Van Til the un-systematician

Quote set #1:

... my [Van Til's] disagreement with Kuyper does not pertain to the question whether formally believers and unbelievers think according to the same logical laws. I do not maintain that Christians operate according to new laws of thought any more than that they have new eyes or noses.

My only criticism of Kuyper was to the effect that this concept of metaphysical sameness must again by supplemented with the concept of ethical difference. The non-Christian uses the gifts of logical reasoning in order to keep down the truth in unrighteousness.

— Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 4th Ed. (Ed. by K. Scott Oliphant; Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 291

Quote set #2:

[Because of the Fall] The intellect of fallen man may, as such, be keen enough. It can therefore formally understand the Christian position. It may be compared to a buzz-saw that is sharp and shining, ready to cut the boards that come to it. Let us saw that a carpenter wishes to cut fifty boards for the purpose of laying the floor of a house. He has marked his boards. He has set his saw. He beings at one end of the mark on the board. But he does not know that his seven-year old son has tampered with the saw and changed its set. The result is that every board he saws is cut slantwise and thus unusable because [the board is] too short except at the point where the saw first made its contact with the wood. As long as the set of the saw is not changed, the result will always be the same.

Ibid., 97

When we say that sin is ethical, we do not mean, however, that sin involved only the will of man and not also his intellect. Sin involved every aspect of man's personality. All of man's reactions in every relation in which God had set him were ethical and not merely intellectual; the intellectual itself is ethical.

Ibid., 70

I have mentioned earlier that Cornelius Van Til is manifestly unsystematic. This can be seen while reading his books. The most charitable way of reading Van Til is to seek for understanding of the context in which the sentences are located, otherwise it can be clearly seen that Van Til contradicts himself countless times. Comparing the two sets of quotes above will expose a contradiction on the surface, of which Van Til did not help with his irrationalist appeal to "paradoxes" without explaining what "paradoxes" are and how exactly they work.

The most charitable reading of Van Til therefore attempts to understand why he says anything in Van Til's own context. For as Van Til wrote, the first quote shows that Van Til understands that logic and logical reasoning is not affected by either the Fall or regeneration. Both believers and unbelievers use the same logic laws, and Christians "do not .. operate according to new laws of thought any more than that they have new eyes or noses." Yet, Van Til seems to affirm the direct opposite in the second set of quotes on page 97 and page 70. In the first set Van Til seems to affirm the ontological immutability of reason; while in the second set Van Til seems to deny the ontological immutability of reason.

Reading the quotes in context will show that Van Til was trying to get at certain biblical truths in all three quotes. This surface contradiction therefore should not have existed. That they do exist therefore shows Van Til to be totally unsystematic, which is further complicated with his boasting in his aversion to be systematic, by masking such sinful actions (in expressing biblical truths in contradictory forms) as being pious and godly (under the guise of "paradox").

That the biblical truths behind the quotes are not actually contradictory can be seen by understanding them in context. The first quote is in reaction to the charge of irrationalism and of denying Kuyper's teachings by a critic Van Halsema. Van Til is here stating that he does not believe that reason is different between believers and unbelievers so that reasoning and communication is impossible between them. In the second quote, Van Til is trying to prove that the unbeliever's reason is defective (so that it cannot seek or understands God on its own) by an analogy. In the third quote, Van Til is trying to state the fact that the intellect itself cannot be trusted to be used as an instrument to lead us to truth as it is affected by sin.

When we read all of these quotes in context and understand them, we will realize that these three concepts that Van Til wanted to teach and defend are biblical and orthodox. The problem however comes when he adds his distinctive spin to teach and defend these truths, and then all of the logical problems rise up. Since the basic concepts are biblical, Van Til (and Vantillians too) treats any criticism of his teachings as an attack upon the biblical truths behind his teachings. The problem of course is not with the biblical concepts underlying Van Til's teachings, but Van Til's distinctive spin on the concepts which is careless, loose and not befitting of someone who is supposed to handle the truths of God's Holy Word.

The godly systematicians of God's Word use precise and measured language to ensure that no surface contradictions exist in their theologizing. In fact, that is what Reformed Scholasticism (and Medieval scholasticism in its method) is well known for. Certainly this is not to say that there are no mysteries left in the Bible. However, paradoxes are wrestled with and resolved in such a way that no contradictions are seen on the surface. For example, the early church came up with the "one essence, three persons" formula for speaking of the Trinity. Why did the early church not just leave it as "one person, three persons" and relegate the whole issue as a paradox reconcilable only by God? After all, if it was good enough for Van Til (who taught the "one person, three persons" heterodox theory), why was it not good enough for the early church fathers, who unlike Van Til were not blessed with the legacy of having available teachings of the giants of the faith?

By stating the teaching of the Trinity as "one essence and three persons," the early church resolved the paradox in favor of mystery. There is after all no formal contradictions between essences and persons! Now, what exactly are "essences" and "persons" can be discussed further, but as long as they are not ontologically equated, there is no contradiction in the formulation of the Trinity. Mystery yes, contradiction and paradox no.

The example of the church fathers is typical of godly systematicians through the ages. Van Til obviously is not one of them, being probably the most unsystematic systematician ever.

What shall we liken Van Til's thought? Van Til's teaching is just like taking the mirror of Reformed orthodoxy, smashing it to pieces, and then piecing them together with the addition of other fragments of glass that Van Til thinks should be part of the mirror. The result is a disparate amalgam consisting of sometimes large fragments of Reformed orthodoxy mixed with distinctive Van Tillian thought, and all this is meant to cohere together. Is it no wonder that with such confusion, Van Til has left behind a mixed legacy consisting of Vantillian Reformed orthodox, Frameans, Christian Reconstructionists, Theonomists, and Federal Visionists, all of whom claim Van Til as their spiritual godfather?

Whatever is orthodox in Vantillian thought can be found in better Reformed writers. Whatever good in Van Tillian thought in the realm of apologetics and philosophy has been said much better by others like Gordon Clark. If one really wants to learn the Reformed Christian faith, one would do well to avoid Van Til and read people like Calvin, Witsius, Turretin, Rutherford, Owen, and even [Richard] Muller. Ad fontes!

A response to Van Tillian Warren Cruz: Logic, Rationality, and the Fall

Over on his blog, Van Tillian Warren Cruz has posted a recent post attempting to defend the Van Tillian notion of the ontological defect of the reason of Man caused by the Fall. Judging by its temporal proximity to my post critiquing Van Til on this topic, the post seems to be a response to mine. I guess that would most definitely merit a response from me.

As I have read Van Til, the major problem with Van Til is that he is not systematic. It can be clearly seen that Van Til is influenced by the Reformed scholars of his day like Bavinck and Kuyper. This however means only that he uses the terms they use and to some extent embrace what they teach. What is required however for apologetics and interaction with detractors is a sharp mind good at systematizing truths and making the proper distinctions, as well as humility to seek to understand the terms and position of your detractors. That is what makes Reformed Scholasticism the highest peak of Reformed theology so far. Sadly, all of these qualities are lacking in Van Til, and it shows here in this post by Cruz.

The main thrust of the argument by Cruz is that Turretin believes in the same position as Van Til. Van Til, per his hagiographical image, was a solid Reformed scholar merely restating the truths of Reformed theology and applying them to the realm of apologetics. Cruz first states the issue at hand and his belief that the Reformed view is that the effects of sin on reason is more than ethical. Cruz then quotes Turretin with the belief that Turretin's work confirms his Van Tillian position on the effects of sin.

The problem with Cruz's post though is that I as a Clarkian agree 100% with what Turretin wrote, yet I disagree with Cruz's and Van Til's distortion of Turretin's views. That is why I have said earlier that proper definitions of terms and humility to seek to understand the positions of detractors is necessary. It is no use like Van Til to merely state the Reformed view without further systematizing, clarifying and reformulating how the truths held by the Reformed tradition are to be applied to the present day and time. [Of course, Van Til did "build on" the Reformed tradition, if building a straw roof on top of a concrete building while rearranging the concrete pillars is considered "building upon it."]

It is possible to say that "reason" is not affected by the Fall as per Clark, and also hold that "reason" is affected by the Fall as per Turretin. The issue here as always has been definitions, definitions and definitions. What do we mean by the use of our terms? What does Turretin mean by the use of his term? Van Tillians it seems ignore this entire issue, and merely parrot the same objection again and again. Of course, it may well be the case that they have never heard a refutation of this canard, but I seriously doubt that to be the case.

What does Clark mean by "reason"? Does he mean by that the reasoning processes of Man? No. Clark is abundantly clear that the Image of God in Man is the mind and logic. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that is irrelevant for this topic. The main point here is that Clark defines "reason" in this area as the rules of reason, or logic.

We will digress here to a short course in basic logic. Let us start with the simple logical argument: "All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is moral." What does logic assert as to this statement? Logic merely shows us whether this argument is valid or invalid (whether the consequence necessarily flows from the premises). It does not supply the premises for the argument, neither does it tell us whether the premises are true or false. Logic furthermore does not even tell us what arguments to evaluate. It is a mere tool. If one inputs true premises into the arguments, logic can tell us whether it is valid, and if it is valid, then the argument is sound. However, if one inputs false premises into the arguments, logic cannot disprove the argument if the structure of the argument is valid. Which is to say, "Rubbish in, rubbish out."

For example, let us look at this argument: "All unicorns are cats. I have seen a unicorn. Therefore I have seen a cat." Logic can only tell us that this argument is valid, but we all know that this argument is nonsensical because unicorns do not exist, unicorns are not cats, and we and everyone else have not seen a unicorn. In other words, the premises of this argument are false and the argument unsound despite the fact that it is valid in form.

Therefore, when Clark states that "reason" is unaffected by the fall ontologically but affected only ethically, it means that unregenerate men after the Fall still use the same logical apparatus as Adam and Eve did, and as regenerate believers still do. Adam and Eve believed in for example the principle of modus tollens as much as Aristotle the pagan did, as much as the Medieval theologian Aquinas did, as much as John Calvin did, and as we do so today. The problem with the unregenerate mind is not their logical apparatus is different, but the way in which they use it. The unregenerate mind is incapable of providing the proper premises for the right argument towards knowing God, and incapable of judging whether the premises of any such arguments to be truth or false correctly.

This brings us to Turretin's quote. When Turretin uses the word "reason," he means the entire reasoning process including the choosing of premises and the assessment of their truth value. Using this definition, Turretin rightly attacks blind reason and the Rationalism of the philosophers, and deny that "sound reason is its [the faith's] principle." In other words, if we talk about the reasoning process as a whole, then of course "reason" defined in this way is very much affected by the Fall. As Cruz kindly reminded us, the bifurcation between reason [understood as the reasoning process] and will is "undue and coerced."

As it can be seen, Clarkians stand in the Reformed tradition with Turretin. It is however Van Til who distorts the Reformed teaching by adding to it the ontological effects of reason in the Fall, something none of the Reformers and Reformed scholastics ever did. In fact, the Reformed scholastics embraced Aristotelianism to a very large extent in its form and vocabulary (though not so much content), so it would be indeed strange, even impossible if their minds which were shaped by Aristotelian categories would reject one of those categories.

As a last word, Van Tillians really need to stop reading Van Til into the writings of the Reformers and their successors. It is manifestly unscholarly and anachronistic, and those of us who DO read the works of the Reformed tradition are not impressed with the mangling of the primary sources in the service of an ideology based upon the veneration of one sinful man.

Book Review: The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Cessation of Special Revelation

I have recently read a very interesting historical theology book on the views of the Westminster Confession and the Westminster divines with regards to the issue of the Gifts of the Spirit, with an eye to that of prophecy. Seeing that this is indeed an important topic, I have done a review of the book here. An excerpt:

What was the view of the Westminster divines with regards to the continuation or cessation of the sign gifts, and especially the gift of prophecy? As the Charismatic movement continues on unabated, such questions with regards to the continuation or cessation of the sign gifts throughout history are looked at. The traditional view has been that the sign-gifts have ceased after the time of the Apostles. Charismatics who insist on the continuation of the sign gifts have to address this historical view. Either they agree that the sign-gifts have ceased in history but blame the cessation on the apostasy of the church, or they must try to find continuation of the sign gifts throughout history and as such dispute the traditional position that the gifts have indeed ceased. In this light, this reviewer has heard both arguments attempted. The first one however does not seem plausible in light of Jesus' promise that the gates of hell with not prevail against the Church (Mt. 16:18). True, the Reformation did happen, but the Reformation was the attempted reformation of the church not its revolution. The Reformers were totally unlike the Radical Anabaptists who insist on overthrowing the Church entirely to create a new one altogether. Only after Trent anathemized the Gospel did the Roman Catholic Church officially cut themselves off from Christ, for as we see from Scriptures, wickedness while serious does not immediately destroy the church (as in the case of the Corinthians, although persistent unrepentance does) but heresy immediately does (as in the case of the Galatians).

In his book, Garnet Howard Milne focused on the narrower scope of the Westminster Confession of Faith (WCF), the Westminster Divines and their view(s) concerning special revelation and prophecy. The book thus is a historical study of the primary sources, being mustered to show forth that the majority view of the Westminster Divines and the Puritans after them was that Special Revelation and thus prophecy has ceased.

[continue]

Analytic and synthetic thought, Deductivism and the philosophy of Gordon Clark

Two methods can be applied in both the discovery and the presentation of knowledge: either one proceeds from the causes to the effects, or else one begins with the end and from there traces back to the causes. The first option, from cause to effect, Zabrella [an Aristotelian] called the way of composition or synthesis. The second option, from the end back to its causes or the means to that end, he called the way of resolution or analysis... The analytical method proceeds inductively. It does not begin with what comes first, but with the effect or outcome.

The contemplative sciences, such as philosophy, are rather concerned with knowledge itself. Here one reasons from cause to effect, and the synthetic or composite method that follows a deductive process is used. The movement is from universal (universalia) to particulars (particularia).

These two methods can be illustrated by comparing them with the building of a house. With an analytical method, one first considers the building itself in general; the point of departure is the whole. From there each element is considered, brick by brick, in order finally to arrive at the foundation. The synthetic method, on the other hand, implies that one first consider the foundation. Then all the other parts follow until one has an impression of the entire building.

— Willem J. Van Asselt, Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), 95-6

There is a small but growing interest in Reformed Scholasticism among the Reformed circles. This is of course a good thing since it is at that time that the fruits of Reformed theology were thriving.

It can be seen from Van Asselt's excellent book that Reformed Scholasticism borrowed greatly in form and method from Aristotelianism, yet without deriving its content from Aristotle. All of this is understandable. However, does the familiarity with Aristotelian categories blind those who are familiar with Reformed Scholasticism to ideas that do not depend on those categories?

Let us consider the philosophy of Gordon Clark. Vantillians have [falsely] accused Clark of many theological crimes — from being a [Cartesian] Rationalist, to denying the Creature/ Creator distinction, to believe that Man can become like God in knowledge etc. Of course, such attacks are totally baseless and only show the ignorance of Vantillians who read almost everything including the Reformers according to Vantillian lenses. In many cases, their idolatrous and un-Christian behavior deserve sharp rebuke as they persistently slander Clark and some Clarkians. (I am not denying however that some Clarkians turn into the caricatures their opponents paint of them.)

Nevertheless, it may be the case that some people unwittingly read Clark through the lens of Aristotle, and because of that they are confused over Clark's philosophy. It is with this in mind that I would like to address some of the basic Aristotelian categories that are used in Reformed Scholasticism.

According to Van Asselt's discussion of Reformed Scholasticism above, what is considered "analytic" is done inductively, reasoning from effect to cause. What is considered "synthetic" on the other hand is done deductively, reasoning from cause to effect. "Analytic" has to do with particulars, while "synthetic" has to do with universals, since after all reasoning from the foundation onwards should imply one universal foundation for everything (with the exception of postmodern thought) and then different structures (particulars) are build upon the same foundation.

Clarkian philosophy however ruins the entire Aristotelian landscape. According to Clark, the first axiom or presupposition of all thinking is revelation [Gordon H. Clark, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy. In The Works of Gordon Haddon Clark, Vol. 4 (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 2004), 298]. In fact, as Clark said, "the notion that God can be known only through revelation seems to be essential to the very concept of God" (Clark, 299). With this one thought, Clark claims for revelation in Scripture to be both the foundation AND the house, and that house is most certainly particular. According to Aristotle, any focus on the foundation must be synthetic and universal, and focus on the house must be analytic and particular. Clark's philosophy dashes Aristotelian categories by making the particular the universal standard of judgment. All other systems, which in Aristotle's category would be deemed as other houses build upon the same type of foundation, are in Clark's system houses build in mid-air without true foundations.

According to Clark's philosophy, we can say that Christianity is discovered analytically in terms of human experience, but it is synthetic in terms of epistemic discourse. It is a particular philosophy which claims universality by denying all other philosophies and religions epistemic reality. Along this same line, we can say that Christianity is experienced inductively while rationally discussed deductively. This should be helpful in for us in seeing and appreciating the differences between the Heidelberg Catechism (inductive-analytic) and the Westminster Standards (deductive-synthetic).

Many have alleged that Clark held that reason in Man is untouched by sin, or that it could still sufficiently reach God in and of itself. As we have said, these accusers either have not read Gordon Clark, or have read his books with Vantillian lenses. Here is what Clark says about reason:

... The important question is not whether or not the Bible is true, but whether or not all knowledge is deducible by reason, i.e. by logic alone.

Now, the history of philosophy ... have convincingly answer in the negative.

...

.. reason without faith not only provides no religion, it supports no knowledge of any kind. ...

(Clark, Religion, Reason and Revelation. In Clark, Works, 143)

Any discussion of man's mind and powers, to be at all Biblical, must take into account the effects of sin. Calvin, Hodge, and Machen were keenly aware of this. ...

[Quoting Machen with approval] ... So our reason is certainly insufficient to tell us about God, unless he reveals himself; but it is capable (or he would be capable if it were not clouded by sin) of receiving revelation when once it is given.

(Clark, Religion. In Works 179)

As we can see, Clark does teach that the mind is very much affected by sin. What Clark teaches on reason is that in the event that our minds are able to reason properly (due to regeneration etc), it is perfectly capable of receiving the revelation of God. Just because Clark teaches that we share the principle of reason with unbelievers in common does not imply at all that unbelievers' minds are capable of utilizing the principles of rational thinking when it comes to addressing the things of God.

In conclusion, while certainly we must keep in mind the use of Aristotelian categories in Reformed scholastic thought, which is not all bad either, we should not try to pigeon-hole other philosophies and theologies into these same Aristotelian categories. Attempting to do so with Clark's philosophy is probably the error that lead to the slanderous accusations against Clark by the Vantillians. Clark's philosophy while dated is still pertinent today, and it is my opinion that a combination of Reformed Scholasticism and Clarkian thought could very well solve most of the problems we face in philosophical thought.