Over on her blog, Alicia posted some of her thoughts on RAAN and their unhelpful attacks on race relations. As a black woman, her musings show us a perspective that RAAN would rather not others read about.
Monday, April 10, 2017
Sunday, April 09, 2017
As I have mentioned months earlier, I do believe that City Harvest "pastor" Kong Hee is indeed guilty in regards to his church's finances, but Christians especially should not be rejoicing in his conviction, and we should differentiate clearly between what is immoral and what is illegal.
In light of the reduced sentence verdict arrived at by the Singapore Court, there has been a lot of outrage from Singaporeans. Now, whether the sentences are fair or unfair is a matter for judges to decide. But what is indeed revealing in many of these comments is the utter lack of distinction between morality and legality. Something can be immoral, yet legal, and vice versa. Adultery is immoral, but the law does not penalize adulterers. Abortion is immoral, but in many countries including Singapore, it is legal. Conversely, in France, telling the truth about abortion is illegal, while it is actually moral to tell the truth about abortion. In other words, there is no necessary correlation between morality and legality. That there ought to be such a relation is an assertion worth arguing about, but even if there should be a relation does not imply that there IS currently such a relation.
It is on this matter that much of the online outrage concerning Kong Hee is disturbing. Is it immoral for a pastor to live like a king? Yes, I think it is. But is it illegal? No! Is it immoral for a pastor to fleece people of their money for his own enrichment? Yes. But if the followers willingly give up their money for their pastor to live such a lifestyle, of their own free will and knowing that is how he uses the money, then how is it illegal for the pastor to use his followers' money in such a way? Is it immoral for Kong Hee to run the church like a corporate dictatorship? Yes, and contrary to the Scriptures too. But if the church members agree that this is how their church should be run, and such is not contrary to their own constitution, then it seems there is nothing illegal here either.
That is why, no matter how reprehensible I think Kong Hee's actions may be, I do not think he should be charged with anything beyond basic criminal breech of trust. The civil laws of a nation can and should only judge what is illegal, not necessarily what is immoral (unless what is immoral is also illegal). Lex Rex! The Law is King. That is what is meant for any country to be ruled by the law. If people think that any of these immoral actions taken by Kong Hee should be punished, then go ahead and try to introduce legislation to criminalize such actions. But unless and until such is done, there is absolutely no basis for anyone to clamor for greater sentencing of Kong Hee and company.
Saturday, April 08, 2017
Darwinists' views about race existed not only in Nazi Germany but also in America, as it apparents from surveys of textbooks published from 1880 to around 1950. For example, Princeton biologist Edwin Conklin stated in his college text that comparison
of any modern race with the Neanderthal or Heidelberg types show... Negroid races more closely resemble the original stock than the white or yellow races. Every consideration should lead those who believe in the superiority of the white race to strive to preserve its purity and to establish and maintain the segregation of the races.32
German eugnicists relied heavily on work completed in Britain and America, especially that research related to sterilization policies. ...
[Jerry Bergman, Hitler and the Nazi Darwinian Worldview: How the Nazi Eugenic Crusade for a Superior Race Caused the Greatest Holocaust in World History (Kitchener, Ontario, Canada: Joshua Press, 2012, 2014), 83]
32 Edwin G. Conklin, The Direction of Human Evolution (New York: Scribner's, 1921), 34, 53
Conversely, German eugenicists repeatedly acknowledged their debt to the American and British researchers and periodically honoured eugenicists from British and American universities with various awards. Furthermore, many of the American eugenicists argued that the Nazis were outdoing them and were able to convince American courts (including the Supreme Court) of the validity of even some of the most outrageous eugenic claims. Some of these eugenic-based ideas became part of American law and practice until after World War II when the full horror of the German eugenics programmes became widely known
What was the prevalent understanding of race relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Western countries? Was it color-blindness? If one were to read the revisionist history put up by RAAN writers such as Jarvis Williams, you would think most Westerners in the late 19th century and early 20th century held to the theory of color-blindness. But such is absolutely false. While Christians of that era hopefully should have been promoters of color-blindness, and they did when their better angels prevailed, the predominant theory concerning race relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was Social Darwinism. It was in Nazi Germany that Social Darwinism was applied in practice in the Holocaust, but that does not mean that only Nazi Germany held to the theory of Social Darwinism, just that they were willing to actually put it into practice regardless of how inhumane it would become.
Social Darwinism is the application of Darwinian evolutionary theory to real life. In Darwinian evolutionary theory, organizations and species evolve towards being fitter, and only the fittest survive (survival of the fittest), while the less fit slowly lose out and become extinct. Humans are also placed on the evolutionary scale as being an evolution from ancient apes, and thus are fitter and stronger than the apes. But even in a species, since everyone is struggling on the evolutionary process, the fitter specimens should survive while the weaker ones die off. Placed into the human context where latent racism was already present, some "races" were seen to be more evolved (e.g. the "Aryans") while other "races" less so and are deemed to be more "ape-like." Social Darwinism aims to apply the Darwinian process to humans and thus eliminate the "less fit" specimens. Thus, individuals and "races" deemed to be less fit are to be eliminated while fitter individuals should procreate and produce many children, leading to the evolution of humanity to become better and fitter. Of course, what does this world "elimination" mean except killing actual humans and groups of humans off, that is, genocide! Nazi Germany followed Social Darwinism to its logical conclusion, conveniently identify their enemies with the "less fit" and sought to eradicate all non-Aryans, starting with the Jews and the Slavs.
Outside of Nazi Germany, the implications of Social Darwinism was not worked out into extermination but rather sterilization, such that the "less fit" would not be able to reproduce and thus decrease the supposed "vitality" of the population gene pool. Of course, in America, it was the blacks who would bore the brunt of the label of being less fit, and I wouldn't be surprised if moves such as segregation came about because of an embrace of some form of Social Darwinism.
Social Darwinism is therefore the prevalent doctrine concerning race relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, not color-blindness. If one desires to deplore racism, then one should attack Social Darwinism and its parents, the theory of human evolution itself. Otherwise, attacking color-blindness is to attack the cure and cause more racism instead of less, a problem that RAAN might actually instigate.
Monday, April 03, 2017
I have stopped going over to The Aquila Report for quite some time, ever since they have shown themselves to be extremely biased and not conveying the truth when it comes to the ESS fiasco. That said, when I had cause to look at them again, I was dismayed that they had gone even further away from orthodoxy.
Meet RAAN, the Reformed African American Network, which is all about being a particular strain of "African-American," and not so much about being Reformed. The Aquila Report re-posted one such article originally published on RAAN, here, entitled The Cruelty of the Color-Blind Theory of Race in Evangelical Churches, written by one Jarvis Williams. In it, Williams took issue with color-blindness as reinforcing racism and especially white supremacy. This is of course astonishing given that at the core of color-blindness is the denial of racism. But what arguments and evidences does William produce for such a counter-intuitive accusation against color-blindness in favor of the neo-Marxist theory of Critical Race Theory?
Let us look at what color-blindness means when it is actually applied. It means that we are to treat everyone equally regardless of ethnicity and even culture. It means that I, as someone normally typed under "yellow skin," treat blacks and whites equally, and such color-blindness ought to be reciprocated. When I interact with an African-American, or interact with a Caucasian, or with an Indian, or another Chinese, I ought to treat them all equally as people all made in the image of God. I am not to discriminate against anyone because of his or her skin color! So, if in the event that someone discriminates against another based upon the person's skin color, that person is not practicing color-blindness! And here we see the problem with Williams' case against color-blindness. According to him, cases of racism (let's assume for the sake of argument they are indeed true cases of racism) invalidates color-blindness. But, if those people are not practicing color-blindness at all, why blame a theory when it is not practiced by racists?
It gets even weirder. Williams made the astonishing assertion: "The very racist social construct of race in 18-19th century Europe and America based on illusory biological traits and rooted in racial hierarchy and biological fiction proves that the color-blind theory is a myth." But are we to assume that color-blindness was held to as truth in the 18th and 19th centuries? Of course not! Color-blindness is a traditional [social] liberal theory, not one linked to the anciens regime in any shape or form! So why blame a theory for what it did not produce? Why blame a theory for the behavior of its non-practitioners?
As a "yellow" person, I find this attack upon color-blindness to be absolutely stupid. If color-blindness is rejected, why must we assume Liberation Theology and Neo-Marxist ideas of affirming the so-called victim races? If color-blindness is rejected, why should anyone not instead decided to embrace White Supremacy, or Chinese Supremacy, or any form of racism in response? Williams, and the Neo-Marxists who come before him, cannot produce a real answer here, because they have none. Liberation theology is assumed, not argued for, because this house of cards cannot be truly challenged otherwise the snowflakes will experience many meltdowns.
In practice, what should we do if we meet those who racially discriminate while claiming to be color-blind? Is the solution to reject color-blindness, or rather, that we ought to call them to live more consistently with their professed belief in color-blindness? The solution to giving lip-service to color-blindness is not less color-blindness, but more color-blindness. Ironically, it is Williams' approach that causes more racism if consistently followed. So, while I have no doubt the good intentions of RAAN, the sad but true fact is that RAAN is promoting racism and racial enmity, in the name of racial equality.
Saturday, April 01, 2017
The issue of historicity concerning Old Testament narrative, especially the first 11 chapters of Genesis, continue to remain a problem for many people. In his book The Bible Among the Myths, John N. Oswalt attempted to answer the questions concerning the Old Testament narratives and the questions of myth and history concerning them, and I have read and reviewed it accordingly, here. An excerpt:
The Bible claims to be a book that depicts historical events, all the way back to the beginning of time, or at least most Christians have always believed that from their reading of the Scriptures starting from the book of Genesis. Liberal “Christianity” since the 19th century has however cast doubt on the historicity of major events narrated both in the Old and the New Testaments, especially the first eleven chapters of Genesis 1. According to liberal scholarship, the first eleven chapters are “primeval history” which is made up of myths and legends no different from the various ancient myths and legends found among the pagan peoples of that time. The “Flood myth” in Genesis 6-9 for example is stated to be borrowed from the Akkadian Gilgamesh Epic. But if the events in the Bible are not truly history despite the fact that they claim to be history, can we trust the Bible at all?
Wednesday, March 29, 2017
Each generation has its own problems, its own idols. The millennial generation has to deal with rank secularism and "progressive" identity politics and issues of "social justice," and it seems there is some question as to how the church ought to best deal with these matters.
In this light, I find these articles illuminating: Andrew Sullivan asking "Is Intersectionality a Religion", and articles from The Federalist "'Secular Religion' and the Impossibility of Religious Liberty" and "Liberal Fascism is what happens once people think God is dead." All of these articles make the point concerning the religious nature of much of progressive thought, and help us understand why progressives are so hateful, intolerant and bigoted, while claiming to be "loving" and "tolerant."
It seems to me that understanding the religious nature of progressive thought is helpful because then we can more clearly address the problem at its presuppositions. How should we address progressive thought? The way we have always dealt with false theologies, by exposing their incoherence and failures, and offering a true Christian alternative. Progressive Marxism however has masked itself, and thus it must be exposed. We cannot allow them to redefine language for their benefit. Progressive Marxism is a totalitarian system of thought and life, and thus the entire system and all its branches must be challenged and the Christian alternative regarding every part of thought and life is to be offered. We should not give an inch to this new incarnation of Marxism, but we cannot just stop at ideology, theology and philosophy, but also in action. The church has to offer an alternative community for the lost and hurting, even though the primary focus of the church is on the Word and sacraments, yet community is necessary for this progressivist age.
The church has to step up as it were, to face this new totalitarian challenge. We cannot be fighting the wars of the last century, for then we would not be properly witnessing to the emerging culture of our time.
λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἕκαστος ὑμῶν λέγει· ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, ἐγὼ δὲ Ἀπολλῶ, ἐγὼ δὲ Κηφᾶ, ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ. μεμέρισται ὁ Χριστός; μὴ Παῦλος ἐσταυρώθη ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ἢ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Παύλου ἐβαπτίσθητε; (1 Cor. 1:12-13)
But I say this: that each of you say, I am of Paul, and I am of Apollos, and I am of Cephas, and I am of Christ. Has Christ been separated? Was Paul crucified for you, or was it into the name of Paul you were baptized? (1 Cor. 1:12-13; my translation)
Last Lord's Day, I had the privilege of bringing God's Word to the saints at Providence Reformed Presbyterian Church, which can be heard here.
It is very easy to take the moralistic route on this passage and just preach that the church must be united, as if unity in the church is as easy as having a big campfire and everyone holding hands and singing around the campfire. But to do justice to the text, one must deal with the real issue of the ground of unity, which is the Gospel message. The problem and sin of schism is real, but more laws and commands will not be able to solve it. We notice here that there are 4 factions under 4 figureheads that Paul mentioned: "of Paul," "of Apollos," "of Cephas or Peter," and "of Christ." The first faction focus on evangelism and church planting, the second emphasizes Bible study, rigorous intellect and apologetics and the third faction, history and tradition. Notice here that the fourth faction claim to be above the fray. In my sermon, I point that those who cry "no creed but Christ," the non-denominational denominations (which I did not name in my sermon, but people can look at examples like the Christian and Missionary Alliance or Calvary Chapel) and anti-intellectuals will fit that category. I will here further point out that striving for "unity" on grounds other than the Gospel will also fit into this category, since such is essentially putting up a new law for believers to keep.
The problem of unity is not that no one wants unity, but that everyone wants unity on his terms. Even the so-called modern "ecumenical movement" is essentially the 4th faction, since they think themselves above the fray of denominational differences while uniting around a social gospel and not the true Gospel itself. True biblical unity, if it is to be there, can only be found in the true Gospel. It stands to reason therefore that anyone, any church, and any denomination that denies the Gospel has cut itself away from true biblical unity. That is why the "ecumenical movement" manifests a false demonic unity, since the Gospel is not the center in it but only a perversion thereof.
True biblical unity therefore is hard, because it requires fidelity to the Gospel, an understanding of its centrality, and an understanding of the subservient functions of other biblical doctrines (baptism in the case of the Corinthians). Christians seeking true biblical unity should strive for it, which in the biblical Presbyterian model imply that they ought to be seeking to join local churches into presbyteries, synods and General Assemblies. This should be the goal for Christians to strive towards, a truly difficult task at hand.
Monday, March 20, 2017
Clark’s solution is to distinguish human responsibility from God’s causative agency. This is certainly a helpful solution which the Reformed world should utilize, yet I do not see it as solving the question completely. (from my review of The Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized Biography of Gordon H. Clark, here)
The distinction between "will" and "nature" in the doctrine of God is properly basic...— puritanreformed (@puritanreformed) March 19, 2017
Chalcedonian theism marks the high point of orthodoxy with regards to the doctrine of God. This catholic (small "c") tradition defines God as one being/ essence, three persons, and this one God has one will and one nature in His being. Jesus Christ, the second person of the Trinity, is one person with two natures (human and divine), and thus two wills. In traditional theism, a nature has a will, and thus Christ's two natures necessitates the existence of two wills. One could also extrapolate that to mean Christ has two minds, as indicative of the fact of Him having two wills.
What, then, is nature? What is will? What is person? Such questions should not be difficult to answer, especially when one looks at the Greek words behind these concepts: nature (φυσις), will (θελημα), person (προσωπον). "Nature" is an ontological terms defining what a thing is. "Will" originates decisions and actions. "Person" is more complicated and much confusion reigned over the term, but in association with the term hypostasis (ὑποστασις), a "person" is a subsistence, an instantiation. To simplify things, I would use the term "individuated consciousness." Note here that I did not say "individual consciousness," or "individuated center of consciousness," in order to keep the definition generic, since the three persons of the Trinity are one and the same being.
A "nature" is what a thing is. A "will" originates decisions and actions. What a thing is is separate from what a thing decides. Socrates is a man; that is his nature. Socrates ate his dinner; that is his will originating a decision to eat, and his body obeying his will to eat. Such is basic English and basic philosophy 101. A "nature" is never a "will," and, as we can see in recent times, it is possible for people to will something (transgender surgery) contrary to their nature (humans as inherently male and female).
God has His own nature, which is who He is ad intra. God wills, and acts accordingly, ad extra. Whatever God wills has its origin ad intra, but is manifested ad extra, where it then effect His works. There should be no question whatsoever that God's nature and God's will is distinct. To be sure, God is consistent, as God is one and simple. Therefore, according to traditional theism, God's will should be consistent with God's nature.
Since we never know God's nature simpliciter, in the history of theology, we come across the debate between realism and voluntarism, in the debate over the potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata (power of God absolute and ordained). Is the power of God absolute, in the sense that He can will anything including alternate past events, round squares and evil as good (divine voluntarism). Is it the power of God restricted to what He ordained to come to pass, and thus is not "absolute" in that sense (realism). Radical divine voluntarism, as held to by the nominalists, have God's power extending over contingency (possible past events), logical contradictions (round squares) and moral contradictions (evil as good). The orthodox position would deny the latter two (at least in their crude form) since they make no sense, but debate remain over contingency. As an example, can God create a world where He can forgive sins without the atonement of Christ? Those who hold to voluntarism might answer yes, while the realists would definitely say no.
So what does this obscure medieval debate has to do with Gordon Clark's theodicy? This "obscure" debate is relevant only because it brings up the same issues concerning God's nature and God's will. It must be noted that we are not talking about whether Clark's solution to the problem of theodicy is helpful. We are speaking concerning those who think that Clark's solution to the problem of theodicy is THE solution. Those who think that appeal to a fiat declaration that God is by definition good and therefore the entire question of theodicy is solved have not begun to scratch the surface of the problems it creates within the doctrine of God. In Clark's solution, we have the following propositions:
(1) God (by definition) is good
(2) God wills evil things
(3) God is ex lex (outside the law) and thus cannot be judged by His law.
Conclusion: Therefore, God is good even though He wills evil
As ONE solution, it is helpful. But we note here there are two propositions concerning the doctrine of God that we need to take note also:
(4) God is one and simple, therefore His will and His nature within Him are one and the same.
(5) God's law is a reflection of His nature
Putting propositions 1-5 together will create a problem, which shows that theodicy is not as easily solved just by Clark's solution. For, yes, God is ex lex in the sense that God is not culpable of evil just because He wills evil. But what is the law? What does willing evil say about the nature of God? For since God is one and God is simple, then His will (as originating ad intra) is equivalent to His nature, but if His will is His nature, then does willing evil things mean that God's nature is evil? But then it is protested that God by definition is good? Well then, you have a contradiction between proposition 1 and 4, and merely repeating proposition 1 does not solve the contradiction you will have. Unless of course, you do not mind throwing away the doctrine of divine simplicity. The same problem will arise when we ask how we can square propositions 3 and 5.
The radical followers of Clark will just assert propositions 1-3 over and over again, and either ignore or deny propositions 4 and 5. Such an emphasis on the divine will as dissociated from the divine nature is a characteristic of divine voluntarism. To be sure, they do not affirm clear logical or moral contradictions, but their emphasis on the divine will blind them to the problems such voluntarism have concerning one's doctrine of God. Perhaps they wish to deny propositions 4 and/or 5? But for those of us who do not reduce everything to "will" alone, we can affirm Clark's solution solve the moral aspect of theodicy, but acknowledge it leaves untouched the ontological problem of theodicy. (For those wanting to know how to solve that latter problem, a pointer would be to distinguish God's will concerning evil as primarily good, while secondarily evil.)
Wednesday, March 15, 2017
Douglas Douma has recently published a biography of the Presbyterian philosopher Gordon Haddon Clark (1902-1985), entitled The Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized Biography of Gordon H. Clark. I have just finished reading it, and here is my review of the book. An excerpt:
Gordon Haddon Clark (1902-1985) was a prominent American Presbyterian philosopher and churchman in the 20th century, yet one would not know it by living in many contemporary 21st century American Presbyterian and Reformed circles. In this biography of this neglected American thinker, Douglas Douma does us all a great service by opening a window into the life of this man, helping us to understand his situation in life, and especially into the major controversy that has played a big influence in the formative years of one Presbyterian denomination, the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC) — the “Clark-Van Til Controversy.”
Wednesday, March 08, 2017
XII. … Thus the promises added to the precepts signify only what God will grant to believers and penitents, not what he wills to grant to all those to whom the precept is proposed. [3.XV.12]
XVIII. There cannot be contrariety between those two wills because they do not will and nill [sic] the same thing in the same manner and respect. … [3.XV.18]
XXIV. If God by this will had signified that he willed the salvation of all without exception, he would have signified that he willed what he least willed (since by passing over the greater part, he has not willed to give them salvation). But when he signifies that he wills the salvation of all believers and penitents, it signifies that he wills that which he really wills and nothing is more true, nothing more sincere than such a declaration. [3.XV.24]
XII. This twofold will [of an antecedent and consequent will as per Amyraut -DHC] cannot be proved from Mt. 23:27, ... Therefore, Jerusalem is here to be distinguished from her sons as the words themselves prove. ... [3.XVI.12]
XVIII. When God testified that "he has no pleasure at all in the death of the sinner, but that he should return from his ways, and live" (Ezek. 18:23), this does not favor the inefficacious will or the feeble velleity of God because the word chpts (which occurs here) does not denote desire so much as delight and complacency. ... [3.XVI.18]
- Francis Turretin, Institute of Elentic Theology
It seems Francis Turretin did not hold to the well-meant offer as taught by John Murray and the Neo-Amyraldians.
Friday, March 03, 2017
Over in an article at the Desiring God website, the word "homophobia" is used once again. While the article does expresses certain truths (i.e. one's opposition to homosexuality should be based on Scripture and love not on emotions), the use of the word "homophobia" is extremely disturbing.
Words have meanings, and while it is a stretch to say that words are instruments of power, it is nonetheless true that terms and phrases direct the flow of thought and conversation. Even if a concept is rejected, the mere naming of the concept (particularly as a neologism) creates a conceptual space for it to be conceived in, with all its connotations. If mentioned and brought up frequently enough, the terms and what it conveys will become part of normalized discourse, even IF the concepts continue to be rejected. On a subconscious level, such normalization in discourse will create an impetus towards seeing such things as part of normal everyday life.
The usage of the neologism "homophobia" therefore functions in such a manner, as a trojan horse towards the normalization of deviant sexualities. Instead of telling people they ought to be compassionate towards those who struggle with deviant sexual temptations, those people are tarred with the neologism "homophobia." Thus, those who buy into the deceptive words of the LGBTQIAXXX agenda have lost half the battle when they adopt the terms and phrases of wicked men, even when they do correctly reject the actual wicked practices themselves. But when you allow wicked activists to direct the flow of thought and conversation, then those who reject the sexual deviancies will be increasingly perceived to be backward intolerant bigots and be on the defensive, no matter how much Desiring God and others will claim otherwise.
If one wants to actually promote the truth of Scripture on the issue, then one should stop adopting the terms of the wicked. Call a thing as what it is, and not what the world thinks it is, and refuse to compromise even on the terms one uses. Terms such as "homophobia" should never be used towards Christians, and should be qualified even in apologetics towards unbelievers.
Thursday, March 02, 2017
Nationalism is not patriotism. Whereas patriotism is the love of one's country, nationalism is the divinization of one's country, to worship one's nation as a god. During World War One, the various European nations were transmogrified into the divine instruments of God and His wrath on earth, with catastrophic consequences. The Liberal Protestant clergy were one of the chief culprits, and here is one such blasphemous prayer from a German pastor:
Our Father, from the height of heaven,
Make haste to succor Thy German people.
Help us in the holy war,
Let your name, like a star, guide us:
Lead Thy German Reich to glorious victories.
Who will stand before the conquerors?
Who will go into the dark sword-grave?
Lord, Thy will be done!
Although war’s bread be scanty,
Smite the foe each day
With death and tenfold woes.
In thy merciful patience, forgive
Each bullet and each blow
That misses its mark
Lead us not into the temptation
Of letting our wrath be too gentle
In carrying out Thy divine judgment.
Deliver us and our pledged ally [Austria-Hungary]
From the Evil One and his servants on earth.
Thine is the kingdom
The German land.
May we, through Thy mailed [sic?] hand
Come to power and glory
[As cited in Philip Jenkins, The Great and Holy War: How World War I Became a Religious Crusade (New York, NY: Harper One, 2014), 13]
Loving one's country is good, but never, ever treat any country or government as divine or semi-divine, as having absolute authority over the souls and consciences of men. Such is idolatry, and idolatry can have real-life consequences, as the First World War and the Second World War have shown us.
Monday, February 27, 2017
X. The decrees of God can be regarded in two ways: either subjectively (if it right so to speak, i.e., on the part of the internal act in itself and absolutely); or objectively, extrinsically and relatively with respect to creatures (respectively). In the former manner, they do not differ from God himself and are no other than God himself decreeing. But in the latter, they do differ because they may be conceived as many and various (not as to the thing, since God has decreed all things by one single and most simple act, but as to the objects), even as the knowledge of God is conversant with him innumerable objects without detriment to his unity.
XI. The decrees of God are free, not absolutely and as to the principle, but relatively and objectively and as to the end. For there could be no external object necessarily terminating to the divine will, for God stands in need of nothing out of himself. Therefore they could be and not be. But this does not hinder them from being called necessary as to the principle and internal act because the act of intelligence and will could not be absent from God at all. He could not be God without intelligence and will. They are necessary, therefore, as to internal existence, but free as to external relation (schesin) and habit. Nor can the will of God be said to cease absolutely, but with respect to the external object on which it is terminated.
What is the relation of God to His decrees? On the one hand, it consists of God decreeing something freely, and thus they seem to be on the side of God ad extra. On the other hand, they are the expression of God's mind and will, which are constitutive of God ad intra. But certainly nothing can be both internal and external to God at the same time, can it?
As Turretin states, the decrees, coming from God's "intelligence and will" is internal to God. But the decrees, as they are freely done by God, is free in its external relations (schesin). But what does this actually mean?
Perhaps to re-phrase for the intention of clarification, we can think of the decrees as being a thing X, which exists. The existence of X comes about from mind and will, and thus it is eternally timeless, partaking of the eternity of God's mind and will. The quiddity (or "what-ness") of the decrees, of the thing X, is internal to God, for God's mind and will necessitates it.
At the same time, the content or relation of the decrees, the thing X, is external to God, for it terminates upon the things decreed. Thus, the decrees are truly free in this sense, towards things external to the being of God. Thus, the decrees as to its reality is internal to God, God ad intra, yet the decrees as to what they refer to are external to God's being, God ad extra.
Therefore, the decrees of God are one, in the being of God, for God is simple and indivisible. When we speak therefore of the decreeS of God, we have already moved to the ad extra aspect of theology proper. The decrees of God in its one simple ad intra form we know that it exists (quiddity), but not as to what it is. When we inquire into what it is, what they are, we only see the decrees as they are of God's work, in a manner we can understand.
"Imagine there's no heaven ..."
… For if there were no God, no republic, no society in the world would be safe. Without virtue, without religion, nothing can be safe. If here were no God, there be neither virtue nor religion. What would the world be but a mere den of robbers in which license would be each one’s law, no such thing as right or wrong, no right of government, no necessity of obedience—the most abandoned, the superior and the most powerful, the master? No check would be placed upon the oppression of rules and the rebellion of subjects. Each one would follow the bent of his own inclination. Again, if there were no God, no mortals would even for a moment be safe or secure from violence, fraud, perjury, slaughter of blood. Every hour everything would have to be feared. Take away the barriers of divinity and what would become of confidence and innocence? What license or violence would not be witnessed? As to human edicts (besides the fact that they cannot change the mind for the better, but on the contrary make it artful and intent upon all the arts of deception), what place would there be for human laws, if (the sense of deity being removed) the conscience would shake off all relations of justice and injustice?
[Turretin, Institutes, 3.I.21]
V. … Now such a judge can be found nowhere else than in the church where they erect four tribunals from which there is no appeal: (1) the church; (2) the councils; (3) the fathers; (4) the pope. But when the votes are properly counted, the pope remains solus (alone), to whom they are accustomed to ascribing that supreme and infallible judgment.
VI. That such is this opinion this passage from Andradius (who was in the Council of Trent) proves: “This high authority of interpreting the Scriptures we grant not to individual bishops, but to the Roman pontiff alone, who is the head of the church, or to all the chief offices collected together by his command” (Defen. triden. fidei, lib. 2+). “That judge cannot be the Scriptures, but the ecclesiastical prince; either alone or with the counsel and consent of the fellow bishops” (Bellarmine, VD 3.9*, p. 110). “The Roman pontiff is the one in whom this authority, which the church has of judging concerning all controversies of faith, resides” (Gregory of Valentia, Analysis fidei catholicae 7 , p. 216). Still this is not the opinion of all. For although they who exalt the pope above the council ascribe this authority of a judge to him, yet they think differently who hold the council to be above the pope finally. Others, to reconcile these two opinions, think the pope (in the council) or the council (approved by the pope) is that infallible judge.
[Turretin, Institutes, 2.XX.5-6]