Conclusion
I have looked at the metaphysics of will and submission, then taken an excursus into the writings of Herman Witsius on the Pactum. I continued with discussing the metaphysics of attributes and act, and the metaphysics of necessity. All of such is done in an attempt to show that the difference between classical theism and my view, and perhaps the views of others who dissent from classical theism, is based on numerous philosophical differences. I have laid down my particular take on these issues, not in an attempt to place philosophy over theology, but to show that my dissent is based upon my disagreements over philosophical assumptions (not biblical assumptions) made by classical theists that, to my knowledge, have never been defended or addressed. The disagreement is not between Scripture and philosophy, but one philosophy against another philosophy.
In this light, I would like to make two pleas to my classical theist brethren in general (assuming they still think of me as a fellow believer), and Rev. Brite in particular. First, if you are genuinely interested in truth, and the truths of God, can you concede that the differences between classical theism and EFS views like mine are due to fundamental philosophical differences? Can you note those differences, and examine your own theology to see if you have smuggled these unexamined assumptions into your theology? Even if you remain a classical theist, could you be self-reflective and be conscious of your assumptions?
Secondly, since I reject your unexamined assumptions, perhaps you can see fit to actually examine these points. If you believe in the principle that act follows being and other such Aristotelian notions, please defend those notions instead of merely repeating them. Why must act follow being for example? Why must necessity be equivalent to the divine essence? How can God be truly free to save whom He wills if His immutable nature is His will? Please address these questions, if you believe classical theism to be the truth on the matter.
Lastly, I would like to add a personal address to all classical theists: Ever since 2016, I have truly wished that the temperature would lower and the demonization would stop. Is all this infighting worth it? You are not the Nicene fathers, you are not whichever theological hero you think you are. You are fighting to divide the Church upon the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, the Saint of the Roman Catholic Church. Is all this worth it? Ask yourself this in your heart as you come to personal prayer before our Lord, who will judge between us on the matter.
Maranatha. Amen.
27 comments:
God is free from external sources and influences to save whoever He wants or chooses to save. But He is not free from His eternal knowledge and decrees to save whoever He chooses to save. As a result of His eternal knowledge and decrees all who God saves He had and have to save them and He can't do otherwise. And all whom He didn't save and will not save He couldn't of save them.
God's nature is His Spirit for God is Spirit. Yet that Spirit (or nature) is fully and completely shared by three distinct persons from all eternity. So His spirit or nature wills, decides, and so on.
The human nature for each person is their human spirit. The human spirit or nature wills, decides, and so on. It's our human spirit (or nature) that makes us humans.
@Gregory,
I don't see how what you have written is relevant to the conversation. The issue is that God's active will and God's nature are not one and the same thing. Otherwise, God is not free to choose to save whom He wishes to, but must save some and damn others, because His nature is immutable, eternal, and therefore there is no "freedom" to do otherwise.
The term 'God' is really referring to the one nature or Spirit of the three persons of the Trinity. The Trinity is one what (one God) and three whos (three persons). It is their nature (or Spirit) that wills, wish, decides, decrees, and so on from all eternity. The three persons of the Trinity are not free from their nature (or Spirit) which is God. God is not free from His eternal will, choice, wish, knowledge, desires, decrees, and so on. So as far as where God's eternal will, omniscience, choice, desires, decrees, and so on are concerned God from all eternity isn't and can't be "free to choose to save" apart from His eternal will, omniscience, desires, decrees, and so on. So therefore from all eternity He "must save some and damn others". God is only free from external factors, influences, and so on.
Because of God's eternal will, choice, wish, knowledge, desires, decrees, and so on God from all eternity had to wish, will, desire, decree, and so on the salvation of certain humans and the damnation of all the others.
@Greg,
nobody says that God is "free from His nature." The issue is not 'freedom from,' but 'determination by.' Is God free to decide which sinners He will save, and which sinners He will not? OR, is that decision (whom to save and whom not) determined by His nature and therefore is just as immutable as His being?
Let's make this simple: Here are a few questions. Please answer yes or no.
1) Is God free to decide not to save any sinner? Y/N
2) Is the basis of God's election the divine nature? Y/N
3) Since God's nature is atemporal, fixed and immutable, perfect in all possible and impossible worlds, do you agree that God's nature and all that it entails is not "free" to be anything other than what it is? Y/N
I await your answers to these three questions.
>"determined by His nature and therefore is just as immutable as His being?"<
God's immutable nature is His immutable being and vice versa. They are both one and the same thing.
1) N
2) Y
3) Y
Let's remember I've said God is only free from external factors, influences, and so on. But God is not free from His nature or being.
'Freedom from,' but 'determination by' goes hand in hand and can't be separated as you have tried to do. They may be distinct but not separate.
God's being or nature is God Himself and vice versa.
@Gregory,
so you deny proposition 1, and affirm the other two propositions. So, basically, you are denying that God has a free will. How would you exegete Ephesians 1:4b-5? Was Paul wrong in stating that God "predestined us according to the purpose of His will"? Rather, according to your metaphysics, God is predestinating us according to His divine nature.
Therefore, logically, if God predestined some to eternal life and some to eternal damnation (if you remain a Calvinist) according to His immutable nature, which cannot ever be otherwise, therefore the reason why some are reprobate is because it is in the very nature of God that they be reprobate. In order for God to be God, some must be reprobate. Consider well the logical implications of your view. Would you want to embrace that?
>"so you deny proposition 1, and affirm the other two propositions'<
True.
>"So, basically, you are denying that God has a free will."<
It all depends on the context of how 'free will' is used. Gordon H. Clake correctly said that the compound term 'free will' is used in different contexts to mean different things. One of the meanings he spoke of was to have free will from external factors which he recognized was a correct and proper way to use the term. I have said more than once here that God is free from external factors or influences. Thus in that context, God has a free will (from externals).
Also, I've said that God isn't free from His eternal will, desires, decrees, omniscience, and so on. So in this other context, God doesn't have a free will. So it all depends on the context.
>"How would you exegete Ephesians 1:4b-5? Was Paul wrong in stating that God "predestined us according to the purpose of His will"?"<
God which is the nature, being, or Spirit of the Trinity eternally wills, desires, decrees, is omniscient, and so on.
>"Was Paul wrong in stating that God "predestined us according to the purpose of His will"?"<
No.
>"God is predestinating us according to His divine nature."<
Strictly speaking, God doesn't have a divine nature rather God Himself is the divine nature (of the Trinity). Remember the Trinity is one 'what' (ie. one God, Spirit (for God is Spirit), one nature, one essence, one being), and three 'whos'.
>"Rather, according to your metaphysics, God is predestinating us according to His divine nature."<
God which is the divine nature (rather than having a divine nature technically and scripturally speaking) predestinated as He willed in eternity past. That is how I'll put it.
>"Therefore, logically, if God predestined some to eternal life and some to eternal damnation (if you remain a Calvinist) according to His immutable nature, which cannot ever be otherwise, therefore the reason why some are reprobate is because it is in the very nature of God that they be reprobate."<
It's not an attribute of God which is the nature of the Trinity to reprobate anyone. Reprobation isn't an attribute of God. Rather God, the nature of the Trinity, from all eternity wills and decrees reprobation on certain of His creatures.
>"In order for God to be God, some must be reprobate."<
Reprobation or reprobating certain creature is not an attribute of God. So it in no way makes 'God to be God'. Rather God wills and decrees reprobation.
My question to you is this since God from all eternity willed, desired, knew, and decreed reprobation on let's say, Bob. Then how could God in any way at any time be free to not reprobate Bob?
It's improper or at least not best to ask, what is the nature of God since God is the nature of the Trinity. The better question is, is what is the nature of the Trinity, or what is the nature of The Father, or The Son, or The Spirit?
To ask what is the nature of God is the same thing as asking, what is the nature of the nature of The Trinity? And that can go on ad infinitum like, what is the nature of the nature of The Trinity, and so on, and so on.
It's better to ask, what are the attributes of God?
>My question to you is this since God from all eternity willed, desired, knew, and decreed reprobation on let's say, Bob. Then how could God in any way at any time be free to not reprobate Bob?
Because, based on modal logic, we say that the decision of God to reprobate Bob is not necessary. That means that, in all possible worlds, there are possible worlds where God elects Bob instead of reprobating him, and reprobates Bill instead. Thus, although the reprobation of Bob is immutable in this world, it is not necessary and could be otherwise in other possible worlds.
>It's improper or at least not best to ask, what is the nature of God since God is the nature of the Trinity. The better question is, is what is the nature of the Trinity, or what is the nature of The Father, or The Son, or The Spirit?
Actually, since "nature" has to do with ontology, φυσις (natura) with ὁ ων (essentia), it is perfectly correct and orthodox to speak of the nature of God. Whereas Father, Son and Spirit are the three persons (ὑποστασις, persona) of the one being (nature) of God, one cannot speak of the "nature" of the Father, Son, and Spirit, but only of the one undivided divine nature.
Yes, we do talk about the attributes of God. The attributes of God are what God is like. They are all done analogously, and spoken of either via positiva or via negativa, or via eminentiae. Yet, there is no clear answer as to the relations between the attributes and the being of God. If the attributes are clearly and univocally God (the "is" of identification - the position of classical theism), then that is one position of how the attributes relate to God's nature. But that is not the only option, and not the only historical option. Eastern Orthodoxy holds to a more dynamic interpretation of the attributes of God, seeing most of the attributes as pertaining to the energies of God not His unknowable essence. Thus, in EO, God is His attributes in the sense of an "is" of inseparable association or union. There is no reason why one is inherently "more biblical" than the other.
>It's not an attribute of God which is the nature of the Trinity to reprobate anyone. Reprobation isn't an attribute of God. Rather God, the nature of the Trinity, from all eternity wills and decrees reprobation on certain of His creatures.
Indeed, reprobation is an ACT of God, based upon the divine decree. And although the divine decree is God (doctrine of simplicity), the contents of that decree do not have to be necessary (i.e. the decree to create this world must be contingent if creation itself is contingent). Therefore, you are back to the problem of basing contingent things upon an immutable nature.
Nobody is saying that God is free from His nature. But just as humans being not free from our human natures are not robots and have free agencies, so analogously and to a greater extent, God is free to choose to do any number of things despite Him being not free to go against His own nature. The greatest example is that of creation. Does God have to create the world? It seems that you must assert that God must create the world, that creation is necessary, since God's decree to create stems from the divine decree which is His being (against divine simplicity).
Since you seem to be dead set in pushing the idea that divine freedom must somehow be an infringement upon the immutable divine nature, let's see if you are consistent with these questions:
(1) Is creation necessary? Is it necessary for God to create any world?
(2) Is sin necessary? Is it necessary for God to allow sin into the world? i.e. Can God not have a perfect human couple Adam and Eve in paradise forever?
(3) Is salvation necessary? Can God throw the whole world into hell, or is God unable to choose this option if He so wants?
>"Because, based on modal logic, we say that the decision of God to reprobate Bob is not necessary. That means that, in all possible worlds, there are possible worlds where God elects Bob instead of reprobating him, and reprobates Bill instead. Thus, although the reprobation of Bob is immutable in this world, it is not necessary and could be otherwise in other possible worlds."<
There are possible worlds (1 Samuel 23:12) but out of all eternity God knew, desired, wished, will, and decreed just one of them to be. And since this was done from all eternity then that one He from all eternity He knew, desired, wished, will, and decreed had to be. It couldn't of been otherwise. This is the one that we are living in. How could God been free to choose another possible world when from all eternity He desired, wished, will, decreed, and knew that this was the one that He was going to bring about?
>"Actually, since "nature" has to do with ontology, φυσις (natura) with ὁ ων (essentia), it is perfectly correct and orthodox to speak of the nature of God."<
Orthodox language doesn't have to mean that it's biblical. Even you have recognized that truth.
>"Whereas Father, Son and Spirit are the three persons (ὑποστασις, persona) of the one being (nature) of God, one cannot speak of the "nature" of the Father, Son, and Spirit, but only of the one undivided divine nature."<
I never meant to convey that the Divine Nature can be or is divided. All I meant was that you can have a conversation where it's asked what is the Nature of The Father, and in another conversation it's asked what is the nature of the Son, and so on depending on the context of the conversations.
>"Yes, we do talk about the attributes of God. The attributes of God are what God is like. They are all done analogously, and spoken of either via positiva or via negativa, or via eminentiae. Yet, there is no clear answer as to the relations between the attributes and the being of God. If the attributes are clearly and univocally God (the "is" of identification - the position of classical theism), then that is one position of how the attributes relate to God's nature."<
I believe that all of God's attributes together is what make God, God.
>" And although the divine decree is God (doctrine of simplicity)"<
The Divine decree isn't God but an eternal act of God coming from His attributes and absolute sovereignty. His eternal decrees are about what He from all eternity has decided to bring about and what He has eternally decreed or decided to bring about is and have to be necessary. It can't be otherwise since it's eternal. So possible alternatives can't be necessary or they can't be. They can't be anything more than just mere abstracts and hypotheticals.
>"the contents of that decree do not have to be necessary (i.e. the decree to create this world must be contingent if creation itself is contingent). Therefore, you are back to the problem of basing contingent things upon an immutable nature."<
Those eternal decrees that God eternally decided, willed, and wished to bring about and eternally knew that He was going to bring about can't be anything other than been necessary and He must bring about. How can it be otherwise?
>"But just as humans being not free from our human natures are not robots and have free agencies"<
We are not free from God's decrees. We must do them. God's eternal decrees must come about. At least to a certain degree we are free from our environment and created external factors.
>"God is free to choose to do any number of things despite Him being not free to go against His own nature."<
All that I've said above and in other comments speak to the freeness and nonfreeness of God.
>"Does God have to create the world?"<
Yes.
>"Since you seem to be dead set in pushing the idea that divine freedom must somehow be an infringement upon the immutable divine nature, let's see if you are consistent with these questions:"<
Again it all depends on what is meant by Divine freedom.
1. Y, Y.
2. Y, Y, N.
3. Y. Because of God's eternal will, desires, wish, decrees, and omniscience He from all eternity couldn't of wanted and can't want to throw the whole world into Hell. Such a want with God is impossible from all eternity for God to want such. So God can't throw the whole world into Hell.
>There are possible worlds (1 Samuel 23:12) but out of all eternity God knew, desired, wished, will, and decreed just one of them to be. And since this was done from all eternity then that one He from all eternity He knew, desired, wished, will, and decreed had to be. It couldn't of been otherwise.
You do not seem to understand the concept of possible worlds. Possible worlds are not worlds that God may have considered creating but decided not to. Possible worlds are worlds that God MIGHT have considered. The difference is between the first and second order conditionals.
>I never meant to convey that the Divine Nature can be or is divided. All I meant was that you can have a conversation where it's asked what is the Nature of The Father, and in another conversation it's asked what is the nature of the Son, and so on depending on the context of the conversations.
And I am saying that such language is inherently problematic and contrary to Nicene Orthodoxy. That is one of the complaints the East had against the West btw.
>I believe that all of God's attributes together is what make God, God.
That language asserts that God's attribute "together" makes up God, and is a formal denial of simplicity. I don't think that is what you have intended, but I here note that you do not seem to understand the issues concerning God and His attributes.
>The Divine decree isn't God but an eternal act of God coming from His attributes and absolute sovereignty.
I'm sorry, but that is a denial of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity says that all that is in God is God, as James Dolezal uses as a title of one of his books.
From the rest of what you have said, you are asserting that the earth is necessarily created, and everything is necessary if it has come to pass. I do not believe you understand the implications this has in undermining divine election and the grace of God. Logically, your position would lead to a form of hyper-Calvinism, or move towards a form of universalism along the lines of Karl Barth. After all, you just said that God could not have damned all sinners to hell
>"You do not seem to understand the concept of possible worlds. Possible worlds are not worlds that God may have considered creating but decided not to. Possible worlds are worlds that God MIGHT have considered. The difference is between the first and second order conditionals."<
How could "God MIGHT have considered" to create a world when He from all eternity knew and decreed that He will not create that world? Please explain that one to me.
>"And I am saying that such language is inherently problematic and contrary to Nicene Orthodoxy. That is one of the complaints the East had against the West btw."<
How is the language "inherently problematic and contrary to Nicene Orthodoxy"?
>"That language asserts that God's attribute "together" makes up God, and is a formal denial of simplicity. I don't think that is what you have intended, but I here note that you do not seem to understand the issues concerning God and His attributes."<
How is it "a formal denial of simplicity"? I should have said, "I believe that all of God's attributes and His absolute sovereignty together are what makes God, God".
>"I'm sorry, but that is a denial of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity says that all that is in God is God, as James Dolezal uses as a title of one of his books."<
So is God's anger and wrath God? How is God's decree in God? What do you mean by 'in God'?
>this has in undermining divine election and the grace of God. Logically, your position would lead to a form of hyper-Calvinism, or move towards a form of universalism along the lines of Karl Barth."<
How so?
Do you believe God has knowledge of what things could have been? When Jesus said that the men of Sodom would repent if he preached there, was that a true statement? Since God only made one world, was that statement untrue?
As for language, again, what is the Nicene view concerning the nature of God? That God is one being, not three. Against the homoiousians, Nicaea-Constaninople insisted that God is one being, one substance. Therefore, the Father and Son are homoousian - same sybstance. It was not enough to say that Father and Son are like one, they are numerically one.
Therefore, to talk about the nature of the Father, when the Father and Son and Spirit have one nature, is to court heresy. It is to move towards homoiousuan thought, where two beings are so close they are like clones (similar nature).
Your ammended statement is also errant. Nothing *makes * God God. God is not made up of parts.
I take wrath and anger to be of the divine energies, not of the divine being.
I will address the last point another time
>"Do you believe God has knowledge of what things could have been?"<
No. Only in the limited context of your question do I say this, God from eternity only has knowledge of what He is going to bring about and that is what will have to and must be. All the other alternatives God eternally knows will always be abstracts and hypothetical at best and nothing else. In the literal sense, there is no "could have been" with God since God's knowledge, decrees, will, wishes, desires, and so on are all eternal. How could it be otherwise?
>"When Jesus said that the men of Sodom would repent if he preached there, was that a true statement?"<
Yes.
But God from all eternity decreed, knew, and willed that such with Sodom would not be at all. So therefore based on God's eternal decree, knowledge, desire, and will God from eternity had to make such to not be true with Sodom. Therefore Sodom repenting if he had preached there as told by Jesus was from eternity meant to be nothing more than an abstract or hypothetical and it couldn't have been otherwise in reality. The men of Sodom were willed and decreed by God from all eternity to be in Hell, thus that is what had to and must be by God.
>"Since God only made one world, was that statement untrue?"<
It's still a true statement despite God only making one world. It's a true hypothetical statement or it's true in the abstract only as only God knows all the hypothetical alternatives that if such was to be then what He had decreed would have happened but He eternally decreed that such will never ever be.
>"That God is one being, not three. Against the homoiousians, Nicaea-Constaninople insisted that God is one being, one substance. Therefore, the Father and Son are homoousian - same sybstance."<
True.
>"It was not enough to say that Father and Son are like one, they are numerically one."<
It all depends on what you mean.
>"Therefore, to talk about the nature of the Father, when the Father and Son and Spirit have one nature, is to court heresy. It is to move towards homoiousuan thought, where two beings are so close they are like clones (similar nature)."<
Yes, the Trinity has one nature or being. But in another context, one can properly speak of the nature of the Father (with the implication that The Son and The Spirit also have the same nature as well).
>"Your ammended statement is also errant. Nothing *makes * God God. God is not made up of parts"<
True. God's attributes and sovereignty are not parts of God. They can be distinguished but they are not parts of God put together to make God, God.
>"I take wrath and anger to be of the divine energies, not of the divine being."<
Are "the divine energies" in God?
>nothing more than an abstract or hypothetical...
I'm sorry but this tells me you have no idea what modality or possible worlds are. Are you perhaps thinking of the multiverse, because possible worlds is NOT the multiverse.
>in another context..
Please tell me what context is it ever right to have the nature of the Father and another nature of the Son.
As for the divine energies, you are welcome to read the multiple places I have talked about them on my blog and in my book review of Simply Trinity.
>"Please tell me what context is it ever right to have the nature of the Father and another nature of the Son."<
None. There is no "another nature of the Son" to that of The Father and The Spirit. They all have one eternal nature.
>"As for the divine energies, you are welcome to read the multiple places I have talked about them on my blog and in my book review of Simply Trinity."<
Thanks. I must say that when it comes to the Eastern Orthodox Church I don't know much about their theology. I know their use the term 'energy(ies)' but what they mean by it I don't know much about their use of it.
Is it possible that you can provide some links to the sources that you recommended to me to read.
The only "another nature of the Son" to that of The Father and The Spirit is the human nature of The Son. But of course, that isn't part of our conversation.
The human nature of the Son does not have its own agency, otherwise we are asserting that the Son somehow "fuse" or "override" the human in the embryo and became Jesus. The human nature of the Son is human yet unlike normal humans in its inability of independent existence apart from the God-Man. So I do not see how that has any bearing on talking about the one divine nature.
As for the divine energies, here you have one post from clicking through the "Theology Proper" category:
https://puritanreformed.blogspot.com/2021/10/gregory-palamas-and-essence-energies.html
Thanks for the link.
Post a Comment