Theology Proper and Mutualism (of any kind)

Previous post on this topic here.

First, it is incoherent to say that God is ontologically immutable while denying that He is absolutely immutable, unless one believe there are change in God that are not alterations of actuality or being (which is de facto ontological). But then these changes would not be the alteration of anything real, and therefore any cogent intelligibility of [Bruce -DHC] Ware's point collapses. (James E. Dolezal, All that is in God, 25)

Thus says Thomist thinker James Dolezal, against the idea that there can be changes in God as promoted by Bruce Ware. But is that a proper critique? I would assert not

Ware and others like him promote theological mutalism, a position that claims that God in His relations with his creatures enter into a "give-and-take" relationship with them. Now, theological mutualism does not seem to me to be correct because the give-and-take seems to be dealing with God in His essence. That would certainly affect the doctrine of immutability. Likewise, I am uncomfortable with any talk about God changing. However, it must be acknowledged that Ware's idea of change within God is not ontological, for that is after all what Ware himself states. To claim that Ware is promoting ontological change in God is therefore not an honest portrayal of his position.

If changes in God are not ontological, are there not real? That is Dolezal's argument against Ware. If non-ontological changes are not real, then to speak of them is to speak nonsense. But it is on this point that we must assert that, yes, non-ontological changes can be real. After all, in marriage, a man becomes a husband, but there is no ontological change in him, is there? When a son is born, does a man ontologically transmutes into "a father"? Is there some "father-ness" quality that is added to the man when his son is born? But it may be objected that these are mere external relations. Firstly, are they truly merely external relations? In the case of the birth of a son, surely the son partakes of the father, having half of his genome within him. Secondly, just because some of them are external relations, does it make them not real? Is the marriage covenant merely a arbitrary thing because there is no ontological changes that take place to both parties during marriage?

In the case of God, surely we can be concerned with any talk of change in God. But if someone states that any such change he is proposing is "non-ontological," may I suggest taking a more charitable approach and actually assume that he really means "non-ontological" when he says "non-ontological"? The problem then with mutualism is not that they are attacking immutability, but they are not ascribing the changes of God in the correct sphere. If they speak of the changes being "non-ontological," then they must at the very least be speaking of God in His workings ad extra, in His energies, not in His essence. And that in my opinion is what Scripture itself teaches, but that is for another time.