the sense that all these are hidden from us and are not on us apart from mediation. Since God does work through secondary causes, He is not directly acting on us. In Cheung's theodicy, since God is diretly acting on us, the only response is resignation. Whereas where there are real secondary causes, we can rage aginst the secondary causes while trusting in God the primary cause.

In life therefore, our faith in the sovereign God is meant to instill trust and confidence in our Lord. It is not meant for us to decipher into the mysteries of the sovereign will, to become fatalistic, or to become stoic in our emotions. Cheung's theodicy however fails to do either of these, and thus necessarily leads to fatalism and stoicism.

The error of Vincent Cheung, explicated

Vincent Cheung is a heretic, because he holds that God is the author of sin. But first, what is the meaning of the phrase "author of sin," and what does Cheung mean when he say that God is the "author of sin"?

The traditional meaning of the term "author of sin" is understood in relation to its use in the Westminster Confession of Faith 3.1, which states:

God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. (WCF 3.1)

Therefore, the phrase has historically meant that if God is the "author of sin," then God makes a person sins directly, either through violating the will of the creature, or by taking away the liberty and contingency of second causes.

In understanding the historical definition of the phrase "author of sin.," we can see that Cheung redefines the phrase, while he actually holds to its historic meaning. Cheung therefore does not formally hold to God being the "author of sin," while he holds to God being the "author of sin" materially, since he affirms the essence of the traditional meaning of the phrase "author of sin," as I have stated here.

Why is Cheung holding materially to the phrase "author of sin" wrong? It is wrong because it makes God into a schizopreniac, a monster, or an untrustworthy being. I had mentioned this in some way in a previous post: Vincent Cheung and the Author of Sin, but I would like to explicate it further to nail down the argument and make it as clear as possible.

Here is the argument for why God being the "author of sin" is wrong (P = Premise, C = Conclusion):

P1: If God is the author of sin, he directly causes people to sin.
P2: God is the Author of sin (Cheung's assertion)
(From P1 and P2) C1: God does actions that directly makes people sin.

P3: Directly making people sin is an evil action.
(From C1 and P3) C2: God does evil actions.

P4: God is by nature good.
(From C2 and P4) C3: God who is by nature good does evil actions.
(from C3) C4: God by nature does something contrary to His nature.

(From C4) Possible conclusion 5a: That is impossible, thus one of the previous premises must be wrong. P1 and P3 are true by definition, so P4 must be false, and God actually is evil and thus a monster.

(From C4) Possible conclusion 5b: God can will to do something contrary to his nature.
(from C5b) C6: God's actions and God's nature are not necessarily linked.

(from C6) C7: If God's actions and nature are not necessarily linked, then God can promise one thing and do another. God's faithfulness is undermined.
(from C7) C8: God is therefore untrustworthy, a schizopreniac, or both.

P5: The biblical God is faithful and trustworthy and good and not schizopreniac
(from P1, P5, C5a and C8) C9: The God who is the "author of sin" is not the biblical God, and this teaching that he is the "author of sin" attacks the character of God.

This argument about the gross error, even heresy, of holding that God is the "author of sin" deals with ontology, not ethics or epistemology. Thus, it deals with the being, the attributes of God. That is why the irrational nominalism of Cheungians is a next to useless counter argument. If the logical implications for God being the "author of sin" is an assault on the character of God, then to repeat over and over again that "God is by definition good" (which is an ethical argument), is useless.

Finally, Cheung's assault against compatibilistic free will and soft determinism, which props up his argument that God is the "author of sin," is baseless, as I have shown in my article "God, the Author of Sin and Metaphysical Distanciation: A Rebuttal to Vincent Cheung's Theodicy." Cheung's position is spiritual poison, and it has many practical implications for life, the main ones which I have pointed out in another article here, entitled "Some Practical Problems with Cheung's heresies."

Lastly,Cheung's determinism is not the same as Gordon Clark's determinism. Gordon Clark held that God is not the "author of sin" and that secondary causes are real causes so that the contingency and liberty of second causes are established, as the WCF 3.1 states. Clark was a presbyterian, and he would definitely reject Cheung's heretical teaching of God being "the author of sin."

On the nature and will of God

Clark’s solution is to distinguish human responsibility from God’s causative agency. This is certainly a helpful solution which the Reformed world should utilize, yet I do not see it as solving the question completely. (from my review of The Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized Biography of Gordon H. Clark, here)

The distinction between "will" and "nature" in the doctrine of God is properly basic...

— puritanreformed (@puritanreformed) March 19, 2017

Chalcedonian theism marks the high point of orthodoxy with regards to the doctrine of God. This catholic (small "c") tradition defines God as one being/ essence, three persons, and this one God has one will and one nature in His being. Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, is one person with two natures (human and divine), and thus two wills. In traditional theism, a nature has a will, and thus Christ's two natures necessitates the existence of two wills. One could also extrapolate that to mean Christ has two minds, as indicative of the fact of Him having two wills.

What, then, is nature? What is will? What is person? Such questions should not be difficult to answer, especially when one looks at the Greek words behind these concepts: nature (φυσις), will (θελημα), person (προσωπον). "Nature" is an ontological terms defining what a thing is. "Will" originates decisions and actions. "Person" is more complicated and much confusion reigned over the term, but in association with the term hypostasis (ὑποστασις), a "person" is a subsistence, an instantiation. To simplify things, I would use the term "individuated consciousness." Note here that I did not say "individual consciousness," or "individuated center of consciousness," in order to keep the definition generic, since the three persons of the Trinity are one and the same being.

A "nature" is what a thing is. A "will" originates decisions and actions. What a thing is is separate from what a thing decides. Socrates is a man; that is his nature. Socrates ate his dinner; that is his will originating a decision to eat, and his body obeying his will to eat. Such is basic English and basic philosophy 101. A "nature" is never a "will," and, as we can see in recent times, it is possible for people to will something (transgender surgery) contrary to their nature (humans as inherently male and female).

God has His own nature, which is who He is ad intra. God wills, and acts accordingly, ad extra. Whatever God wills has its origin ad intra, but is manifested ad extra, where it then effect His works. There should be no question whatsoever that God's nature and God's will is distinct. To be sure, God is consistent, as God is one and simple. Therefore, according to traditional theism, God's will should be consistent with God's nature.

Since we never know God's nature simpliciter, in the history of theology, we come across the debate between realism and voluntarism, in the debate over the potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata (power of God absolute and ordained). Is the power of God absolute, in the sense that He can will anything including alternate past events, round squares and evil as good (divine voluntarism). Is it the power of God restricted to what He ordained to come to pass, and thus is not "absolute" in that sense (realism). Radical divine voluntarism, as held to by the nominalists, have God's power extending over contingency (possible past events), logical contradictions (round squares) and moral contradictions (evil as good). The orthodox position would deny the latter two (at least in their crude form) since they make no sense, but debate remain over contingency. As an example, can God create a world where He can forgive sins without the atonement of Christ? Those who hold to voluntarism might answer yes, while the realists would definitely say no.

So what does this obscure medieval debate has to do with Gordon Clark's theodicy? This "obscure" debate is relevant only because it brings up the same issues concerning God's nature and God's will. It must be noted that we are not talking about whether Clark's solution to the problem of theodicy is helpful. We are speaking concerning those who think that Clark's solution to the problem of theodicy is THE solution. Those who think that appeal to a fiat declaration that God is by definition good and therefore the entire question of theodicy is solved have not begun to scratch the surface of the problems it creates within the doctrine of God. In Clark's solution, we have the following propositions:

(1) God (by definition) is good

(2) God wills evil things

(3) God is ex lex (outside the law) and thus cannot be judged by His law.

Conclusion: Therefore, God is good even though He wills evil

As ONE solution, it is helpful. But we note here there are two propositions concerning the doctrine of God that we need to take note also:

(4) God is one and simple, therefore His will and His nature within Him are one and the same.

(5) God's law is a reflection of His nature

Putting propositions 1-5 together will create a problem, which shows that theodicy is not as easily solved just by Clark's solution. For, yes, God is ex lex in the sense that God is not culpable of evil just because He wills evil. But what is the law? What does willing evil say about the nature of God? For since God is one and God is simple, then His will (as originating ad intra) is equivalent to His nature, but if His will is His nature, then does willing evil things mean that God's nature is evil? But then it is protested that God by definition is good? Well then, you have a contradiction between proposition 1 and 4, and merely repeating proposition 1 does not solve the contradiction you will have. Unless of course, you do not mind throwing away the doctrine of divine simplicity. The same problem will arise when we ask how we can square propositions 3 and 5.

The radical followers of Clark will just assert propositions 1-3 over and over again, and either ignore or deny propositions 4 and 5. Such an emphasis on the divine will as dissociated from the divine nature is a characteristic of divine voluntarism. To be sure, they do not affirm clear logical or moral contradictions, but their emphasis on the divine will blind them to the problems such voluntarism have concerning one's doctrine of God. Perhaps they wish to deny propositions 4 and/or 5? But for those of us who do not reduce everything to "will" alone, we can affirm Clark's solution solve the moral aspect of theodicy, but acknowledge it leaves untouched the ontological problem of theodicy. (For those wanting to know how to solve that latter problem, a pointer would be to distinguish God's will concerning evil as primarily good, while secondarily evil.)

What practical differences does making God the "Author of Sin" have

“But you are full of the judgment on the wicked; judgment and justice seize you.
Beware lest wrath entice you into scoffing, and let not the greatness of the ransom turn you aside.
Will your cry for help avail to keep you from distress, or all the force of your strength?
Do not long for the night, when peoples vanish in their place.
Take care; do not turn to iniquity, for this you have chosen rather than affliction.
Behold, God is exalted in his power; who is a teacher like him?
Who has prescribed for him his way, or who can say, ‘You have done wrong’?
“Remember to extol his work, of which men have sung. (Job 36:17-24)

Theologically, it makes a big deal whether God is or is not the Author of Sin. Yet, even if the dust will settle on this topic and my rebuttal to Vincent Cheung's rationalistic hypercalvinism, some might not see the differences between the two views. After all, God is the ultimate cause of sin either way, so does it matter whether it is "direct" or "indirect?" For Arminians like Roger Olsen, what difference does it make whether God directly caused sin, or indirectly superintends sin?

Theology is not merely abstract. Theology of course must start with the abstract, but it continues into the practical realm, for God is always immensely true and His Word always practical. So, if it is a big deal whether God is the direct cause of sin or the indirect superintendent of sin, then what practical differences would result from the two views? I suggest that it is in how one deals with trials and tribulations in life that the differences between these two views would be manifested.

In the wisdom literature, we read in the account of Job how he struggled with his unjust suffering. Job's three friends (Eliphaz, Bildad, Zophar) applied the retributive principle to Job's suffering, and inferred that Job must have sinned because he was suffering. Their dialogues are basically variants on the accusation that Job must have sinned against God and he needs to repent, while Job insisted on pleading his righteousness before God.

In contrast to Job's three friends, his fourth friend Elihu did not so rebuke Job. Rather, he rebuked Job for presuming he could demand an explanation from God, that God is answerable to him. When God finally responds out of the storm, God similarly rebukes Job for his presumption in questioning Him, exposing Job's total inadequacy in the areas of knowledge and power (Job 38-41). It is thus understandable that God did not rebuke Elihu, while Job's other three friends were rebuked (Job. 42:7-8). Elihu's rebuke of Job is fully in line with God's rebuke to Job, and thus it is to Elihu's words that we want to focus our attention here.

In Job 36:17-24, we see here that Elihu rebuked Job for letting his judgment of the wicked descend into a self-righteous exoneration of himself. In Job's bitter affliction, Job has crossed the line from pleading for justice to demanding justice. Job's affliction has turned in this sense into iniquity. Elihu's rebuke, and God's rebuke, is not because Job called for justice and pleaded his cause, but because in his vehement cry for vindication, he has elevated himself to the position of a judge instead of remaining the supplicant.

Thus, we see here that there is nothing wrong with calling for vindication before God. There is nothing wrong with facing trials and tribulations with anguish and calls for relief. All of these are not sinful unless they become demands where we become the judge demanding that God must act (or worse still, take matters into our own hands). But if everything is ordained by God, shouldn't the response to trials and tribulations be resignation and trust in God, instead of anger and anguish and cries for relief?

Here, we see one practical difference between Cheung's direct causation model of sovereignty, and the biblical Reformed model of full sovereignty through both primary and secondary means. Under Cheung's model, one should approach trials and tribulations with a certain sense of "resignation," trusting in God to bring good out of the trials and tribulations. Since everything is directly caused by God, to be angry at the means is to be angry at God, for the means are mere occasions for God to act. But in the biblical model, since the means are not directly from God, but that God superintends all things, then there is nothing wrong with being angry at the means. Anger at sin, anger towards oppression, anguish at suffering — all these are legitimate emotions to be expressed. Cries for vindication from God for what one perceives to be unjust suffering, like in the sufferings of Job, are not sinful in and of themselves. Of course, one has to have faith and trust in God that all things would work together for good (cf. Rom. 8:28), but this trust is not contradictory to having legitimate feelings of anguish and an attitude of questioning. We are after all not Stoics. In Job's case, Job's bitter anguish and suffering coexists with his own faith and trust in God as his redeemer (Job 19); the two are not mutually exclusive.

It is thus in this very practical aspect of life that the differences between Cheung's direct causation model and the biblical Reformed model can be in my opinion most clearly perceived. Cheung's model, while it might not lead to fatalism, certainly necessitates a certain soft form of resignation. After all, how can one be angry at the means if God is the one directly bringing about the means? Can one be angry at God? If I know that all things work together for good, then I would infer that persecution would work together for good, so should I be angry at the persecution of Christians around the world? Why should I if God is directly causing it for good?

Only in the biblical Reformed model that we can both trust God and yet have questions and anger at injustices. We live in a fallen world, not in the realm of God's decrees and sovereign will. Emotions of anguish and bitterness are natural. Instead of striving for artificiality in the Christian life, we should not have any issue with so-called "negative emotions," but rather cultivate faith in God as the deeper anchor for our souls in the many storms of life, so that our faith would bring us through the trials and tribulations that we face in this world.

A failure in reckoning with theodicy

.... If one begins with the biblical drama, in which a broken covenant lies at the very center of a crime scene, the problem takes on deeply personal and historical overtones. According to this plot, God was in no way obligated to rescue the creature, ..

So when this drama is the context for theodicy, the tables are turned. Instead of God being on trial, it is the creature who is arraigned and questioned. ... And now the problem of evil, though not solved in our minds, is overwhelmed by the problem of good. (Michael S. Horton, Covenant and Eschatology: The Divine Drama, p. 93)

As per my effort to finish Horton's 4-volume dogmatics, I decided to go back and scan through the first book in the series which I had read earlier as part of my MDiv course requirement, in preparation for an upcoming blog post. In the process, I found this discussion on theodicy, which I would like to comment upon.

Horton's reply to the question of theodicy is to thrust it back unto the questioner as not a question concerning evil but a question concerning good. In rhetoric, it is similar to how the Apostle Paul argues in Romans 9. This of course is a valid answer, but it is a valid answer to the question as to "why bad things happen to good people." It is a valid answer to anyone who think they deserve anything good from God. Unfortunately, it is not a valid answer to the actual question of theodicy, which this section is supposed to tackle.

The question of theodicy deals with the character of God as being one that is wholly good and pure and righteous. Answering that we as fallen creatures have the problem of good does not however addresses why God is only good. It might be that humans deserve evil, but at the same time God could be evil also. In other words, the two issues, while related, are distinct and independent of each other. Solving the question for humans does not solve the problem for God.

Ultimately of course, the origin of evil is shrouded in mystery, yet mystery only implies that it is impossible for us to fully comprehend the issue, not that it is necessarily impossible to have a partial solution. Since God is supremely logical, there are no contradictions and the problem can have a plausible partial solution. It seems to me that such a solution can be seen in this: God is good, evil came through the creature's free agency, which in its free prelapsarian state have the potential to do right or to sin. Since evil is the absence of good, sin comes about by the absence of God's strength to do right. God is not culpable because He is under no obligation to positively aid any creature.

This of course is a plausible theodicy, to be held tentatively as all inferences from Scripture into the deeper things of God are to be held. Yet this is a better explanation compared with the non-explanation in Covenant and Eschatology, which sadly does not reckon properly with the problem of theodicy.

Supralapsarianism, and Charles Hodge's objections to it

The debate between Intralapsarianism and Suprelapsarianism concerns the logical order of God's decrees. God as the sovereign Ruler plans for everything, and thus the various decrees of God are God's directives to cause various and diverse things to happen in space-time. Thus, there is the decree of creation, which results in the creation of this universe, and the decree of the incarnation, where the Son willingly came down and was born of a woman into this world, which is part of the overall decree of redemption. Since in eternity (past) time doesn't really exist, the order of the decrees must be logical, not temporal. In other words, what is the best way we can understand how God's decrees relate to each other?

In the Supralapsarian scheme, the decree of election and reprobation comes before (thus "supra-") the decree of the Fall. Thus, the order is (1) the decree of election and reprobation, (2) the decree to cause the Fall, and (3) the decree to create. Whereas, in the Infralapsarian scheme, the decree of election and reprobation comes after (thus "infra-") the decree of the Fall. Thus, the order would be (1) the decree to create, (2) the decree to cause the Fall, (3) the decree of election and reprobation. It is to be noted that the logical order of the decree is just that: logical. It therefore does not concern the execution of the decrees in space-time, one thing which we need to take note when we look at the Reformed Confessions none of which have dealt specifically with anything other than the execution of the decrees.

Charles Hodge in pages 318-319 of volume 2 of his Systematic Theology lists down his objections to Surpralapsarianism. I think them singularly unconvincing and would like to provide a response to his objections.

Hodge's first objection is that Supralapsarianism involves a contradiction because the objects of the decree of election and reprobation need to exist, for nothing can be determined of a non-entity. This objection however is to confuse the idea of a logical order with the execution of that order in space-time. Individuals can be thought of before they have existed, in fact they must be for after that this is how any piece of fiction is made: One conceives of the plot and the characters before writing them down. One does not (at least in a good plot) introduce a character without any idea of what that character would be doing in the story, so how much more are individual humans before the Creator God, the Author of the greatest story ever told?

The second objection argues from the principle that "where there is no sin there is no condemnation" to show that foreordination unto death must contemplate its objects as being already sinful. But this fails to distinguish between the aspects of preterition (passing-by) and condemnation. Reprobation in the orthodox scheme is never equivalent to election. Election is God's active work to save sinners, while reprobation is God's passive work in leaving sinners in their sin. [Note: the use of the word "sinners" here is the language of the execution of those decrees]. The decree of reprobation therefore includes their preterition, and then only after that, their subsequent condemnation. No reprobate is ever condemned apart from consideration of his sins, and thus, while we agree that where there is no sin there is no condemnation, we disagree that this has anything to say about the decree of reprobation, which is primarily about preterition, which does lead to damnation but is not damnation per se.

Hodge's third objection is that the language of Romans 9:9-21 is that the "'mass' out of which some are chosen and others left, is the mass of fallen men" (2:318). But this again confuses the logical order of the decree with the execution of that order, which, as the scholar Robert Reymond has pointed out, is always the inverse of the logical order of the decree. His fourth objection is that creation in the Bible is never represented as a means to execute the purposes of election and reprobation, but that to me is a strawman. Creation has its own penultimate telos, but we are talking about how these decrees relate to each other logically, not whether these decrees have legitimate penultimate purposes different from each other. The decrees of God are not just towards one goal only, but many goals, all of which are non-exclusive. After all, the desire to glorify the Son is not mutually exclusive to the desire to save some sinners to eternal life in Christ. Similarly, the desire to manifest His glory in Creation is not mutually exclusive from the desire to glorify Himself through redemption.

The final objection given is that Supralapsarianism is inconsistent with the portrayal of God as a God of mercy and justice, since in Supralapsarianism individuals are condemned to "misery and eternal death" as "innocents." First of all, this confuses preterition and condemnation. Secondly, since in the Infralapsarian scheme, God permitted or passively caused the Fall which affects all subsequent "innocents," the Infralapsarian scheme is not superior to the Supralapsarian scheme in dealing with the topic of theodicy ("Why evil exists").

Hodge of course supports the Infralapsarian position. But if that is treated as the logical order of God's decrees, then it seems that election and reprobation only come about because of sin, and therefore they are contingent upon sin occurring. In the Supralapsarian scheme, the allowance of sin serves the purposes of election and reprobation, whereas in the infralapsarian scheme, election and reprobation are reactions to sin. This seems to me troubling because of what that implies for our understanding of God's desire to save us. To put it practically and somewhat simplistically for simple believers, are we saved because God has always desired to save us (Supralapsarianism), or that God desires to save us only when it appears we are falling away (Infralapsarianism)?

I mentioned that we need to decide on the best way we are to understand God's decrees as they relate to each other. The best way to relate them is to look for the ultimate purpose of God, which is His own glory, and then locate each decree in the order towards the promotion of God's glory. After all, God desires to glorify Himself, and therefore the best way to relate them is to put them in an order towards that same goal. Before time began, God who works all things for His own glory will plan for that to happen, thus we perceive the logical order of God's decrees accordingly. God of course will execute these decrees in "time," and thus in the execution we see the election and reprobation of sinners after they have sinned in Adam. Thus, we understand a logical order, and an order of execution. All of these intellectual exercises are for us to be consistent in our theology, and thus make us understand that God has always desired to save us, which did not begin only after Adam and Eve fall.

Charles Hodge against Occasionalism

A third form of necessity includes all those theories which supersede the efficiency of second causes, by referring all events to the immediate agency of the first cause. This of course is done by Pantheism in all its forms, ... According to all these views, God is the only agent; all activity is but different modes in which the activity of God manifests itself.

The theory of occasional causes leads to the same results. According to this doctrine, all efficiency is in God. Second causes are only the occasions on which that efficiency is exerted. Although this system allows a real existence to matter and mind, and admits that they are endowed with certain qualities and attributes, yet these are nothing more than susceptibilities, or receptivities for the manifestation of the divine efficiency. They furnish the occasions for the exercise of the all-pervading power of God. Matter and mind are alike passive: all the changes in the one, and all of the appearance of activity in the other, are due to God’s immediate operation. (Charles Hodge, Systematc Theology, 2:281-2)

Hodge and the doctrine of concursus

This concursus is represented first, as general; an influence of the omnipresent power of God not only sustaining creatures and their properties and powers, but exciting each to act according to its nature. It is analogous to the general influence of the sun which affects different objects in different ways. The same solar ray softens wax and hardens clay. ... (Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1:599)

Concursus, therefore, assumes, (1) That God gives to second causes the power of acting. (2) That He preserves them in being and vigour. (3) That He excites and determines second causes to act. (4) That He directs and governs them to the predetermined end. ...

The doctrine of concursus does not deny the efficiency of second causes. They are real causes, having a principium agendi in themselves. (1:600)

The above statement of the doctrine of concursus is designed merely to give the views generally entertained by Augustinians, as to the nature of God's providential government. Whether those views are correct or not, it is important that they should be understood. It is very evident that there is a broad distinction between this theory of concursus and the theory which resolves all events, whether necessary or free, into the immediate agency of God. The points of difference between the two theories are, (1.) That the one admits and the other denies the reality and efficiency of second causes. (2.) The one makes no distinction between free and necessary events, attributing them equally to the almighty and creative energy of God; the other admits the validity and unspeakable importance of this distinction. (3.) The one asserts and the other denies that the agency of God is the same in sinful acts that it is in good acts. (4.) The one admits that God is the author of sin, the other repudiates that doctrine with abhorrence. (1: 603)

God works, and there are real second causes at work. To deny the real validity of second causes, like Vincent Cheung, is to make God a monster.

Warfield on the WCF and the "Author of Sin"

When the [Westminster] Confession was written as well as now, there were men who were accustomed to asseverate that to affirm that God had freely and unchangeably ordained whatsoever comes to pass were to declare God the sole cause operative in the universe, to destroy the freedom of the human will, and indeed the reality of all second causes, ... Accordingly, the Confession adds the caveat, that God's foreordination does not make him the author of sin, nor offer violence to the will of the creature, nor take away (but rather establish) the liberty of contingency of second causes. In other words, the Confession guards it readers against being misled into supposing that the divine government of the universe according to an eternal plan excludes the administration of that government through instruments; and protects the reality and real efficiency of all second causes, free and necessary alike, while affirming the reality and real efficiency of the first cause as the determiner of the course of events in accordance with the primal plan. [B.B. Warfield, "The Confessional Doctrine of the Decree," in Selected Shorter Writings (ed. by John E. Meeter; Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 1970), 1:98-99]

According to Warfield, the rejection by the Westminster Confession of God being the "Author of Sin" is meant to reject the view that God is the "sole cause operative in the universe." Also, the insertion of the predicate adjective "reality" to the nominative phrase "second causes" shows that those second causes are to be regarded as actually and truly operative, not just an appearance or occasion for the actual cause, hiding behind the "second cause," to work. The first cause, God, is indeed the determiner of the course of events, but it is determined without the rejection of the real legitimacy of free and necessary creaturely causes.

Any position therefore that claims God as the Author of Sin in the rejection of the true ontological reality of second causes is contrary to the Westminster Confession and contrary to the Reformed faith, regardless of how one wishes to define the word "author." To claim God as the "Author of Sin" in the conceptual form (regardless of terminology used) as articulated and rejected by the Westminster Standards, is to reject the Reformed and catholic view concerning the nature and the decree of God.

The sovereign God, His decrees and secondary causes

God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. [WCF 3.1. OPC edition. Taken from The Confession of Faith and Catechisms of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church with Proof Texts (Wilow Grove, PA: The Committee on Christian Education of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 2005, 2008), 12]

A friend of mine asked me to write on what I am for, if I am against Vincent Cheung's promotion of God as the Author of sin. That is rather simple. It is based upon the position of the Westminster Confession of Faith, which I subscribe wholeheartedly. God is the cause of all things, but God is not the author of sin. What that means I will explicate further.

Before I begin, I would like to direct attention to this post I had written 7 years ago, and to which I have not changed my position. It also has a nice chart to which I still think is excellent, and which I will reproduce as follows:

Causes	Primary	Secondary
Active	God personally does this action by a positive extension of His will	God does this action through intermediaries by a positive extension of His will
Passive	God personally does this action by not doing something in order to accomplish His will	God does this action through intermediaries by not doing something in order to accomplish His will

Back to the topic. We believe in the sovereignty of God over all things. Furthermore, God has total exhaustive control over everything both good and evil. Nothing happens without God approving of it, either actively or passively. God's sovereignty is worked out in His decrees, the proclamation of His plans to the cosmos of what is to happen and what is to come. God decreed it from eternity, and this decree once proclaimed will work itself out when the time comes. God's decrees are not God's work. The former is the plan, the latter its execution. Just as a carpenter draws up the plans for his work e.g. a table, and then he executes the plan to create that table, so likewise God "draws up" His plans, and when the time comes, the plans are executed.

The Reformed tradition and in fact almost all of Christian theology until recent times have always believed that God ordained whatsoever comes to pass. The difference between competing traditions (Calvinism, Arminianism, Molinism) is what functions as the basis of God's ordination. The Reformed claims, as Ephesians 1:11 states, that the basis for God's choices, God's ordination, is God's free will. God decides freely, which is to say He does not decides based upon anything external to Himself. God decides unchangeably, which is to say God decides, and there is no change at all in any of His decisions. God after all does not change (Num. 23:19 Mal. 3:6) as He is perfect. Any change at all would have meant He was imperfect before the change. God's decides based upon His free will, and the counsel of His will is most holy and wise, as God is full perfection.

God decrees everything. Yet while we fully affirm God's decree of all things, yet we state unequivocally and clearly that God is not the Author of sin, which is to say that although God decrees everything, yet this decree does not imply that God personally creates or does sin (which is what "primary cause" means in Aristotelianism). Sin is done by the creature. God is fully passive in their sinning, by not intervening to stop them from sinning. Now, many people have the idea that mere allowance implies God is uninvolved, but that is false. Since God controls everything, even God's allowance is allowance of God as to where the person and how the person can sin. As an analogy, imagine 5 marbles. If I were to ask the person to choose a marble but take away four of them, the person can only choose one marble even though there was no external coercion upon him to choose it. Or to give a better, and more biblical analogy, the heart of Man is like a river. It flows. God directs the river's path, as He does the hearts of kings (Prov. 21:1). In this analogy, the river flows and God direct them, but God does not make the river flow. Likewise, God changes circumstances and uses all manner of intermediaries so that the person will do what God intends, but the motivation (like the kinetic flow of water in the river) derives solely from the hearts of men.

Sin therefore is under God passively and secondarily. God's causing sin is "through intermediaries by not doing something in order to accomplish His will." God is not the author or the primary cause of sin. Rather, sin is sovereignly controlled by God through the use of intermediaries, or second causes. These second causes are actual and are real. They actually make real choices, not robots dictated by God that they can only make one choice. Just like the hearts of kings, the control is through direction, not choice. They freely choose, but their choices will always be what God intended them to choose.

As I have mentioned in that old 7-year old post, which God is more sovereign: the God who sovereignly controls all things such that everyone can make free choices yet their choices are always what God intended them to make, or a god who has his decrees and the free choice of anyone could potentially jeopardize his plans? Surely it is the former! This is why the Confession says that the "liberty or contingency of second causes [are not] taken away, but rather established," because God's full sovereignty means that Man's free actions are truly free; God does not have to impose restrictions on Man's freedom for His will to be done and for men to do what He has always planned for them to do. God is just THAT sovereign! That is why Calvinism is not fatalism in any sense, because in fatalism one always lives in fear that one's actions might be contrary to one's fate or destiny.

God is sovereign, and Man is free. That has been the truth trumpeted since the Reformation, and even before that in some form. Cheung's teaching on the other hand is novel, and shows the sovereignty of a god who will lose control if anything is not under his direct control. That is not the God of Scripture, and not the Lord I worship.

Gordon Clark on the "Author of Sin"

Summarizing the Scriptures, the [Westminster] Confession says here that God is not the author of sin; that is God does nothing sinful. Even those Christians who are not Calvinists must admit that God in some sense is the cause of sin, for he is the sole ultimate cause of everything. But God does not commit the sinful act, nor does he approve of it and reward it. Perhaps this illustration is faulty, as most illustrations are, but consider that God is the cause of my writing this book. Who would deny that God is the first or ultimate cause, since it was he who created mankind? But although God is the cause of his chapter, he is not its author. ...

The Scripture references show clearly that God controls the wills of men. ...

This does not mean that violence was done to the will of the creatures. It was not as if [in the case of Absalom and his men choosing a war plan] the men wanted to adopt Ahithophel's plan and were forced to follow Hushai against their desires. ... But it must be noted that God established psychological processes just as truly as he established physical processes.

This ties in with the next phrase, "nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

In the case of Absalom the secondary causes were the psychological proceses. The decision the men of Israel made was not made in opposition to those processes, nor even without them. God has established such processes for the purpose of accomplishing his will. He does not arrange things or control history apart from secondary causes.

To mention other examples, God decreed to bring the children of Israel out of Egypt; but they had to do the walking themselves. God decreed that Solomon should build the temple; but Solomon had to collect the materials. God dos not decree the end apart from the means. He decrees that the end shall be accomplished by means of the means. [Gordon H. Clark, What Do Presbyterians Believe? (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2001), 37-8]

None of these can be affirmed by Vincent Cheung and his drones, who claim that (1) God is the Author of sin, (2) God is the primary cause of everything, (3)Second causes are mere occasions, not actually and truly real processes in which God is in control but not directly working

Recent consolidated articles

I have consolidated my posts on Vincent Cheung and 18th century English Hyper-Calvinism into one article here, and consolidated my review of Ronald E. Osborn's book Death Before the Fall: Biblical Literalism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, with some editing and a brief conclusion, here.

The irrational nominalism of Cheungians

In their defence of their idol, Vincent Cheung, Cheungians behave like mindless drones repeating what their guru has taught them so well. It is really really sad that those who claim to be rational are the most impervious to logical reasoning. Not only are they impervious to reason, they propagate Cheungism and share their guru's writings as if they live by every word from his mouth

In the matter of ascribing the title "Author of sin" to God, Cheung came up with a seemingly easy answer to the question of theodicy. By definition, God is good, and therefore God cannot be called evil even though God is the author of sin. But this does not and will not work. Cheung's logical syllogism is as follows:

p = God is the Author of sin
r = God acts according to His nature
q = God is evil

P1: p
P2: not q
Conclusion: Not q

The problem is that statement p, when coupled with r, necessitates conclusion q. If that is indeed the case, then Cheung's argument become as follows:

P1': If p [and r; therefore q]
P2: not q
P3, p, r
C': not q

As it can be clearly seen, the new syllogism is clearly invalid and logically contradictory. Does it matter how true P2 is? If I shout over and over again statement q, that God is not evil by definition, does it solve the logical problem inherent to Cheung's position? NO, it doesn't! Logic is a tool. They are rules governing thought, and validity and invalidity of arguments does not lie in what the subject matter being discussed is. Insert anything, any proposition, you might wish into 'p,' 'q,' 'r' and the validity or invalidity of the argument does not change. The argument form: If p and r, then q; p, r, not q, therefore not q, is an invalid form of argument, regardless of the cognitive content of the argument.

Cheung's drones repeat over and over again "God by definition is not evil." That is "Not Q" and as it can be clearly seen from the form of the argument, asserting not-q over and over again does not make an invalid argument valid. As long as I can show the truth of premise 1', Cheung's argument is toast, period. Cheung's nominalism expressed in repeating "God is by definition not evil" like a mantra over and over again is useless. It is illogical to think that the problem is solved just by the mere assertion of a single premise. This is basic logic 101, on the definitions of soundness and validity of arguments. Cheung failed logic 101, and his followers fall headlong together with him into collective intellectual suicide.

If you are a Cheungian, please repent of following that false teacher. He has led you astray, clouded your mind towards irrational argumentation, in the false flag operation of being rational. May the Holy Spirit have mercy to break the bondage Cheung has on your mind and on your soul

I challenge all unrepentant Cheungians to a contest in logic. Elucidate the logical forms of all your premises and conclusions in nice, neat propositional logic forms, and then we can discuss who exactly is being logical

Repost: Eternal Justification and Hyper-Calvinism

Back in 2010 (how time flies), I had posted on the topic of Eternal Justification here. I have matured in my thinking since then and would like to modify some things in that piece.

The main thing I would modify is with regards to the distinction I made between "timeless" and "everlasting." I would now say that God in Himself is timeless (imminent Trinity) while God in His works is everlasting (economic Trinity). The problem with both Eternal Justification and Hyper-Calvinism is the flattening of the distinction between the imminent and economic Trinity, such that everything is about the imminent Trinity, the "naked God" as it were. I would also like to modify the issue regarding the rationalism of the 18th century Hypers with the discussion I had in my previous post on the issue.

Overall, I stand by what I have written 4 years back. The blog post I had referenced on the heinous errors of Hyper-Calvinism seemed to have disappeared, but, as with almost anything on the Internet, what is posted will never truly disappear, and it can be found here. It is interesting to note the first point stated about Hyper-Calvinism is the statement that God is the author of sin and evil, precisely the point at which Vincent Cheung has gone astray.

Vincent Cheung and 18th century English Hyper-Calvinism: The temptation to over-react

Fourthly, the Hyper-Calvinists were sincere men of average intelligence, but they lacked a prophetical and discerning spirit. They keenly desire to glorify God and mistakenly believed that God was more glorified in the exaltation of free grace in the pulpit and on the printed page, than in the evangelism and conversion of men. They became so obsessed with the defence of what they regarded as sound doctrine that the evangelistic note of Scripture as basically an overture by God towards sinners was muted. This lack of interest in evangelism (and a reference to evangelism in their books is virtually impossible to find) came, as we have seen, with the deduction of the duty of ministers in preaching from the secret will of the Lord, the will of His decrees. They did not realise what a baneful influence their doctrines would have upon those who followed in their footsteps. [Peter Toon, The Emergence of Hyper-Calvinism in English Nonconformity, 1689-1765 (London, UK: The Olive Tree, 1967), 148]

As we have seen, it was a reaction within Nonconformity to Neonomism and Arminianism that resulted in the rise of Antinomianism and Hyper-Calvinism in the early 18th century. The Noncomformist pastors and theologians had good intentions, but good intentions alone is insufficient in the Christian life. Sadly, their efforts resulted in an arid church climate, such that God used the Evangelical Arminian John Wesley in the later half of the 18th century to chastise them for their lack of concern over evangelism, which was caused by their flawed theologies. Likewise, I am deeply concerned over the extreme views emanating from the online pen of Vincent Cheung, and the almost fanatical devotion his followers have for his views to the point of comparative neglect of many others.

My question to Cheung and his followers are thus: Are you open to the possibility that you just might be wrong? Does it not bother you at all that no one else in the entire 20 centuries of church history held to your position? Can you see that you just might have overreacted to the errors of the modern contemporary American (and American-influenced) churches, in the same way as the 18th century Noncomfromists overreacted to the errors of their time?

When you read those whom you disagree with, do you try to read them to understand where they are coming from, instead of circling the wagons and pigeon-holing them into a particular category? I am no Vantillian, but I appreciate Van Til's writings even where I disagree with some of what he says. Can you say that about those whom you disagree with, and actually try to understand where they are coming from? Would you even consider the objections people have made, instead of imputing whatever meaning you please to the words they use, and see any critique of e.g. rationalism, as an attack on rationality?

I admire your zeal, but it is greatly misplaced. Your philosophy has clouded your thinking, instead of clarifying it. There is a reason why tradition (small "t") exists, not that we are held captive to it, but that it guides us in the path we should go in our theologizing. Christianity was not born yesterday, and true theology has not been lost until the dawning of Vincent Cheung, or anyone else for that matter. Shouldn't you be guided by the Reformed and Christian tradition, instead of thinking that everyone, every single one of you is doing theology de novo? To raise some precedents, almost all biblicists have deviated in some way from the faith, from the Seventh-Day Adventists to the Jehovah's Witnesses to even Barton Stone and Alexander Campbell (founders of the Stone-Campbell movement). The fruit of biblicalism has been anything but biblical, so why do you insist on going down that path?

The temptation to over-react is always there. But overreactions almost invariably have potentially deadly consequences. For the sakes of your souls, please abandon Cheungism. Being "logical" (as opposed to being truly biblical and logical) is not a sufficient price for jeopardizing your salvation. Stop being so proud and certain of yourselves, and come and learn from the Reformed tradition. Not everything found in the Reformed tradition may be right, but at least you will be on the right track.

If you persist in Cheung's errors, be warned that it would lead you onto a path of death. For the sake of your souls, awake from your slumber and abandon it now. Do not be deceived, there is no life in that way, and only fools tread in that path.

There is a way that seems right to a man, but its end is the way to death. (Prov. 14:12)

Vincent Cheung and 18th century English Hyper-Calvinism: The rise of heresies

Secondly, between 1689 and 1765, High Calvinism was placed in an environment which emphasised the role of reason in religious faith. This meant that the High Calvinists were in danger either of absorbing the rationalism, or of rejecting it completely, or of doing both. It would seem Joseph Hussey fell prey to both temptations. He absorbed the rationalistic tendencies of his day and applied strict logic to Biblical doctrines so that from the doctrines of eternal election and irresistible grace he deduced that Christ should not be offered to all men. And also he deduced from the part which he believed that Christ played in the covenant of grace the doctrine that Christ's humanity was "standing in God" before the creation of the world. One of Hussey's followers, Samuel Stockell, abandoned the doctrine of eternal generation because he could not conceive how "the Begetter and the Begotten" could be of equal date. [Lewis] Wayman, [John] Gill and [John] Brine applied logic to the (hypothetical) covenant of works and deduced the doctrine that it is not the duty of hearers of the Gospel to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. Yet all these men believed that they were not being rationalistic in a human sense but were simply applying "evangelical reason", or reason inspired by the Holy Spirit, to the Bible's teaching. [Peter Toon, The Emergence of Hyper-Calvinism in English Nonconformity, 1689-1765 (London, UK: The Olive Tree, 1967), 147]

In the 18th century, the orthodox (what Toon called the "High Calvinists") were shocked at the growing apostasy within both Anglican but especially Nonconformist circles. They were appalled and "a group of influential laymen decided to sponsor a series of lectures in defence of what they considered to be the main doctrines of the Protestant faith." (ibid., 42). The upshot was a strong reaffirmation of sound doctrine, yet at the same time danger lurks even within the camp.

The orthodox were not immune to the rationalist zeitgeist. They decided to use what they think is "evangelical reason." Here, we already seen a problem with their hermeneutics. Reason according to sound orthodoxy is a reason that reasons after faith. Fides quaerens intellectum — Faith seeking understanding. Faith provides the premises and manner for the exercise of reason. In this so-called "evangelical reason" however, reason chose the manner of reasoning and faith provides the "premises" through proof-texting. The traditional view is that reason works only after faith has provided the framework for it to function. The new "evangelical" view is that reason provides the framework while faith provides only the premises. That is why we can have biblicists like Samuel Stockell abandoning the doctrine of eternal generation of the Son. His reasoning process is as follows: The premises derived from Scripture are: "The Begetter is from eternity" and "The Begotten is from eternity." "By definition" the Begetter is temporally prior to the Begotten, so in conclusion, the eternal generation of the Son must be denied. Notice that Stockell's reasoning uses biblical truths as mere premises. Instead of understanding the form of reasoning behind the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son and evaluating it rationally, he uses a rationalistic form of argument with the input of biblical premises in his form of "evangelical reason."

This 18th century evangelical rationalism resulted in the emergence of two main errors within Noncomformity: Antinomianism and Hyper-Calvinism. Antinomianism is the denial of the third use of the Law, and had its main proponent in Tobias Crisp (d. 1642). It is noted that we are speaking of "Doctrinal Antinomianism" here, as there is no indication that those promoting these teachings were in any way deficient in Christian conduct. As a reaction to Richard Baxter's neonomism, Crisp denied that God's law performed any function at all for a Christian. As Toon wrote:

The basic underlying difference of opinion in the Antinomian controversy concerned the nature of the law of God. Since his purpose was to extol Christ and free grace, Crisp had little to say about the moral law. ... he believed that God's justice is affronted by human transgression of His law, although he never seems to have explicitly stated that God's law is an eternal expression of His righteousness and justice.

...

He believed that the law served a useful purpose in convincing men of their need of a Saviour; nevertheless, he gave it little or no place in the life of a Christian since he held that "free grace is the teacher of good works." (ibid., 54)

As it can be seen, Crisp's stance is reactionary and directly opposite Baxter's neonomian idea of a salvation that takes account of works in some sense.

Following upon the heels of the antinomian controversy was the hard-shelling of Calvinism into Hyper-Calvinism. First, the doctrine of eternal justification was promoted by Isaac Chauncy (ibid., 61). The embrace of Eternal Justification betrays the flatenning of the imminent and economical Trinity in the theologies of the Hyper-Calvinists as time and eternity begin to be blurred. God's work in time was rationalistically seen to be a mirror portrayal of the imminent workings of the Trinity, and therefore justification must be eternal if it is to be actual for believers. The distinctions between God's being, God's decrees and God's work are burred in this rationalistic theory of eternal justification. Such blurring codified itself in Hyper-Calvinism, its logical conclusion. In 1706 and 1707, Joseph Hussy took this philosophical blurring of the imminent and economical Trinity to its logical conclusion in the denial of the offer of the Gospel (ibid., 74-5). Since God issues forth his irresistible grace only to the elect, this grace (of the economical Trinity) is a reflection of His call only to the elect (imminent Trinity). An offer to the non-elect (economical Trinity) has no reflection at all in God's eternal decree (imminent Trinity) and therefore such is to be rejected. As one of Hussey's 20 propositions states, "We must preach the Gospel as it is most fitted to the display of effectual grace. To offer God's grace is to steal: God saith, Thou shalt not steal." (ibid., 81) From Joseph Hussey to Lewis Wayman, John Gill and John Brine, this rationalistic tendency follows through in their denials of the offer of the Gospel. To be sure, Hussey, Gill and other do not deny that the Gospel ought to be preached to all. Rather, they deny that the Gospel is to be offered to all.

We see thus that rationalism had caused the creation of two heresies within the supposed defenders of the faith. Reacting against Neonomism and Arminianism, they swung to the opposite errors of Antinomanism and Hyper-Calvinism. The rise of heresies oftentimes come out of good intentions, as the case of the devolution of 18th century Noncomformity shows.

The parallels with Vincent Cheung in the early 21st century is not hard to discern. Cheung reasons rationalistically as well, using biblical truths as mere proof-text premises to insert into a priori rationalistically formed syllogisms. The Hyper-Calvinists of the 18th century flattened the distinction between the imminent and the economic Trinity, which resulted in their promotion of Hyper-Calvinism. Cheung likewise flattens the distinction between primary and secondary causation, which results in his monstrous doctrine of God being the author of sin. The 18th century Hyper-Calvinists were reacting to Arminianism and Socinianism, so likewise Cheung reacts against the soft-peddling of Calvinism in the Neo-Amyraldian views of contemporary New [Evangelical] Calvinism. The parallels are striking. And just as the 18th century English Hyper-Calvinists are in error, so likewise Cheung is in error.

[to be concluded]

Vincent Cheung and 18th century English Hyper-Calvinism: Social religious contexts

First, we may note that after the Restoration in 1660 orthodox Calvinism became, as it were, a cause under siege. The majority of Puritans who were orthodox Calvinists left the Church of England in 1662 to become Noncomformists. Thus the religious leadership of the nation was lodged firmly in the hands of men who were either Arminian or moderately Calvinistic in theology. The ejected ministers, being Noncomformists, were placed under harsh and cruel restrictions until 1688 and this severely curtailed their influence upon the religious thought of the nation. As the older men died their places were taken by younger men who had been educated under liberalizing influences in Holland and so a Moderated Calvinism gradually became popular, especially amongst the Presbyterian Dissenters. As the years passed by High Calvinism became more and more the sole preserve of the Independents and the Particular Baptists. The Antinomian controversy of the 1690s served to widen the gap between High Calvinism and Moderated Calvinism, and as the eighteenth century passed by, High Calvinism became in the main, the faith of the poorly-educated Independents and Baptists. These men who clung to the doctrines of High Calvinism saw themselves as a group preserved by God in an apostate age to defend “the faith once delivered to the saints”. Their time was taken up by the defence of their faith and it was in this atmosphere of a cause under siege that Hyper-Calvinism was born and nurtured. [Peter Toon, The Emergence of Hyper-Calvinism in English Nonconformity, 1689-1765 (London, UK: The Olive Tree, 1967), 146]

England in the late 17th and early 18th century was a time of moderation of religion. It was the Augustan era, which was followed by the Victorian era. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 had deposed the last Roman Catholic Stuart Monarch James II. James II had presided over the continued persecution of Nonconformity and the killing fields of Scotland, where he tried to impose Prelacy upon the Scots. After all the inter-confessional strife, the terrible 30-years war (1619-1648) on the continent and both the English Civil war (1642-1651) and the ruthless persecution and bloodletting following the Restoration of 1660, European Christianity entered into the deconfessional and nascent Enlightenment era. People desired peace and toleration, even within the churches. What was the point of continued strife, as if killing everyone who disagreed with you was an answer to anything? In 1689, the Act of Toleration was signed into law allowing for the meeting of Protestant Dissenters, but not Roman Catholics, as long as they register with the government.

The times were changing. This was the period preceding the Industrial Revolution. Descartes had kick-started modern thought as he tried to come up with a third way (tertia via), as a reaction to the terrible massacres of the wars of religion. The turn to reason or empirical inquiry sought to ground knowledge on something more objective that can be argued for, instead of the confessional impasse between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. Contrary to modern rationalism, non-French Enlightenment was not trying to supplant religion altogether, but rather Anglo-American Enlightenment thought desired to use reason to explicate the truths of religion. The Enlightenment in its three main forms (French, Anglo-American, German) can be seen as the bitter reaction against the Constantinian captivity of the Church in both its Roman and Protestant forms.

It is not surprising, though sad, that people were abandoning the Christian faith for the new teachings. Socinianism came into England where it was embraced by members within the Church of England, and it provoked controversy within the Anglican Communion (Toon, 36-7). Samuel Clarke, a rationalist and biblicist, published his Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity in 1712 which examined the doctrine of the Trinity and denied it as being taught in Scripture (ibid., 37). We must remember that Clarke was not denying the Trinity because of any denial of the authority of Scripture. Rather, he was claiming that precisely because He follows Scripture only (biblicistically), the doctrine of the Trinity should be denied. Within the establishment, the eruption of Socinianism and Arianism caused much controversy

Among the Calvinistic Dissenters, many were influenced by the "moderate Calvinism" of the school of Saumur (most famous for its "4-point Calvinism or Amyraldism). Others followed Richard Baxter's Neonomian thought. The "moderate Calvinism" proved to be a Trojan Horse for many errors. In the continent, "moderate Calvinism" resulted in deconfessionalism and the toleration of errors in the days of Jean-Alphonse Turretin in the early 18th century. In England, "moderate Calvinism" became the vehicle for rationalism in religion resulting in many dissenters, particularly Presbyterians, denying the doctrine of the Trinity and becoming Arians (ibid., 39). In both establishment and dissenting circles, apostasy from the faith was rife. It was truly a sad time for orthodoxy.

The orthodox party among the dissenters consists mostly of less learned laymen, and increasingly, many of them were Baptists. (ibid., 146). Faced with the assault upon orthodoxy, they felt obliged to defend the faith. Many of them were self-taught and sought to defend the Calvinistic faith as best as they could. Being less learned, there was a tendency to veer towards the opposite error of what they were opposing, and this led to the various controversies that will plague Noncomformity in the early 18th century.

The relevance this has for today can be seen in the similar environment we find ourselves in. Mainstream Christianity, both mainline and evangelical, are riddled with all manner of errors, many of them serious. There is a need to defend the faith and affirm the truths taught in Scripture. More particularly, there is much soft-pedaling of Calvinism even within the so-called "New Calvinist" circles, in which their "Calvinism" has more in common with Amyraldism than true orthodox Calvinism. The social religious contexts of both early 18th century England and our times are very similar. In both situations, there is a dire need for sound teaching, and in both situations, catastrophe strikes even within orthodoxy.

Vincent Cheung and 18th century English Hyper-Calvinism: Introduction

I have been shifting in my attitude towards Vincent Cheung, as it can be seen from my posts. I initially stumbled unto his stuff quite some time back and found them provocative. Note, I found them provocative, not that I found them necessarily orthodox. So I had thought of what he wrote as something that could be read to stimulate thought on various topics, and that was then. Fast forward to now when one of my friends have sadly fallen under Cheung's spell, and things have become different. Now, it is personal. What grieves me is that I was the one who mentioned Cheung to him as someone who is an interesting thinker, but I never in a million years would have realized just how deep he has fallen into Cheung's heresies. This is a regret that I will hold for as long as he continues under Cheung's errors.

My one main article dealing with Cheung's thoughts deals with perhaps the most egregious and outrageous position he holds to, that God is the author of sin. This of course is just the surface of Cheung's many heresies. Cheung is a Rationalist (capital "R") sometimes, and a "biblicist" otherwise when it suits him. He utilizes philosophy as his first principles, despite any protestations to the contrary. After all, nowhere in Scripture is Occasionalism taught; you wouldn't find it. One could argue for Occasionalism, like Jonathan Edwards, but I doubt Edwards' Occasionalism is as bad as Cheung's. Starting from a priori "logical principles," Cheung utilizes Scripture propositions as proof-texts for his philosophy, instead of using Scripture as the beginning of knowledge (principium cognoscendi).

An example of Cheung's Rationalism is not hard to find. In his heretical book speaking about God being "the author of sin," Cheung writes about "metaphysical distanciation." Now, I seriously doubt THAT concept was being discussed in the Westminster Assembly at all. Is it something that Christians should think about? Yes, I think we should, which is why I had initial positive views of Cheung as an interlocutor. But note that this issue, while important, is an apologetic issue. It is something that we must think about in order to formulate a rational apologetic response. The concept of "metaphysical distanciation" itself should have no bearing at ALL on the biblical doctrine of God and theodicy. It should be discussed after the doctrine is established, not as something to establish doctrine. Scripture before reason, reason in service to the faith — that is how Christianity is to operate between the twin poles of Rationalism and Irrationalism. We reason AFTER faith, not before faith, which is one main reason why I am against natural theology.

Cheung establishes himself online as some sort of expert, formulating a path that is claimed to be the best of Van Tillian and Clarkian presuppositionalism, while rejecting anything in either that he thinks is false. Of course, who exactly is Vincent Cheung? Who knows? In which church is he a pastor, and who is he accountable to? I doubt many people know that. Unfortunately, the nature of the Internet is such that those who can make the most noise and appear knowledgeable have an influence that they probably will not have in real life. Unfortunately also, it is those who hunger for more of God's truth that will be attracted to his form of godliness. It is past time that Cheung is exposed, and I as someone who identifies with Clarkian apologetic want nothing to do whatsoever with this heretic. He does not speak for [G.H. Clark] and there is no "progression" from [G.H. Clark] to him. I have read Clark, and I have read Van Til, and I read Cheung. To put it in perspective, if I were given the choice between Van Til and Cheung, I will choose Van Til. Even the "one-person" teaching of Van Til is more orthodox in comparison to Cheung's blasphemies.

After saying all that, why do I juxtapose Cheung with 18th century English Hyper-Calvinism? I put them together because Cheung's emergence is very similar to the emergence of English Hyper-Calvinism. The spiritual climate of the times were similar, the pressures on the faith were similar, and the "solutions" of Cheung and the Hyper-Calvinists were similar. Through looking at the history of the 18th century English Hyper-Calvinism, it is hoped that we can see the similarity in our times, and beware of people like Cheung, and not just Cheung, but also anyone like him.

[to be continued]

Vincent Cheung and Modus Tollens

If p, then q. ~q. Therefore ~p

In thinking in general, and philosophy and theology in particular, logic is very important. Logic is the way we think, formulate arguments and prove our theses. Without logic, not only can there be no reasoning, but even words are meaningless since they can mean both A and ~A (not A), or X.

The problem with much of contemporary discussion is that logic is overlooked and even demeaned, and those who are logical are labeled and maybe shunned as "rationalists" (proving that those applying the label have no idea what they are talking about). Logic however has a way of returning with a vengeance, and those who neglect it will pay the price when their arguments fail.

I am currently having an email discussion concerning Vincent Cheung's heresy on theodicy. Part of my argument deals with the issue of unacceptable consequences, which somehow my correspondent fails to get.

This is where basic logic comes into play, which is extremely funny and ironic since Vincent Cheung supposedly priced logic. The argument against Cheung's supposition that God is the author of sin is in the form of a modus tollens, as follows:

p: God is the Author of Sin
q: God's will is divorced from God's nature, or God is evil
If p, then q; ~q, therefore ~p

So the argument is set simply as such. If the conditional statement is true (If p, then q), then a rejection of q must necessarily result in a rejection of p as well. It is altogether irrelevant for one to subsequently claim ~q, that God is good by definition. That is a separate claim that stands in tension with this particular argument. If one insists, as Cheung does, on claiming that God is not evil because of He is good by definition, what does this claim do? It does not vitiate the initial argument at all! Rather, it creates a new argument as follows:

If p, then q. p; ~q; therefore p.

As it can be clearly seen, such an argument is nonsense, for it is logically contradictory and invalid.

Now, one can dispute the truth of the conditional statement, but such is easy to be proved. If God is the Author of evil, which is to say he directly causes evil, then he must do so because his action in causing evil has no relation with his good and pure nature, or that his nature is evil. These are the only two possibilities. Either God is good but does evil, or he is evil and does evil. That is the basic logical law of the excluded middle, and is thus non-negotiable. So if God is evil and does evil, God is evil. But if it were to say that God is good and yet he does evil, then there must be no relation of his nature to his will; the two are divorced from each other. The conditional statement therefore is proven true.

But then the proposition q is actually two propositions, and are both necessarily false? Let us have q1 = God's will is divorced from God's nature, and q2 = God is evil. q2 is most certainly to be rejected. But what about q1? If q1 were to be true, then God's actions are totally arbitrary, since there would be no necessary relations between God's actions and who God is. Is that however how the Scripture portray God? Don't we see the Scripture proclaim who God is as the basis for what He will do for His people? In Numbers 6:23, God's faithfulness and truthfulness and immutability (His nature) function as the basis for why God will do what He has spoken and promised. However, if we have the "God" of Vincent Cheung with his arbitrary actions, God could continue to be faithful, truthful and immutable, but he could change his mind (action) and decided not to fulfil his word. Judge for yourself whether proposition q2 is true to Scripture! It is most certainly not!

That is why everyone should have a course in basic logic, for it exposes a whole bunch of nonsense that tries to pass itself off as something profound. Cheung's theodicy is unbiblical, because its consequences contradict the express teachings of Scripture. It is sad that even such a basic argument in my first article needs to be clearly enunciated in another blog post, which just goes to show how illogical people are.