Contra Barrett (Part 8): Actions, authority and submission, and tritheism?

Furthermore, the three persons cannot perform a single action if one or more persons are, by definition of their personhood, inferior in authority to another person. As soon as you insert gradations of authority within the immanent Trinity, gradations that are person-defining and therefore essential for the Trinity to be a Trinity, you forfeit one will in God. You forfeit the Trinity's one, simple essence. Our God is simply Trinity ... no more. (Matthe Barrett, Simply Trinity, 229)

What does actions have to do with being? In Aristotelian metaphysics, the final cause of an object is part of the determiner of the object, alongside the other three causes (material, formal, efficient). A being acts towards its final cause, therefore being determines actions. However, that is a philosophical position that is simply not true. In the modern scientific world, what a thing is is independent of its purpose, and its purpose is independent of what it does. For the second, the clearest example of this is the human person, whose purpose or final cause is to be the image of God representing Him in front of creation, yet humans routinely rebel against God. Actions therefore have absolutely no link to the purpose of a thing. For the former, as being a modern scientific person and in rejection of Aristotle, the purpose of a thing is not part of the being of a thing. The Statue of Liberty is used as an American national monument, but if taken away and placed in a remote jungle, it could be used as an idol to be worshipped. Purpose is ascribed by the one who utilizes the object. What a thing's purpose is is determined by its owner or user or creator, depending on the object and its environment.

What does this have to do with one's doctrine of God? We see in the paragraph above an extremely condensed argument by Matthew Barrett. Unfortunately, Barrett does not make his argument plain, so we have to explicate them. Why does Barrett believe his argument to be foolproof, and why does he condense it? Perhaps the exposure of Aristotle is not a good thing to have?

What then is Barrett's argument? The first sentence links the idea that an inferiority in authority means that the three persons cannot perform a single action. What is that the case is not stated, since one can think of any group of ranked individuals who can perform a single action. Likewise, the second sentence states that gradations that are "persons-defining" would forfeit the one will in God. Again, why that is the case is not shown. Without an idea of the philosophy behind such statements, such statements are just mere assertions that make no sense whatsoever. What needs to be added are the Aristotelian philsophical principles so that the arguments can start to make sense.

The first sentence can be explicated as follows:

P1: If one or more persons are inferior in authority to another person, then their lower rank would correlate with a different final cause than the other person.

P2: A different final cause would mean a different action.

C1: Therefore, the three persons cannot perform a single action.

We note here that this "different action" may not be an altogether different action. It just needs to be not the exact same action. Once it is written down this way, we see here the smuggling of Aristotelian philosophy in order to create this argument, and therefore we can reject this argument in the same light.

The second sentence can be explicated as follows:

P3: Gradations that are person-defining are essential for the Trinity to be a Trinity.

P4: Gradations of authority within the immanent Trinity are gradations that are person-defining.

IC1: Gradations of authority within the immanent Trinity are essential for the Trinity to be a Trinity.

P5: Inserting gradations that are essential for the Trinity to be a Trinity would result in multiple wills in God.

C2: Insering gradations of authority within the immanent Trinity would result in multiple wills in God.

There are major problems with this second argument. For premise 3, it is true that gradations that are person-defining are essential for the Trinity to be a Trinity. However, the premise is only true if the word "essential" here is synonymous with "necessary," and not with "pertaining to the essence of a thing." This is because in classical theism, the taxis or order of the Trinity are a type of gradation that is person-defining and yet does not deal with the essence of the Trinity. Now, this is important because in intermediate conclusion 1, the fallacy of amphiboly is committed here. Whereas premise 3 is true only if the word "essential" is taken as "necessary," the word "necessary" in intermediate conclusion 1 has shifted to pertaining to the nature of a thing. This is the definition of "essential" in premise 5, which when combined with intermediate conclusion 1, creates conclusion 2. The whole argument is invalid as it runs on equivocating on the word "essential."

The premises themselves are problematic. First, premise 4 assumes EFS teaches gradations of authority within the immanent Trinity, which is a false statement no mattter how many times it is repeated. Premise 5 is basically a form of argument 1, and therefore false. The number of wills in God is a separate question altogether from gradations in the Trinity or the lack thereof. Thus, Barrett's second statement shows an invalid and unsound argument, with premises smuggled in from Aristotelian philosophy and not Scripture.

Barrett uses these arguments to claim that there is a danger of tritheism within EFS. That is however false, since EFS does not even teach mutiple wills in God. The reason why Barrett accuses EFS as tending to tritheism is because EFS as interpreted within Aristotelian metaphysics would lead to tritheism, but EFS does not follow Aristotle at all. Barrett's assertions and accusations therefore should be rejected as mere assertions based upon a faulty metaphysics. EFS does not "forfeit" the one will in God, because EFS rejects Aristotelian metaphysics altogether. Since Aristotle's writings are not Scripture, and neither is Thomas' Summa Theologica part of the biblical canon, we can safely reject them while holding on to the biblical relevation concerning who God truly is.

Contra Barrett (Part 7): Multiple wills

But if one considers how EFS has introduced a new, novel category of functional relations of authority-submission into the immanent Trintiy, suddenly this language is very alarming. Especially talk of an authority exclusive to the Father and a subordination exclusive to the Son. It screams, "Multiple wills!" Here is EFS's social trinitarianism—distinct centers of consciousness— coming through thick and heavy. Point is, EFS segregates the persons of the Trinity from one another, even sets them over against one another. (Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity, 228)

"Talk of a paternity exclusive to the Father and a spiration exclusive to the Spirit," "segregates the persons of the Trinity from one another, even sets them over against one another"! Of course that is nonsense, but this is what happens when one is more interested to find fault than to actually note the difference. The fact of the matter is that personal properties are always exclusive to the persons, or they would not be called personal properties at all. Noting that a personal property is exclusive to a person is like noticing that water is wet; nothing to make a big fuss about.

More significantly, Barrett asserts that such talk of functional relations of authority-submission screams of multiple wills. Barrett does not indicate why that is the case. A possible case might be made saying that stative words exclusive to the persons are fine, so there is nothing wrong with paternity or spirtaion, but action words are not, since actions are dynamic and refer to wills. However, that is not true even in classical theism. Only the Son is incarnated, so the property of "being incarnated" is exclusive to the Son only. Only the Son atones for sin, so the property of "atoning for sins" is likewise exclusive to the Son. Therefore, whether a property is stative or active should be irrelevant to the issue at hand.

What other reason is there for the charge of multiple wills? Perhaps it can be argued that authority requires a separate will from submission, but since we think of God analogously not univocally, why can we not speak of a single will that consists of an authority exclusive to the Father and submission exclusive to the Son?The fact of the matter is that I have not seen anyone positing three separate wills of the Trinity, only three distinct wills. If Barrett cannot connceive of a single will subsisting in the authority of the Father and the subission of the Son, that is a failure of his imagination and a failure to think analogously.

The charge of multipe wills is therefore flawed. Barrett has asserted over and over that EFS holds to multiple wills, by which he means multiple separate wills. However, he has failed to substantiate the claim. EFS does not believe in three separate wills of the Trinity, but three distinct wills or willings of the Trinity. Distinct, not separate. One and three at the same time.

Contra Barrett (Part 6): EFS and the marks of social trinitarianism

Now that you're seen the EFS view, notice how so many of these marks are an exact match:

• Starting point (and emphasis) is not simplicity but the three persons—some reject simplicity altogether
• Trinity redefined as society and community, analogous to human society
• Persons redefined as three centers of consciousness and will
• Persons redefined according to their relationships and roles
• Large overlap (sometime collapse) of immanent and economic Trinity
• Social Trinity is paradigm for social theory (ecclesiology, politics, gender, etc.)

EFS lines up with each of these marks, which makes EFS a species of social trinitarianism.

[Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity, 226]

Is EFS a form of social trinitarianism? It depends on how you defined "social trinitarianism." Matthew Barrett has defined social trinitarianism with these 6 points. Thus, defined, Barrett then asserts that EFS has all 6 points, and therefore this "makes EFS a species of social trinitarianism." But is this a valid characterization of EFS? In order to answer this question, we must ask ourselves: (1) Are these 6 points valid markers of social trinitarianism, and (2) Does EFS fulfill these 6 marks?

First, are these 6 points valid markers of social trinitarianism? Social trinitarianism, if defined just according to its name, is any view of the Trinity that defines the Trinity socially. In other words, if the Trinity is defined as a society of persons, then by virtue of the adjective "social," that view of the Trinity is a version of "social trinitarianism." Of course, things are much more complicated, but let's take that as a basic marker of social trinitarianism. Note that any marker for social trinitarianism must be something that is in some manner definitive of it. In other words, if a point (Point X) is shared between social trinitarianism and a non-social trinitarianism view of the Trinity, then Point X cannot be definitive of social trinitarianism.

When we look at it this way, only point 2 (Trinity redefined as society and community, analogous to human society) is definitive of social trinitarianism. What about the other points? Point 1 is not definitive of social trinitarianism, otherwise Eastern Orthodoxy would be considered social trinitarianism. Point 3 would be needed for social trinitarianism, but to claim it is necessary does not make it definitive of social trinitarianism. Nevertheless, since it is necessary, we can grant it as a marker for social trinitarianism. This goes the same for points 4 and 6. As for point 5, that is a very subjective criterion: what is seen as a small overlap can be seen as a large overlap by others, and vice versa. Regardlesss, that is in no way definitive of social trinitarianismm, since social trinitarianism is independent of one's view of the relation between the immanent and economic Trinity.

We are left with points 2, 3, 4 and 6. Now, how does EFS match to these points? EFS in its generic variety simply is a teaching that the Son submitted to the Father in eternity. Generic EFS therefore does not correspond to any of the points. How about specific variants of EFS? The dominant variant of EFS promoted by Bruce Ware, Wayne Grduem and others would line up with points 4 and 6. Wih regards to point 2, a case could be made that Bruce Ware in his earlier work Father, Son, and Holy Spirit seem to hold to point 2, although as have shown, Ware is using it for deriving practical applications. Regarding point 3, I have not seen any EFS proponent assert that each person is an individual center of consciousness and will. Barrett is inferring from phrases talking about the will of the Father, the will of the Son, and the will of the Spirit as distinct wills, that therefore EFS teaches three centers of consciousness and will. However, that does not follow (Non Sequitur). Classical Theism holds to the Father loving the Son, the Son loving the Father, and so on. Yet, the Father loving the Son in Classical Theism does not imply two wills, so why should any phrase or sentence discussing the will of the Father, the will of the Son and so on imply three centers of will?

Therefore, is EFS a version of social trinitarianism? Not necessarily. Is the dominant variant of EFS a version of social trinitarianism? No. We have said that only point 2 is definitive of social trinitarianism, while allowing points 3, 4 and 6 as they are necesary for social trinitarianism. But necessity is not the same as sufficiency. Points 3, 4 and 6 are necessary for social trinitarianism, but they are not sufficient for social trinitarianism. Therefore, merely having points 4 and 6 does not mean that the dominant variant of EFS is a version of social trinitarianism. Is Bruce Ware's version of EFS a form of social trinitarianism? It depends on how one interprets his earlier work Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Correctly read and interpreted, the focus of that work uses relationality for application, not for definition. If however, one reads that as reflective of his view of the Trinity, both immanent and economic, then it can be argued that Bruce Ware's view embraces point 2. Nevertheless, we note here the one simple fact that EFS is not necessarily a version of social trinitarianism, and only if one's version of EFS holds to point 2 can that version of EFS be considered a version of social trinitarianism.

Barrett assserts that EFS exactly matches all 6 ponts of social trinitarianism. That is a false statement. The reason why Barrett can make such a statement is because he misunderstands and misrepresents EFS, as we will continue to show to be the case.

Contra Barrett (Part 5): On the new post-2016 EFS

At first, Ware prommises he is orthodox and Nicene, but the more he elaborates, the more noticeable it becomes that he is dissatisfied with the way the Nicene fathers and the Great Tradition have articulated the Trinity. For example, the oorthodox "appeal to divine apprpopriations falls short of expressing fully what Scripture indicates regarding the functional relations." "Yes, the order of operations ad extra is expressive of the order of relations ad intra, but saying only this excludes a significant portion of scriptural indications." What exactly is excluded and "missing""? Authority. Hierarchy. Inside the Trinity. Without authority-submission within the immanent Trinity, Ware believes the Father sending the Son is but a "mechanical" and "impersonal outworking of the relations of origin." (Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity, 224)

The fallout from the 2016 ESS fiasco did indeed result in some positive changes, in that more orthodox language and concepts were adopted by many biblicists. Nevertheless, according to Barrett, all changes are at best cosmetic and at worst make the "heresy" even worse. Reacting to Bruce Ware's 2019 article, Barrett charges that (1) Ware is "dissastified with the Nicene fathers and the Great Tradition," and Barrett thinks that anyone who thinks the Nicene doctrine of God is not the pinnacle of orthodoxy to be one of at least questionable faith, and (2) still thinks that EFS teaches authority-submission within the immanent Trinity. We will look at these in turn.

First, Barrett is highly critical of anyone who is "dissatisfied with the Nicene fathers" and the 'Great Tradition.' Note here the elevation and capitalization of the "Great Tradition." But just what is this "Great Tradition"? Barrett is using it as a short form for classical theism, but not just any classical theism but Thomism. Saint Thomas Aquinas is now his patron saint it seems! But this whole idea that there is a Great Tradition which holds to everything Barrett is teaching is a mirage. Thomas Aquinas's view is not the only claassical theist view concerning the doctrine of God. This is not to mention the total neglect of Eastern Orthodox views with its idea of the essence- energies distinction. The "Great Tradition" Barrett is promoting is as much a modern phenomenon as EFS. The only difference is one has Saint Thomas while the other doesn't.

It must be noted that the doctrine of God is never static. The idea that even pro-Nicene thought is the same as Thomist classical theism is a figment of Barrett's imagination. If the Nicene doctrine of God is the pinnacle of orthodoxy, then why should the charge that Thomas Aquinas is "dissastified with the Nicene faith" not be true, since he adds to the Nicene doctrine of God as well? The fact of the matter is that everyone by virtue of being a theologian "adds to" the Nicene faith, as long as one attempts to formulate what one believes to be the biblical view of the Trinity.

That goes to the heart of the problem with Barrett's attack on Bruce Ware. It is false to think that dissastifaction with the Nicene fathers is a bad thing, because everyone including Barrrett alters or improves upon the beliefs of others. The only difference is that some are more honest about their theological project than others. Barrett himself is not content with the Nicene faith but embraces Thomas' views of the Trinity. And, as we shall see in future posts, Barrrett's view of the Trinity is itself not the same as older classical theist views.

Secondly, Barrett doubles down on his accusation that EFS teaches that authority and submission is within the immanent Trinity. However, he gave no proof that this is the case. As I have mentioned earlier, any talk of the inner life of the Trinity should not be read as pertaining to the immanent Trinity. Since immanent Trinity refers to God in His being, and EFS is not about being but function, therefore EFS by definition is not about the immanent Trinity, no matter what Barrett says.

Contra Barrett (Part 4): Optional involvement of the Son and jealousy within the Trinity?

Ware went so far as to compare the Son to creation: "In many ways, what we see here of the Father choosing not to work unilaterally but to accomplish his work through the Son, or thhrough the Spirit, extends into his relationship to us. Does God need us to do his work?²⁵ The answer is no, but for EFSers the reason why stems from the Trinity: the Son's involvement is optional. The Son is not involved, because he is the Son. He is only involved because the Father chooses to include him. The Father could have asked the Son to stand aside the watch him do all the work. Likewise with the work of creation. (Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity, 219)

Generosity is key to the EFS view. Otherwise, the Son might be ungrateful, buck his place of submission, and attempt to exalt himself to the Father's position of authority within the Trinity. But EFSers say the Son won't do that because he "accepts his role" and minds his place below the Father.²⁹ There is, then, "neither jealosy nor pride"; rather, each person "works together with the others for one unified, common purpose."³⁰ ... Jealosy, pride, discord? Why would EFSers feel the need to preclude these within the eternal, immanent Trinity? (Barrett, 219-20)

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25. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 57

29. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 20

30. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 20

While it is true that Barrett does much misrepresentation, some of the criticisms he has leveled are indeed valid. That said, where he goes with it is another thing altogether.

The next criticism of EFS is that EFS teaches that the "Son's involvement [in the works of God] is optional." Barrett cites Bruce Ware there, and that is certainly an error on the part of Ware. It is certainly true that Ware is talking about a hypothetical here, but still if we are to preserve the fact that there is one God who is simple, then this hypothetical is nonsense. Ware is in error on this point.

Barrett's next criticism however is ridiculous. Citing Ware again, Barrett states that EFS teaches that there is "neither jealosy nor pride" within the Trinity. But certainly just denying that such things exist within the Trinity does not give anyone the license to insinuate that somehow something nefarious is happening? (Note also how Barrett asserts that the Son being in a certain role is equivalent with the negative phrase "minds his place below the Father.") It is unfair to infer from something that Barrett himself will agree with (i.e. there is neither jealosy nor pride within the Trinity) to cast shade on one's opponents.

Ware is indeed wrong on this point. The problem with Barrett here however is using this to somehow insinuate that all EFSers hold to the same teaching that the Son's involvement in the works of God is optional. Presumably, Barrett would bristle if somebody attacks all classical theists as teaching questionable doctrine X if one classical theist promotes teaching X. Yet Barrett violates the law of charity in this attack upon EFS, as if others like Waynge Grudem, John Piper, Owen Strachan and others hold to the same view.

Hymn for Reformation Day '21: And can it be that I should gain

[This version is from the Trinity Hymnal, revised edition]

1. And can it be that I should gain
an interest in the Savior's blood?
Died he for me, who cause his pain?
For me, who him to death pursued?
Amazing love! How can it be that
that thou, my God, should die for me?

Refrain:

Amazing love! How can it be
that thou, my God, should die for me?

2. 'Tis myst'ry all! Th'Immortal dies:
who can explore his strange design?
In vain the firstborn seraph tries
to sound the depths of love divine.
'Tis mercy all! Let earth adore,
let angel minds inquire no more.

3. He left his Father's throne above
(so free, so infinite his grace!),
humbled himself (so great his love!),
and bled for all his chosen race.
'Tis mercy all, immense and free;
for, O my God, it found out me.

4. Long my imprisoned spirit lay
fast bound in sin and nature's night;
thine eye diffused a quick'ning ray;
I woke, the dungeon flamed with light;
my chains fell off, my heart was free;
I rose, went forth, and followed thee.

5. No condemnation now I dread;
Jesus, and all in him, is mine!
Alive in him, my living Head,
and clothed in righteousness divine,
bold I approach th'eternal throne,
and claim the crown, through Christ, my own.

Contra Barrett (Part 3): EFS is subordination within the immanent Trinity?

The subjugation of the Son is not just an economic reality either, limited to salvation or the incarnation. The subordination of the Son is ingrained within the very DNA of the Trinity apart from creation, within the immanent Trinity itself (which EFSers assume is synonymous with what they label eternity past and future). (Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity, 218)

In part 1, we note how Matthew Barrett misrepresents EFS in claiming that Bruce Ware teaches the Trinity is defined as a relational community. In part 2, we see how Barrett is misleading in claiming that EFS teaches hierarchy within the Trinity. In part 3, we will look at the main problem with many critiques of EFS (ESS): the inability to understand economic relations in anything other than created reality, thus misrepresenting EFS as teaching subordination within the immanent Trinity.

In the beginning, there was God. God in Himself, in the three persons of the Trinity, is love. Modern Christian apologists utilize this point particularly against Islam, in pointing out that a unitary God cannot actually be love. For there to be love, the persons of the Trinity must be loving each other from eternity past to eternity future.

In the beginning, God has a decree. The one decree of God translates to the many decrees of God which are enacted in time and space. This one decree is in eternity past. The many decrees are also in eternity past, for a decree must exist before its results come to fruition. Since a decree must exist before its results come to fruition, then the decree to create the world must be in eternity before time. But since God is immutable, that means all the many decrees must be already present before time exist, in eternity past.

What is the point of looking at these, you might ask. The point is simple: The love of God expressed towards each other person is outside of the persons of God. The one decree is God, but the many decrees coming from that one decree is not God, for it is many (Divine simplicity). Already in orthodoxy Christian theology, and especially Reformed theology, there are divine things that are from eternity and before time. The ad extra ("to out of") elements of God are not just limited to the incarnation or to salvation. Anything that is not one-ness is ad extra by virtue of the doctrine of divine simplicity. That includes the expressed love of the persons of the Trinity, the decreees (plural) of God, the relationship God has with any of His people, even the upholding of creation.

Straight away, we see the problem with Barrett's accusation. In Barrett's mind, and in the minds of many classical theists it seem, the economic Trinity, God ad extra, pertains only to salvation and the incarnation. That assertion is expressively rejected by all proponents of EFS. In fact, from the examples I have given of the love of God and the decrees of God, it is uncertain that Barrett's assertion is even coherent much less logical. There is God ad intra, with regards to His being in the one essence, and God ad extra, which includs any and everything that is not of the being of God, including the decrees and actions of any one person or all of them.

Barrett's accusation against EFS proponents stem from reading concepts into their words. Many EFS proponents are biblicists, and they, I would say carelessly, use words like the life of the Trinity, or the inner life of the triune God or things to that effect. What they have in mind is that the persons of the God relate to each other, and these relations happen in eternity past, and willl continue to happen in eternity future. This inner life of the triune God is NOT The same as the immanent Trinity, which refers to the being of God. Here, I acknowledge that part of the confusion is a failure by the biblicists to properly use terms like "immanent" and "econimic," or "ad intra/ ad extra." However, when read in context according to the words and concepts they use, it is clear that what they mean is that EFS pertains to the economic ad extra aspect of the Godhead, as they are seen in the relations of the triune persons from eternity past to eternity future.

When Barrett states that "EFSers assume [the immanent Trinity] is synonymous with what they label eternity past and future," the person who is confused is Barrett, not EFSers. Barrett misrepresents EFS as teaching subordination within the immanent Trinity, whereas EFS merely teaches submission of the Son to the Father in eternity, but such is economic not immanent.

Contra Barrett (Part 2): EFS and "hierarchy inside God"

For EFS, the position of supremacy wihtin the Trinity belongs to the Father alone, not to the Son, and definitely not to the Spirit, who has the least authority of all. The Father alone is "supreme among the persons of the Godhead."¹³ He alone has "ultimate supremacy," and he alone is "supreme in the Trinity." ¹⁴. The Father "stands above the Son," and the "Father has absolute and uncontested supremacy, inluding authority over the Son and Spirit,"¹⁵ The Father "stands above the Son" and is "supreme within the Godhead."¹⁶

EFSers were adamant that these indications of supremacy and subordination tell us who the persons are apart from creation and salvation. They are even person-defining. Just as subordination distinguishes the Son as Son, so too does supremacy distinguish the Father as Father within the Trinity. Apart from these roles there is no Trinity, a point Grudem also stressed repeatedly.¹⁷(Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity, 217)

13. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 46-51

14. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 65

15. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 49, 153, emphasis added.

16. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 51.

17. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 251. C.f. Grudem, Evangelical Feminism, 47, 433; Grudem, Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womandhood, 457, 540.

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So it appears that McCall confuses two sets of properties that are distinguished within the ERAS position: (1) properties possessed fully and eternally by the Father, by the Son, and by the Spirit, of the one and undiviede essence—properties, then, that are the essential attributes of God comprising the eternal nature of God, which is the one and same divine nature possessed fully and eternally by the Father, and by the Son, and by the Spirit— and (2) properties possessed distinctly by the Father, and other properties possessed distinctly by the Son, and yet other properties possessed distinctly by the Spirit, as properties of each of their respective persons&mdassh;distinctly relational and personal properties, which must not be confused with the essential attributes of the one common divine nature. When advocates of ERAS state that the Son possessed eternally the property of being under the authority of the Father, they also propose this as a relational property of the Son's personhood and not an atttribute of the Son's essence. [Bruce A. Ware, "Does Affirming an Eternal Authority-Submission Relationship in the Trinity Ential a Denial of Homoousios?: A Response fo Millard Erikcson and Tom McCall," in Bruce A. Ware and John Starke, eds., One God in Three Persons: Unity of Essence, Distinction of Persons, Implications for Life (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2015), 245]

In the previous installment, we have seen how Matthew Barrett distorts Bruce Ware's words. While Ware argues for the application of ERAS to our roles in life, Barrett states that Ware is teaching that the trinity is a relational community in those very same sentences. But besides asserting thus, Barrett also asserts that Ware (and EFS) teaches a "hierarchy inside God." Is Barrett right in that representation?

On the surface, Barrett's argument seems convincing. Flipping to the pages referenced in endnotes 13 to 16, one can see the exact words, and the immediate context seem to support Barrett's argument. However, in order to get a grasp at what EFS teaches, one must read what EFS teaches in general, and interpret Ware's words accordingly.

We read, in a later article written in a more recent book, One God in Three Persons, that Ware conceives of properties in two levels: (1) properties of the one essence, and (2) properties of each person. In other words, personal properties do not affect the one essence. While less clear in his older book Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it is more charitable to interpret what he says about any distinctions of the persons as pertaining to their personal properties, not each person as to their one essence. As I have said in my review of that book, "uncharitable interpretations are available for those who do not read the cues properly." But taking the charitable reading is to see that the mountain of evidence mustered by Barrett should be recognized as pertaining not to the divine essence and to each person in their essential relations, but to their personal relations. Now, does that answer all concerns? I am not claiming that it does, but at least such a charitable reading should show us that the references mustered by Barrett is at the least misleading.

Now, is there "hierarchy inside God"? It depends on what you mean by the term "hierarchy"? If by "hierarchy," it is implied that there are grades of being, or that one person is superior to the other in nature, then EFS rejects "hierarchy" altogether. If by "hierarchy" one means higher and lower roles, higher and lower distinctions, then it could be argued that some EFSers would assert that to be true. However, I myself would reject "hierarchy" altogether, because I do not believe even a difference in roles and eminance in functions indicate any higher or lower status of any sorts.

Therefore, to the question, the short answer is that, "no, there is no hierarchy in the being of God," "maybe, there might be a functional hierarchy among the persons of the Godhead," and "no, distinctions in roles and eminance are not hierarchical among the persons of the Trinity." Barrett's statement that EFS believes in "hierarchy inside God" is at best misleading, and at worst in error.

Contra Barrett (Part 1): EFS and the issue of a "relational community"

What kind of "roles" and "relationships" distinguish the persons? ... EFS's answer: a society of authrity and submission. A relational community of hierarchy inside God. [Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity: The Unmanipulated Father, Son, and Spirit (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2021), 217]

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LESSONS FOR OUR LIVES AND MINISTIRES FROM THE RELATIONSHIPS AND ROLES OF THE TRIUNE GOD

...

2. Eternal relationality calls for and calls forth a created community of persons. [Bruce A. Ware, Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Relationships, Roles, and Relevance, 132-3]

Matthew Barrett sincerely thinks that the doctrine of the Trinity needs retrieving. According to Barrett, the doctrine of God has been distorted and manipulated towards our modern times, and we really, desparately, need to get it back. That sounds like a laudable sentiment, but the details is where we see what he means by that, and what we see is not very nice at all.

In chapter 8 of his book Simply Trinity, Barrett pulls no punches as he goes after the supposed "heresy" of EFS (Eternal Functional Submission) with a vengeance. The vehemence with which he does this is a sight to behold. It also gives us clear statements of what many of the classical theists might have believed but have not expressed in such a clear manner. Barrett's vehemence gives us a fixed critique of EFS, and therefore makes it easy for those of us who hold to ESS to address.

In this light, here is part 1 of my examination of Barrett's strongly worded critique of EFS (also better called ESS - Eternal Submission of the Son).

In the first statement of Barrett's attack on ESS, he states that ESS believes in a relational society within the Trinity where there is a "community of hierarchy inside God." There are two accusations here: (1) ESS believes that the Trinity is a relational society, (2) ESS believes there is a community of hierarchy inside God. Is that true? We will look at the first part of the accusation here.

Barrett has made an accusation. In response, we should ask, "Upon what basis do you say that ESS believe that God is a relational community?" We see here in the endnotes that Barrett references Bruce Ware's book Father, Son and Holy Spirit, a book that I myself had find problematic and had reviewed here. Nonetheless, while I found certain parts of his book problematic, it is illuminating that (1) Barrett dedicates most of his endnotes in chapter 8 to that book, as if that particular book by Ware is representative of all who hold to ESS, and (2) Barrett refuses to let Ware speak for himself.

One thing that one must understand as it deals with hermeneutics is that the authorial intent is the most important. One is not free to read any book, and read things into the book that is not there. In seminary, all of us learn this about the Scriptures. But this does not pertain just to the Scriptures but to all literature. After all, would you want someone to read your book a meaning that you did not intend? I hope not. That is a most basic element of engaging others, which unfortunately Barrett does not respect.

To promote the view that ESS teaches that the Trinity is a relational society, Barrett refences Ware's book Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as follows:

Ware presented the Trinity with a strong social emphasis, defining the Trinity as "triune persons in relational community."¹⁰ "Eternal relationality calls for and calls forth a created community of persons."¹¹ As a society itself, the Trinity is the model for human society. Sometimes Ware even looked to human society to define the Trinity.¹².

10. Emphasis added. This phrase is used throughout chapter 6 of Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

11. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 133; c.f. 134

12. Ware, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 134.

When we look at the source material, we notice the following: Chapter 6 of Ware's book is the last chapter of his book, and it is clear from his book that he is trying to draw analogies and practical lessons from all that he has said in the previous 5 chapters of his book. Endnote 10 of Chapter 8 of Barrett's book is indeed correct that the phrase is used throughout chapter 6, but what is missing is a discussion of the context, which is that Ware is trying to use the Trinity as an analogy for lessons for us. Whether one thinks that should be done or not is not the point; what is the point is that Ware is not defining the Trinity as "triune persons in relational community" but using the phrase for analogy and practical applications.

We see the issue again in endnote 11, where Barrett rightly cites the sentence but divorces it from its context. In context, Ware uses that as a subeading under the heading "lessson for our lives and ministries from the relationships and roles of the triune God." Note the preposition "from." Ware is not defining the Trinity relationally, but asking us to apply to our relationships lessons we can learn from the Trinity. This is the same problem for endnote 12 where the direction is the exact opposite of what Ware is advocating. Here is what Ware is advocating for in chapter 6 of his book:

In our own relationships in the home and in ministry, we should endeavor, by God's grace, to model our work and worship in ways that reflect the trinitarian unity expressed through harmony. (Ware, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, 136)

So what shall we make of Barrett's accusation here? First of all, it is false that Ware "presented the Trinity with a strong social emphasis, defining the Trintiy as 'triune persons in relational community,'" as we can see from the source material. The use of the subheading in page 134 of Ware's book is misleading, and Ware does not look to human society to define the Trinity. As seen from the actual source material, nothing could be further from the truth. Again, Ware said that "we should endeavor, by God's grace, to model our work and worship in ways that reflect the trinitarian harmony expressed through harmony." Put the two side by side and you see how badly Barrett has misrepresented Ware. Whereas Ware is asking us to model the trinitarian harmony in our social relationships, Barrett acccuses him of defining the trinity as "triune persons in relational community"!

As I have said, one has to represent one's opponents correctly. Failure to do so is wrong, and failure to do so after repeatedly being corrected is sin. Barrett has misrepresented Ware here, and this is just but the tip of the iceburg.

What does Bruce Ware believe about the persons of the Trinity?

Each member of the Godhead is equally God, each is eternally God, and each is fully God‐not three gods but three Persons of the One Godhead. .... This—the one and undivided divine nature—is also possessed equally and fully by the Son and Spirit. (Bruce A. Ware, Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Relationships, Roles, and Relevance, p. 43)

What did Bruce Ware believe about the Trinity? One thing he did believe in is that in terms of being (ontology, immanant Trinity), God is one and each person is fully equal to the other. Also, each person does not have one-third of the divine nature, but rather the whole divine nature is "possessed equally and fully" by all persons of the Godhead. As it can be seen, Ware does not believe that any one person of the Trinity is higher or superior to the other as it regards to their being; all are ontologically equal.

One supposed implications of simplicity and its denial, according to Matthew Barrett

He is not a God made up of parts but a God without parts. There is in him no composition, nor can he be compounded by parts. If he could, then he would be a divided being (parts are divivisible by definition), a mutable being (parts are prone to change), a temporal being (parts require a composer), and a dependentent being (depending on these parts as if they precede him). [Matthew Barrett, Simply Trinity: The Unmanipulated Father, Son and Spirit (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2021), 137]

The doctrine of simplicity of God, in its basic form, is the teaching that God is not made up of parts such that one can have a part of, or various parts of God. At its most basic form, it means simply this: One gets God, or no God; there is no in-between. In this basic sense, simplicity is a biblical doctrine, since the Scripture make it clear that one gets God, "warts" and all.

In the providence of God, God uses the metaphysics of classical theism, based as it is upon Greek philosophy, to express this truth for us Christians. Yet, philosophy, being invented by Man, is a mere tool for gaining knowledge. Being a creation of Man, philosophy was never meant to be infallible, and thus we must be free to critique philosophy and never treat any one particular philosophy as THE way to think about anything, both the philosophy of things or theology itself. This particular critical stance is important when we look at some of the ways the supposed recovery of the "creedal doctrine of God" has been working itself out, as seen in the above argument by Matthew Barrett.

In this particular argument, Barrett makes the following argument: If God is not simple, then he is divisible, mutable, temporal, and dependent. But is this statement true? We would certainly agree that if God is not simple, then he is divisible, since "divisibility" is opposite of "simplicitity." However, I would question what Barrett means by a "divided being." Next, according to Barrett, parts are prone to change, therefore a non-simple God would be mutable. However, why should parts be prone to change? Even in the material world, parts like atoms of hydrogen-1 are not prone to change over millions of years. Accordingly, the protons, neutrons, and electrons of Hydrogen-1 in interstellar space do not change at all over time. Thus, even in the material world, we can see that parts are not necessarily prone to change. Why then would a non-simple God be mutable at all? Obviously, I am not arguing against simplicity here, just showing that the argument here just does not follow. It is possible to believe in immutability and deny simplicity, for the simple fact that parts are not necessarily prone to change or even are mutable in any respect.

Barrett next claims that parts require a composer, and therefore a non-simple God is temporal. That likewise does not follow. Why should parts require a compser? Again, in the material world, if you accept the Big Bang Theory, then atoms come into being spontaneously without a composer. While agreeing that God is the ultimate cause of things, there are many things in the world that are self-organizing, from a material point of view. Salt solutions when left to themselve naturally compose themselves into salt crystals, with fixed crystalline structures depending on their chemical composition. There are autocatylytic reactions like the degradation of tin metal into grey tin, or the auto-excision of introns from RNA. Therefore, even things that have parts do not necessarily need a composer. It is possible for parts to auto-organize, and therefore parts do not necessarily require a composer. For a non-simple deity, it is possible to envision such a god being made of self-organizing and eternal parts, thus a non-simple deity is not necessarily temporal.

The last claim made by Barrett is that a non-simple God is dependent on the parts that precede him. Again, this is a non sequitur. Something made of parts could be made of parts because it could be divisible yet started as one whole (the whole is prior to the parts). There is simply no reason why parts must necessarily precede the whole. For example, the human body is made up of parts, yet the human body does not develop as parts which are then composed into the human body. Right from the start as a fetus, the human body develops as a whole. The human body is not like a car assembly line whereby parts are made separately then put together to make a car. Rather, the whole comes prior to the parts, as the parts develop from the whole. In fact, the parts of the human body depend on the whole human body for them to survive. Cut the hand out, and the hand dies while the rest of the body survives. In the case of the human body therefore, the part here is dependent on the whole.

Barrett is right to promote the doctrine of simplicity. However, there are biblical ways to argue for simplicity, and simply illogical ways stemming from outdated philosophy. In this particular case, Barrett's argument is unsound. God is simple because one cannot have a God that has only certain parts, the parts that any particular group likes. But denying simplicity does not lead to a mutable or temporal or dependent being.

When seeking to teach and defend biblical and confessional truths, a key point to note is that one ought to put foward arguments that are sound. Making unsound arguments only weakens one's position, and might lead some to reject the position altogether. The last thing anyone who is promoting simplicity as the biblical doctrine should be doing, is to repeat such unsound arguments. Keep to the basics, and leave the psuedo-intellectual arguments of classical theism behind.

Book Review: Through Western Eyes, by Robert Letham

What is Eastern Orthodoxy? In his book Through Western Eyes — Eastern Orthodoxy: A Reformed Perspective, theologian Robert Letham seeks to introduce and analyze Eastern Orthodoxy for the rest of who are children of the Western churches. Has Letham done a good job introducing Eastern Orthodoxy to us? You can read my thoughts in my review of his book, here. An excerpt:

What is Eastern Orthodoxy? For most Christians in the West, Eastern Orthodoxy (EO) seems mysterious, and looks like an older Roman Catholicism without the Pope. Into this lacuna of knowledge, Reformed theologian Robert Letham has written a book seeking to “demystify” Eastern Orthodoxy for the rest of us Christians of the Western tradition. Specifically, Letham seeks to put forward and analyze Eastern Orthodoxy according to his Reformed perspective, thus helping us understand what Eastern Orthodoxy is about.

Letham divides his book into three sections. In part one, he deals briefly with the history of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Part two deals with the theology of Eastern Orthodoxy, and part three is where he does a comparative evaluation between Reformed theology and Eastern Orthodoxy. He ends with a glossary of terms and a rather comprehensive bibliography for the study of Eastern Orthodoxy.

[more]

Gregory Palamas and the Essence/ Energies Distinction

(III.ii.6)

… but also some works of God are without beginning, as the Fathers also rightly affirm. For was it not needful for the work of providence to exist before Creation, so as to cause each of the created things to come to be in time, out of nonbeing? As it not necessary for a divine knowledge to know before choosing, even outside time? But how does it follow that the divine prescience had a beginning? How could one conceive of a beginning of God’s self-contemplation, and was there ever a moment when God began to be moved toward contemplation of Himself? Never! [Gregory Palamas, The Triads (The Classics of Western Spirituality; Ed. John Meyendorff; trans. Nicholas Gendle; Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), p. 94]

These works of God, then, are manifestly unoriginated and pre-temporal: His foreknowledge, will, providence, contemplation of Himself, and whatever powers are akin to these. But if this contemplation, prescience, predetermination and will are works of God that are without beginning, then virtue is also unoriginated, for each of His works is a virtue; ... (Ibid., p. 94)

(III.ii.8)

But even if this man considers that everything that has a beginning is created, we for our part know that while all the energies of God are uncreated, not all are without beginning. Indeed, beginning and end must be ascribed, if not to the creative power itself, then at least to its activity, that is to say, to its energy as directed towards created things. (Ibid., p. 96)/p>

The strong influence of Neoplatonism on Eastern Orthodoxy would logically result in a distant and remote deity. Such is however contrary to biblical Christianity. The contradiction is so obvious that Eastern Orthodoxy could not continue being Christian without modifying parts of what it received through Dionysius. This it did in positing a distinction between the essence of God, and His energies. "Energies" can be taken as the workings of God. They are the dynamic workings of God, not to be identified with who God is (essence), neither are they identified with what God does (the works of God). The essence of God is as what Neoplatonism says it is: beyond being, beyond intelligibility, utterly inaccessible to anyone but God. The energies of God are however what humans can perceive. In fact, the Eastern Orthodox doctrine of theosis, sometimes called "deification," is the idea that the believer could partake in the divine energies fully.

In Palamas' Triads, certainly not everything stated is I believe compatible with biblical Christianity. Nevertheless, Palamas' promotion of the essence/ energies distinction is a helpful category. Neoplatonism has forced the issue, showing how immutability if applied to the whole of God would result in a static God, the God of Deism. Therefore, in order to have a vital communion with God (which the East promoted through its misguided monasticism), new philosophical categories were formed. Western Christianity in general was not as strongly influenced by Neoplatonism as the East was, and therefore was slow to see the problems that would arise with a God who has only an essence that is utterly transendent and immutable. The East remained orthodox in their doctrine of God, unlike many Western theologians who came to see the same problems, and therefore invented these categories congrunt to biblical orthodoxy that we can now appropriate.

One argument that Palamas pointed out was to note that the decrees of God and the foreknowledge of God are prior to creation. God's will and His own self-enjoyment (contemplation) are likewise eternal. Yet all these are not "being" but operations of some sort, since they are active in nature. Therefore, it can be seen that these "works" (as utilized by Palamas) of God are "without beginning." These energies are not just within God so to speak, but they translate to "activities" that are "directed towards created things."

Now, the fact that there are these decrees of God and other active operations are clear from Scripture. What is however omitted from the thoughts of many theologians is an attempt to categorize them as either essence or works. The fact of the matter is that it is neither of these categories, and thus the category of "energies" is most appropriate here. Orthodox Western systematic theologians tend to talk about God's essencce, then His attributes (communicable and incommunicable), and subsume these operations under the atttributes of God. The problem is that atttributes are "static" in nature. They describe what God is, not what God does. Therefore, including these active operations under the section on the atttributes of God, or worse, to shift parts of them to the works of God, is I believe to be massive categorical confusion.

God is immutable yet He relates both to Himself and to us His creatures. We must hold to both, and do it without diminishing either of them. Without the category of "energies," I do not see how either of these truths could not but be diminished, to the detriment of our understanding and worship of our living God.

Mark Galli, formerly from Christianity Today, admits what we always knew about Big Eva

Mark Galli on his Substack platform recently admitted in his report what we always knew was the case: That Evangelicals love the accolades of the world and lean left while punching right. An excerpt:

Elite evangelicalism (represented by CT, IVPress, World Vision, Fuller Seminary, and a host of other establishment organizations) is too often “a form of cultural accommodation dressed as convictional religion.” These evangelicals want to appear respectable to the elite of American culture. ...

...

I saw this accommodation dynamic as CT managing editor and then editor in chief. We said, for example, that the magazine did not take a stand in the complementarianism or egalitarianism debate. But we rarely if ever published an article that endorsed complementarianism; we did offer many that assumed egalitarianism in family and church life (not to mention the many women pastors who we published).

Then there was the six-day creation/evolution debate, in which again we said we took no stand. But try to find an article in the last three decades that argued for or assumed six-day creation. And yet we published several pieces that simply assumed a billion-year time span for the history of the earth.

It’s not a coincidence that complementarianism and six-day creation are anathema to secularists, features of a religion out of touch with reality.

Is it any wonder that Evangelicalism has always drifted towards doctrinal and moral corruption over time? Galli puts forward TGC (The Gospel Coalition) as the successor to New Evangelicalism. Unfortunately, the same dynamic is busy at work in TGC, just at a less advanced stage.

In response to Perl's call for a return to Neoplatonism

The alternative to the principle that to be is to be intelligible, therefore is the nihilism which afflicts so much of contemporary thought and culture. For if being is not what is apprehended by thought, then thought does not apprehend being. This in effect means that there is no being, since whatever we call “being” is not being but a projection, interpretation, illusion—in short, nothing. If reality is not as thought must apprehend it, then there is no such thing as reality. Conversely, if thought is not the apprehension of being, then all thought, in that it never apprehends being, is illusory. Nihilism may indeed be said to consist most fundamentally in the denial of the intelligibility of being. (Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 111-2)

In his conclusion of his book on Dionysius, Eric Perl puts forth his promotion of Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism is treated as superior as opposed to what he sees as the nihilism that infects the modern world. While certainly nihilism is present in much modern thought, I do not agree that Neoplatonism is a better alternative.

Perl's argument against much of modern philosophy can be stated as follows: (1) If thought does not apprehend being, being is an illusion. (2) If thought is not the apprehension of being, then thought is illusory. (3) Therefore, if Neoplatonism is false, being and thought are illusory. (4) (Implied) Being and thought are not illusory. (5) Therefore, Neoplatonism is true. The problem comes with statements 1 and 2. Is it really true that apprehending being is necessary for the reality of thought and being?

Reality and thought are linked in Plato due to the idea of forms, in which apprehension comes about when one apprehends the form of things. One knows what fire is when one sees "fire-ness" in the object. Implicit in this view of knowledge is that the mind has access to the forms in order to apprehend an object. But is that truly how cognition works?

Let us think through a few questions: Can the mind apprehend a pink unicorn? How about a pegasus? Surely we can say that the mind can apprehend these things, but then these things are not real. But suppose it is said that their forms are derived from real forms, and thus even though the mythical creatures do not exist, the reason why we apprehend them is because the original forms exist and we can apprehend them. So let's try something different, something real. How about the wave-particle duality of photons? Can our minds apprehend the concept? I would think so. Pointing out that we can apprehend "wave" and "particle" does not help because "wave-particle" is not wave and not particle. Or from Math, can we apprehend the idea of transfinites, where again transfinites are not truly infinite and yet they compose infinite sets?

The thing is: Ever since the Scientific Revolution, the link between being and intelligibility has been strained to the breaking point. Our knowledge is not limited to what there is, as we are able to conceptualize new theories and new things. Our thought is virtually limited to what we can conceptualize. Reality of course remains the same. The world in Plato's time is more or less the same world in modern times. Photons existed as wave-particles in Plato's time just as it does in ours, except Plato did not know or understand modern physics. Thus, we see a separation between the world of being and the world of ideas. Reality remains the same, yet thought and cognition does not.

Since such is the case, I would propose that we need a separation of reality from the world of ideas. There is nothing necessarily wrong with the Platonic forms, and that objects have forms which impress themselves on the mind (Whether that is the best way to understand cognition I would not comment here). The separation however needs to happen between reality and thought. We must understand that conceptualization is a mental process that can operate apart from the world, and that has happened as we come to grips with the strangeness and counter-intuitive nature of the inner workings of reality. Reality or being is one thing; the world of ideas does have relation to reality but is able to transcend it altogether.

From a Christian perspective, we must hold to some version of that separation, since we believe in a God who is in many ways unlike us. To assert that God is a se (when nothing in reality is a se), and we are expected to understand what we mean when we say that God is a se, is already a conceptual leap from reality. We also say that there are the "secret things of God" (c.f. Deut. 29:29), which are certainly real and yet not known by us, thus we must create an extra category of real but not intelligible. Christianity therefore cuts against the identification of being and intelligibility, and those who hold to such an identification would come to face problems in their philosophies. Those holding to Platonism tend towards rationalism, while those rejecting rationalism tend towards mysticism, precisely because they continue to run with Plato's link between being and intelligibility.

If we separate being and intelligibility, we can have 3 categories: (1) Things real but not intelligible (secret things of God), (2) Things real and intelligible (most things), and (3) Things intelligible but without being (e.g. knowledge of God, Scientific paradigms). There is no need to reduce everything to intelligibility and thus become a rationalist (rejecting 1), or focus on being and thus treading the path of Dionysius (rejecting 1 and 3). If we take this paradigm, then we can reject statements 1 and 2 of Perl's argument, and therefore his case for Neoplatonism. What I suspect is happening in much of philosophy is a failure of imagination, and a stubborn clinging to the idea that unity of thought and being can be found in this world by Man.