Book Review: Reforming Apologetics by J.V. Fesko

Dr. John Fesko was one of my professors when I was at WSCAL. He is a learned professor deep into historical sources and Reformed doctrine. He has however wrote a book on apologetics last year entitled Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith, which stirred up some controversy due to its attack specifically on Cornelius Van Til and Vantillian presuppositionalism. Due to the subject nature, I decided to check it out when I can. I have finally read it and wrote a review of it, here. An excerpt:

With the resurgence of interest in Aristotelianism within the Reformed community, it should not come as a surprise that the topic of apologetics would come under the spotlight for ressourcement. Presuppositionalism after all is a novel system that began in the 20th century with Cornelius Van Til and/or Gordon H. Clark, whereas classical apologetics was the system utilized in the Medieval, Reformation, and Post-Reformation era.

In this light, Dr. John Fesko has taken on the task of “reforming” apologetics. According to Fesko, the 20th century turn to presuppositionalism is flawed and contrary to the Reformed tradition. While not necessarily against all aspects of presuppositionalism, stating for example his position that the TAG (Transcendental Argument for God) “can be a useful argument” (p. 137), Fesko rejects presuppositionalism as a whole.

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As a Clarkian presuppositionalist, I reject this approach to apologetics. And while I do respect Dr. Fesko's scholarship, on this issue I'm afraid he is way out of his depth.

On the use of words circumscribing sin, and the perception of insults and derogation

Lift up your eyes to the bare heights, and see!
Where have you not been ravished?
By the waysides you have sat awaiting lovers
like an Arab in the wilderness.
You have polluted the land
with your vile whoredom.
Therefore the showers have been withheld,
and the spring rain has not come;
yet you have the forehead of a whore;
you refuse to be ashamed. (Jer. 3:2-3 ESV)

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"Whore" is a biblical term. When used as a accurate description, it is not offensive. I do not believe in demeaning, ridiculing or mocking women

— puritanreformed (@puritanreformed) July 1, 2020

If you use some versions, it says 'whoredom'. That word is not and does not mean whore. They share the same root word, but even the def show diff. 'whoredom' says its outdated while 'whore' is derogatory. Words that share the same root are not the same: take cyclopes vs cyclones

— Marianne (@The_Dark_Elf) July 8, 2020

In a Twitter exchange between Marianne (@The_Dark_Elf) and me, she astonishing paints herself in a corner in an attempt to make the word "whore" a reprehensible insult. My position was, and always is, that it is not right to demen, ridicule or mock women, but facts are facts. Calling a prostitute a whore is not an insult. Calling a loose woman a "slut" is not an insult either. Yes, IF one uses these terms to insult the person, then it becomes an insult. But just because a word can become an insult does not necessarily make it an insult. In the thread, I also pointed out how the postmodern Western culture is against terms like "sodomy," "immorality (except when applied to right-wing 'sins' especially 'Capitalism')," "adultery," "fornication" and other such words. Are these words to be blacklisted just because others see them as 'insults'? Who exactly determines what word is to be an insult and what not?

To press home the fact that "whore" is not an insult, I had directed Marianne to Jeremiah 3:2-3, where God inspired the words (in Hebrew) where God accused Israel "you have the forehead of a whore." Marianne finally admitted that "some versions" use the word "whoredom," and then asserted that "whoredom" does not mean "whore," and that the two are as different as "cyclopes" and "cyclones." I do not know whether to laugh or to cry at this tweet. "Whoredom" is merely the substantival adjectival form of the verb "to whore," describing the state of a person whoring around. I am not brought up with Shakespearean English either, so this is not an archaic term at all. So why the weaseling around the fact that "whore" is a perfectly proper English term?

The problem here is that too many especially in the West have a different value system in place rather than the value system of the Bible, where certain terms are, subconsciously or consciously, termed "out of bounds" and thus not to be utilized. This is not necessarily speaking of Marianne, but it is fascinating to me how many people are offended when you used words as Scripture uses it. In a private FB post, I had stated the fact that Scripture treats LGBTQ as abominations, and it was fascinating how even a pastor can be offended by it. It is truly weird time indeed, when proper English words are taken to be "out of bounds" even though they are not archaic, just because these people have imbibed on the culture's value system instead of the biblical value system.

Aimee Byrd, Deepfakes, and the importance of integrity

Aimee Byrd has recently kicked up a storm with her assault upon Genevan Commons, a private Facebook group. In her post, she linked to a "discernment" website which doxxed members of the group as well as posted doctored and deepfaked images of screenshots from the group, insinuating that the people there are ungodly slanderers and misogynists. This came after her forced departure from the Alliances of Confessing Evangelicals (ACE). In light of those images, it seems that the pastors and elders and all commentors on Genevan Commons are to be sharply rebuked and censured for their conduct, for after all, there is no excuse for such sinful behavior despite the fact that Byrd is in error in her egalitarianism.

The case agaisnt Genevan Commons however starts to unravel when one begins to peer beneath the surface, and noticing the way the comments are rearranged in order to mislead, as Seven Wedgeworth (whom I have criticized over his view of justification and therefore cannot be said to be a friend or ally of mine) had pointed out. Another commentor has joined in to show how the images had misrepresented his commment which was not directed at Byrd at all. Whatever one thinks of the wisdom of using the term "whore," the fact remains that "whore" is a perfectly proper term in the English language to refer to a prostitute, and pornographer Stormy Daniel deserves that label. Now, in order for sin to be sin, it must be truly a sin. In other words, if the comments in their proper context are not sinful, then the images, having misrepresented the comments, are guilty of violating the ninth commandment. Thus, the creator of those images and those who share them, including Byrd, are guilty of violating the ninth commandment. But instead, we see Byrd doubling down and refusing to aknowledge her sin. The question is very simple: Were those images misrepresentations of the comments? Yes or no? If yes, then they violate the ninth commandment. If no, then the onus is on the one asserting that it is not a misrepresentation to prove that the images are indeed a prroper representation of the comments. Instead, what we see from Byrd is a hysterical vent about how "tired" she is, portraying herself as a victim, while totally ignoring the substance of Wedgeworth's post.

None of this exonerates the ungodly conduct of some commentors. Those who do so ought to repent. However, if we are to be people of truth, then we must stick to the truth. Slandering Byrd is sin, but so is slandering her critics. Just because Byrd was sinned against does not in any way give her the right to sin against others as well.

The key question therefore, for Byrd and her defenders, are these:

1. Do you agree that the images misrepresented some of the comments, and specifically Steven Wedgeworth and Paul Barth? Yes or no?

2. If yes, do you repent of bearing false witness against them?

3. If no, please disprove Wedgeworth's and Barth's assertion. Saying you are "tired" and playing the victim card gets no brownie points from me. Answer the question, and show you are interested in actually engaging the issue, instead of playing the victim card.

MacArthur on riots and BLM

News: Aimee Byrd kicked out of ACE

In an interesting development, soocial egalitarian Aimee Byrd has been removed from contributing to the Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals, which occasioned her current "update" about the event on Scott McKnight's blog on Christianity Today.

There are three things that I want to comment here. First, Byrd states that she does not know who the Board of Directors of ACE are, presumably except for the chair since she was contacted by him. She has also mentioned the unnamed people who have contributed to the questions posed to her by Jonathan Master. I will just add that I do not like this practice of seeming anonymity in the Reformed world. I do not understand the reason for anonymity especially for ordained ministers, so perhaps someone would want to enlighten me why this is the case. I do believe the best way to deal with disagreement is to be frank and honest about it. What is the point of anonymmity and getting someone to be the spokesman for a group of people in the church?

The second issue I want to comment is Byrd's conduct concerning the questions put forward by Jonathan Master. According to Byrd, in response to the question, she answered one of them, and decided "afer seeking counsel" to decline answering the rest of them. Now, I do not know which universe Byrd resides in, but I think that when someone has questions concerning your orthodoxy, you should try to assauge their concerns and answer their questions properly. Instead, Byrd's conduct in this mattter has been the same as to her conduct with CMBW, which is mere obfuscation of the issues. In the supposed response to one of the questions, her response is one of non-response. The questions was one of natural law, yet Byrd's reponse is to to talk about ontology, but the two are not the same thing. It is possible that Byrd does not understand the question, but if that is the case, then she has no business writing a book on the topic of biblical manhoood and womanhood, in the same way no one is interested in whether a five-year old agrees with Einstein's theory(ies) of relativity.

Lastly, I want to comment on Byrd's insistence that she and what she has written is "in line with the confessions in which my Orthodox Presbyterian Church subscribes." As someone who was in the OPC as a licentiate during the time I was in the US, merely stating that she is "in line with the confessions" is not sufficient. She may think she is in line with the Reformed confessions, but she may be wrong and self-deceived. It is not enough for her to assert that she is "in line with the confessions" of the OPC. Since she has written a book on the topic, anyone can test what she has written to what the Reformed Confessions, and what the Word of God, actually says about the topic.

This assertion by Byrd that she is in line with the OPC's Confessions is troubling. Most people do not assert that they are in line with their church's confession as an argument in favor of their position, but if they say so, they prove that their views are in fact in line with their church's confessions. From Byrd however, there is much talk about her being in line with the OPC's confessions and about her being in good standing in her church, and little proof about how what she says is actually biblical and Reformed. To be honest, this is my first time seeing someone make an argument about the validity of their position from their standing in the church, as if the latter has any bearing on the former at all!

What Byrd should have received from Reformed pastors is empathy, compassion, correction, and teaching. Instead, she has been propped up in her ignorance by men who should have known better: men like Carl Trueman, Todd Pruitt, and R Scott Clark. The current situation with Byrd is a disaster, and this infection of egalitarianism will weaken the Reformed churches.

The Reformed understanding of the Trinity circa 2008

The Christian Research and Apologetics Ministry (CARM) run by Matt Slick, it seems to me, reflected the mainstream Reformed view in the 1990s and early 2000s concerning where Reformed theology was in relation to apologetics. Just a decade ago or so, a period which seems like a long time already after the sea change that has occurred from then to 2020, Reformed apologetics was all about engaging the secular world with the truths of the Reformed faith, and the most prominent ministry then was Ligonier Ministries headed by the late R. C. Sproul.

It seems prudent then to enquire into what was taken to be the standard Reformed views at that time concerning certain subjects, especially those that are controversial in this time. At CARM, Matt Slick had in 2008 published an article concerning the Ontological and Economic Trinity, and some excerpts are noted below:

Since we see different roles within the Trinity, does this signify a subordination among the three persons? The clear answer seems to be yes. But remember, affirming this is not the same as advocating the heresy of subordinationism. We can say that there is a subordination of the Son to the Father in role (as a father-son relationship would naturally have), but we also say that subordinationism (difference in nature) is wrong.

But, as is said above, if there is no difference in roles among them, there can be no distinction between them. It is only by recognizing and accepting the difference of roles that we can acknowledge the Trinity at all.

By definition, each person of the Trinity must have his own will; otherwise, they are not persons.

Now, read this article in light of the 2016 ESS fiasco, and ask yourself: Who has changed their position, and why? The answer is not hard to figure out: It is the 2016-2020 Reformed pastors and theologians like Liam Gollligher who have changed their position, and the reason why they have shifted their position is due to an embrace of Thomas Aquinas and Thomistic/ Aristotelian philosophy of being. Without Thomas or Aristotle (or the mediation of people like Dolezal), none of this would have happened.

Who has changed their understanding of the Trinity? It is the new "classical theists" who have shifted in their doctrinal understanding of the Trinity, not the rest of us. We want no part in this so-called "Ressourcement" of classical sources if it brings us into bondage to Aristotelianism.

New book: Faith Seeking Understanding - The Culmination of the CREDO500 saga

In 2009, Jonah Tang, at that time a pastor in Sibu, Malaysia, roped me in to help out with his ambitious plan to conduct the CREDO500 conference, an online conference where essays were submitted by various pastors and theologians from Chinese churches or related to the Chinese churches in the diaspora around the world. I did not realize at that time how big the conference would be and the amount of work required to make it work, having no prior experience in managing such an event. Thankfully, the essays were submitted and edited more or less on schedule, and the conference was largely successful. Subsequently, the essays were left online, and we went our separate ways.

It was always our desire to have these essays in print one day, and the original was to have two versions, an English version and a Chinese version. Unfortuantely, the reality is that, once the conference is over, nobody wants to be working on the hard and laborious work of translation and editing, with no compensation for the enormous task at hand. I myself have my own life to live, and so the process dragged on for years and years.

One of my virutues, you can say, is tenacity. I do not like to leave an unfinished project unfinished. It took time, but finally, 11 years later, all of the translation (from Chinese to English - the conference was bilingual so some of the essays were presented only in Chinese) is done, and so is the editing, reference checking, and formatting. From there, the process of publication was even more work, but finally the work is complete.

The work has been split into 2 volumes due to the sheer amount of material. Since there are no plans at the moment for a separate Chinese translation of the English essays and a separate Chinese publication, I have decided to add the original Chinese in the book as well.

Daniel H. Chew and Jonah Tang, eds., Faith Seeking Understanding - Volume 1: The Legacy of the Reformed Tradition - Proceedings from the 2009 CREDO500 conference (San Jacinta, CA: Daniel H Chew, 2020) - HERE

Daniel H. Chew and Jonah Tang, eds., Faith Seeking Understanding - Volume 2: The Reformation and John Calvin - Proceedings from the 2009 CREDO500 conference (San Jacinta, CA: Daniel H Chew, 2020) - HERE

Since this is a conference work, I have no desire to profit off it so I have priced it cheaply. On the other hand, something that is free is trivialized, so this Kindle book is not free.

Please do get a copy of the two volumes, for there are some very good essays within it. There is a breadth of views on some interesting topics within a broadly Reformed camp, so please do get your copies now.

Trump: Religious services are essential

US President Donald Trump is not a very righteous man. However, in this COVID-19 crisis, he has done a great thing in one of his most recent speeches, where he declared churches essential:

Churches are essential because God is essential. It is way past time for the secularist totalitarians to stop imposing their irreligion upon the rest of us who disagree with their privitization of religion. And shame on those so-called evangelicals who have no issue with and are happy to tolerate the secular privitization of religion.

CBMW book review: Aimee Byrd's "Recovering from Biblical Manhood and Womanhood"

Over at the CBMW (Council of Biblical Manhood and Womanhood) website, Andrew David Naselli has written a review of Aimee Byrd's new book Recovering from Biblical Manhood and Womanhood. An excerpt:

John Piper and Wayne Grudem edited Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood in 1991, and now Aimee Byrd has written Recovering from Biblical Manhood and Womanhood some thirty years later. Byrd, an influential author, speaker, blogger, and podcaster, claims to be recovering from so-called “biblical manhood and womanhood.” For the past several years on her podcast and blog, Byrd has been criticizing the version of complementarianism that leaders such as John Piper teach. (The term complementarianism summarizes the theological view of the Danvers Statement and conveys that men and women are both equal in value and dignity and beneficially different.) Byrd has developed and expanded those critiques in her latest book.

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Whatever one thinks of the topic of complementarianism, the main thing to take note is that one should properly represent one's opponent(s). And that is one virtue of which Byrd shows a shocking lack. From the review, it seems that Byrd misrepresents her opponents regularly, which is not surprising seeing how impervious to correction she is online. Misrepresentation, especially willful misrepresentation, is a violation of God's law, specifically the ninth commandment.

As it pertains to the ESS controversy of 2016, this is what Naselli wrote, after saying that he disagrees with ESS:

1. Byrd misrepresents the eternal relations of authority and submission view when she writes, “This doctrine teaches that the Son, the second person of the Trinity, is subordinate to the Father, not only in the economy of salvation but in his essence” (101). Grudem and Ware and others who hold to eternal relations of authority and submission would not affirm that statement; they would explicitly reject it.

2. Byrd misrepresents the motives of those who teach this view when she asserts that they employ “an unorthodox teaching of the Trinity, the eternal subordination of the Son (ESS), in order to promote subordination of women to men” (100). But the motive for such a teaching is to elevate women and dignify the submission that God calls them to. The motive for such a teaching is to attempt to explain and apply passages about authority and submission such as 1 Corinthians 11:3: “I want you to understand that the head of every man is Christ, the head of a wife is her husband, and the head of Christ is God.”

3. Byrd implies that theologians such as Grudem and Ware are heretics and thus not genuine Christians. She argues that such theologians hold unorthodox teachings “on a first-order doctrine,” (121) and that they are “unorthodox teachers that are not in line with Nicene Trinitarian doctrine” (173). But the eternal relations of authority and submission position that Grudem and Ware defend is not heresy.

4. Byrd repeatedly writes (especially in ch. 4—pp. 99–132) as if the eternal relations of authority and submission position that Grudem and Ware defend is essential to complementarianism. I understand why some might assume it is essential since Grudem is a leading proponent of complementarianism. But some complementarians intensely criticized Grudem and Ware on this matter, and most complementarians realize that Grudem and Ware made some theological missteps—even Grudem and Ware acknowledge that! More importantly, complementarianism does not stand or fall regarding whether the eternal relations of authority and submission view is true. That view is not part of the Danvers Statement, which states what all complementarians affirm. Complementarianism is not intrinsically tied to that particular view of the Trinity.

While I myself do not agree with Grudem and Ware's formulation of ESS, it is truly astonishing to see all the misrepresentation on this issue. The fact is this: ESS (of any form) does not postulate submission or subordination of any person of the Godhead in the essence of the Godhead. Whoever says otherwise is lying and has to repent.

Now that Byrd's views are stated in black and white, there is a public record of what she has to say about the issue, and anyone is free to read it and see whether she has truly proven her case. For those on her side however, it is unlikely that they will actually interact with Naselli's review in a fair manner. After all, if they have continually misrepresented ESS for years, why would they suddenly swallow their egos and confess their sin and error in this matter?

The nature of the bond in 1 Corinthians 7:15

Being “under bondage” is not the same as being bound. If it is, all married Christians are “under bondage”, for all are bound to their mate. This is not a happy view of marriage, to say nothing of the Christian view of marriage: “I am in bondage to my wife or husband”.

The deserted wife is not under bondage in the case of desertion. She is still bound to the deserter. The apostle will say so in verse 39 of 1 Corinthians 7: “The wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth, but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will…”

That “under bondage” refers to a guilty conscience is further proved by the apostle’s statement of its opposite: “but God hath called us to peace”. The opposite of being under bondage is peace. It is an important principle of the interpretation of the Bible that one can determine the meaning of a word or concept by its opposite in the passage. For example, in Romans 8:33, 34 the meaning of “justifieth” in verse 33 as a judicial act of God is established from its opposite in verse 34, “condemneth”. As “condemns” is a legal act of the judge, so is its opposite, “justifies”, in verse 33. In 1 Corinthians 7:15, the opposite of “under bondage” is “peace”. This proves that by “under bondage” the apostle is describing the state of one’s conscience, not a liberty to be remarried. (David Engelsma, "A Critique of Divorce and Remarriage in the Westminster Confession of Faith (2)," Salt Shakers 59 (Apr 2020): 8-9)

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To the rest I say (I, not the Lord) that if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her. If any woman has a husband who is an unbeliever, and he consents to live with her, she should not divorce him. For the unbelieving husband is made holy because of his wife, and the unbelieving wife is made holy because of her husband. Otherwise your children would be unclean, but as it is, they are holy. But if the unbelieving partner separates, let it be so. In such cases the brother or sister is not enslaved. God has called you to peace. For how do you know, wife, whether you will save your husband? Or how do you know, husband, whether you will save your wife? (1 Cor. 7:12-16)

Does the passage of 1 Corinthians 7 allow for a true divorce in the event of a breakdown in a marriage? Within the hardline fringe Dutch Reformed wing, the answer is no. According to David Engelsma and the PRCA (Protestant Reformed Churches of America), once two people are married to one another, the marriage bond cannot be broken unless one of the spouses die. In the event of adultery or any manner of serious sin, a formal divorce can be filed, but the two parties are still considered married to one another, in the sense that the bond between the estranged husband and wife continue to exist. The two divorcees still possess a bond of marriage between them, despite the fact that they are legitimately and biblically divorced. Obviously, this means that there can never be a true divorce between the couple at all, for the bond was never broken.

To support his case, Engelsma argued that the term "under bondage" is not the same thing as "being bound." He further argued that "under bondage" cannot be said of the marriage bond because it is "not a happy view of marriage." However, since the original text is in Greek, to appeal to the "weirdness" of the English text is, to put it nicely, unacceptable. Regardless, the way to interpret the text is in context, and it is the passage of 1 Corinthians 7:12-16 that is placed above in order for us to understand what the text is actually saying.

The first thing to take note here is the situation facing the couple is the threat of divorce in a marriage where one party is a believer and the other is an unbeliever. That divorce is in the air is seen in verse 12 whereby Paul counsels the believing spouse not to initiate divorce against the unbelieving spouse. Paul however knows that the unbelieving spouse might be adamant in wanting to divorce the believing spouse. Therefore, he counsels that "if the unbelieving spouse separates, let it be so" (verse 15). The flow of thought should immediately make it apparent that this "separation" is a divorce, since Paul was counseling against divorce just 4 verses back.

A good way to visualize what is going on is to replicate the situation mentally. Let's have a couple Adam and Susan. Susan has just recently came to faith and Adam is upset over that. Paul would counsel Susan not to initiate divorce against her husband. However, Adam insists on divorce and thus he wants to "separate." Now, if Susan was counseled not to divorce, then surely she wants to preserve the marriage, and would attempt to stop Adam from filing for divorce. Tensions would surely erupt if one party wants a divorce, and the other does not want divorce. The marital bond has become like slavery bonding Adam against his will. This then is the context in which Paul's further counsel to the believing spouses like Susan would apply. In such a scenario, the believing spouse is not bound or enslaved to the marriage relationship — to preserve it at all costs. Rather, let the unbelieving spouse go through with divorce, says Paul. Instead of tension and dissension in the household, God has called the believer to peace. In a sense, Paul's counsel to Susan would be: "I have told you not to divorce Adam. But if he is so adamant in wanting a divorce, let it be. Do not continue to fight him over this and put numerous obstacles in an attempt to forestall divorce. Rather, God has called you to peace instead of conflict with Adam who is insistent on getting a divorce."

Having exegeted the text in context, compare this with Engelsma's handling of the text of Scripture. Engelsma asserted that the "under bondage" here must be about the believer's conscience since the opposite of "peace" must be turmoil in the soul. The problem is that that is not the only thing that can be the opposite of peace. Interpersonal conflict and tensions within the home, if not open conflict between husband and wife, is also the opposite of peace. Upon what basis should we understand Paul to refer to the individual's conscience? Engelsma does not say why that is the case, but instead just asserted his position to be true. However, a plain reading of the passage of 1 Corinthians 7:12-16 should make it evident that the context here is social and familial, not individual. As I have shown, when understood in the context of how Paul's advice interacts with an understanding of interpersonal dynamics, one comes away from the passage with an understanding that is far from Engelsma's interpretation of the text.

The key point of 1 Corinthians 7:15 for the purpose of the divorce and remarriage issue is not that 1 Corinthians 7:15 teaches remarriage after divorce, but rather that 1 Corinthians 7:15 teaches that the marital bond is indeed broken in a divorce. Being in a marriage is to be bonded to each other, and that bond can feel like slavery when it is preserved against the will of one of the spouses. Therefore, when a divorce happens, this bond is indeed broken. And if the bond is broken, then one cannot claim that the bond between husband and wife continues to exist after divorce, for that is a contradiction.

In conclusion, on this issue of divorce and remarriage, Engelsma is mistaken in his interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:15, and the Westminster stance on this issue is exonerated. While divorce is a serious sin, we do live in a fallen world where human covenants are breakable. Let us not impose doctrine on biblical texts, but rather derive doctrine from biblical texts, and as we do so, have compassion over the brokenness of the world instead of imposing even more burdens on divorcees.

Book review: Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science

With the reflections done on various passages in the book, I have compiled and rewrote some of the reflections and joined them together in a review of the book. Here is my review of Edward Feser's book Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science. An excerpt:

How should we understand the world and how it works? What is the nature of reality itself? In the modern era, the natural sciences are taken to be the study of reality. The success of the natural sciences is due to the correspondence their theories have to how reality seems to function, and the ability to apply the knowledge gained from the natural sciences for the betterment of humanity. While the natural sciences are always developing, their explanatory power and technological advancement has gained our trust that they do in fact teach us what reality is and how reality functions.

The philosopher Edward Feser however demurs from this depiction of reality. Rather, he asserts that Aristotelian philosophy is properly basic and that the operation of science presupposes Aristotelian categories and terms. ... [more]

On color (again)

The starting point of the argument is the observation that the appearance of qualities like color varies from observer to observer. The same object will look bright red or dull red depending on the lighting; a color blind person might not be able to tell it apart from a green object; another person’s color experiences could in theory be inverted relative to my own; and so on. The best explanation of these facts, the argument concludes, is that color is not really there in the objects themselves but only in the mind of the observer.

But there are several problems with this argument, which Putnam (1999, pp. 38-41) has usefully summarized (where Putnam is reiterating points that go back to writers like J.L. Austin (1962) and P.F. Strawson (1979)). First, the argument rests on a simplistic characterization of the commonsense understanding of color. Common sense allows that the same color can look different under different circumstances, just as it allows that a round object can appear oval under certain circumstances. Hence the commonsense thesis that color is mind-independent is not undermined by the fact that an object will look bright red in some contexts and dull red in others. Furthermore, color blindness no more casts down on the supposition that color is mind-independent than hallucination casts doubt on the reality of physical objects. In both cases, the defender of common sense can note that a perceiver’s faculties are simply malfunctioning, and thus not presenting objective reality as it really is. Meanwhile the inverted spectrum scenario presupposes that the physical facts about both external objects and the brain could be exactly as they are while the way colors look is different. It presupposes, in other words, that color can float entirely free of the way things really are in the material world. But that is exactly what the commonsense view denies, so that to appeal in this context to the alleged possibility of color inversion is to beg the question. (Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge, pp. 342-3)

The problem with Edward Feser here is privileging yellowish light from the Sun over all other lights. What happens if Earth orbits a blue giant start, or a red dwarf star?

Hence the reductionist would say that in a world without conscious observers, apples, oranges, and the like would not have color understood in the irreducibly qualitative commonsense way. This is so even though these objects would in that case still have the same surface reflectance properties they have in the actual world. But then, the reductionist himself is committed to the thesis that color, in the commonsense qualitative sense, is distinct from any physical property. Moreover, he is committed to the thesis that physical properties are neither necessary nor sufficient for color in that irreducibly qualitative sense – since, again, color in that sense would not exist in the absence of observers, even though the relevant physical properties would. (p. 346)

From a scientific viewpoint, color exists in the absence of observers.

Ontology: Things inside "virtually"

By contrast, the hydrogen and oxygen in water are virtual or potential rather than actual. … That it is in the water only virtually or potentially rather than actually is the reason you cannot burn the hydrogen in water, which you could do with actual hydrogen. (Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge, p. 313)

In general, the particles of which any true physical substance is composed exist within it virtually or potentially rather than actually. For example, if a stone is a true substance, then while the innumerable atoms that make it up are real, they exist within it virtually or potentially rather than actually. What actually exists is just the one thing, the stone itself. (pp. 313-314)

This echoes the Aristotelian position that parts exist in a substance virtually or potentially rather than actually. (p. 317)

Indeed, there is a sense in which these ordinary objects are more fundamental than the particles that make them up, insofar as the particles exist in them only virtually, only relative to the wholes of which they are parts. (p. 330)

Using an electron microscope, we can see individual atoms. It should be evident therefore that the idea that atoms of molecules like water, or even the various atoms in stone, are only there "virtually" and not actually, is nonsense.

Time, time dilation, and the Aristotelian view of time

In particular, that spacetime appears curved could be interpreted as evidence that it really is curved, but it could also be interpreted instead as evidence that some force is affecting our measuring devices (Kosso 1998, pp. 102-3; Rickles 2016, pp. 83-90; Sklar 1992, pp. 53-69). (Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge, p. 305)

When one has an a priori system, it can be really astonishing where one can end up. In this particular instance, it is astonishing that Edward Feser thinks it is a plausible interpretation of the special theory of relativity that time dilation does not exist. Rather, in Feser's interpretation, the measurement of time is dilated, but time itself is perfectly fine. Given how everything in the material world including the human body runs on physical and chemical and biological processes that proceed in time, what Feser is advocating for here is a split between the clock and processes in time. But since the clock keeps time through mechanical or other processes (e.g. computer chip), how is that supposed to work out?

Feser's proposed interpretation is therefore unscientific. It fails to notice how the human body itself depends on the flow of time to function. The moving of muscles, the transmission of nerve signals — all of these depend on physiological processes that are similar to how clocks keep time. It is simply inconceivable that something that affects "our measuring devices" will not affect us also. If something affects "our measuring devices," then it will affect our perception and engagement with time as well. Electrical impulses will travel slower if time is slowed and so on, and one does not have to be a materialist to hold that to be true.

It is hoped that philosophers actually understand science if they want to propose interpretations of that science. Otherwise, they will appear foolish, as Feser does in this statement of his.

On the "spatialization" of time - Definition of time, as spatial dimension?

This suggest a further argument against any attempt to spatialize time, which is that it can never be completely carried through. Again, time is the measure of change within space. If we think if space as three-dimensional, then time is the measure of change within three-dimensional space, but if instead we say that what common sense conceive of as time is “really” just a fourth spatial dimension, then what this implies – again, for all the defender of the spatialization of time has shown – is that time ought really to be thought of as the measure of change within four-dimensional space. If the defender of the spatialization of time now claims that time so understood is really just a fifth spatial dimension, then the response will be that in that case time turns out to be the measure of change in five-dimensional space. And so on ad-infinitum. (Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge, p. 290)

According to Aristotelianism it seems, time is defined as the "measure of change within space." Using this definition, Edward Feser argued that time cannot be taken as another dimension like space. However, is that truly an acceptable definition of time?

This definition of time implies that change must happen when time progresses. In other words, if there is an instance in which change does not occur, then time cannot be said to have occurred. This is problematic on many levels. First of all, there are many examples in which change does not occur even though it cannot be said that time has not passed. Hydrogen atoms in the inter-galatic medium are perhaps the best example of something that will not be undergoing any changes for the next few hundred years (unless Christ comes again, but that is a different thing altogether). Most atoms will not undergo any form of nuclear reaction so they would be considered "timeless" as well according to this definition. Bacteria locked in ice are also "timeless" during their "time" frozen in ice, as they do not change. All such examples should be sufficient to show that time can pass without any change happening. Therefore, the Aristotelian definition of time is falsified.

Feser is also in error in understanding what "spatialization" of time in the context of modern science actually mean. It does not mean time becomes another spatial dimension (although some may give that impression). It just means that time is analogous to space in the sense of its quantifiability and ability to be manipulated (time dilation and gravitational dilation). It does not mean that time is a spatial dimension in an eternalist 4-dimensional block that we (3-dimensional beings) perceive as time. Rather, time is qualitatively different from space. It is theoretically possible that we might discover infinite dimensions of space, yet time is still the (א +1 ) dimension, a separate dimension from all other spatial dimensions.

As such, it seems that there is no reason why time cannot be seen to be analogous to space. While we currently know of only one temporal dimension, there is theoretically no reason why there cannot be more than one temporal dimension either. Feser's and the Neo-Aristotelian argument on the nature of time is flawed and based upon an errant understanding of the world, and thus should be rejected, whether it is seen in philosophy, or in theology (Classical theism).