The third main pillar of the Hyperists, which informs their error of Eternal Justification, is the [Neo-Platonic] theory of Timeless Eternity. In this post, we would briefly look at this theory, and show from Robert Reymond's magnum opus, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith 2nd Ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1999) why the idea of eternity being timeless is untenable according to the biblical data and the concept of eternity being "everlasting" rather a better understanding of God and his ways in the world.
The issue of hermeneutics
When addressing the issue of eternity, it must first be acknowledged that Scripture is not explicit regarding this issue. Scripture affirms that God is "eternal", but whether eternity includes the concept of timelessness or everlasting is rather inferred from the text of Scripture. It is therefore simply eisegesis of the worst order to assume that eternity must include the concept of timelessness based upon extra-biblical concepts such as the scientific concept of time being the 4th dimension in the created order. Certainly since the dawn of Einstein's theories of Special and General Relativity, space and time and velocity (most noticeably the speed of light at 3× 108 ms-1 in vacuum), and gravity in the case of General Relativity, are seen as intricately related to each other such that [perceived or situational] time can be altered by increasing velocity near light-speed (Special Relativity) or positions/movements at or through gravitational fields of huge magnitudes (General Relativity). Through Einstein's theories of relativity, the assumption of time as a created order may enter into the discussion of such issues.
The main contention from theologians and philosophers however would not come from science bur rather [obviously] from philosophy. While we would look at some of the contentions later, the issue here we need to beware of is precisely what Scripture itself mentions:
See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ (Col. 2:8)
While philosophical enquiry is not evil per se, if Sola Scriptura means anything at all, it is that our theories and doctrines about the faith are to be primarily deduced from Scripture, while philosophical enquires come later. It may be said that the idea of the mind being a tabula rasa such that one can come to the Scripture without a priori ideas derived from the world and philosophy is well neigh impossible, which is indeed true. Yet, it is precisely because of this that Christians are called to be renewed in their minds according to God's Truth (Rom. 12:2), and through meditation on Scripture, remove the ideas they have which are not biblical while embracing those taught in Scripture, as the Scripture interprets itself. Semper Reformanda — Always being reformed!
Now, since the concept of eternity is not explicitly taught in Scripture, it must certainly be the case that all other major doctrines in the Scriptures must be prioritized. In this instance for example, the concept of eternity must be settled only after we have settled according to Scripture the doctrine of justification. Instead of interpreting the doctrine of justification according to one's concept of eternity, shouldn't we not do the reverse and interpret the non-explicit concept of eternity based upon what Scripture has already plainly taught about the doctrine of justification?
The Hyperists in the Predestinarian Network are to be congratulated for attempting to be consistent in their worldview. There is nothing wrong with attempting to be consistent, since God after all is not irrational. The problem with the Hyperists is that they refuse to interpret the concept of eternity according to the other doctrines explicitly taught in Scripture, and thus reverse the order of interpretation of the Scripture; they are simply not critical enough. Granting their argument that "If p, then q", whereby p = 'the concept of timeless eternity is true' and q = 'eternal justification is true', they insist on arguing along the lines of modus ponens (p → q; p, therefore q) instead of modus tollens (p → q; ~q, therefore ~p).
As I have mentioned in the first post refuting the Hyperists, we use the framework of Scripture to interpret all of Scripture. We therefore do not use an "Absolute Predestination" framework or a "Timeless Eternity" framework to interpret Scripture. In their usage of the modus ponens form of argument and thus the "Absolute Predestination" and "Timeless Eternity" hermeneutical frameworks, the Hyperists have shown themselves to be violating the basic principles of biblical exegesis. It is therefore no wonder that they go astray and embrace such abominations as the heresy of Eternal Justification. While other Christians whom they claim are inconsistent  may indeed be inconsistent, at least they understand the basics of hermeneutics and are thus blessedly inconsistent, instead of being consistent at the expense of sound doctrine.
Disposing of the argument from science
The first objection (and the one that to scientific minds is more pertinent) is the argument according to Relativity. While one can legitimately argue regarding the validity of science to attain truth, let us assume for the sake of argument that the theory of Relativity or some form of it is indeed correct. Does this therefore mean that time is a created being of which therefore God, being apart from the creation, does not partake of.
If must be stated that God is definitely apart from created time. God in this sense is eternal, for God is present before the world (Gen. 1:1 - In the beginning ...), and will be around after the end (cf Rev. 21-22). In this sense, God is above time. Time as how we chronologically experience it is thus foreign to God. However, what this cannot prove or disprove is that there is a form of "divine time", separate from created time, in which God functions. The argument from science therefore is limited by the subject matter of this cosmos in which the empirical methods apply, and thus has no bearing at all on the topic of God, eternity and time.
Disposing of a few arguments by the Hyperists
In the piece "The Eternal God" , the author with the pseudonym "Forester07" has made some interesting points. The quoting of Is. 57:15 is certainly a peculiarity in its own right, for the passage does not makes clear whether when it is predicated of God that he "inhabits eternity" that it is referring to a state of time or a state of place that God inhabits.
More pertinent to our discussion here is this particular objection laid against the idea of God not being timeless. In his own words: "To say God does not exist outside of time makes time god and God not really God". This is astonishing since many things are predicated of God and God cannot function outside of these parameters. God is rational, so can we say that "To say God does not exist apart from rationality is to make rationality god and God not really God"? Can we say that "To say God does not exist outside of morality makes morality god and God not really God'? Or what about the case of any of God's other attributes?
In dealing with the idea of the relationship between God and Logic, C. Matthew McMahon in his book The Two Wills of God (New Lenox, IL: Puritan Rublicatios, 2005), p. 24 footnote 5, states thus: "Epistemology, logic precedes God. Ontologically, God precedes logic". In other words, God is most definitely before all things, and all things thus owe its existence to Him. Yet, God does not exist in a vacuum apart from His attributes (a most ridiculous idea). Logic being the manner of God thinking  proceeds ontologically from God, yet it is just as eternal as God and in fact precedes God in our way of knowing Him.
Likewise, in the case of time, it may be the case that "divine" time ontologically proceeds from God. If such is indeed the case, then "forester07" 's objection with its negation of God being in time is baseless.
We have been mentioning the word "time" often. However, what exactly IS time? If God is not apart from time so to speak, does this therefore mean that He is mutable?
Here, we would have theologian and pastor Robert Reymond to engage the issue and show us the way forward.
... it is a non sequitur to conclude from the fact of God's omniscience that God has no idea of succession, that is, that relative to his own existence he has no knowledge of a past, present, and future applicable to his own existence. This is to confuse the notion of the succession of ideas, which is surely not true of God if one means by this notion that God learns new facts, with the notion of the idea of succession which I submit God surely has. Robert Lewis Dabney observes:
If ... the divine consciousness of its existence has no relation to successive duration, I think it unproved, and incapable of proof to us. Is not the whole plausibility of the notion hence; that divines ... infer: Since all God's thoughts are ever equally present with Him, he can have no succession of His consciousnesses; and so, no relation to successive time. But the analysis is false and would not prove the conclusion as to God, if correct. ... In all the acts and changes of creatures, the relation of succession is actual and true. Now, although God's knowledge of these as it is subjective to Him, is unsuccessive [I take him to mean here that God does not first learn about them as the creature thinks and acts these changes — author], yet it [his knowledge] is doubtless correct, i.e. true to the objective facts. But these [the objective facts] have actual succession. So that the idea of successive duration must be in God's thinking. Has He not all the ideas which we have; and infinitely more? But if God in thinking the objective, ever thinks successive duration, can we be sure that His own consciousness of His own subsistence is unrelated to succession in time?
I concur with Dabney's analysis. Not to do so and to insist that God is timeless, that is to say, that the distinctives of time and hence existence with succession have no reference to him, lies behind much theological mischief. For example, Charles Hodge, who stands in the classical tradition, writes that "with [God] there is no distinction between the present, past and future, but all things are equally and always present to Him. With Him duration is an eternal now," that "to Him there is neither past nor future ... the past and the future are always and equally present to Him [as an eternal now (or present)]," and that "to Him there is neither past nor future, neither before nor after."
But such words seem to go too far, first, in that, if taken literally, they reduce to zero significance the temporal reference in every finite Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek verb form God employed in his revelational description to us of his thoughts, words, and actions, and virtually transform them all into timeless participles. 
Time has to do with succession. However, as what Reymond has pointed out, the advocates of timeless eternity confuse the "idea of succession" with the "succession of ideas". The idea of "divine time" therefore has to do with the "idea of succession". God never does learn anything new nor change in any way, yet that does not mean that He does not have an [epistemic] idea of succession in which He knows every single event in successive detail. To make it simpler, God knows everything past, present and future, but these past, present and future events do happen successively in chronology before God.
.. as well as the significance of the proposition προ, pro, in "foreknew" (προγινωοσκω, proginosko) and "predestine" (προοριζω, proorizo) in Romans 8:29 and in the expresson, "He chose us in him before [προ, pro] the creation of the world" (Eph. 1:3; see also John 17:24). Does not God inform us in these verses that he had a plan (his "eternal purpose") before he created the world? Does this data not mean that before the creation of the world God could have said, indeed, woud have had to say as the God of truth if an angel had asked him about the "when" of the world's creation: "I have not yet created the world. Its creation is still in the future"? And does he not now have to say as the God of truth: "I have created the world; its creation is no longer in the future, it is now in the past"? It would certainly seem that the past is past for God, the present is present for God, and the future is future for God as surely as they are for us! And while he certainly and infallibly knows the future because he ordained it, it is still as the future that he knows it. It is odd, to say the least, to argue as does E.L. Mascall that all of God's acts are dipolar, and that a given act at the creature's end is temporal (either past, present or future), while at the Creator's end the same act is timeless. If God's "time-words" to us respecting his plans and actions do not mean for God the same as they mean to us, then for him the creation of the world may not have actually occurred yet, for him Christ's second coming may be a thing of the past, ... In short, if God is timeless and if all of his acts are for him timeles acts, then we can have no true and certain knowledge of anything except pure mathematics.
Third, there seems to be an inherent contradicton in saying that a timeless person lives in the "eternal present" because the referent of the word "present" has significance only in the ordering category wich includes past and future as well. Nicholas Wolterstorff points out:
In order for something to be timeless, none of these ordering relatonships [past, present, or future[ can be applicable to that being. If a being is truly timeless, it should be impossible for it to exist simultaneously with anything else, or before anything else, or after anything else. Once it is established [or argued, as Hodge does — author] that a being does occupy one of the ordering relations, thn that being is clearly temporal.
For these three reasons it would seem that the ascriptions to God of the attributes of timelessness (understood as the absence of a divine consciousness of successive duration with respect to his own existence) cannot be supprted from Scripture nor is it self-consistent. At best, it is only an inference (and quite likely a fallacious one) from Scripture. These reasons also suggest that the Christian should be willing to affirm that the ordering relationships (before, now, after) that are normally represented as relationships of time are true for God as well as for man. 
The idea of a God who is immanent and works out His decrees in time is completely inimical to the concept of timelessness in God. For all these reasons, the Neo-Platonic idea of timeless eternity cannot be predicated of the biblical God. Rather, God in eternity is everlasting — without beginning or end. God knows all things past, pesent and future, and remains the same throughout all time, yet God does have an idea of succession within Himself, and His decrees and the events that are caused by the decrees have a chronological ordering to them.
In conclusion, the Neo-Platonic idea of timeless eternity is distinctly not supported by Scripture and in fact inimical to its teachings. The Hyperists therefore are in error in their view of eternity and time. Not only is their choice of hermeneutical framework in error, even the basis of their framework is in error, substituting the doctrines of God for the philosophies of Man. May God show them their errors so that they would return back to the truths of God's Word and abandon their cryto-hyper-Calvinism. Amen.
 "Forester07" , The Eternal God - "However, it seems that in reality most people who claim that God is eternal do not truly understand the many implications this has on understanding Christian doctrine and practice".
 W. Gary Crampton, The Scripturalsm of Gordon H. Clark (Unicoi, TN: Trinity Foundation, 1999), p. 25]
 Robert Reymond, pp. 173-174
 Reymond, pp. 175-176