Time and fatalism

... By the same token, a thorough criticism of the 'moving now' conception must eventually deal with the tree model of reality. Let us therefore examine the reason that, following Aristotle, is most often cited as motivating this ontological asymmetry: the avoidance of fatalism.

The case for fatalism goes something like this: What was true in the past logically determines what will be true in the future; therefore, since the past is over and done with and beyond our control, the future must also be beyond our control; consequently, there is no point worrying, planning, and taking pains to influence what will happen. [Paul Horwich, Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987), 28]

In his book on the issue of time, Paul Horwich attempts to show how we can understand time, which is seemingly unidirectional, as being a non-directional dimension that has inherent properties that result in the emergence of the flow of time as we know it. The book is an exercise in how time can be understood to exist in the universe if time is to be understood as a dimension of the universe, but in my reading I have not seen any reason stated why time is to be understood thus.

Horwich in the first main chapter (the second chapter of the book) attempts to deal with the issue of the directionality of time. Time moves forward for all of us, and thus it is taken as common sense by most people that the future is undetermined while the past which is already past cannot be changed. However, Horwich sought to undermine the concept that the past is actually fixed. The argument in this chapter is not that the past MUST be mutable, but that it CAN be changed, which is a weaker argument. To do this, Horwich extends the argument for fatalism from the premise that the past is fixed to the conclusion that either some act R's "future truth is now fixed and beyond our control, or R's future falsity is fixed and beyond our control" (p. 29). In other words, if the past is fixed, then logically, it means that the future is fixed as well. Horwich accomplishes this with a key step stating that the truth value of the statement "It was the case at past time p that S will be true at future time f" is necessarily the same as the truth value of the statement "It is the case that S will be true at future time f." Thus, given a B series, the end result is fatalism. Therefore, there are three choices Horwich gives to us:

1. Abandon the plausible sounding view that the past is already determined and beyond our control ...
2. Follow Aristotle by giving up the idea that all statements about the future have a present truth value ...
3. Invite fatalism by agreeing that even future events are presently beyond our control

(Horwich, 29)

The first problem with Horwich's approach it seems is that there does not seem to be any recognition of the difference between determinism and fatalism. Fatalism is the view that everything happens regardless of what you or anyone does. In other words, in fatalism, if it is predetermined that person X will be walking along the road and be hit by a car at 11 pm and die, that will happen even if person X attempts to stay home at 11 pm and so avoid his fate. Determinism however only state that such and such a thing would happen. But one variation of determinism could state that the actions of individuals are factored into the future. In other words, if it is determined that person X have the same fate, person X will want to walk on that road and then he will be hit by the car on 11 pm and die. If person X learned that he might die and thus stayed home, the actual determined future is that person X stayed home and live. Fatalism allows for no personal agency of any actor to interfere with its determined future, while determinism factors in the personal agencies of all actors in its determined future.

Since such is the case, Horwich's aversion to fatalism and his rejection of it in favor of a mutable past does not seem wise. There is no reason why we must be open to the idea that the past is mutable, and fatalism is just as false as it always has been.