Tuesday, April 07, 2020

On the "spatialization" of time - Definition of time, as spatial dimension?

This suggest a further argument against any attempt to spatialize time, which is that it can never be completely carried through. Again, time is the measure of change within space. If we think if space as three-dimensional, then time is the measure of change within three-dimensional space, but if instead we say that what common sense conceive of as time is “really” just a fourth spatial dimension, then what this implies – again, for all the defender of the spatialization of time has shown – is that time ought really to be thought of as the measure of change within four-dimensional space. If the defender of the spatialization of time now claims that time so understood is really just a fifth spatial dimension, then the response will be that in that case time turns out to be the measure of change in five-dimensional space. And so on ad-infinitum. (Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge, p. 290)

According to Aristotelianism it seems, time is defined as the "measure of change within space." Using this definition, Edward Feser argued that time cannot be taken as another dimension like space. However, is that truly an acceptable definition of time?

This definition of time implies that change must happen when time progresses. In other words, if there is an instance in which change does not occur, then time cannot be said to have occurred. This is problematic on many levels. First of all, there are many examples in which change does not occur even though it cannot be said that time has not passed. Hydrogen atoms in the inter-galatic medium are perhaps the best example of something that will not be undergoing any changes for the next few hundred years (unless Christ comes again, but that is a different thing altogether). Most atoms will not undergo any form of nuclear reaction so they would be considered "timeless" as well according to this definition. Bacteria locked in ice are also "timeless" during their "time" frozen in ice, as they do not change. All such examples should be sufficient to show that time can pass without any change happening. Therefore, the Aristotelian definition of time is falsified.

Feser is also in error in understanding what "spatialization" of time in the context of modern science actually mean. It does not mean time becomes another spatial dimension (although some may give that impression). It just means that time is analogous to space in the sense of its quantifiability and ability to be manipulated (time dilation and gravitational dilation). It does not mean that time is a spatial dimension in an eternalist 4-dimensional block that we (3-dimensional beings) perceive as time. Rather, time is qualitatively different from space. It is theoretically possible that we might discover infinite dimensions of space, yet time is still the (א +1 ) dimension, a separate dimension from all other spatial dimensions.

As such, it seems that there is no reason why time cannot be seen to be analogous to space. While we currently know of only one temporal dimension, there is theoretically no reason why there cannot be more than one temporal dimension either. Feser's and the Neo-Aristotelian argument on the nature of time is flawed and based upon an errant understanding of the world, and thus should be rejected, whether it is seen in philosophy, or in theology (Classical theism).

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