A hypothesis on energies and will in medieval Constantinople

This dynamic conception of created nature constitutes Maximus' main argument against the "Monoenergists" of the seventh century, whose Christology considered Christ's humanity as having lost its geniunely human "energy" or will because of its union with divinity. But, for Maximus, created nature would lose its very existence if it were deprived of its proper energy, its proper purpose, and its proper dynamic identity. This proper movement of nature, however, can be fully itself only if it follows its proper goal (skopos), which consists in striving for God, entering into communion with Him, and thus fulfilling the logos, or divine purpose, though which and for which it is created. (John Meyendorff, Byzantine Thoeology: historical trends and doctrinal themes, 133)

When it comes to the issue of will, it is interesting how Eastern theologians like Vladimir Lossky have distinguished between "will" and "choice." To understand why that is so, we have to look at what happened during the 6^th century controversies over monoenergism and monothelitism, which are not exactly topics most people are interested in. Most certainly, the writings of Maximus would be helpful. But in the meantime, from what Meyendorff has written, it seems there is more than meets the eye in this distinction between will and choice.

In the controversy over monoenergism and monothelitism, nature is associated with energy, and energy to will. Therefore, just as there are two natures in Christ, so likewise there are two energies and two wills. In Meyendorff's book, the picture that seems to emerge is as follows: The workings or energes are identified by where they come from, as energies are the dynamic movement (kinesis) of natures. Therefore, in the case of Christ, he must have a human energy because the human nature will "imprint" as such when energy proceeds from it. But energy must be properly directed, and the will directs the energy according to the proper goal (skopos) of its movement (kinesis). In other words, the will moves the energies to its final cause.

This is of course just a preliminary picture for now. But such a picture would make sense of why the Byzatines held that Christ has two wills. If however, we define 'will' differently, then there is no reason why we cannot tie 'will' to person instead of nature, and so better preserve the dynamism of the three Persons.