The Council at Chalcedon (451) and the Court of Final Appeal

[The Canons of Chalcedon on the Church of Constantinople (Canons 9, 17 and 28); Text, with commentary]
9. If any cleric has a suit against another cleric, let him not leave his own bishop, nor have recourse to the secular courts of justice, but let him first try the question before his own bishop, or, with the consent of the bishop himself, before these persons whom both parties shall choose to have the hearing of the cause. And if any person shall act contrary to these decrees, let him undergo the canonical punishments.

But if a cleric has any matter either against his own or any other bishop, let him be judged by the synod of the province. But if any bishop or cleric has a controversy against the metropolitan of the same province, let him have recourse to the exarch of the dioceses, or to the Throne of the imperial city of Constantinople, and plead his cause before him. [J. Stevenson, ed., Creeds, Councils and Controversies: Documents illustrating the History of the Church, AD 337 – 461 (rev. W.H.C. Frend; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1966, 2012), 415]

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[Leo, Ep. CV. 2-3, to the Empress Pulcheria]
But bishops’ assents, which are opposed to the regulations of the holy canons at Nicaea in conjunction with your faithful Piety, we do not recognize, and by the blessed Apostle Peter’s authority we absolutely disannul in comprehensive terms, in all ecclesiastical cases obeying those las which the Holy Ghost set forth by the 318 bishops for the pacific observance of all bishops in such a way that ever if a much greater number were to pass a different decree to theirs, whatever was opposed to their regulations must be held in no respect. (p. 422)

In the history of the Church, a major point to be made is that the pope played only a minor role in the earlier ecumenical councils (Nicea 325AD, Constantinople 381AD, Ephesus 431AD). At Chalcedon in 451AD, Pope Leeo I played an important role through his tome, yet he was not present at the council and, as we can see, he did not have as much authority as what papalism demands.

As it can be seen from the Canons promulgated at Chalcedon, the bishops there worked hard to deal with the Nestorian and the Eutychian errors, and also drafted a bunch of canonical rulings. Canon 9 is interesting because it duplicated imperial procedure in deferring authority to the most important city of the Empire, which at that time was the new capital Constantinople. That such a ruling was drafted showed us that papal authority was not considered ultimate at that time, but merely one of respect and deference. Pope Leo I of course protested against this ruling, but as we know from subsequent church history, his protests did not register for the churches in the Eastern part of the empire.

The beginnings of monasticism

Where did Christian monks come from? There were certainly no monks or nuns in the Bible, yet, for we know that monasticism infests the lands in the time of Martin Luther. Most certainly, monasticism is a departure from biblical Christianity, yet how did it emerge in the first place?

In his book on the history of monasticism, John Binns details the emergence and development of monasticism [John Binns, The T&T Clark History of Monasticism: The Eastern Tradition (New York, NY: T&T Clark, 2020)]. As someone sympathetic to the Eastern tradition, Binns holds that monasticism is nothing more than Paul's supposed ascetism taken to heart, but more on that at another time. Formally however, monasticism begins with the first monk, Anthony of Egypt, the father of eremetic or solitary monasticism, around 304 AD. Pachomus began the first coenobitic or communal form of monasticism aound 320 AD. From then on, monasticism spreads rapidly through Christendom, becoming a feature of both Eastern and Western Christianity.

The beginnings of monasticism come about due to a few factors. A major factor is the fermenting of pagan views of ascetism through the views of condemned heretics like Origen and Evagrius, something which Binns could not deny, although he separated their heretical "metaphysical speculation" from their "ascetical teaching." (p. 182). Another factor is the elevation of marytrdom and martys to a holy status in the early church (the "cult of the martyrs"). Those who attain to this yet are denied actual marytrdom can aspire for the "white martyrdom" (p. 36) that symbolizes a removal from the world. A third factor is the zeal for holiness, which became difficult when more and more people became Christians. When Christianity became normal, those who seek purity ran to the desert to live out their separate lives, a choice easier to make after Constantine legalized Christianity in the Roman Empire resulting in an influx of nominal Christians into the Church.

As it can be seen, two of the main factors of the beginnings of monasticism come from a desire for good things. There is nothing wrong with honoring and respecting those who pay the ultimate price for their faith in Jesus Christ. There is likewise nothing wrong with a desire for holiness, and the influx of worldliness into the church should trouble Christians. But is the solution a withdrawal from the world, as monasticism would do, in a personal pursuit of one's subjective holiness? The answer of the Reformation was a resounding no. We are called to be in the world, but not of the world, as it is written:

I do not ask that you take them out of the world, but that you keep them from the evil one. They are not of the world, just as I am not of the world. (Jn. 17:15-6)

Marytrdom is a gift, and so is continence, but none of these things are things one can dictate to God. The problem with monasticism from its inception is its vain attempt to control what gifts God should give to His people. One desire matyrdom, so one seeks after the "white" variety when the "red"' version (real martyrdom) is not given. One thinks ascetism brings one closer to God, so one becomes a monk, usurping God's prerogative over who should be married and who is to be celibate. In the end, instead of submitting to God, one attempts to climb Jacob's ladder to reach God, never understanding that God is the only one who can reach us, never we him.

John Damascene on energies

For activity is the natural power and movement of each essence. (St John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 147)

ἐνέργεια γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φυσικὴ ἑκάστης οὐσίας δύναμίς τε καὶ κίνησις (pp. 147-8)

And again: Natural activity is the innate movement of every essence. It is therefore clear that those things that have the same essence have the same activity, and those things that have different natures also have different activity. For it impossible for an essence to be without a natural activity. (p. 148)

Natural activity, again, is the power that makes each essence manifest. And again: Natural and primary activity is the ever-moving power of the intellectual soul, that is to say, its every-moving reason flowing out naturally from it. Natural activity is the power and movement of each essence; only non-being is without it. (p. 148)

One should know that the second way embraces both potentiality and actuality, for on the one hand, the latter is in potentiality, on the other, the former is in actuality. (p. 148)

Χρὴ οὖν γινώσκειν, ὁτι ὁ δεύτερος τρόπος κοινός ἐστι τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, δεύτερος μὲν τοῦ δυνάμει, πρῶτος δὲ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ (p. 148)

Far from the static view of the classical God, the Eastern tradition has preserved a more dynamic view of God through its preservation of the difference between "essence," "energies," and "acts." In John of Damascus' work, all essences must have energies, and part of these energies includes the actions being do. However, the main focus of "energies" is to manifest the essence, not the actions themselves. Actions are part of the energies, but are not all of the energies. That is why actions are discussed later, after discussions of the "natural and primary activity" of the intellectual soul. We note here that discussions of "actuality" and "potentiality," where the same term is used for "actualities," should be taken to mean that "actualities" is a subset of "energies," rather than the two being the same.

God is thus not the "unmoved Mover," but rather He constantly "moves" yet never changes. The Father loves the Son, yet neither change despite the dynamism of the relationship. God has His own movement, and it is we who are blessed because of it.

John Damascene's view on the will

One needs to know that here is a faculty naturally implanted in the soul that is appetitive of what is in accordance with nature and embraces everything that is essentially characteristic of nature. This is called the capacity for willing (θέλησις, thelēsis). For the essence of being and living and moving, both mentally and sensibly, has an appetency directed towards its own natural and full realization. For that reason, this natural will (θέλημα, thelēma) is also defined as follows: Will is a rational and vital appetency that depends solely on what belongs to nature. (St John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 144)

Θέλημά ἐστιν ὄρεξις λογική τε καὶ ζωτικὴ μόνων ἠρτημένη τῶν φυσικῶν (Ibid., 143)

Actual willing or wishing (βούλησις, boulēsis) is a natural capacity for willing of a particular kind, that is to say, a natural and rational appetency in relation to some specific thing. For there lies within the human soul a faculty of reaching out in a rational manner. Therefore when this rational appetency in relation to some specific thing is set in motion in a natural manner, it is called wishing. For wishing is an appetency and yearning for some rational specific thing. (p. 144)

One needs to know that the capacity for willing (θέλησις, thelēsis) is one thing and actual willing (βούλησις, boulēsis) is another, and that what is willed (τὸ θελητόν, to thelēton) is one thing, the faculty of volition (τὸ θελητικόν, to thelētikon) is another, and the agent of willing (ὁ θέλων, ho thelōn) is another. For the capacity for willing is the simple power itself of willing. Actual willing is the direction of the capacity of willing towards something. What is willed is the matter that is subject to the will, namely, that which we will. (For example, appetency is oriented towards food. Appetency on its own is a rational capacity for willing but when appetency is directed towards food it is actual willing, and the food itself is what is willed.) The faculty of willing is that which possesses the power to will, such as a human being, and the agent of willing is the one who exercises the capacity for willing. (p. 147)

Much has been made over whether God has one will or three wills. When one look at the Church Fathers on the issue, one of course know that they insisted that God has one will and that will is tied to nature not to the persons. But why is that the case?

When one reads carefully what they are saying, it is clear the Father are definining "will" in a very specific way. They are defining it not as how most of us today think of as a will. No. According to them, "will" (το θέλημα) is the "rational and vital appetency that depends solely on what belongs to nature." Put it another way, "will" is capacity. One does not "will" (θέλω) to do anything, but rather one chooses (βουλομαι), thus a distinction is made between "actual willling" (βούλησις) and "the will" (θέλησις).

The distinction works in its own way of course, and if one holds to these definitions, then most certainly God has one will, the Father and the Son do not have different wills but merely different βούλησις. If one wants to holds to Patristic terminology, then one should be able to say of the Trinity that there is one θέλησις, three βούλησεις. The problem of course is that the new classical theists do not go there even though that seems to what John of Damascus is moving towards.

That said, I would gladly hold to the technical difference between θέλησις and βούλησις, but not to calling θέλησις "will" as belonging to the nature. That is because that is not how the Enlish language works. "Will" is a dynammic term in modern parlance, not a static term in later patristics/ early medieval thought. Rather, it stands to reason in the modern context that we should translate θέλησις as "disposition" and βούλησις as "will," so as to better appreciate their use in the texts.

Machen does not hold to the modern Ressourcement view on the "Great Tradition" of the church

If we could imagine all the creeds of Christendom as having been suddenly wiped out of men’s memories, so that we should have to start all over again in our understanding of the Bible and in our summary setting forth of what the Bible teaches, I believe in tie the necessary creeds of the church would again be built up. It might take another nineteen centuries – if it be God’s will that the present age shall remain that long; it might take twice that time. But sooner or later it would be done. The Bible is the really essential thing; it is the foundation. The creeds of the church are the superstructure. Take away the foundation, and all is lost. But take away the superstructure, and the superstructure can be built up again if the foundation remains. (J. Gresham Machen, Things Unseen, 332)

If we were to remove all creeds and confessions of the Church, the Church would face a setback in understanding God's truth, but it would not be lost. The "Great Tradition," even if one can agree on it that it is true and beneficial, according to Machen is not essential for the Church.

Once more on the word "biblicism"

Here is the work by Sophei Finngan which discussed "Biblicism".

Note that Finngan is a Catholic Priest. pic.twitter.com/Ov7snxXodB

— Namor 📖 (@NamorPB) July 25, 2023

What is "biblicism"? Matthew Barrett has found an early work from 1827 that uses the term "bibicism," probably the earliest known use of that word in the English language. Does this somehow imply that the word "biblicism" has that meaning used by its first author Sophei Finngan? If we go strictly by the "first use" principle, then certainly "biblicism" would have the same meaning as what Finngan meant by the use of that term. But should it?

When we examined Finngan's book (as found on Google Books), it can be easily seen that Finngan is an Irish Roman Catholic priest writing a polemical work primarily against the Protestants of England. "Biblicism" by Finngan is a wicked idolatry that uses the Bible wrongly and breaks the unity of the Roman Catholic church. In other words, Finngan's "biblicism" is a derogatory slur against the Protestant practice of Sola Scriptura. Finngan did indeed use the term to attack rank heretics like Spinoza whom he claims as springing from within Protestantism, but he does not see this as a wrong use of the Protestant interpretation of Scripture (as what Barrett and company wants to make it into), but rather as proof that atheism and all manner of heresies have their origin in Sola Scriptura.

Since, I hope, that supposed Protestant Great Tradition men want to insist that they hold to Sola Scriptura, Barrett's reliance on Finngan's use of the term "biblicism" is an own-goal. If one agrees with Barrett and Finngan, then the logical conclusion is to abandon Sola Scriptura altogether. This raises the important question whether Barrett actually checked the primary source here, as relying on anti-Protestant polemics to attack "biblicism" only serves to undermine the Reformation, even if Finngan had a valid point, which he did not. As with many polemics written in church history, reason and rational arguments are far from its pages, and the goal is to rile up the masses with mass accusations and guilt by association arguments.

Shoud we therefore consider that "biblicism" is a word that has many meanings then? Or is the term redeemable in some fashion? Dr. James White has been talking about the term "Reformed biblicism" as his way of approaching the Scriptures. The issue of word usage then is: Who gets to define the word? Or if there is none, should anyone be allowed to define the term in any way they wish? I would suggest not.

As I have mentioned time and again, I see church historian David Bebbington's usage of the word "biblicism" to be normative. Even with this current revelation that the word was used in the 19th century by a Roman Catholic priest, my position remains the same. Finngan had used the term, but few people caught onto the term as it was then used. What has caught on however is the Bebbington Quadrilateral, which remains an important element in the study of Evangelicalism. In other words, it is Bebbington's use of the term that is prevalent in the academy and the study of the history of Evangelicalism. The current bastardized use of the term by Great Tradition polemicists is a more recent invention, and one that plays off the established meaning of "biblicism" while eviscerating it of its historical meaning.

It is this more established use, a neutral historical use, of the word "biblicism" that makes me uncomfortable with Dr. White's attempted appropriation of the term in "Reformed biblicism." "Biblicism" has a certain use and meaning in the history of Evangelicalism. Unless Dr. White's hermeneutics is indeed similar to that of 19th century Evangelicals, he should not utilize that term of his hermeneutics. Dr. White does engage in systematic thinking, is not afraid of dealing with matters of church history, and holds to the historic creeds, so according to Bebbington's meaning of the term, Dr. White is not a biblicist.

For me therefore, it is the desire to be able to talk about Evangelical church history that drives me towards Bebbington's use of the word "biblicism." I have no desire to throw out an entire work of study on the history of Evangelicalism, just to appease recent doctrinal extremists. They are the ones who should stop their ignorant prattle, instead of spewing nonsense and creating their own sects.

Apophaticism and the limits of human reason

The divine, being incomprehensible, is also necessarily nameless. [St John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith: A New Translation of An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (Popular Patristics Series 62; trans. Norman Russell; Yonkers, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2022, 88]

… [God's essence - DHC] it is superessential and beyond beings, beyond the divine, beyond the good, beyond fullness, and is set apart from all principles and classes as a whole, and is superior to every principle and class, since it is more than essence, life, word, and concepts; it is light itself, goodness itself, life itself, essence itself, since it does not have its being, or anything in the category of existents, from another, being the source itself of the being of that which exists, of the life of that which lives, of the rationality of that which participates in reason, .... (Ibid., 71)

… ὡς ὑπερούσιον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα οὖσαν, ὑπέρθεον, ὑπεράγαθον, ὑπερπλήρη, τὰς ὅλας ἀρχὰς καὶ τάξεις ἀφορίζουσαν καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς και τάξεως ὑπεριδρυμένην ὑπερ οὐσίαν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔννοιαν, αὐτοφῶς, αὐτοαγαθότητα, αὐτοζωήν, αὐτοουσίαν ὡς μὴ παρ' ἑτέρου τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι, τοῖς ζῶσι τῆς ζωῆς, τοῖς λόγου μετέχουσι τοῦ λογου , … (Ibid., 71)

Apophatism is the manner of deriving truths about God through negation. God is stated as being "not X." Apophatism comes about through influence from Neo-Platonic philosophy as it meditates upon the one "beyond (or above) being" (ὑπερούσιον). Simply stated, Neoplatonic philosophy finds the inadequacy its philosophy to comprehend the One, which is appropriated by Christians as the one God.

There can be many things that a Christian can find problematic about apophaticism, since it seems to make God unknowable. Absolute apophaticism seems to imply agnosticism on the one side (we cannot know anything about God since "we cannot say anything true about God") and mysticism on the other (we cannot know anything about God so we must bypass the mind and approach God through mystical encounter). Or we can go the "classical theist" route and use apophaticism to reject any ideas or implications of cataphatic ("positive") theology that we do not like. Thus, in the case of much of "classical theism," certain dogmas of what they deem to be orthodoxy is maintained to be true. But if pressed and if any contradictions are shown, they retreat to "mystery" and apophatic language, claiming that the objector is being a "rationalist" and embracing "univocity," thus evading any examination of their system by attacking the opposition.

There is therefore a prima facie reason to reject apophaticism. But if one thinks about the issues, there is another way to embrace apophaticism despite its questionable legacy, and despite its origin in Neo-Platonism. If one sees apophaticism as the realization of the finitude of human reason and human philosophy to truly grasp the nature of God, thus needing the revelation of God to truly reveal who He is, then we can embrace this form of apophaticism. We can say that God is "beyond being," meaning by that He is beyond all philosophical discussions of ontology. God is thus sui generis in this sense: Any discussion of God and His being must be from Scripture, and Scripture alone. All objections based upon Man's philosophy are necessarily corrupted, including those found in "classical theism," a system which is very much Aristotelian in its philosophy. This is not to deny that we can "spoil the Egyptians" of their philosophical riches, both Platonism and Aristotelianism, but to deny that any one philosophy should be considered definitive for the Christian doctrine of God, and that includes both Plato and Aristotle.

Fanciful history and Dubious Hermeneutics: A review of Craig Carter's Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition

Craig Carter is one of the foremost proponents of the ressourcement happening in current Reformed and Evangelical circles. His books on the subject have been promoted as showing us the way forward towards embracing Classical Theism and 'Great Tradition' exegesis. I have finally gotten around to review his book on exegesis, and it has been a real doozy. Here is my review of Craig Carter's book Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition: Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis, laid out in three main sections interacting with his narrative of church history, his idea of "Christian Platonism" or "Ur-Platonism," and his hermeneutics or embrace of the medieval Quadriga. An excerpt:

How does one interpret the Scriptures? In Craig Carter’s view, the correct way to interpret the Scriptures is to read them the “premodern” way. Taking us on a tour through the history of exegesis, as retold by Carter, we are told a history of the rise and fall of good exegesis. There was a ‘golden age’ of premodern exegesis based upon ‘Christian Platonism,’ which at the advent of the Enlightenment caused the downfall of this glorious age of exegesis into the broken shards of unbelieving scholarship. The way back is to recover the ‘Great Tradition’ based upon ‘Christian Platonism,’ and in so doing we learn how to interpret Scripture alright. In Carter’s words, “academic theory needs to be reformed according to church practice when it comes to biblical interpretation.”

[continue]

Craig Carter on John Calvin

Another Christian Platonist, John Calvin, makes a very similar point in the opening lines of his Institutes of the Christian Religion:

Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But, while joined by many bonds, which one precedes and brings forth the other is not easy to discern. In the first place, no one can look upon himself without immediately turning his thoughts to the contemplation of God, in whom he “lives and moves” (Acts 17: 28). For, quite clearly, the mighty gifts with which we are endowed are hardly from ourselves; indeed, our very being is nothing but subsistence in the one God.

Here we see the linking of the true knowledge of ourselves with the true knowledge of God; advance in one brings advance in the other, while mistakes in one cause mistakes in the other. Calvin sees our being as subsisting in God, and contemplation of ourselves occasions thoughts of God; for the entire Great Tradition, this explains why no human being can ever be neutral with regard to God, oceans of Enlightenment sophistry notwithstanding.

[Craig A. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition: Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2018), 134-5]

On the previous quote, does it mean:
1) Humanity's being subsists in God, and contemplation of our true subsistent being will bring us to God
2) We have wisdom by knowing God and ourselves, and our beings depends on God who creates us

— Daniel C (@puritanreformed) March 28, 2023

Craig Carter is one of the prime architects of the entrance of Platonism into Evangelical and Reformed circles, mediating the false retreival of history through the Roman Catholic ressourcement, as mediated through radical orthodoxy proponents like John Millbank. Whatever the merits of his ressourcement project or lack thereof, a disturbing pattern can be seen in his reading of historical sources. One such reading can be seen in how Carter reads the Institues of John Calvin.

In pages 134-5 of his book on reading the Scriptures, Carter cited John Calvin to promote his vision of "Christian Patonism." Citing the first part of the Institutes where Calvin argued that to know ourselves and to know God are two intricately connected things (Institues, 1.1), Carter latches onto one part of Calvin's sentence, to claim that John Calvin teaches that "our being [subsists] in God, and contemplation of ourselves occasions thoughts of God." In context, Calvin was making the statement that we know from God's gifts that our being subsists because of the one God. Notice that "subsistence in the one God" does not necessarily mean "our being subsists in the one God." The former merely state that our being depends on God for its subsistence, without stating how this dependence relation works. Carter however reads Calvin as a Platonist, and therefore excludes any other type of dependence relationship man has with God.

We can see immediately that Carter's manner of interpreting historical sources is to interpret the "good sources" as Platonists, rather than let the historical sources interpret themselves. That is most certainly not the way to actually interpret historical sources. Whether Calvin is a Platonist or not is irrelevant for the topic at hand, because firstly there is no such thing as one type of "Platonist," so even if it were granted that Calvin was a "Platonist" in some aspects, it does not mean he is a "Platonist" in certain other aspects. Secondly, one must focus on the context and what Calvin was trying to convey in 1.1 of his Institutes. The text builds towards a thesis, certain conclusions, and that is the "authorial intent" of the passage. Even if Calvin were a Platonist on the issue of the "subsistence" of the soul, this is most certainly not what he was driving at in 1.1 of his Institutes, which is focused on the knowedge of God and driving home our dependence upon Him for our very being, not on the Platonic view of being (whichever version Carter has in mind; probably the Christian Neo-Platonic view of being).

Carter's hermeneutics on historical sources in the case of John Calvin is flawed, and we look at this source from John Calvin because it has been read and studied so many times, and this is the first time I have read anyone try to claim that Calvin is teaching a Christian Neo-Platonic ontology in this passage. Carter's manner of reading texts is disturbing, but probably perfectly in line with the ressourcement's way of interpreting historical sources, as texts addressing ecclesiastical concerns instead of historically-situated documents.

Babel babble: A review of Christian Smith's The Bible Made Impossible

The term "biblicism" has been floating around for quite some time. What is it, and is it really bad?

In this light, I have recently finished a book review of Christian Smith's book attacking "biblicism." Entitled The Bible Made Impossible: Why Biblicism is not truly an Evangelical Reading of Scripture, Smith thinks that biblicism is wrong and not a biblical hermeneutic. If Smith is true, then evangelicalism has been reading the Bible wrongly for a long time, but is that so? I would assert not. In the process of my review, I addressed the issue of "biblicism" in some detail. An excerpt of the review is here given:

How should a person read the Bible? In the Reformation, the emphasis was on placing the Bible in the hands of the laity, so that God’s people can read God’s Word for themselves. Whatever one can say about the Reformation, one must be able to say that putting the Bible into the hands of the laity, into “untrained hands” as it were, is a good thing. But is that really the case?

Sociologist Christian Smith, in his new book, demurred against this approach. Smith’s central thesis is that a plain reading of the Bible is impossible, and that one has to approach the Bible differently from that “biblicist” approach. Smith does not advocate for removing the Bible from the hands of the laity, but he thinks the typical approach they take in reading it is not correct. Given that the “biblicist” approach is the approach of the unwashed masses, what Smith’s argument implies is that, while the laity can have the Bible, they cannot read it for themselves, because they will otherwise read it with a “biblicist” and hence wrong hermeneutic. Rather, they must be taught to read it differently from what they have been doing by default.

[continue]

Meyendorff on the reception of the Fifth and Sixth "Ecumenical" Councils in the West

... although the Quinisext is invested with “ecumenical” authority in the Byzantine Church tradition, it has never been received as such in the West. Actually, since it explicitly condemns several Latin liturgical and canonical practices, it already clearly implies an understanding of Church tradition and authority differing from that of the Latin Church. (John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, 82)

Are the fifth and sixth councils ecumenical? It seems that John Meyendorff does not think that the Western Church has ever received it as ecumenical. This is not to say that the West has not approved of parts of these councils, but I doubt they endorsed them wholly.

David Bradshaw: The Transformation of energeia into esse in the West

… how energeia as it is found in Plotinus and Porphyry was transformed into the medieval (and especially Thomistic) concept of esse, the ”act of being.” Tracing this history will reveal a major and relatively little noticed source of medieval thought. At the same time it will be important to notice what the developments we are tracing leave behind. At each stage there is a king of sloughing off of unwanted metaphysics. This is usually done silently, so that a reader not familiar with the earlier texts will be unaware of how key concepts have been removed from their original setting and radically simplified. [David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, 97]

In effect we find in [Marius - DHC] Victorinus a further specification of the energein katharon of the Anonymous Commentary [on Pamenides -DHC]. This energein now turns out to be esse, the unlimited and uncircumscribed being of the Father, from which is derived all the limited and circumscribed being (ὄν) found in the Son. Such esse is anything but “being” conceived as a static condition of existence; it is a kind of inwardly directed activity, containing implicitly life and intelligence as well as existence. In thinking itself it manifests itself as what it is, giving rise to the triad of ese, vivere, and intellegere – Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Oddly enough, then, despite all the accretions of Neoplatonism, we are not too far from the self-thinking thought of Aristotle’s Prime Mover. The divine self-intellection remains the activity par excellence, the one that precedes all others, giving rise by virtue of its necessary intrinsic structure to the intelligible order and plurality of the world. (Ibid., 115)

According to David Bradshaw's resarch, it seems that there is a shift in the West (after Plotinus) to turn activity into being, energeia into esse. This is troubling for many reasons, but it would answer the question of how pure act is interpreted in Classical Theism to be a rejection of divine choices and activity outside the being of God.

Book Review of Craig Carter's book Contemplating God with the Great Tradition

Baptist theologian Jordan Steffaniak has written a book review of Craig Carter's book Contemplating God with the Great Tradition, which you can read here. I had read Steffaniak's review prior but thought it best to post it here only after I have read the book myself, with myself pointing out certain major issues that I have with how Carter deals with history as I was reading the book. Steffaniak wrote about how Carter misrepresents his opponents. For me, since Carter posts broad denunciations at the start, it does not seem to me that Carter actually engages anyone. Up to the last page of his book, I was still waiting for Carter to actually begin showing us why those who reject what he calls "Trinitarian Classical Theism "(TCT) are wrong, and yet nothing was offered to justify Carter's stance.

I am obviously not in the "Classical Theist" camp. Reading this book, as well as Matthew Barrett's book, has emotionally validated my rejection of Classical Theism. After all, if Classical Theism is so true, why are its proponents totally unable to actually engage the issues properly, and why are they only interested in the burning of strawmen and committing logical fallacies?

On the sweeping denigration of "modernism"

Throughout this book, I have argued that modern theology has lost its grip on Nicene orthodoxy becaus it has failed to challenge modern metaphysics at a fundamental level. Instead, many modern theologians have been preoccupied with trying to squeeze orthodox doctrines onto the Procrustean bed of modernist metaphysics. For them, the key question is "How much of the Bible can we fit into a philosophical naturalist framework?" (Craig A. Carter, Contemplating God with the Great Tradition: Recovering Trinitarian Classical Theism, 237)

Part of the ressourcement movement has been a wholesale rejection of modernity. In some sense, a critical examination of modernity and post-modernity (modernity version 2.0) is understandable, even laudable. That said, modernity is not one monolithic movement, just as the Enlightenment is not monolithic. The same Enlightenment that gave us Schleiermacher, Bauer, Rauschenbusch, and Bultmann also gave us Old Princeton and the Doleantie. (I intentionally omit Evangelicalism since "Evangelicalism" has become a derogatory term in much of American Refomed Christianity). History is complex, and demonizing entire epochs of history is just as errant whether it be the Enlightenment or the Medieval period.

We see in Carter's attack on "modern metaphysics" something more reminiscent of the Vatican I Roman Catholic attack upon modernity. According to Carter, modern metaphysics is essentially a "philosophical naturalist framework," and this naturalism is a "temporary phase between the fall of Christendom and the rise of neopaganism" (Carter, 237). No argument or evidence is given to support such strong assertions. Most certainly, we can trace the progression of worldviews in the Western world from one based upon some version of Christendom to a "philosophical naturalist" view and now towards a neopagan worldview. But, and this is a big but, that does not implicate all things that is found in the modern era or even the post-modern era. Charles Hodge of Old Princeton wrote with a presupposition of Common Sense Realism, not philosophical naturalism. Even outside of Evangelicalism, Karl Barth (from a Idealist position) rejected philosophical naturalism with a "Nein" against German liberalism. To assert that there is something called THE "modern metaphysic" which is tied to the zeitgeist is not an argument that has shown that it has actually wrestled with the complexity of real history.

Should there be concerns over "philosophical naturalism"? Sure. Is it possible that "modern theologians" (whoever they are) have beeen "preoccupied with trying to squeeze orthodox doctrine onto the Procrustean bed of" philosophical naturalism? Maybe. But such overly broad denunciation is extremely unhelpful and serves more to poison the well than actually deal with the issues raised by "modern theologians," whoever they are.

Instead of broad sweeping denunciations of "modernism," engagement with "modern theologians" is preferable. This kind of polemic is extremely unhelpful. After all, it wasn't a long time ago that theologians were denigrating the Medieval period. So if Carter does not like the denigration of the Church Father or the Medieval period, perhaps he shouldn't be doing the same to "modern theologians."

The Hellenization thesis and the over-reaction to it

So let us hear no more nonsense about the supposed imposition of Greek metaphysics on the Bible by the fourth-century fathers! (Craig A. Carter, Contemplating God with the Great Tradition: Recovering Trinitarian Classical Theism, 216)

The Hellenization thesis is the theory that periods of church history, be it the Church Fathers or even up to the Reformation era, have been so influenced by Greek philosophy that we need to recover the "true biblical truths" that have been distorted by those "Hellenizers" in church history. Be it those who reject the Church Fathers and attempt to read the Bible by oneself, or those who pit John Calvin against the Calvinists and those "dead" Reformed Scholastics, the Hellenization thesis has wrecked havoc on the Church's ability to be the one catholic and apostolic church, the Church of all ages. The demolishing of the Helleization thesis has been a welcome development in academia and in the Church broadly speaking. Unfortunately, the pendulum seems to be swinging to the opposite extreme, as can be seen in the recent "retreival" of classical theism, spearheaded by those who are trying to retreive the "Great Tradition," something that any Reformed Christian who holds to Sola Scriptura ought to be skeptical of.

The Hellenization thesis asserts that certain periods of Church History have seen great distortion of biblical truths by Greek philosophy. In opposition to this, the modern ressourcement movement asserts the total opposite: that the church has always been fully biblical and that there was never any compromise of biblical truth due to the use of Greek philosophy. In the eyes of the leaders in this ressourcement, the Church Fathers took Greek philosophical concepts, hammered them "on the anvil of Scripture" (Carter, p. 216), and "reforg[ed] them in the flame of truth until they were bent into a usable shape for proclaiming the gospel" (pp. 216-7). There was never any "Greek captivity," but rather everything that comes out of the Church Fathers is biblical and not tainted by Greek philosophy at all, not even an iota!

As it can be seen, the two are mirror images and exact opposites of each other. The Hellenization thesis asserts the full captivity of the Church to Greek philosophy, while the modern ressourcement asserts the full "captivity" of Greek philosophy to true theology in the Church. The reality is that both are wrong. The Church Fathers indeed are trying to be biblical, and their use of Greek philosophy is not unreflective and Greek philosophical thought has been altered and pressed into service of the Church's theology. At the same time, Greek philosophy has influenced the Church Fathers in ways thot are not always in line with biblical truth. The clearest example of such an unbiblical influence is in the Medieval Church's embrace of realism unto the denial of forensic justification, seeing justification as something that must be actually true for a believer before God can proclaim the believer just, a teaching that continues on as the Roman Catholic teaching on justification. If Greek philosophical thought as mediated through the Medival Church is wrong, why must we think that the supposed "Great Tradition" is neigh infallible in its use and modification of Greek philosophy?

The Hellenization thesis is wrong. But so is the glorification and unreflective adoption of the "Great Tradition." The current ressourcement project is moving in a dangerous direction. If not careful, it would lead to the wholesale rejection of the Reformation. After all, why stop at one's doctrine of God? Why not adopt Aquinas' doctrine of justification, merit, and the saints, as part of the teaching of the "Great Tradition"?

The shift towards medievalism?

Uh yeah, pope/trentless roman catholicism is called protestantism

— Gnoisome Gnoll 🦃⚓🦃 (@gnoisomegnoll) November 12, 2021

In response to critics of EFS/ ERAS, Own Strachan had released a podcast episode decrying the shift towards "popeless and Trentless Catholicism." This shift has come about as much of Evangelical academia has shifted towards Thomism in its metaphysics. Strachan's charge of popeless and Trentless Catholicism is a charge that Evangelical academia has become like Roman Catholicism with the exception of having no pope and having the Gospel. In response to Strachan, at least one person claims that Protestantism is indeed a popeless and Trentless Catholicism. But is Protestantism merely Roman Catholicism with the Gospel and without the Pope?

The 16th century Reformation did not happen in a vacuum. It was preceded by the Renaissance, where new forms of learning and innovation came onto the scene. Most of the Reformers came from the (Renaissance) humanist tradition, as opposed to the establishes scholars steeped in medieval scholasticism. Calvin for example wrote against the scholastics of the Sorbonne, and much of the Protestant Reformation began with a rejection of Medieval Scholasticism.

Now, it is correct to say the none of the Reformers thought to thoroughly reject scholasticism, and that later Reformed scholasticism did not see the Protestant faith and the methods of Scholasticism as being incompatible. This is not a rehash of the discredited "Calvin versus the Calvinist" historiography. It is also not to claim that the first two generations of Reformers would disagree with Medieval Scholasticism on the doctrine of God; they did not. The key point here is to note that the initial point was not that of scholasticism. When Reformed Scholasticism began to take shape, the Reformed theologians of that era thought that the tools of scholasticism could be used in service of explicating the truths of the Christian Reformed faith. Generally, none of them thought that scholasticism in itself would become THE method the way medieval scholastics did. Does the method change the message? That can be discussed but none of the Reformed theologians thought it did, or they would not embrace scholastic methods as tools in theology.

The key point to observe here is to assert that Protestantism is not a "popeless and Trentless Catholicism," at least consistent Protestantism (we can exclude the via media Anglicans from the discussion). Protestantism did not just reject the pope or get the Gospel right. Without rejecting tradition, they nonetheless were willing to question it and dissent from it if they believed it to be false. They held to what Jaroslav Pelikan called "Tradition 1," treasuring tradition while keeping it at arm's length. They did not see any tradition as necessarily sacrosanct, unlike the way today's "Evangelical academia" seem to treat the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which is basically slipping into a form of Tradition 2.

Is there a movement in church history that corresponds to "popeless Trentless Catholicism"? Yes, there has been such movements. The 17th and 18th century Jansenists in France is one such movement. But even bigger than that is Eastern Orthodoxy, which has no pope neitther does it hold to Trent. The fact is that Protestantism is more than just "popeless" and "Trentless." A major issue of the Reformation was also on the nature of authority, and this unfortunately is the major issue of our time as well, as American Evangelical academia flirts with Tradition 2 in its embrace of Thomas Aquinas.

Gregory Palamas and the Essence/ Energies Distinction

(III.ii.6)

… but also some works of God are without beginning, as the Fathers also rightly affirm. For was it not needful for the work of providence to exist before Creation, so as to cause each of the created things to come to be in time, out of nonbeing? As it not necessary for a divine knowledge to know before choosing, even outside time? But how does it follow that the divine prescience had a beginning? How could one conceive of a beginning of God’s self-contemplation, and was there ever a moment when God began to be moved toward contemplation of Himself? Never! [Gregory Palamas, The Triads (The Classics of Western Spirituality; Ed. John Meyendorff; trans. Nicholas Gendle; Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), p. 94]

These works of God, then, are manifestly unoriginated and pre-temporal: His foreknowledge, will, providence, contemplation of Himself, and whatever powers are akin to these. But if this contemplation, prescience, predetermination and will are works of God that are without beginning, then virtue is also unoriginated, for each of His works is a virtue; ... (Ibid., p. 94)

(III.ii.8)

But even if this man considers that everything that has a beginning is created, we for our part know that while all the energies of God are uncreated, not all are without beginning. Indeed, beginning and end must be ascribed, if not to the creative power itself, then at least to its activity, that is to say, to its energy as directed towards created things. (Ibid., p. 96)/p>

The strong influence of Neoplatonism on Eastern Orthodoxy would logically result in a distant and remote deity. Such is however contrary to biblical Christianity. The contradiction is so obvious that Eastern Orthodoxy could not continue being Christian without modifying parts of what it received through Dionysius. This it did in positing a distinction between the essence of God, and His energies. "Energies" can be taken as the workings of God. They are the dynamic workings of God, not to be identified with who God is (essence), neither are they identified with what God does (the works of God). The essence of God is as what Neoplatonism says it is: beyond being, beyond intelligibility, utterly inaccessible to anyone but God. The energies of God are however what humans can perceive. In fact, the Eastern Orthodox doctrine of theosis, sometimes called "deification," is the idea that the believer could partake in the divine energies fully.

In Palamas' Triads, certainly not everything stated is I believe compatible with biblical Christianity. Nevertheless, Palamas' promotion of the essence/ energies distinction is a helpful category. Neoplatonism has forced the issue, showing how immutability if applied to the whole of God would result in a static God, the God of Deism. Therefore, in order to have a vital communion with God (which the East promoted through its misguided monasticism), new philosophical categories were formed. Western Christianity in general was not as strongly influenced by Neoplatonism as the East was, and therefore was slow to see the problems that would arise with a God who has only an essence that is utterly transendent and immutable. The East remained orthodox in their doctrine of God, unlike many Western theologians who came to see the same problems, and therefore invented these categories congrunt to biblical orthodoxy that we can now appropriate.

One argument that Palamas pointed out was to note that the decrees of God and the foreknowledge of God are prior to creation. God's will and His own self-enjoyment (contemplation) are likewise eternal. Yet all these are not "being" but operations of some sort, since they are active in nature. Therefore, it can be seen that these "works" (as utilized by Palamas) of God are "without beginning." These energies are not just within God so to speak, but they translate to "activities" that are "directed towards created things."

Now, the fact that there are these decrees of God and other active operations are clear from Scripture. What is however omitted from the thoughts of many theologians is an attempt to categorize them as either essence or works. The fact of the matter is that it is neither of these categories, and thus the category of "energies" is most appropriate here. Orthodox Western systematic theologians tend to talk about God's essencce, then His attributes (communicable and incommunicable), and subsume these operations under the atttributes of God. The problem is that atttributes are "static" in nature. They describe what God is, not what God does. Therefore, including these active operations under the section on the atttributes of God, or worse, to shift parts of them to the works of God, is I believe to be massive categorical confusion.

God is immutable yet He relates both to Himself and to us His creatures. We must hold to both, and do it without diminishing either of them. Without the category of "energies," I do not see how either of these truths could not but be diminished, to the detriment of our understanding and worship of our living God.

Neoplatonism, symbols, and the issue of icons

All expressions of God, the lowly and sensible no less than the exalted and intelligible, participate in him and are thus “similar.” (Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 103)

All things, then, are in effect symbols of God and are so used in the scriptures, and this is simply a restatement of the doctrine that being is theophany. (p. 103)

The Platonic doctrine of participation, which Dionysius invokes in justifying the suitability of all things as symbols of God, makes it clear that the symbol is a genuine presentation of the symbolized. (p. 104)

A symbol, then, in being finite, available, in not being God and thus in leaving him behind, in concealing him, reveals him as beyond being and thought. … Only by being concealed in symbols can God be revealed (p. 104)

Hence, as Dionysius here indicates, there can be non-symbolic knowledge of God, no knowledge of God without the concealment of symbolism. (p. 105)

The Second Council of Nicea of 787 AD, known in Eastern Orthodoxy as the "Seventh Ecumenical Council," mandated the virtue of holy icons (two-dimensional images) and anathemized those who reject icons (the iconoclasts). For Protestants who see idols of any kind as a violation of the Second Commandment, Nicea II contradicts Scripture and is thus an illegitimate council. Therefore, we would not call it the "Seventh Ecumenical Council" except improperly. Nevertheless, Eastern Orthodox promotion of icons and treating the issue as of the essence of faith stems from this council.

For a Reformed person like myself, I had found it puzzling why Eastern Orthodoxy is so adamant on the issue of icons. Reading Eric Perl on Dionysius however has shown me the likely backdrop for this fascination with icons. This is not to argue that any Eastern Orthodox is a neoplatonist or that any of them hold to full-blown neoplatonism, but rather that the philosophical underpinnings of the Eastern theology of icons is found in the neoplatonism of Dionysius.

In Dionysius' neoplatonic ontology, symbols mediate the divine. Since God is not "being" neither is he "not-being," being the unity of all as the necessary condition for being, being as such is a "theophany," an appearance of the divine (Ibid., p. 32). All things are symbols mediating the divine. To use Christian terminology, all matter is "sacramental." Since God is "beyond being" and "unknowable," to get to the "hidden God" is to go through the symbols mediating the divine. As Perl said, "Only by being concealed in symbols can God be revealed." In other words, Dionysius asserts that there is no way to reach the divine if the symbols are gone.

Once we see this, it becomes clear that a main reason why icons are so important in Eastern Orthodoxy is due to its fear of losing the connection to God. If symbols are necessary to reveal the hidden God, then removing the symbols would be akin to removing God. Seen this way, Nicea II is understandable, albeit it shows us the tragic consequences of adopting an unbiblical ontology which leads to gross idolatry.

Trinity Review: Did Calvin Teach a Doctrine of Secondary Justification?

Some time ago, I had written a short blog post refuting Steven Wedgeworth's assertion that John Calvin had in fact teach a doctrine of double justification (an initial and a secondary justification). I was subsequently contacted by Tom Juodaitis about using it in the Trinity Review, and I decided to improve it and send the improved version to him. Well, I have just checked the website and the latest Trinity Review (for April/ May 2020) is out, by yours truly. Check it out here. An excerpt:

In the modern Reformed world, there have been raging controversies over issues like the Law-Gospel distinction, and charges of neo-nomism versus antinomianism as it relates to the Federal Vision, Norman Shepherd, John Piper, and the disgraced pastor Tullian Tchividjian. Most worrying is the push for some version of a “judgment by works” by theologians such as Mark Jones, who has likewise defended John Piper from the charge of works-righteousness. According to Jones, all that Piper has striven to do was to defend the necessity of works for salvation, which he asserted was taught by Reformed theologians and the Reformed faith. Works lead us to the “possession of life” not the “right to life,” and therefore for Jones there is nothing wrong in asserting that works are necessary for salvation, when understood according to the manner he has prescribed.

[more]

Sharp readers might have noticed that I have removed the part about Arminianism. That is because I did not want to expand the article even further. Without writing a second article about this, let me just point out to you the Arminian error on this topic as stated in the Canons of the Synod of Dordt:

Who teach that what is involved in the new covenant of grace which God the Father made with men through the intervening of Christ’s death is not that we are justified before God and saved through faith, insofar as it accepts Christ’s merit, but rather that God, having withdrawn his demand for perfect obedience to the law, counts faith itself, and the imperfect obedience of faith, as perfect obedience to the law, and graciously looks upon this as worthy of the reward of eternal life. (Canons of the Synod of Dordt, Second main point of doctrine, Rejection of Error, 4)

Did John Calvin teach a doctrine of secondary justification?

Steven Wedgeworth over at The Calvinist International had written a blog article arguing that the notion of a "secondary justification" is a Reformed doctrine, taught by no less than John Calvin himself. According to Wedgeworth, John Calvin does in fact teach Justification by Faith Alone, but alongside that he taught a secondary or "different kind of justification" which "remains a forensic and declarative act" and takes account of the "transformative work of regeneration" and "render(s) a sort of judgment on the spiritual fruit of sanctification." This secondary justification is "built atop" and "dependent on" the initial justification, and thus it can be said that there is a sense in which justification is by works, as long as one holds to that justification as a "secondary justification." But are Wedgeworth's arguments sound? We will address them theologically, then historically.

Theologically, it is unclear how this view of initial and secondary justification is not functionally similar to Federal Vision, Arminian and Roman Catholic soteriologies. Just because the "secondary justification" is built upon and dependent on the initial justification does not solve anything, for after all Arminians and Roman Catholics believe that too. For the latter, here is what Trent says about justification and works:

Of this Justification the causes are these: ... the efficient cause is a merciful God who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing, and anointing with the holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance ... (Chapter VII, Council of Trent Sixth Session, On Justification - First Decree)

And whereas the Apostle saith, that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consent of the Catholic Church hath held and expressed; to wit, that we are therefore said to be justified by faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation, and the root of all Justification; without which it is impossible to please God, and to come unto the fellowship of His sons: but we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification-whether faith or works-merit the grace itself of justification. For, if it be a grace, it is not now by works, otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace. (Chapter VIII, Council of Trent Sixth Session, On Justification - First Decree)

As it can be seen, in Tridentine Roman Catholicism, justification is "free," and faith and works do not merit the grace itself of justification, since the efficient cause of justification is the God who is merciful and washed and sanctify gratuitously sinners through the Holy Spirit. In popular Evangelical rhetoric, it is assumed that Roman Catholicism teaches justification by faith and works, or by works. However, while Roman Catholicism ends up being about salvation by faith and works, it is not technically true that it teaches justification by faith and works. Rather, justification is by grace through faith without works, but justification in Roman Catholicism is a process and thus the works is the "outworking" of grace through works. In orthodox Roman Catholic theology, the works are treated as the outworking of faith in justification, and therefore works become essential for one's status before God, albeit in a round-about way.

Once the Tridentine Roman Catholic teaching on justification is properly understood, it is unclear how it differs from what Wedgeworth is proposing, except that instead of a process of justification we have two acts of justification—the initial justification and the secondary justification. Since the term "justification" is literally "to make just," this calls into question Wedgeworth's assertion that the "secondary justification" does not change the verdict given by the initial justification. In what sense is that secondary justification "justification" if it does not actually "make [the person] just"? Therefore, whatever the intent of those promoting this view of "secondary justification" is, it seems clear that this "secondary justification" smuggles works into the act of justification by a more sophisticated route compared to Roman Catholicism, a move which coincides with the redefinition of "faith" to become "faithfulness" in Federal Vision discourse.

Historical theology is where Wedgeworth's assertions about the historical pedigree of his view come undone. Wedgeworth asserts that John Calvin teaches this secondary justification, but the passages cited from Calvin clearly states that God justifies the unclean works of believers. This "secondary justification" if you may is God declaring that the works of believers are acceptable to Him, or as cited and emphasized by Wedgeworth, "their works are esteemed righteous by the same gratuitous liberality. (Comment. on Ezekiel 18:17)." Note here that the object of this "justification" is the believers' works, not believers themselves. It is the works which are justified, not believers who get doses of justification every time they do a good work. This view of God justifying our works is taught by the Westminster Confession of Faith in the chapter on good works:

Notwithstanding, the persons of believers being accepted through Christ, their good works also are accepted in him, not as though they were in this life wholly unblamable and unreprovable in God’s sight; but that he, looking upon them in his Son, is pleased to accept and reward that which is sincere, although accompanied with many weaknesses and imperfections. (WCF 16.6)

Wedgeworth's argument that Calvin taught a doctrine of secondary justification is therefore a misinterpretation of what he actually wrote. Knowing what Tridentine Roman Catholicism actually teaches, and that the orthodox Reformers unanimously rejected it, we must understand that the orthodox Reformed position is a denial of any kind of two-stage justification or process of justification. The scandal of the Reformation was not because Roman Catholicism believed in works meriting justification (a typical Evangelical caricature), but that the Reformers taught that justification requires no work of any kind at all. That is the essence of the Gospel message of Justification by Faith Alone that scandalized the Pope and the entire structure of Medieval Catholicism. Why is it that charges of antinomianism were leveled against the Reformers? Were 16th century Roman Catholic theologians so dense that they did not know (if it were true) that Protestants have a place for good works in justification (beyond evidence), and therefore the dispute is one of semantics rather than substance?

So did John Calvin taught a doctrine of secondary justification? He did not. Moreover, knowing the centrality of the Gospel and the importance of justification, I think it is very dangerous that such teaching is deemed acceptable in Reformed circles, for once we lose the Gospel, we lose the faith. It is my sincere hope that all of us including Wedgeworth would one day come to reject this teaching as misleading at best, and heretical at worst.