One supposed implications of simplicity and its denial, according to Matthew Barrett

He is not a God made up of parts but a God without parts. There is in him no composition, nor can he be compounded by parts. If he could, then he would be a divided being (parts are divivisible by definition), a mutable being (parts are prone to change), a temporal being (parts require a composer), and a dependentent being (depending on these parts as if they precede him). [Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity: The Unmanipulated Father, Son and Spirit (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2021), 137]

The doctrine of simplicity of God, in its basic form, is the teaching that God is not made up of parts such that one can have a part of, or various parts of God. At its most basic form, it means simply this: One gets God, or no God; there is no in-between. In this basic sense, simplicity is a biblical doctrine, since the Scripture make it clear that one gets God, "warts" and all.

In the providence of God, God uses the metaphysics of classical theism, based as it is upon Greek philosophy, to express this truth for us Christians. Yet, philosophy, being invented by Man, is a mere tool for gaining knowledge. Being a creation of Man, philosophy was never meant to be infallible, and thus we must be free to critique philosophy and never treat any one particular philosophy as THE way to think about anything, both the philosophy of things or theology itself. This particular critical stance is important when we look at some of the ways the supposed recovery of the "creedal doctrine of God" has been working itself out, as seen in the above argument by Matthew Barrett.

In this particular argument, Barrett makes the following argument: If God is not simple, then he is divisible, mutable, temporal, and dependent. But is this statement true? We would certainly agree that if God is not simple, then he is divisible, since "divisibility" is opposite of "simplicitity." However, I would question what Barrett means by a "divided being." Next, according to Barrett, parts are prone to change, therefore a non-simple God would be mutable. However, why should parts be prone to change? Even in the material world, parts like atoms of hydrogen-1 are not prone to change over millions of years. Accordingly, the protons, neutrons, and electrons of Hydrogen-1 in interstellar space do not change at all over time. Thus, even in the material world, we can see that parts are not necessarily prone to change. Why then would a non-simple God be mutable at all? Obviously, I am not arguing against simplicity here, just showing that the argument here just does not follow. It is possible to believe in immutability and deny simplicity, for the simple fact that parts are not necessarily prone to change or even are mutable in any respect.

Barrett next claims that parts require a composer, and therefore a non-simple God is temporal. That likewise does not follow. Why should parts require a compser? Again, in the material world, if you accept the Big Bang Theory, then atoms come into being spontaneously without a composer. While agreeing that God is the ultimate cause of things, there are many things in the world that are self-organizing, from a material point of view. Salt solutions when left to themselve naturally compose themselves into salt crystals, with fixed crystalline structures depending on their chemical composition. There are autocatylytic reactions like the degradation of tin metal into grey tin, or the auto-excision of introns from RNA. Therefore, even things that have parts do not necessarily need a composer. It is possible for parts to auto-organize, and therefore parts do not necessarily require a composer. For a non-simple deity, it is possible to envision such a god being made of self-organizing and eternal parts, thus a non-simple deity is not necessarily temporal.

The last claim made by Barrett is that a non-simple God is dependent on the parts that precede him. Again, this is a non sequitur. Something made of parts could be made of parts because it could be divisible yet started as one whole (the whole is prior to the parts). There is simply no reason why parts must necessarily precede the whole. For example, the human body is made up of parts, yet the human body does not develop as parts which are then composed into the human body. Right from the start as a fetus, the human body develops as a whole. The human body is not like a car assembly line whereby parts are made separately then put together to make a car. Rather, the whole comes prior to the parts, as the parts develop from the whole. In fact, the parts of the human body depend on the whole human body for them to survive. Cut the hand out, and the hand dies while the rest of the body survives. In the case of the human body therefore, the part here is dependent on the whole.

Barrett is right to promote the doctrine of simplicity. However, there are biblical ways to argue for simplicity, and simply illogical ways stemming from outdated philosophy. In this particular case, Barrett's argument is unsound. God is simple because one cannot have a God that has only certain parts, the parts that any particular group likes. But denying simplicity does not lead to a mutable or temporal or dependent being.

When seeking to teach and defend biblical and confessional truths, a key point to note is that one ought to put foward arguments that are sound. Making unsound arguments only weakens one's position, and might lead some to reject the position altogether. The last thing anyone who is promoting simplicity as the biblical doctrine should be doing, is to repeat such unsound arguments. Keep to the basics, and leave the psuedo-intellectual arguments of classical theism behind.

Book Review: Through Western Eyes, by Robert Letham

What is Eastern Orthodoxy? In his book Through Western Eyes — Eastern Orthodoxy: A Reformed Perspective, theologian Robert Letham seeks to introduce and analyze Eastern Orthodoxy for the rest of who are children of the Western churches. Has Letham done a good job introducing Eastern Orthodoxy to us? You can read my thoughts in my review of his book, here. An excerpt:

What is Eastern Orthodoxy? For most Christians in the West, Eastern Orthodoxy (EO) seems mysterious, and looks like an older Roman Catholicism without the Pope. Into this lacuna of knowledge, Reformed theologian Robert Letham has written a book seeking to “demystify” Eastern Orthodoxy for the rest of us Christians of the Western tradition. Specifically, Letham seeks to put forward and analyze Eastern Orthodoxy according to his Reformed perspective, thus helping us understand what Eastern Orthodoxy is about.

Letham divides his book into three sections. In part one, he deals briefly with the history of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Part two deals with the theology of Eastern Orthodoxy, and part three is where he does a comparative evaluation between Reformed theology and Eastern Orthodoxy. He ends with a glossary of terms and a rather comprehensive bibliography for the study of Eastern Orthodoxy.

[more]

Gregory Palamas and the Essence/ Energies Distinction

(III.ii.6)

… but also some works of God are without beginning, as the Fathers also rightly affirm. For was it not needful for the work of providence to exist before Creation, so as to cause each of the created things to come to be in time, out of nonbeing? As it not necessary for a divine knowledge to know before choosing, even outside time? But how does it follow that the divine prescience had a beginning? How could one conceive of a beginning of God’s self-contemplation, and was there ever a moment when God began to be moved toward contemplation of Himself? Never! [Gregory Palamas, The Triads (The Classics of Western Spirituality; Ed. John Meyendorff; trans. Nicholas Gendle; Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), p. 94]

These works of God, then, are manifestly unoriginated and pre-temporal: His foreknowledge, will, providence, contemplation of Himself, and whatever powers are akin to these. But if this contemplation, prescience, predetermination and will are works of God that are without beginning, then virtue is also unoriginated, for each of His works is a virtue; ... (Ibid., p. 94)

(III.ii.8)

But even if this man considers that everything that has a beginning is created, we for our part know that while all the energies of God are uncreated, not all are without beginning. Indeed, beginning and end must be ascribed, if not to the creative power itself, then at least to its activity, that is to say, to its energy as directed towards created things. (Ibid., p. 96)/p>

The strong influence of Neoplatonism on Eastern Orthodoxy would logically result in a distant and remote deity. Such is however contrary to biblical Christianity. The contradiction is so obvious that Eastern Orthodoxy could not continue being Christian without modifying parts of what it received through Dionysius. This it did in positing a distinction between the essence of God, and His energies. "Energies" can be taken as the workings of God. They are the dynamic workings of God, not to be identified with who God is (essence), neither are they identified with what God does (the works of God). The essence of God is as what Neoplatonism says it is: beyond being, beyond intelligibility, utterly inaccessible to anyone but God. The energies of God are however what humans can perceive. In fact, the Eastern Orthodox doctrine of theosis, sometimes called "deification," is the idea that the believer could partake in the divine energies fully.

In Palamas' Triads, certainly not everything stated is I believe compatible with biblical Christianity. Nevertheless, Palamas' promotion of the essence/ energies distinction is a helpful category. Neoplatonism has forced the issue, showing how immutability if applied to the whole of God would result in a static God, the God of Deism. Therefore, in order to have a vital communion with God (which the East promoted through its misguided monasticism), new philosophical categories were formed. Western Christianity in general was not as strongly influenced by Neoplatonism as the East was, and therefore was slow to see the problems that would arise with a God who has only an essence that is utterly transendent and immutable. The East remained orthodox in their doctrine of God, unlike many Western theologians who came to see the same problems, and therefore invented these categories congrunt to biblical orthodoxy that we can now appropriate.

One argument that Palamas pointed out was to note that the decrees of God and the foreknowledge of God are prior to creation. God's will and His own self-enjoyment (contemplation) are likewise eternal. Yet all these are not "being" but operations of some sort, since they are active in nature. Therefore, it can be seen that these "works" (as utilized by Palamas) of God are "without beginning." These energies are not just within God so to speak, but they translate to "activities" that are "directed towards created things."

Now, the fact that there are these decrees of God and other active operations are clear from Scripture. What is however omitted from the thoughts of many theologians is an attempt to categorize them as either essence or works. The fact of the matter is that it is neither of these categories, and thus the category of "energies" is most appropriate here. Orthodox Western systematic theologians tend to talk about God's essencce, then His attributes (communicable and incommunicable), and subsume these operations under the atttributes of God. The problem is that atttributes are "static" in nature. They describe what God is, not what God does. Therefore, including these active operations under the section on the atttributes of God, or worse, to shift parts of them to the works of God, is I believe to be massive categorical confusion.

God is immutable yet He relates both to Himself and to us His creatures. We must hold to both, and do it without diminishing either of them. Without the category of "energies," I do not see how either of these truths could not but be diminished, to the detriment of our understanding and worship of our living God.

Mark Galli, formerly from Christianity Today, admits what we always knew about Big Eva

Mark Galli on his Substack platform recently admitted in his report what we always knew was the case: That Evangelicals love the accolades of the world and lean left while punching right. An excerpt:

Elite evangelicalism (represented by CT, IVPress, World Vision, Fuller Seminary, and a host of other establishment organizations) is too often “a form of cultural accommodation dressed as convictional religion.” These evangelicals want to appear respectable to the elite of American culture. ...

...

I saw this accommodation dynamic as CT managing editor and then editor in chief. We said, for example, that the magazine did not take a stand in the complementarianism or egalitarianism debate. But we rarely if ever published an article that endorsed complementarianism; we did offer many that assumed egalitarianism in family and church life (not to mention the many women pastors who we published).

Then there was the six-day creation/evolution debate, in which again we said we took no stand. But try to find an article in the last three decades that argued for or assumed six-day creation. And yet we published several pieces that simply assumed a billion-year time span for the history of the earth.

It’s not a coincidence that complementarianism and six-day creation are anathema to secularists, features of a religion out of touch with reality.

Is it any wonder that Evangelicalism has always drifted towards doctrinal and moral corruption over time? Galli puts forward TGC (The Gospel Coalition) as the successor to New Evangelicalism. Unfortunately, the same dynamic is busy at work in TGC, just at a less advanced stage.

In response to Perl's call for a return to Neoplatonism

The alternative to the principle that to be is to be intelligible, therefore is the nihilism which afflicts so much of contemporary thought and culture. For if being is not what is apprehended by thought, then thought does not apprehend being. This in effect means that there is no being, since whatever we call “being” is not being but a projection, interpretation, illusion—in short, nothing. If reality is not as thought must apprehend it, then there is no such thing as reality. Conversely, if thought is not the apprehension of being, then all thought, in that it never apprehends being, is illusory. Nihilism may indeed be said to consist most fundamentally in the denial of the intelligibility of being. (Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 111-2)

In his conclusion of his book on Dionysius, Eric Perl puts forth his promotion of Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism is treated as superior as opposed to what he sees as the nihilism that infects the modern world. While certainly nihilism is present in much modern thought, I do not agree that Neoplatonism is a better alternative.

Perl's argument against much of modern philosophy can be stated as follows: (1) If thought does not apprehend being, being is an illusion. (2) If thought is not the apprehension of being, then thought is illusory. (3) Therefore, if Neoplatonism is false, being and thought are illusory. (4) (Implied) Being and thought are not illusory. (5) Therefore, Neoplatonism is true. The problem comes with statements 1 and 2. Is it really true that apprehending being is necessary for the reality of thought and being?

Reality and thought are linked in Plato due to the idea of forms, in which apprehension comes about when one apprehends the form of things. One knows what fire is when one sees "fire-ness" in the object. Implicit in this view of knowledge is that the mind has access to the forms in order to apprehend an object. But is that truly how cognition works?

Let us think through a few questions: Can the mind apprehend a pink unicorn? How about a pegasus? Surely we can say that the mind can apprehend these things, but then these things are not real. But suppose it is said that their forms are derived from real forms, and thus even though the mythical creatures do not exist, the reason why we apprehend them is because the original forms exist and we can apprehend them. So let's try something different, something real. How about the wave-particle duality of photons? Can our minds apprehend the concept? I would think so. Pointing out that we can apprehend "wave" and "particle" does not help because "wave-particle" is not wave and not particle. Or from Math, can we apprehend the idea of transfinites, where again transfinites are not truly infinite and yet they compose infinite sets?

The thing is: Ever since the Scientific Revolution, the link between being and intelligibility has been strained to the breaking point. Our knowledge is not limited to what there is, as we are able to conceptualize new theories and new things. Our thought is virtually limited to what we can conceptualize. Reality of course remains the same. The world in Plato's time is more or less the same world in modern times. Photons existed as wave-particles in Plato's time just as it does in ours, except Plato did not know or understand modern physics. Thus, we see a separation between the world of being and the world of ideas. Reality remains the same, yet thought and cognition does not.

Since such is the case, I would propose that we need a separation of reality from the world of ideas. There is nothing necessarily wrong with the Platonic forms, and that objects have forms which impress themselves on the mind (Whether that is the best way to understand cognition I would not comment here). The separation however needs to happen between reality and thought. We must understand that conceptualization is a mental process that can operate apart from the world, and that has happened as we come to grips with the strangeness and counter-intuitive nature of the inner workings of reality. Reality or being is one thing; the world of ideas does have relation to reality but is able to transcend it altogether.

From a Christian perspective, we must hold to some version of that separation, since we believe in a God who is in many ways unlike us. To assert that God is a se (when nothing in reality is a se), and we are expected to understand what we mean when we say that God is a se, is already a conceptual leap from reality. We also say that there are the "secret things of God" (c.f. Deut. 29:29), which are certainly real and yet not known by us, thus we must create an extra category of real but not intelligible. Christianity therefore cuts against the identification of being and intelligibility, and those who hold to such an identification would come to face problems in their philosophies. Those holding to Platonism tend towards rationalism, while those rejecting rationalism tend towards mysticism, precisely because they continue to run with Plato's link between being and intelligibility.

If we separate being and intelligibility, we can have 3 categories: (1) Things real but not intelligible (secret things of God), (2) Things real and intelligible (most things), and (3) Things intelligible but without being (e.g. knowledge of God, Scientific paradigms). There is no need to reduce everything to intelligibility and thus become a rationalist (rejecting 1), or focus on being and thus treading the path of Dionysius (rejecting 1 and 3). If we take this paradigm, then we can reject statements 1 and 2 of Perl's argument, and therefore his case for Neoplatonism. What I suspect is happening in much of philosophy is a failure of imagination, and a stubborn clinging to the idea that unity of thought and being can be found in this world by Man.

Neoplatonism, symbols, and the issue of icons

All expressions of God, the lowly and sensible no less than the exalted and intelligible, participate in him and are thus “similar.” (Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 103)

All things, then, are in effect symbols of God and are so used in the scriptures, and this is simply a restatement of the doctrine that being is theophany. (p. 103)

The Platonic doctrine of participation, which Dionysius invokes in justifying the suitability of all things as symbols of God, makes it clear that the symbol is a genuine presentation of the symbolized. (p. 104)

A symbol, then, in being finite, available, in not being God and thus in leaving him behind, in concealing him, reveals him as beyond being and thought. … Only by being concealed in symbols can God be revealed (p. 104)

Hence, as Dionysius here indicates, there can be non-symbolic knowledge of God, no knowledge of God without the concealment of symbolism. (p. 105)

The Second Council of Nicea of 787 AD, known in Eastern Orthodoxy as the "Seventh Ecumenical Council," mandated the virtue of holy icons (two-dimensional images) and anathemized those who reject icons (the iconoclasts). For Protestants who see idols of any kind as a violation of the Second Commandment, Nicea II contradicts Scripture and is thus an illegitimate council. Therefore, we would not call it the "Seventh Ecumenical Council" except improperly. Nevertheless, Eastern Orthodox promotion of icons and treating the issue as of the essence of faith stems from this council.

For a Reformed person like myself, I had found it puzzling why Eastern Orthodoxy is so adamant on the issue of icons. Reading Eric Perl on Dionysius however has shown me the likely backdrop for this fascination with icons. This is not to argue that any Eastern Orthodox is a neoplatonist or that any of them hold to full-blown neoplatonism, but rather that the philosophical underpinnings of the Eastern theology of icons is found in the neoplatonism of Dionysius.

In Dionysius' neoplatonic ontology, symbols mediate the divine. Since God is not "being" neither is he "not-being," being the unity of all as the necessary condition for being, being as such is a "theophany," an appearance of the divine (Ibid., p. 32). All things are symbols mediating the divine. To use Christian terminology, all matter is "sacramental." Since God is "beyond being" and "unknowable," to get to the "hidden God" is to go through the symbols mediating the divine. As Perl said, "Only by being concealed in symbols can God be revealed." In other words, Dionysius asserts that there is no way to reach the divine if the symbols are gone.

Once we see this, it becomes clear that a main reason why icons are so important in Eastern Orthodoxy is due to its fear of losing the connection to God. If symbols are necessary to reveal the hidden God, then removing the symbols would be akin to removing God. Seen this way, Nicea II is understandable, albeit it shows us the tragic consequences of adopting an unbiblical ontology which leads to gross idolatry.

Neoplatonic ontology: Being as Intelligibility and God as unknowable

Plato’s understanding of being as form or idea (εἶδος, ἰδέα) is a direct consequence of this identification of being and intelligibility. [Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite (New York NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 6]

Intellect, therefore, is perfect consciousness in that it is the knowledge of being as its own content and therefore as itself. (Ibid., p. 85)

Dionysius adopts his doctrine of God as “nameless,” “unknowable,” and “beyond being” from the Neoplatonic tradition established by Plotinus, and his thought can be understood only in that context. His “negative theology” is not fundamentally a theory of theological language but a philosophical position taken over directly from Neoplatonism, although, as in Plotinus, it has implications for language in that words are discursive expressions of intellection and hence cannot apply to God. (Ibid., p. 13)

Similarly, Dionysius is not content to say simply that God is ineffable, unknowable, or incomprehensible. To say “God is ineffable” is to describe him, to ascribe the attribute of ineffability to him, and thus to contradict oneself. (Ibid., p. 14)

… God is not some being other than all things (the very formula is an absurdity) but is rather the entire content of reality, i.e. all things, without differentiation, without the distinctions from one another by which they are all things. (Ibid., p. 31)

The knowledge of God, then, is given to sense no less than to intellect. Conversely, since God is the object of all cognition and of none rather than merely the object of the highest cognition, the cognitive ascent does not end with intellect. It extends beyond intellect to culminate in “the darkness of unknowing” … (Ibid., p. 93)

Platonism and neoplatonism are important philosophies at the base of the Western philosophical enterprise. For the purpose of church history, Neoplatonism plays an important role in the formation of certain philosophies and theologies in the church. Specifically, as I read more into Eastern Orthodoxy, the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius played an important role in the formation of Eastern Orthodoxy theology, as mediated by Eastern fathers such as Gregoras Palamas in his Triads. Dionysius is not actually written by the real Dionysius the Aeropagite (thus a "false writing" - pseudepigrapha), but it was thought to be so for a long time. The writer of these false writings was a Neoplatonist, and through him Neoplatonism influenced the theology of Eastern Orthodoxy.

But what does Neoplatonism believe in, besides the usual things we associate with Plato? In his book, Eric Perl brought forth certain aspects of Neoplatonism that can be seen in the writing of Psuedo-Dionysius. Concerning ontology, one thing that struck out was the absolute identity between being and thought. Whether Plato taught that to be the case I am unsure, but certainly this strong identification of one to the other was surprising. Note that Perl is not merely stating that Neoplatonism teaches that being and intelligibility are associated or linked, but that they are to be identified. Thus, it is not the case that things exist are intelligible, but rather that to begin to exist is to be intelligible, and to not begin to exist is to be unintelligible. In set theory, all elements of the set "having being" map exhaustively onto all elements of the set "being intelligible." This strict identification implies a collapse of epistemology into ontology, and I suppose that is why the issue of "being" is so prominent in many philosophical discussions.

In Perl's analysis of Dionysius as read alongside Plotinus and Proclus, this identification of being with intelligibility is the reason why Dionysius calls God (the philosophical "the One") "beyond being." To call God a "being" is to imply that he is derivative and not ultimate. To say that one can speak about what God is, is to likewise make God knowable and thus derivative, since being is intelligibility. Thus, in Dionysius, God is "beyond being" and we can describe him only using "negative theology" or apophatic theology. But unlike today's classical theists who use the term, apophatic theology in the Dionysian sense implies a total rejection of any description of God, such that even "ineffable" cannot be predicated of God, for to predicate something of God (even "ineffable") is to reduce him from cause to derivation. Dionysian apophatism is thorough and cannot be squared with any Western theology save mysticism.

Not surprisingly, Dionysian apophatism logically leads to a form of naturalism. The One is not separate from the world, but rather is the supreme unity of the world, in a descriptive manner of speaking (since it technically *is* not anything). While Neoplatonism would baulk at any determination of the One, both Proclus and Dionysius would reject the view that God can exist apart from the world (aseity), and thus no matter how apophatic they want to be, "the One" is certainly not a se therefore Neoplatonism would be considered a form of naturalism. Since Dionysius influenced Eastern Orthodoxy, it would be interesting to see to what extent Gregory Palamas and Eastern Orthodoxy in general utilized those ideas from Dionysius, but that is for another time.

Big Eva, Rise and Fall of Mars Hill, and passive aggressive posturing

Christianity Astray Today (CT) had put up a series of podcasts on The Rise and Fall of Mars Hills quite some time back. On the surface, the series does highlight problems with the defunct Mars Hill Church and especially its founder Mark Driscoll. The toxic "hyper-masculinity" and pornification of religion promoted by Driscoll is indeed contrary to true Christianity. The podcasts promote egalitarian views, but that should be expected of the broad evangelicalism that is CT, so the podcasts should be fine, or are they?

The problems with the podcasts come about when you consider the timing and context of the podcasts. First, consider that Evangelicalism had no problems with Driscoll back in 2009 when Driscoll was all the rage. When John MacArthur, a complementarian pastor by the way, criticized Driscoll for his degradation of the Songs of Songs, he was criticized by Evangelicals. Evangelicals had no problems with Driscoll back then, and the reason why CT can run this series of podcasts now is because Driscoll has been disgraced and out of mainstream Evangelicalism for a long time. "After all, who are you to judge Pastor Mark Driscoll?" Where was CT when MacArthur criticized Driscoll for his disgusting treatment of the Songs of Songs? Nowhere! CT only attacks people when they are out of power and influence in Evangelical circles, kicking them when they are down. This is not a defence of Driscoll, but rather a statement that shows how Evangelicalism (Big Eva) deals with people they disagree with. CT applies "judge not" to those in power and influence even if they disagree with them, but go after them when they are out of power and influence.

Second, consider that in episode 5 entitled "The Things We Do to Women," feminists are brought in to critique Driscoll, while those who had criticized him before like MacArthur were overlooked. Here, we see CT has an agenda in mind when it comes to the timing of these podcasts. American society had its #MeToo movement and the airing of former President Donald Trump's past misogynistic remarks. It is clear that CT is using this to push egalitarianism, noting that it has the Americo-centric social "historian" Kristin Du Mez in the podcast commenting on the evolution of the emphasis on men and male headship in the American church. I say "historian" because Du Mez does not actually do history. She starts with a conclusion and reads her thesis into history, since it is clear from Reformation writings and even patristic sources that patriarchy (understood in its neutral sense) of some form is the historic Christian view of gender relations. CT is capitalizing on the current social moment (celebration of victimhood and the dismantling of "hegemony" and oppressive systems of power) and bashing Driscoll (who does deserves to be bashed, but that's not the point of contention) in order to stealthily promote egalitarianism. Instead of dealing with Driscoll's error, complementarianism is tarred by association with Driscoll, such that anyone defending complementarianism is seen as a misogynist who promotes porn and "rape culture" by default. The worst thing is that CT is right in its exposé on Driscoll, but its narrative poisons the well against complementarianism, and all this by appeal to emotions without any appeal to the mind.

To go deeper into the tactics of Big Eva, we see here the way Big Eva deals with those they disagree and/or dislike. Many Evangelicals today prefer to be non-confrontational. Calling people heretics is considered socially unacceptable. Talking frankly about disagreements, disagreeing and fighting openly — these are rejected by Evangelicals. But it is not as if Evangelicals are all about love and fun and roses. The human heart does not change, and disagreements still happen. But instead of the open confrontations of the past, today's Evangelicals engage in passive aggression and other forms of scheming and politicking as a way of dealing with their problems and disagreements. Instead of openly and honestly confronting Driscoll in 2009, CT waited until 2021 to bash Driscoll, when it is more or less socially acceptable to do so. Instead of openly discussing the debate between complementarianism versus egalitarianism, they underhandedly used their podcast to create a visceral antagonism against complementarianism, all under the banner of caring for women. Does anyone seriously think that the passive aggressive posturing, the scheming, the conniving, is way better than open confrontation and disagreement?

Much has been said against the bad and horrible "white conservative evangelical men." While certainly "white conservative evangelical men" are not perfect, I prefer their company over the schemers and passive-aggressors where pretense is everything and backstabbing is laudable. Better a straight talker than one of those politicians.

The issue of "white privilege" and self-condfidence

"Who are you? You are not [e.g. Carl Trueman]" - Someone

The issue of "white privilege" is treated as the original sin of the radical liberal Left. Insofar as it is ideological, it reads the concept into every interaction between individuals of different ethnicities, particular when one or more of the participants are considered "white." Nevertheless, there is some empirical evidence that would seem to support the concept. But just as in dealing with metanarratives, the argument commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent, in the sense that empirical data that would seem to support Critical Race Theory (CRT) could be legitimately interpreted in another manner to support a different narrative.

What are the empirical evidences that would seem to support "white privilege"? Consider how people of the Caucasian ethnicities are treated differently in places like Singapore. Behavior that are not tolerated if committed by locals are tolerated when whites do it. White theologians like Carl Trueman can criticize other theologians like Bruce Ware and are still treated as godly men, but we know what happens if a Singaporean does the same. White pastors like David Platt promote division in their own church, and yet their books continue to be promoted. Does anyone sincerely think that a Singaporean pastor can get away with what Platt is doing in his own church and also have their books promoted?

These, and many more examples of social interactions that others can provide, seem to show that "white privilege" is alive and well. But I would suggest that the evidences point elsewhere. Specifically, it points to a veneration of whites (a concept most aptly conveyed by the Chinese term 崇洋) by Asians in general coupled with a lack of self-confidence in oneself in comparison to whites. In other words, it is because we do not practice color-blindness but instead make ourselve inferior that "white privilege" comes about. If we have self-confidence, then there is one standard for both whites and non-whites (i.e. color-blindness). If we do not accept such behavior, then it should not matter who commits that behavior. If it is wrong to criticize other Christians, then please go ahead and condemn Carl Trueman et al as schismatics. If you claim that it is wrong for a godly Christian to criticize other Christians, yet exempt these theologians from your judgment, you are a hypocrite!

What is the solution to "white privilege"? Stop treating whites differently from non-whites. Do not treat them as superiors, and do not treat them as inferiors. Treat people with no regard to their skin color and ethnicity, and you would solve the problem immediately. The question is: Will you do it?

Book Review: Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Part 5): Induction and the History of Religions

Part 5 of my book review of Yuval Noah Harari's book Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind is up at the Daily Genevan site, here. In this central part of my review, I point out the main problem with Harari's telling of history, which is the problem of induction. While the problem of induction is minimized in normal historical reconstruction since we can get an appoximation to the truth, looking especially into pre-history erases guide posts that alllow us to make such an approximation, as I argue in the review here.

After demonstrating Harari's problem with induction, I shift to the issue of religions, noting how Harari's view on religion is disrespectful towards all religions, and pays zero heed to what those religions actually say. You can read more about it in the review.

The Sovereignty of God and our emotions

In light of my opposition to Vincent Cheung, I received a feedback concerning this post. Specifically, this sentence was singled out: "We live in a fallen world, not in the realm of God's decrees and sovereign will." How can that sentence make sense if one believes that God is sovereign over the world?

Seen out of context, such a sentence does in fact undermine God's sovereignty. But this sentence has to be read in context. When I use the words "world" and "realm" here, I am not using this to be referring to the world in its cosmological sense. Rather, as it should be seen in context, the focus is on the world as conceptually perceived, the way "world" is used in Thomas Kuhn's analysis in his epistemic anti-realism. We do not live in the conceptual world of the decrees of God, in the sense that all these are hidden from us and are not on us apart from mediation. Since God does work through secondary causes, He is not directly acting on us. In Cheung's theodicy, since God is diretly acting on us, the only response is resignation. Whereas where there are real secondary causes, we can rage aginst the secondary causes while trusting in God the primary cause.

In life therefore, our faith in the sovereign God is meant to instill trust and confidence in our Lord. It is not meant for us to decipher into the mysteries of the sovereign will, to become fatalistic, or to become stoic in our emotions. Cheung's theodicy however fails to do either of these, and thus necessarily leads to fatalism and stoicism.

Why being "apolitical" does not help in Christian discipleship

Pastors, as those entrusted with the mysteries of God (1 Cor. 4:1) you are ministers of Word and Sacrament. Not political pundits. https://t.co/bwuSXYrIMw

— Brian Onstead (@brianonstead) August 19, 2021

Christianity as a religion focuses on spiritual things. Christianity is also a worldview that seeks to explain all of life. After all, if the God who created the world and ordered it is the same God who redeems sinners from sin, then it follows logically that all of life and the things in this world must be present in the scheme of God. To relegate Christianity to the private realm, unconcerned with the things of this world, is a denial that God is the God of creation.

That said, Jesus' kingdom is not of this world (Jn. 18:36). The primary focus of Christians should be on the things of God. Thus, while God is the God of creation, our emphasis should be on God as the God of redemption. Herein lies the tension for Christians in this age: On the one hand, we worship the God who is Creator and King. On the other hand, our focus is on God as our redeemer and the one who mandates that in this period of the Gospel Christians ought to be focused on proclaiming the Gospel of salvation from sin. Both are true, and both cannot be denied. Those that focus on the Gospel alone while ignoring creation are inbalanced in their faith, just like those who do not focus on the primacy of the Gospel due to concern over creation. How then should Christians live in this world?

The tension between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of creation, and between the City of God and the City of Man, has occupied pastors and theologians since the beginning of the church. A recent view attributed to Reformed theologian David VanDrunen, the "Two Kingdoms" view, state that God is ruler over both the kingdom of creation and the kingdom of the church, but He does so separately. One implication of this view is that the Church in her assembly ought to be focused on spiritual things and not the things of this world. Activism of all sorts are to be proscribed by the church in her gathering, a corrective to both right-wing and left-wing activism found within American Evangelicalism. In this general sense, the Two Kingdoms view is biblical. Complications arise however when we look at the specifics.

Recently, Baptist theologian Owen Strachan wrote a tweet stating that pastors ought to teach their congregants how to understand the world, and that failure to do so is a failure in Christian discipleship as the sheep will look elsewhere for guidance on these matters. Strachan of course is thinking in terms of social issues like Critical Race Theory, in light of the shocking abandonment of biblical orthodoxy by former YRR (Young, Restless, Reformed) adherents for the mirage of "social justice." Many Evangelical Christians in turn turn to conservative political analysts and Fox News for their catechesis on socio-political issues. It seems clear that many people in the church learn about society and politics not through the lens of Scripture, but through partisan lenses. Now, if one believes that there is such a thing as a Christian worldview, then this fact should be seen as problematic.

In response to this tweet, Brian Onstead has reminded us that pastors are not political pundits. That of course is true, but I am unsure the relevance that has to the original tweet. The focus in on Christian worldview, and the shocking abandonment of the Reformed faith by many New Calvinists for "social justice" shows that they had lacked a biblical worldview. Somehow "Gospel-centered" has devolved into "Gospel-only," and it seems that they learn their sociology and politics from the culture rather than the Scriptures. On the right, the reaction to the Left has reached fever pitch, and it is not helpful to be trained by them in one's worldview, even though they are correct on many matters. Are these not evidenct that the Church ought to disciple her members in the Christian worldview, instead of allowing the culture to teach us about such matters? After all, Strachan is not asking for political activism or guidance from the pulpit, but Christian instruction on such matters.

It is of coure true that there is a category called "wisdom" as one deals with the things of the world. But as opposed to this ivory-tower theologian, it is a fact that calling for wisdom is insufficient to actually ajudicate on a practical level between a biblical theory and an unbiblical theory. This author has seen first-hand how a pastor can agree with biblical doctrines on many things but consistently promotes left-wing social issues as being merely concerned with "social justice," while simultaneously claiming to be apolitical and not interested in doing politics. What is going on here, you might ask? What is happening is that left-wing views have so permeated society that they became seen as the "default" view; it is considered being moderate and "not political" to hold to that particular left-wing view. In other words, the Overton window has shifted so much leftwards that anyone who has not thought through the issues are by default politically left.

In exegesis, "tradition" is the idea that nobody comes to the Bible "just as they are." We all come with preconceived notions and lenses through which we read our Bibles. The one who is uncritical about that and who claims no tradition is often the one so bound by tradition that he is blind to it. Likewise, the one who does not recognize that they have a default inchoate "sociopolitical theory" are the ones that are most blind to their own political biases. That is why Strachan's call for biblical discipleship in this area resonates with me, not because Christians ought to be political or to be partisan, but because most Christians are not taught how to think through these matters from a biblical perspective. Wisdom is of course necessary, but calling for wisdom without showing how wisdom is seen is like the man who knows he needs food but is unable to recognize food from poison.

It is of course correct to desire to be apolitical, since the kingdom of grace is not of this world. But desiring to be apolitical is not the same as BEING apolitical. Ironically, one has to be educated on socio-political issues from a Christian worldview in order to be apolitical. Just as knowing one's tradition helps one to better interpret the Bible from a more objective standpoint, likewise knowing the Christian worldview on political matters helps one to be properly apolitical. Without such education, one can call for all the "wisdom" one desires, but there is no escaping the forces that have swallowed up people like Christina Edmonson, Jemar Tisby, and the others who have fallen away from biblical Christianity.

The social liberalism of David French

David French, once a conservative, has shifted ever leftward. That is less of an issue if the leftward movement was on issues that Scripture does not explicitly address. However, in his attack piece on the "new right" over their "embrace" of Hungary, he took positions contrary to Scripture, and thus showed that he has shifted towards being more theologically liberal. Hungary of course is not immune to criticism, and this piece should not be construed to taking any position on Hungary. The focus here rather is on French and the values he shows in his attack piece.

The key passaage from French's attack piece lies here:

The regime doesn’t recognize gay marriage. Only heterosexual couples may adopt. And the regime just passed a law sharply limiting any promotion of homosexuality or gender transition to children. He has banned gender studies programs at Hungarian universities

Besides the banning of gender studies programs (a conntroversial issue), all the other policies would be uncontroversial in America in the 1990s. Notice how French thinks that all these are normal for what he holds to be his "conservative" viewpoint. Nevermind that all these are considered abominations by Scripture; evidently having biblical morality is considered to be merely engaged in the "culture wars" which of course is reprehensible. So French evidently thinks that having biblical morality is part of the "new right" and to partake of the taint of authoritarianism.

This is of course part of the problem with the so-called "culture wars." The Overton Window has shifted so much that what was considered normal and acceptable in social discourse is now considered to be part of the "far-right" or "new right" or whatever nonsense the real culture warriors of the left have come up with. French's liberalism is as much a fact as well as a sad indictment over the state of spirituality in America. In any society where biblical morality is taken as a norm, French would be considered a left liberal for his abandonment of biblical morality, and treated as such by society.

Book Review: Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Part 4): Neanderthals and Harari's misinterpretation of Scripture

Here is Part 4 of my review of Yuvah Noah Harari's book Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Once again, we look at Harari's views, this time concerning human evolution as it regards the Neanderthals. As we go deeper towards the main problem with Harari's narratives, I took a short detour and deal with Harari's misinterpretation of Scripture. Harari, being a non-Christian, is of course free to reject Christianity. He is not however free to misinterpret Scripture to say what he wants it to say.

The key point here is that Harari is not quite the vaunted historian or scholar others paint him out to be. A good historian will not make elementary errors on the history of science. A good scholar will not make elementary errors in the interpretation of the Christian Scriptures. We will continue further in further installments of the review.

Book Review: Sapiens - A Brief History of Humankind (Part 3): History of Primeval human development - Preliminary Concerns

Primeval human history is an interesting topic, intersting particularly as it is a topic with a comparative paucity of evidence. In Part 3 of the review, I note some preliminary concerns I have on Yuvah Noah Harari's take on primeval human history, which can be read here.