Feser's failure in logic: Example #3

[Examples #1, #2]

So, the very existence of scientists themselves, qua perceiving and thinking subjects, presupposes the reality of change. But the reality of change, the Aristotelian argues, in turn presupposes the distinction between actuality and potentiality (Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundation of Physical and Biological Science, 88)

Correction: Initially, I thought this was of the logical form of affirming the consequent. It is not. Rather, the problem is with the premises themselves, which posit a false causal relationship between the items mentioned.

Feser's failure in logic: Example #2

[Example #1]

From the Aristotelian point of view, the difficulties notoriously facing modern origins of life research stem, not merely from any gap in current empirical knowledge, but from the irreducibility of even the simplest organic substances to purely inorganic phenomena. The intractability of the qualia problem stems from the irreducibility of sentient forms of life to merely vegetative forms of life. The difficulties facing materialist theories of the propositional attitudes stem from the irreducibility of the rational or human form of life to the merely sentient forms of life. In other words, the difficulties in question are essentially confirmation of the traditional Aristotelian position. … (Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundation of Physical and Biological Science, 41)

In the elemental laws of propositional logic, the logical fallacy of Affirming the Consequent states that it is invalid to assert the truth of the antecedent if the consequent is valid. Thus, in the syllogism If p, then q, if one asserts q, p is not necessarily true. This particular fallacy is pertinent here because Edward Feser just committed this fallacy in trying to argue that the problems of modern science "confirms the traditional Aristotelian position " (Emphasis added).

The syllogism can be constructed as follows:

• P1) "If Aristotelianism is true, then there is irreducibility of animal life to vegetative life, and irreducibility of rational life to animal life."
• P2) "This irreducibility seems to be true as seen in the failure of modern science to account for the origins of life and rationality
• C) Therefore, the traditional Aristotelian position is true.

As it should be evident from the syllogism, the form of this syllogism is essentially "If p, then q; q; therefore p," and thus it is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Feser errs in his argument for the truth of Aristotle in this matter, and this is just the beginning.

Rushdoony's Kinism

Rousas John Rushdoony (1916-2001) is the father of Christian Reconstructionism, a fringe movement on the far reaches of the Religious Right. Reconstructionism is so extreme in its view of Christianity and social engagement that I do not even think it worth discussion. Just as extreme is kinism, a view that the "races" while equal have to be separate and treated differently - basically a slightly more benign form of racism. It seems that Rushdoony has played no small part in the promotion of this ridiculous view, as can be seen here.

Kinism is racism. As I have said, this and the error of Reconstructinism is so obvious that it almost refutes itself. What can be said however is that it is now clearer to me why kinism seems to be present in some sections of supposedly conservative Christian circles in America. The trojan horse has been delivered, and under the guise of being biblical, old-time racism has emerged in the radical fringes of the right.

The priority of corporate worship: Corporate worship and Covid-19

Around the world, there have been multiple outbreaks of the Covid-19 virus, leading to the declaration that it has become a pandemic. With the high infection rate of the virus, certain precautions have been recommended included social distancing. Part of this social distancing as it pertains to the church has been societal pressure to stop corporate worship services altogether.

As Christians, what should we think about this? Before we think through the spiritual issues, first, it must be pointed out that the panic seen in many parts of the world is irrational, as the relatively low fatality rate of the virus plus the fact that is it borne by droplets makes it a relatively benign outbreak. Note that I said it was relatively benign, insofar that it is not something on the scale of Ebola or the Spanish Flu. Thus, there is absolutely no need to panic over it. Second, it can be limited by taking precautions, thus we are to be responsible and take necessary precautions in maintaining hygiene and being wise in social interaction.

More importantly, the question is asked as to the worship of God on Sunday, the Lord's Day. Christians must remind ourselves why we physically meet Sunday after Sunday together to worship God. For many Evangelicals, it is understandable that there is little understanding of this matter, with only a superficial appeal to Hebrews 10:24-25. If the focus of worship is merely to sing worship songs to God and to hear His Word, then it is understandable why some churches think that there is nothing wrong with moving church online to live streaming, and this is seen as the "socially responsible" thing to do. But that manifests a deficient doctrine of the church and an ignorance of the reason for corporate worship in the first place.

Why have Christians met together Lord's Day after Lord's Day to worship God? Is the corporate nature of the worship service merely because of the technological limitations of the First Century AD, or for that matter all of human history until the last few decades?After all, if Hebrews 10:24-25 speaks about encouraging one another, surely that can be done online or even through Whatsapp and other social media platforms? But the corporate nature of the worship service is demanded by what the worship service is, and the physical presence of the saints manifests the importance of the body. The Scriptures always declare that we are spirit and body, not a spirit inhabiting a body. When we are raised up on the Last Day, our bodies are raised anew (1 Cor. 15:44) and we will always be embodied spirits through eternity. Therefore, where the physical body is is important, which is why online church or even virtual reality church is no church at all! To denigrate the body is to embrace Gnosticism, and unfortunately, many Evangelicals fail to see that.

The nature of the worship service is that it is not a time for us to give to God, to sing songs and hear the Word preached. Bur rather, the worship service is where God is present spiritually (Mt. 18:20, 1 Cor. 4:5, 11:29-30, Rev. 2:1), meeting us covenantally (Hos. 2:23, Rom. 9:26, 1 Pet. 2:10). The worship service is God's service, not ours. For just as we are saved by grace alone through faith alone, so likewise we cannot approach God to worship Him except through His invitation only. And just as in an ancient covenant, the parties of the covenant physically meet, so likewise the reason why we must be physically present for worship is that the Lord meets us there as we are there physically. We encounter God in the corporate worship, praising Him and hearing Him speak to us through the pastor who proclaims His Word. This is why Christians ought to meet together in church services Lord's Day after Lord's Day, honoring God in our use of time and our use of space.

If that is true, how then should we respond to the secular pressure to stop the worship service? First of all, we must agree that the corporate worship service is very important in the life of the Christian. It should not be something to be cancelled at whim. It must be said that it is understandable though wrong that many think that religious worship gatherings should be the first to stop, but work is seen to be something must more important and must continue. If corporate worship is that important in the Christian life, then surely it must be treated at least as important as work and school. If the outbreak results in the cessation of work and school, then certainly there should be a cessation of corporate worship for that period. Yet, if work and school continue, then the corporate worship should likewise continue.

This does not necessarily mean that there should not be precautions taken. The necessity of corporate worship does not negate the requirement for wisdom. Rather, during an epidemic or pandemic, steps can be taken to reduce the risk of infection. Perhaps this is a good time for big churches to practice church the way the early church did so, by splitting up into many congregations of smaller numbers. Instead of halting services, why not have groups of 20 or so which can worship God corporately? This can be a good time to break up the business model of doing church, in favor of a model more in line with biblical Christianity. While not for the "house church movement," there is nothing wrong with meeting in homes per se to worship God, so why not get around to doing that?

Corporate worship is biblical mandated by Scripture. Barring a situation like the Black Death, Christians ought to continue to worship God corporately. God is still sovereign over the virus, and He calls us to worship. The paranoia over Covid-19 displays the world's fear of the unknown, but Christians ought to be better than this. While taking precautions, we must have faith and trust in God. We are not to panic as the world does, but put our faith wholly in God. After all, as it is confessed in the Heiberg Catechism:

Q1: What is your only comfort in life and death?

A. That I am not my own, but belong with body and soul, both in life and in death, to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ. He has fully paid for all my sins with His precious blood, and has set me free from all the power of the devil. He also preserves me in such a way that without the will of my heavenly Father not a hair can fall from my head; indeed, all things must work together for my salvation. Therefore, by His Holy Spirit He also assures me of eternal life and makes me heartily willing and ready from now on to live for Him.

God is sovereign, and thus we should not fear this virus. We must know this and believe this. If God wants me dead through the virus, I will get it no matter what. If God wants me alive, I will stay alive no matter what. So, trust God and do not panic. Take precautions and attend to the worship service. For there is where God is, and where we receive from Him His grace and mercy, our supply for each and every week.

One critique of Aristotelian ontology

But a problem with this view is that it entails that dogs, trees, stones, and the like are not really substances. The true substances are the fundamental particles, and to be a dog, a tree, or a stone is just for these particles to take on a certain kind of accidental form. Yet this seems clearly wrong insofar as these and other natural objects appear to have causal powers that are irreducible to the sum of the causal powers of fundamental particles. … (Edward Feser, Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science, p. 30)

Another problem is that from the Aristotelian point of view, the atomist doesn’t really get rid of substantial form and prime matter at all, but simply relocates them. Supposed that to be a dog, a tree, or a stone really is to have a merely accidental form, and that the only true substances are the fundamental particles. We would still have to regard them as composites of substantial form and prime matter, for the reasons given in the arguments from limitation and from change. (p. 31)

The basic idea of the first line of argument is, again, that a form is of itself universal, so that we need a principle to explain how it gets tied down, as it were, to a particular thing, time, and place. … Matter – the matter of this individual bowling ball, of that individual wheel, and so forth – is what does this job. (pp. 27-28)

On an Aristotelian analysis, a real change involves the gain or loss of some attribute, but also the persistence of that which gains or loses the attribute. For example, when a banana goes from being green to being yellow, the greenness is lost and the yellowness is gained, but the banana itself persists. If there were no such persistence, we would not have a change to the banana, but rather the annihilation of a green banana and the creation of a new, yellow one in its place. (p. 28)

Without prime matter, there could be no substantial change, because there would be no subject of change that persists through the change. (pp. 30)

Aristotelianism as a philosophical system is certainly something that should be learned, as it provides the background from which much of modern thought emerged. However, it is another thing altogether to assert its continual relevance for modern thought, especially when it deals with ontology on the same level of empirical science, as Edward Feser seems to have done.

In the initial part of the book, Feser asserted that the atomism of modern science is not feasible as an understanding of how things are constituted. Feser does not dispute the empirical findings of modern science, but rather the modern theory of atomism that lies behind the empirical findings. Feser argued his case by utilizing Aristotle's view of form and matter, utilizing an argument from limitation and an argument from change to assert that modern atomism fails to explain the nature of things.

While there is a rejection of modern atomic theory, it must be stated here that Feser is not disputing atomic theory in general, just its explanatory power. Feser is not "anti-science" in rejecting that atoms are there, but rather, as we shall look further in subsequent posts, he is rejecting the status we assign to atoms in modern atomic theory.

With that caveat, it must be stated that Feser's rejection of modern atomic theory is flawed. First, in the argument from limitation, Feser argues that even if atoms were constitutive of substance, they still need to have "substantial form" and "prime matter." But that is to impose Aristotelianism as constitutive of reality, instead of a description of reality one chooses to use. But what is reality, really? Whatever reality really is, on the empirical level, reality is investigated through the scientific method. It is not modern atomic theory that has to conform to Aristotelianism, but modern ontology that has to conform to modern atomic theory.

In this instance, the answer to the argument from limitation is simple: Atoms are made up of the subatomic particles: Protons, Neutrons and Electrons. All of them ultimately are made up of quarks. The process by which quarks make subatomic particles make atoms which make things does not imply a reduction of all substance to quarks, for we can say that substances emerged out of more basic matter. Form is an emergent quality, not a basic quality. It emerges through the interaction of atoms with each other, and complexity in their interactions creates form.

The response to Feser's second argument, the argument from change, is to assert that qualities like color are emergent qualities not primary qualities. There is no substantial change in the banana because the banana did not change, only various chemicals in the banana have been altered as the fruit ripened. There was no change from green-ness to yellow-ness, but rather there was substantial change in certain chemicals in the banana, while there is no change in the banana itself, and the secondary quality of "green-ness" changes to "yellow-ness" due to the chemical changes that have taken place in the banana. One does not have to postulate prime matter, because based on modern scientific theory, there is no need for this idea at all.

As will be seen in subsequent interactions, Feser has more objections to this and other modern scientific theories. Again, the conflict is not truly at the empirical level, but rather one step above in ontology in the empirical plane (since Aristotle is no idealist).

How we should speak of sin

Aaron O'Kelley has a great article on the issue of speaking about sin, especially in light of the growing tolerance for vile wickedness at Christianity Today. An excerpt:

Polite discourse minimizes and, over time, neutralizes the instinct of moral revulsion. While moral revulsion alone is not enough to sustain ethical practice over time, it is an important community-shaping element. Healthy communities express moral revulsion at that which is truly abominable, and the healthy effect of such revulsion is a natural deterrent toward said behavior within the community. People who are socialized into being appalled at what is appalling to God have the blessing of a moral compass shaped according to truth.

It is not enough to say something is sin if we trivialize it. When God made divisions in sins calling some abominations, such ranking is meant to shape our discourse and understanding of life such that certain sins are to be considered so vile that they are to be treated with absolute disgust. Moral revulsion is a good thing, and it is sad that such an obvious point needs to be even mentioned in the first place.

[P.S.: Just remember, Christianity Today has also asserted (without proof) that voting for Donald Trump is a great sin. So evidently, for these "Evangelicals," voting for Donald Trump is a greater sin than flirting with "polyamory" or adultery]

The issue of change: Zeno's Paradox revisited

[continued from here]

For Parmenides to work through the steps of his argument, he has first to entertain its initial premise, then to entertain its succeeding premises, and then to entertain its conclusion. He will also thereby have gone from believing that change is real to wondering whether it is in fact real, and finally to being convinced that it is not real after all. But all of that entails the existence of change. If he considers such an objection, wonders how he might reply to it, and then finally puts forward a response, that too will involved change. The truth of static monism would thus be incompatible with the existence of static monists like Parmenides. [Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundation of Physical and Biological Science (Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: editiones scholasticae, 2019), pp. 14-15]

According to Parmenides and his disciple Zeno, change is illusionary. Zeno's paradox on motion was meant to show that real change is impossible. Obviously, Zeno was not saying that change does not seem to happen. Rather, he would probably be happy with the cliche phrase "the more things change, the more they remain the same," interpreted literally. Behind the illusion or facade of change is the reality of changelessness, according to Zeno.

In a book heavily promoting Aristotelian philosophy, Edward Feser puts forward what he thinks is an impeccable argument against the "changelessness" view. Feser argued that change within a person happens and therefore change is real. While this argument is indeed applicable to a naive interpretation of Parmenides and Zeno, I do not believe it actually works.

Feser's argument essentially shows that change does in fact occur, and that a denial of change is a contradiction. However, as we have seen, Zeno does not deny change. Rather, he denies the reality of change. What does this actually mean? From Zeno's position one can go in diverse directions. One can claim that even our responses and thoughts are illusions of change. One can instead hold that there is true change mentally but not physically. One can claim that all change is phenomenal while the noumenal never changes. The common theme here is Idealism. Feser's argument, at least in dealing with Parmenides and Zeno, only proves that some form of succession is necessary, but it does not prove change, or at least the type of "change" that most people would consider change.

CT on Polyamory

As if signs of apostasy in the American Evangelical church were not clear enough, Christianity Astray Today decided that an article about polyamory (what used to be called fornication and adultery) is acceptable to be published by them. While the article does assert that polyamory is sin, it also says this:

Another important pastoral step is to distinguish elements of polyamory that are in violation of God’s will from elements that are simply culturally unfamiliar to us. When we want to lovingly call people to repentance, we should be precise about what needs repentance and what relationships or elements can and should be sanctified in Christ. For example, the notion of kinship in polyamory is a secular echo of the way Scripture calls the church to function as a new family. In cultures that idolize individualism (but actually isolate individuals), polyamory’s focus on relationship, care, and affection can have a powerful pull. And in churches that idolize marriage and the nuclear family, polyamory’s focus on hospitality and community can be an attractive alternative. We can acknowledge that many of the elements that draw people to polyamory—deep relationships, care for others, hospitality, and community—are good things.

Whereas Scripture says:

Flee from sexual immorality. Every other sin a person commits is outside the body, but the sexually immoral person sins against his own body. (1 Cor. 6:18)

Take no part in the unfruitful works of darkness, but instead expose them. For it is shameful even to speak of the things that they do in secret. (Eph. 5:11-12)

The problem with this article is less about the issue of trying to "redeem" elements from something that is so obviously sinful, but rather that this article has to be even written at all! As Jesus revealed in Ephesians 5:11-12, some evil are just too depraved that it is even shameful to be speaking about them, and the immediate context of Ephesians 5 is about sexual sin. The world has slowly desensitized even believers such that something so depraved can be treated as a legitimate topic of discussion, as if we are talking about ways to "redeem" food.

The sad thing is that this type of article was used to desensitize Christians on the issue of LGBTQ+, and now in certain circles of professing "Presbyterian" circles, calling LGBTQ according to its biblical category ("abomination") is grounds for rebuke by the pastor! Substitute polyamory with LGBT in any of the arguments that have been used by many liberal Christians (inclusive of "Side B" proponents aka Revoice), and the form of the arguments are identical in every way. When will Christians wake up and realize that we are being manipulated into tolerating sin?

It is grievous that Christians by and large have lost the vision of the holiness of God. We fail to recognize that what God says is the truth, period. We fail to recognize that what God says about sin is what sin is, and "abomination" is indeed "abomination." We are not given the liberty to alter God's Word and make God "kinder" than He really is. If God says something is an abomination, then the only right response is detestation and a holy hatred of that sin, and woe to the pastor who thinks himself smarter and kinder than God! Exactly who does he thinks he is, to go against the words of the Almighty God?

The continual simplification and misrepresentation of those who do not subscribe to Classical Theism

Over at Ligonier, Keith A. Matthison has written an article for Table Talk on the importance of Classical Theism. Matthison asserts the importance of Classical Theism and strongly asserts that "classical theism is simply a shorthand way of describing God as He has revealed Himself in His Word." The problem however is that Matthison's assertion is simply that: a mere assertion, without proof.

It may not seem obvious, but the problem with Matthison's article is surprisingly simple: Matthison asserts that it is important that we hold on to the biblical doctrines of God's simplicity, immutability, and impassibility, and that without those we would have a different God than the God of Scripture. But Matthison nowhere argues that Classical Theism is necessary or we would have a different God than the God of Scripture. The whole article assumes that Classical Theism, and only Classical Theism, will preserve the biblical doctrines of God's simplicity, immutability, and impassibility. However, for orthodox Christians who object to Classical Theism, that is precisely the point of contention. We do not agree that Classical Theism is the only way to preserve the biblical doctrines of God's simplicity, immutability, and impassibility. From my own perspective, while I do not think that Classical Theism is totally wrong, I do think that there is a bit too much paganism in Classical Theism which corrupts our understanding of God, if taken to its logical conclusions.

Take for example, the idea that the will is a property of nature. From that assumption, it is denied that the Triune God can have three wills, because if He has three wills, then He has three natures and thus there are three Gods. But why should we assume that will is necessarily a property of nature? On the contrary, if we insist that will is a property of nature, then it would seem that communion with any Person of the Godhead is impossible. One communes with the whole God, but it is not possible to commune with Jesus, or with the Father, for they are all one will. After all, anything that smacks of "Social Trinitarianism" must be rejected right? Even Jesus' High Priestly Prayer was interpreted to mean Jesus in his human will submitting to His divine will, so I guess any communion with Jesus is only with his human nature, and any communion with the divine nature is with the whole Trinity?

The fact of the matter is that there is just too much Aristotle and not enough Scripture in Classical Theism. That is why I reject Classical Theism. There is just too much philosophical baggage from Aristotelian categories that are not philosophically or theologically tenable. One example is the idea that "infinity" is a divine attribute, an assertion which is not tenable in light of Cantor's mathematical insights. Thus, we should reject the notion, prevalent in Classical Theism, that infinity is necessarily a divine attribute. Rather, we must say that created infinities point us to the ultimate infinity that is God, and thus infinity becomes a communicable attribute not an incommunicable one. This is just one of many potential modifications that have to happen in our thinking about God, for a blind adherence to Aristotle may give us a coherent system, but a system that is philosophically untenable and intellectually bankrupt.

It is of course hoped that Reformed adherents to Classical Theism may be a bit more critical in their theology, and more receptive to criticism instead of circling the wagons of "orthodoxy." The conduct of many Reformed leaders during the 2016 ESS fiasco however does not give me confidence that that will happen anytime soon. Thus, there will continue to be articles like this that essentially ignore the critics and ignore the many problems with Classical Theism, and, like the ostrich with its head in the ground, continue to sound off in the Big Reformed echo-chamber that only a limited audience will hear.

Did John Calvin teach a doctrine of secondary justification?

Steven Wedgeworth over at The Calvinist International had written a blog article arguing that the notion of a "secondary justification" is a Reformed doctrine, taught by no less than John Calvin himself. According to Wedgeworth, John Calvin does in fact teach Justification by Faith Alone, but alongside that he taught a secondary or "different kind of justification" which "remains a forensic and declarative act" and takes account of the "transformative work of regeneration" and "render(s) a sort of judgment on the spiritual fruit of sanctification." This secondary justification is "built atop" and "dependent on" the initial justification, and thus it can be said that there is a sense in which justification is by works, as long as one holds to that justification as a "secondary justification." But are Wedgeworth's arguments sound? We will address them theologically, then historically.

Theologically, it is unclear how this view of initial and secondary justification is not functionally similar to Federal Vision, Arminian and Roman Catholic soteriologies. Just because the "secondary justification" is built upon and dependent on the initial justification does not solve anything, for after all Arminians and Roman Catholics believe that too. For the latter, here is what Trent says about justification and works:

Of this Justification the causes are these: ... the efficient cause is a merciful God who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing, and anointing with the holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance ... (Chapter VII, Council of Trent Sixth Session, On Justification - First Decree)

And whereas the Apostle saith, that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consent of the Catholic Church hath held and expressed; to wit, that we are therefore said to be justified by faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation, and the root of all Justification; without which it is impossible to please God, and to come unto the fellowship of His sons: but we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification-whether faith or works-merit the grace itself of justification. For, if it be a grace, it is not now by works, otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace. (Chapter VIII, Council of Trent Sixth Session, On Justification - First Decree)

As it can be seen, in Tridentine Roman Catholicism, justification is "free," and faith and works do not merit the grace itself of justification, since the efficient cause of justification is the God who is merciful and washed and sanctify gratuitously sinners through the Holy Spirit. In popular Evangelical rhetoric, it is assumed that Roman Catholicism teaches justification by faith and works, or by works. However, while Roman Catholicism ends up being about salvation by faith and works, it is not technically true that it teaches justification by faith and works. Rather, justification is by grace through faith without works, but justification in Roman Catholicism is a process and thus the works is the "outworking" of grace through works. In orthodox Roman Catholic theology, the works are treated as the outworking of faith in justification, and therefore works become essential for one's status before God, albeit in a round-about way.

Once the Tridentine Roman Catholic teaching on justification is properly understood, it is unclear how it differs from what Wedgeworth is proposing, except that instead of a process of justification we have two acts of justification—the initial justification and the secondary justification. Since the term "justification" is literally "to make just," this calls into question Wedgeworth's assertion that the "secondary justification" does not change the verdict given by the initial justification. In what sense is that secondary justification "justification" if it does not actually "make [the person] just"? Therefore, whatever the intent of those promoting this view of "secondary justification" is, it seems clear that this "secondary justification" smuggles works into the act of justification by a more sophisticated route compared to Roman Catholicism, a move which coincides with the redefinition of "faith" to become "faithfulness" in Federal Vision discourse.

Historical theology is where Wedgeworth's assertions about the historical pedigree of his view come undone. Wedgeworth asserts that John Calvin teaches this secondary justification, but the passages cited from Calvin clearly states that God justifies the unclean works of believers. This "secondary justification" if you may is God declaring that the works of believers are acceptable to Him, or as cited and emphasized by Wedgeworth, "their works are esteemed righteous by the same gratuitous liberality. (Comment. on Ezekiel 18:17)." Note here that the object of this "justification" is the believers' works, not believers themselves. It is the works which are justified, not believers who get doses of justification every time they do a good work. This view of God justifying our works is taught by the Westminster Confession of Faith in the chapter on good works:

Notwithstanding, the persons of believers being accepted through Christ, their good works also are accepted in him, not as though they were in this life wholly unblamable and unreprovable in God’s sight; but that he, looking upon them in his Son, is pleased to accept and reward that which is sincere, although accompanied with many weaknesses and imperfections. (WCF 16.6)

Wedgeworth's argument that Calvin taught a doctrine of secondary justification is therefore a misinterpretation of what he actually wrote. Knowing what Tridentine Roman Catholicism actually teaches, and that the orthodox Reformers unanimously rejected it, we must understand that the orthodox Reformed position is a denial of any kind of two-stage justification or process of justification. The scandal of the Reformation was not because Roman Catholicism believed in works meriting justification (a typical Evangelical caricature), but that the Reformers taught that justification requires no work of any kind at all. That is the essence of the Gospel message of Justification by Faith Alone that scandalized the Pope and the entire structure of Medieval Catholicism. Why is it that charges of antinomianism were leveled against the Reformers? Were 16th century Roman Catholic theologians so dense that they did not know (if it were true) that Protestants have a place for good works in justification (beyond evidence), and therefore the dispute is one of semantics rather than substance?

So did John Calvin taught a doctrine of secondary justification? He did not. Moreover, knowing the centrality of the Gospel and the importance of justification, I think it is very dangerous that such teaching is deemed acceptable in Reformed circles, for once we lose the Gospel, we lose the faith. It is my sincere hope that all of us including Wedgeworth would one day come to reject this teaching as misleading at best, and heretical at worst.

Adams again on Doug Wilson and FV Baptists

On his blog, Brandon Adams has written an interesting response on the issue of Douglas Wilson and the Federal Vision. You can read it here.

Eternity, essential and accidental attributes

The problem is this. If authority over the Son is an essential, not an accidental, attribute of the Father, and subordination to the Father is an essential, not an accidental, attribute of the Son, then something significant follows. Authority is part of the Father’s essence, and subordination is part of the Son’s essence, and each attribute is not part of the essence of the other persons. (Millard J. Erickson, Who’s Tampering with the Trinity: An Assessment of the Subordination Debate (Grand Rapid, MI: Kregel, 2009), 172)

When it comes to issues of time and eternity, issues of contention are very very difficult to be dealt with. Nowhere is this so when we talk about predication of God. Since God is eternal, does whatever God does in eternity essential to Him? This is the argument put forward by Millard Erickson against what he calls the "gradationist" position, now commonly called ESS (Eternal Submission of the Son). The problem when we deal with God in eternity is that we can come across some rather strange difficulties. Let us put the issue of ESS to the side for now. Rather, let us go back to the basics.

When we say that God the Father is the the Father, is Him being the Father necessary or contingent? Surely if we believe in immutability, we must say that God the Father is always God the Father, because there is not where the three persons mutually decided that one of them is the Father, the other the Son, and the last one the Holy Spirit. But if God the Father is always the Father, then is "being the Father" always part of the Father's essence, "being the Son" always part of the Son's essence, and each of these attributes is not part of the "essence of the other persons"? But, you object, there is only one essence in the Godhead. And you are perfectly correct. This is why Erikson's formulation of the supposed problem makes no sense, because what is of the persons is not necessarily predicated of the essence. The "unbegotten-ness" of the Father is not shared with the Son or the Spirit, but this does not imply that "each attribute is not part of the essence of the other persons."

The orthodox formula on the Trinity is: One undivided divine essence subsisting in three divine persons. It is an "unstable" formula, in the sense that it is not at all clear what that means, except that God is truly one, and yet truly three, in different senses. Since that is the case, predications of "necessity" and "contingency" are liable to fallacies. What does it mean for something to be an "essential" attribute of a person, if the person is not the essence (each divine person is fully God, but none of them are the essence apart from the other two)? If each person is distinct from the other, does that not imply that whatever is distinct is not shared between them, as "unbegotten-ness" is not shared with the Son and the Spirit?

This is not to say that there are no difficulties with saying that "authority over the Son is an essential, not an accidental, attribute of the Father." Rather, it is to assert that unless we can be clear about what we mean by "essential" when predicated of a divine person as opposed to the divine being, we cannot assume that the position known as ESS leads to ontological subordination of some kind.

Is there science before the Scientific Revolution?

If historians of science were to investigate past practices and beliefs only insofar as those practices and beliefs resemble modern science, the result would be serious distortion. (David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450, 2)

… they were operating within quite a different linguistic and conceptual world and with different purposes; and it is in the light of these that their achievements must be judged. (p. 9)

The second candidate for early modern revolutionary status is methodological—the invention and practice of the “experimental method” (according to the defenders of this thesis) by such sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scientists as Galileo, William Gilbert, Robert Boyle, and many others. According to defenders of this theory, the sterile scholastic debates and syllogistic demonstrations of ancient and medieval natural philosophy came to an end, replaced by experimental science, with its firsthand observation and manipulation under controlled conditions. (p. 362)

For present purposes, I am inclined to define it [the word "experiment" in experimental method" -DHC] narrowly, by what I take to be its primary epistemological function: an attempt to confirm or disconfirm a theoretical claim about the nature or behavior of the material world by an observation (under controlled conditions if necessary) made for that purpose, or the gathering of data against which future anticipated theoretical claims may be tested. (p. 362)

Experimentation continued through the later Middle Ages, wherever it met a scientific need. (p. 363)

… what credit is left for Francis Bacon (1561-1626) popularly celebrated as the founder (or a founder) of experimental science? … what he and the Baconian tradition of the seventeenth century gave us was not a new method of experiment, but a new rhetoric of experiment coupled with full exploitation of the possibilities of experiment in programs of scientific investigation. (p. 364)

Where, then can we locate this elusive revolution of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century science? I believe that Alexandre Koyré, who, in the 1950s and 1960s, disputed Combrie’s focus on experimental science as the revolutionary agent, has put his finder on the right place. The underlying source of revolutionary novelty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he argued, was metaphysical and cosmological rather than methodological. (p. 364)

Historian of science David Lindberg has written a book showing the intellectual foundations of modern Western science. In its elucidation of intellectual history, I find it compelling. However, Lindberg has seemingly asserted that ancient science is indeed "ancient SCIENCE." My question to that is: Can we actually called what we see prior to the Scientific Revolution "science"?

The question posed here is not to claim that there is no rich intellectual foundations for science prior to the Scientific Revolution. But for science to be "science," it must be distinct from anything that is not science, otherwise the word "science" has lost its meaning. This to me is my main objection to the whole idea of "ancient" or "medieval" science. Lindberg has held up Alexandre Koyré's thesis that the Scientific Revolution was "metaphysical and cosmological rather than methodological" (p. 364). From a philosophical perspective, that seems correct. But I think such is a partial picture, for a shift in metaphysical and cosmological perspective would surely affect one's methodology.

When one does scientific experiments today, one does not appeal to the divine or to spiritual forces as part of one's explanation for why things happen the way they do. The reason is that modern science is committed to what is called "methodological naturalism." That is indeed a philosophical commitment, yet it is necessary for modern science to be "science" as opposed to "philosophy" or "religion." Should science be committed to methodological naturalism? Well, if science is not committed to methodological naturalism, then where is the boundary between "science" and "philosophy," or "science" and "religion"? This is why I find Lindberg's definition of "experimental" in explaining one reason why there is a scientific revolution deficient. Judging by Lindberg's definition of "experimental," certain aspects of philosophy (e.g. that there is a God) and religion (e.g. the resurrection of Christ) can be termed "science," but we do not normally called these "science," do we?

It is because of the necessity of defining our terms properly that I think Lindberg's assertion of continuity between "ancient science" and "modern science" problematic. Rather, it is better to assert that there is a continuity between ancient natural philosophy and modern science. For "science" to be "science," there must be a commitment to methodological naturalism. That being said, I will assert that this is a limitation on science, for anything that is outside the realm of nature can still be true but it is outside science's purview. Thus, I will assert, contra Lindberg, that there was indeed a real scientific revolution that is more than just a shift in rhetoric (that marked the beginnings of modern science). I will further claim that the emergence of modern science does not imply the de-legitimization of anything that is non-science as disciplines that do not convey truth, since an a priori commitment to methodological naturalism precludes science from discovering truth outside of naturalistic events.

The history of Christianity and Science

One of the charges frequently leveled against the church is that it was broadly anti-intellectual—that the leaders of the church preferred faith to reason and ignorance to education. In that, this Is a major distortion. Although Christianity seems at first to have appealed to the poor and disenfranchised, it soon reached out to the upper classes, including the educated. Christians quickly recognized that if the Bible were to be read, literacy would have to be encouraged; and in the long run Christianity became the major patron of education in the Latin West and a major borrower from the classical intellectual tradition. Naturally enough, the kind and level of education and intellectual effort favored by the church fathers was that which supported the mission of the church as they perceived it. But this mission, interestingly, did not include the suppression of scientific investigations and ideas. [David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450 (2nd ed.; Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 2007); 148-9]

If we compare the early church with a modern research university or the National Science Foundation, the church will proved to have failed abysmally as a supporter of science and natural philosophy. But such a comparison is obviously unfair. If, instead, we compare the support given to the study of nature by the early church with the support available from any other contemporary social institution, it will soon become apparent that the church was the major patron of scientific learning. Its patronage may have been limited and selective, but limited and selective patronage is a far cry from opposition.

However, a critic determined to view the early church as an obstacle to scientific progress might argue that the handmaiden status accorded to natural philosophy is inconsistent with the existence of genuine science. True science, the critic might maintain, cannot be handmaiden of anything, but must possess total autonomy; consequently, the “disciplined” science that Augustine sought is no science at all. In fact, this complain misses the mark: totally autonomous science is an attractive ideal, but we do not live in an ideal world. Any many of the most important developments in the history of science have been produced by people committed not to autonomous science, but to science in the service of some ideology, social program, or practical end; for most of its history, the question has not been whether science will function as handmaiden, but which mistress it will serve. (p. 150)

The monasteries served as the transmitters of literacy and a thin veneer of the classical tradition (including science or natural philosophy) through a period when literacy and scholarship were severely threatened. (pp. 156-7)

The issue of time and (one of) Zeno's Paradox(es)

One of the problems with the whole ESS fiasco, and the so-called recovery of the historic doctrine of God by people like Reformed Baptist James Dolezal, is its uncritical appropriation of Aristotelianism as mediated by Thomas Aquinas. To put it bluntly, these "confessional scholars" are philosophically stuck in the 16th century. They are reasonably well-versed in the Scholastic literature during the Reformed and Post-Reformed period, but they ignore or downplay the reasons why philosophy has dumped Aristotelianism as a whole.

One major issue has to do with the problem of time. Time is something that is hard to grasp, only because we are creatures of time. How do we go about thinking about time when we are bound by time itself? There is no place whereby we can be "objective" about time and the passage of time. It seems prima facie that time progresses, does it not? We can conceive of time moving faster or slower, because time can appear to move faster or slower (even when it does not do so objectively) when we labor at things we enjoy or things we dread. But to conceive of a stoppage of time, or timelessness, or reversal of time, or time loops, all of these are conjectures not available to us except by extrapolation and guesswork. We can deal with it mathematically, but numbers are abstract things which we cannot conceived how it may or may not work out in real life.

One ancient paradox concerning the issue of time in general is Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Hare. In this paradox, the hare is ahead of Achilles by a certain distance (let's say 1 meter). As they race, both Achilles and the hare moved a certain distance in a certain time. In order for Achilles to overtake the hare, he must first cover the distance from him to the initial point of the hare. But during that time, the hare would have moved a certain distance (e.g. 0.1m). Achilles would then still be behind the hare, and must now race to where the hare is currently at. But at distance 1.1m, the hare would have moved 0.01m which Achilles needs to cover, but then the hare would move 0.001m, and so on. The paradox here asserts that if motion is possible, then Achilles would need to cover an infinite series of distances in order to catch up and overtake the hare. Since it is not possible to cover an infinite series of motions, the fact that Achilles can actually overtake the hare suggests that motion and change does not truly exist—they are illusionary.

For those from a scientific background, the "solution" to Zeno's Paradox of Achilles and the hare seemed easy enough. After all, it is a mere addition of a set to infinity of (1 + 0.1 + 0.01 + 0.001 +...). Or rather it can be expressed as follows:

Therefore Achilles will pass the hare at distance 1-1/9m. There, problem solved, but has the paradox actually been resolved?

We must remember that the key point of the paradox is not that Achilles will not overtake the hare. Rather, the key point of the paradox is that true motion, true change, cannot exist. The argument is a philosophical reductio ad absurdum concerning the nature of motion and time. It is not an empirical question at all. Just as in Plato's Allegory of the Cave, just because something is empirically seen does not necessarily imply that what is seen and what is perceived is indicative of true reality. Zeno's paradox is a question on reality itself, not empirically how things work. One might as well "disprove" Zeno by merely arranging a race between Achilles and a hare and showing that Achilles does in fact overtake the hare, easily, and it would still prove nothing. Why is the overtaking not a mere illusion, and that actually change is not real, but everything merely exists? Already, in modern physics under a B-series interpretation of space-time, time itself is a dimension and therefore nothing really changes, since the 4-D tesseract of space-time is "fixed" (in a universe without any higher dimensional beings or gods/God), and therefore space-time is determined right from "the start."

Science therefore cannot address Zeno's paradox. Since it deals with empirical reality, it cannot, until and unless there is a way to get us time-bound creatures out of the dimension of space-time (and I do not mean tunneling from one point of space-time to another point in space-time, but to be independent of space-time altogether). So how then should we deal with this paradox, but by rational philosophical inquiry?

One way, the way I think would address this paradox, is to point out how, as Achilles reached the next place of the hare, the time taken for each part in the series gets shorter and shorter. Let's say Achilles took 1 second to reach the hare's first position. He will then take 0.1 seconds to reach the hare's second position, and 0.01 seconds to reach the hare's third position. One would get a decreasing infinite series for the time traveled for Achilles to overtake the hare, and therefore it seems that we will never reach the "point" in time whereby Achilles overtake the hare. However, since there are two infinite series of time and distance, dividing the two infinite series gives us a finite (non-serial) speed of 1 m/s. One can therefore assert that the "infinite" aspect of the paradox is illusionary, since motion in terms of speed is not an infinite series but a finite number. Therefore, following Aristotle, I would say that seeing motion as a continuum instead of moving from point to point in space-time would solve the paradox quite nicely.

However Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the hare is solved, Zeno's paradox (not by itself) points to an even deeper issue concerning the nature of time itself (and thus indirectly opens the paradox again to mystery). We talk about time as "here," "before," and "after," or "now," "yesterday," and "tomorrow." But what exactly is this thing called "now"? John McTaggart has given an argument why time itself is not real. This is reflected in Zeno's paradox as one considers the infinite series of temporal instances Achilles must cover to overtake the hare. So while we can perhaps prove that motion seems real (since speed is a finite non-serial number), how do we, or can we, prove the reality of time? And if time is not real, then space is not real and motion becomes a mere mathematical number depicting the relation of two unreal things.

As with time, thus goes the notion of "eternity." "Eternity" is defined as an "infinity" with regards to time. When we say God is "eternal," what we mean is that God is infinite with respects to time But what does this mean when the notion of "time" itself gets questioned?

To untangle all these will not be easy, and this article is not meant to give all the answers to these questions, although I have suggested a preliminary approach here. The main point of this post rather is to show, by appeal to Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Hare, that issues concerning time and eternity are so much more complicated than our modern "confessional theologians" make it out to be. Adopting Thomism as orthodoxy is not a virtue but a step backward in the wrong direction. If we are to be interested in truth, then we should wrestle with the actual issues involved when we talk about terms like "time" and "eternity," or even "temporal attributes," instead of going back to the "Golden Age" of "Reformed Scholasticism," which definitely has its strengths but many weaknesses also, chief among them its wholesale embrace of Aristotelianism.