The will and personal identity, as pertaining to the philosophy behind classical theism

If will is a personal property, it folllows that personal identity is located in freely willed actions. It means that a person is most fully herself when freely exercising the prerogative to initiate actions and make decisions. (Adonis Vidu, The Same God who works all things, p. 111)

What is a person? What is a person's identity? For one, it can be "tall, smart, black hair, male, Chinese," and for another, "eloquest, short, female, American." Personal identities, subjectively speaking, are intensively personal and pick up the traits that a person portrays as well as other distinguishing things about them. Objectively speaking, personal identities can cover all of the traits of a person, to identify that person against another.

Personal properties are of course the properties of a person, and thus key to their personal identities. So, in humans, if will is a personal property, is will part of their personal identity? For humans, of course not, because all humans have wills. The exercise of that will in action can form part of a person's identity (e.g. successful businessman), but that has nothing to do with the will per se but the will as acted out in the business actions he takes. Will we say that in humans, a person's identity is located in freely willed actions? No, because it is what is willed and what is done that identifies a person.

How then should we respond to Vidu's strange comment on will being a personal property? Vidu I think fails to differentiate being something being present, and something acted out. If will is a personal property, it can be said that a personal identity is that a person is a moral agent. However, the exercise of that will is an act, which the person can and does exercise. Therefore, it is a non sequitur to claim that "will" being a personal property implies that the personal identity is located in freely willed actions. The will is after all distinct from the act, though not separate from it.

There are of course more nuances when it comes to God, but the problem here is how Vidu, as with many of his Roman Catholic ressourcement friends, seem to think that a rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics and Aquinas is the cause of the problems with the world today (Modernism and Postmodernism). There are many problems with modernism and postmodernism, but making will a personal property has nothing to do with self-autonomy and the need for self-expression and self-actualization.

The corruption of Aristotelian metaphysics in classical theism: Exhibit B

Now, and this is the pivotal move in this argument, if the persons are identified with the relations, if these are relations that subsist in the unity of an intellectual substance, and if other relations, contingent and economic, were to obtain between the persons—where there would be a to and fro, a giving and a taking—then the very identity of the persons would also depend in some way upon these contingent and finite realities. (Adonis Vidu, The Same God who Works All Things, p. 100)

In hard classical theism, ressourcement classical theism, the persons are identified with the relations (paternity, begotten, proceeding). Note that we are not denying that the persons are relations in some sense. But in hard classical theism, the only distinction between the persons are the (eternal) relations. These relations are eternal, necessary and pertains to the very nature of the Godhead. To posit any other relation other than these is to make "the very identity of the person" to be dependent "in some way upon these contingent and finite realities."

The problem with this view is precisely at this fixation on "relations." Even if we were to hold to the identity thesis, who is to say that one kind of relations (the eternal kind) precludes other types of relations (the contingent kind)? Vidu is positing a univocity of the term "relation" in order to deny that God can form any type of non-ontic and/or non-eternal relations either within the Godhead or with anything in creation. It is the amphiboly fallacy. And why must a relation make "the very identity of the person" dependent on contingent and finity realities? All of us know that God is the Creator of the universe, so does this relation of "being a Creator" make God dependent upon the contingent and finite reality of the universe, or we are going to make inane arguments about what constitues a "real relation" or not?

While the doctrine of God is certainly hard and mysterious, as pertaining to the mysteries of the Almighty God, sometimes it seems that it is theologians who are busy making God more mysterious than He is. This is the kind of argument that creates all kinds of gnots for theologians to twist and turn in order to make themselves look smart and God more mysterious, as if God needs the help of Man to make Himmself beyond full comprehension! The persons of the Godhead are indeed defined by their personal relations (paternity, begotten, proceeding), but to therefore claim that they cannot have any other types of relations is an assertion not a proof.

The corruption of Aristotelian metaphysics in classical theism: Exhibit A

"A thing acts in so far as it is in act," Aquinas wrote. By no means an esoteric principle of the Common Doctor, this axiom merely expresses the simple idea that the activity of a particular thing is determined in its nature by the kind of thing it is. A rock can't speak, but it can break; water can flow, but it can't break; and so on. [Adonis Vidu, The Same God who works all things, 92]

The so-called "ressourcement" of classical theism has been treating Aristotelian metaphysics, as modified by Thomas Aquinas, as axiomatic. As I read through this book by Adonis Vidu, I would like to point out places where this has been done, to the detriment of common sense and biblical theism.

An action of a thing is determined by its nature? Now, if we are merely saying that actions cannot contradict the nature of a thing, then of course that is true. A human cannot naturally fly, because a human does not have the apparatus for flying (e.g. wings, hollow wing bones etc). But where Aristotle goes with it is a form of hard determinism, where a nature determines actions. Or, in the case of God, nature wills actions. "...the nature of the action is determined by the nature of the agent." (Ibid.) In other words, God Himself does not have libertarian free will. But this is nonsense. A human being can do good, but a good Calvinist will say that humans have a fallen nature incapable of doing good. A human being can and have invented lots of things, but is the nature of inventing an airplane (as opposed to being inventive) determined by the nature of human beings?

The natural sciences have in large part rejected this principle for the simple reason that it restricts scientific research. Science cannot be done if scientists are constantly being told what they can or cannot do according to metaphysical considerations. For Aristotle and Aquinas to say is before the scientific revolution is understandable. For people in the 21st century to say that is to be a Luddite.

A free being such as God can do anything not contrary to His nature. He is not restricted to what philosophers think He can or cannot do. Therefore, to claim something about the nature of God from His actions is not a good argument. Of course, God's actions may reflect on His nature, but that is an argument to be made, not assumed.