Liberal anti-intellectuals and the Crusades (Ammended)

US President Obama has taken flak for his National Prayer Breakfast address equivocating the actions of ISIS with the Medieval Crusades. The main issue is that Medieval scholars, that is, those who actually do the hard historical work of shifting through the primary sources and attempting an objective interpretation of historical data, have rejected the idea of the Crusades being a war of aggression. Rodney Stark's book God's Battalions: The Case for the Crusades and the more recent book The Concise History of the Crusades by Thomas F. Madden are recent scholarly works on the Crusades, and as such the Liberal equivalence of ISIS and the Crusades is just plain wrong.

The Liberals however prove that truth does not actually matter to them. This hack job at New Republic asserts what the author thinks is true, without interacting with the scholarly arguments medieval scholars have put out. The author evidently thinks she knows much more than medieval scholars about what actually happened in the Crusades. Forget about the primary sources, forget about actually thinking historically; one does not actually have to do the work of a medieval scholar to know he/she is wrong! If that is not anti-intellectualism, nothing is!

Yes, the Crusades were not pretty and crimes were committed by all sides. But the kind of sloppy thinking liberals have just show that truth to them is totally unimportant. When truth gets in the way of a "good story," then lies should be believed. The academic work of medieval scholars can be ignored, as they have done to the work of all who do not share their beliefs. How much lower can Liberals stoop? Or do they remain so deluded that nothing can ever show them how intellectually dishonest they have become?

If Liberals actually want to speak intelligently about the Crusades, they should actually deal with what the Medieval Scholars have actually said. But I guess I'm asking too much from them to do that.

Erratum: It is not the SOTU, but the National Prayer Breakfast, in which Obama said those comments

My licensure sermon

Yesterday February 6th 2015, I preached my licensure sermon during the meeting of the OPC Presbytery of Southern California. It can be heard here.

Creation and the focus on clocks

We should also consider different cultural approaches to time. Cultures differ in striking ways in their attitudes toward time. Among these differences are differences concerning punctuality and "keeping to the clock." First, people can focus on the "objective" passing of time as shown by a clock. We may call this clock orientation. Second, they can focus on the more subjective, interactive time that they experience in the rhythms of human events. Human beings interact with one another in social groups or interact with created things, such as when they celebrate a wedding or harvest a field. .. We may call this focus interactive orientation. ... [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 138]

How does all this apply to Genesis 1? If one goes to Genesis 1 with a clock orientation, one focuses primarily on how long it took, as measured by a clock. But if one goes to Genesis 1 with an interactive orientation, one asks what important events took place, and what was their human social meaning. ... (Ibid., 139)

The argument made by Poythress, in his promotion of the analogical day position, is that the very notion of 24-hour days of creation is a very modern and Western phenomenon. Ancient societies like ancient Israel do not have a "clock orientation" but an "interactive orientation" and therefore the fixation on the length of days is unbiblical.

It is granted that modern Western societies have a "clock orientation." Yet, this objection to the 6-24 view is rather strange. If the objection merely wants to claim that it may not exactly 24 hours, then of course YECs are not tied to exactly 24 hours 00 minutes 00.000 seconds! The "24" in the 24 hours of the day is not meant to insist on a particular scientific measurement of the duration of one day, but rather to indicate that the creation days are not qualitatively different from subsequent earth days. From a phenomenological perspective, an observer placed on the surface of the earth during the 6 days would have seen a cycle of one period of light and one period of darkness just like how he would have expected it to be seen in the subsequent earth days.

There are indeed differences between those with a "clock orientation" and those with an "interactive orientation." Yet, the differences are exaggerated if one thinks that those with an "interactive orientation" have no recognition of time. They do! The difference is how they perceive time should be utilized. Furthermore, all societies most certainly have a basic "clock orientation" in the recognition of the passing of days and nights, if only for the fact that one has to sleep at night and wake up in the morning! So while there are indeed difference in time perception and utilization, it is simply wrong to think that such differences would allow for the stretching of a day to any duration even to millions of years. Sure, one can plus/minus a few hours per day, but that would not have really helped any other position besides the literal 6-24 view.

Poythress attempts to make the duration of a day more indeterminate by appeal to the fact that there was no sun or moon in the first three days, so those three days should not be taken as normal calendar days (Ibid., 141). But that is erroneous, for just because the sun and moon and astral bodies are to function as normal time keepers does not imply that time before the fourth day can be of any length. When God created the light on Day 1, and separated the light from the darkness, time could function already if one sees the light as shining from one direction onto a rotating earth. Moreover, there is no indication in the text that the first 3 days were meant to be in any sense qualitatively different from the next 3 days, so this argument is invalid.

So in conclusion, yes, there are indeed difference in the perception of time between different societies. Yet, those difference are overblown if one thinks that it would allow for the duration of a creation day to be stretched indefinitely. So while Poythress' point about perceptions of time might be helpful to those who are dogmatic about it being scientifically 24 hours, it is little relevance for those who are more interested in the day being a normal calendar day, who use "24" as a short-hand to indicate their view.

The problems with the mature creation view (ADD)

I suggest, then, that the mature creation view offers an attractive supplement to the 24-hour view. It retains all the main advantages of the 24-hour-day view, by maintaining that God created the universe within six 24-hour days. It supplements this view with a clear and simple explanation for the conclusions of modern astronomy. The universe appears to be 14 billion years old because God created it mature. Moreover, the universe is coherently mature, in the sense that estimates of age deriving from different methods arrive at similar results. [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 116]

... But the idea of mature creation threatens to produce doubts in their mind. If God would do something like this, which appears to be deceptive, how can we trust him in other areas? ... If Adam sensed that the animals were new, he would have had a doctrine of mature creation with respects to the animals. He saw adult animals, but understood that they were freshly created. (Ibid., 117)

But now a more nuanced objection arises: mature structures are not a problem, but records or traces of earlier apparent events from an unreal (ideal) past are a problem. ... (Ibid., 118)

It sounds as if the objector by contrast, cannot really accept mature creation, but rather only creation of a complex structure. And this structure would then have no record within it of a past history. According to this model, God created Adam or a tree but without coherent apparent age. Coherent age would point both to earlier structures and to earlier events &mash; and the latter the objector cannot accept. (Ibid., 119)

When Jesus turned water into wine at Cana in Galilee (John 2:1-11), the wine would have tasted like the product from grapes. Presumably, it would be a complex structure. But could it have contained any grape plant cells or yeast cells or fragments from cells? Such cells would contain DNA, and the DNA would by its distinctive signature enable a scientist to infer from what grapevine stock the wine derived. He would then infer past events like the picking of the grapes, the pressing in a wine press, the operation of yeast in aging, and so on.

The objector now seems to be on the horns of a dilemma. He might claim that the drink at Cana in Galilee only tasted like wine, but did not have the complex inner structure that would include the remains of yeast cells. But that would mean a denial that God could have freshly created complex structures in a moment. ... So suppose that he allows that the wine might actually yeast cell DNA. In that case, he seems to allow both mature structures (yeast cells) and apparent past events that one can infer from them (cell growth and division). I conclude, then, that a hard-and-fast distinction between complex structures and mature structures with an ideal past is implausible. (Ibid., 119-20)

On the days of creation, Poythress tends towards the analogical day view, but he has sympathy for the mature creation view. Poythress claims that the "indisputable" findings of astronomy makes the 24-hour view untenable, and thus a belief in a "mature creation" as a supplement would rescue it as a viable theory. Poythress then attempts to answer objections to the mature creation view, attempting to show that it does not result in God being deceptive at all.

First of all, Poythress is wrong in his certainty concerning the findings of astronomy. As I have shown, Poythress misrepresented Russell Humphreys' white hole cosmology. Alternate cosmologies such as his might just be able to explain astronomical data without the need for billions of years. There is thus no need to supplement a 6-24 view with a belief in mature creation.

With regards to Poythress' argument, Poythress is right in pointing out that Adam and Eve and the animals are created mature. Thus, the presence of mature structures do not suggest that they get to be that way because of the duration of long periods of time. The "more nuanced" objection that Poythress mentioned is however the crux of the objection against the mature creation view. The issue is not so much an appearance of age in complex structures, but there is the presence of "coherent ages" indicating apparent events in "an unreal past." But Poythress does not frame the objection in its best form. The problem with the mature creation view is that the phenomena that indicate "coherent age" contains information about the past which would not be otherwise present if the past was unreal. Take the example of distant starlight. Holding the mature creation view would indicate that the light from any stellar body beyond about 10,000 light-years away consist of photons created in transit. Therefore, such light is not truly indicative of what is happening in the stellar bodies. But when the light portrays for example a supernova, taking the mature creation view must say that the supernova did not actually happen since the light containing the information about the supernova was created in transit. How is this not deceptive, to indicate an astronomical event which did not actually happen?

Poythress attempts to use the miracle of Jesus' turning water into wine at Cana as an example of why this "nuanced" objection is invalid. Poythress asked us whether the wine is actually wine with remnants of yeast cell and yeast DNA. In response, it is to be asked whether these are essential for wine to be wine, and the answer is no. We can take any wine that is naturally produced, remove all yeast cells and, if it were possible, all yeast cell DNA and grape DNA and any other cell remnants, and the resulting beverage would still be wine. The elements of wine are the various organic and trace inorganic chemicals that together in certain proportions give us wine. Yeast's function in wine production is to convert sugars to alcohol, not to be part of the essence of wine. Poythress' example thus does not show that such a distinction is not possible. In fact, it would have been better for Poythress to actually address how the mature creation view can answer the issue of "coherent age" with respects to distant starlight. As I have point out, should those who hold on to the mature creation view hold to the creation of light in transit and thus the creation of false information about astronomical phenomena?

It might be tempting to take the mature creation view as a cop-out against wrestling with the scientific data, as it might be tempting to take the Framework view as a cop-out against resolving the tension between science and the Genesis account. But such is not the right way, for we hold that God does not contradict Himself. What is revealed in General Revelation (astronomical data, NOT theories) cannot be discarded as illusionary but must be properly addressed. Yes, science is not the same as General Revelation, which is why we do not have to explain the "concordance" between the Big Bang Theory and the Genesis account but rather the astronomical data with the Genesis account. The problem with the mature creation theory is the problem of information, not the presence of phenomena, and this Poythress did not adequately address.

P.S.: When I mention that one must take into account the data of astronomy, I am well aware that there are no such things as brute data. Rather, what I am saying is that one must account for the data, either through explaining how it makes sense in one's system, or by questioning how it is collected and offering an viable alternative explanation of the collection and results of data.

Poythress' misrepresentation of Humphreys' cosmology

Third, D. Russell Humphreys employs the general theory of relativity in order to try to "rescale" the time back to the Big Band. But he misapplies the mathematics of general relativity, and does not realize that in any case general relativity would not significantly affect the time estimates to nearby galaxies like the Andromeda galaxy.¹⁵ [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 103]

¹⁵ Because the relative velocities of our solar system and of the Andromeda galaxy are small compared with the velocity of light, and because there are no gargantuan gravitational fields in the line of sight to Andromeda, neither special relativity nor general relativity significantly affects time estimates for light coming from the Andromeda galaxy. ... [Footnote 15, in ibid., 103]

Humphreys, D. Russell, Starlight and Time: Solving the Puzzle of Distant Starlight in a Young Universe. Colorado Springs, Master, 1994. Argues that general relativity plus certain reasonable assumptions about the beginnings provides a suitable model in which, because of relativistic time dilation, distant parts of the universe may appear to be old when the earth is young. This and forthcoming works based on it may come to play a role in the arguments of six-24-hour-day creationists. A flaw in the physical reasoning invalidates the argument. (In bibliography, in ibid., 358)

A major part of Vern Poythress' book deals with science and the question of origins, especially dealing with the text of Genesis 1-2. In his description of the young earth creationist, 6-24 position, Poythress list some attempts to deal with what he thinks to be the obvious evidence of long ages, distant starlight. Russell Humphreys' attempt is noticed by Poythress and listed as one attempt to deal with the problem of distant starlight. That is good. The problem however is that Poythress misrepresented Humphreys' cosmology.

Humphreys is his book Starlight and Time postulates a white hole cosmology. First, Humphreys denies the Copernican cosmological principle — that there is no center of the universe. The beginning is therefore an explosion of matter from a white hole into 3-dimensional space. Whereas in the standard Lambda-CDM Big Band Model, the initial explosion is 3-D space itself on the surface of a 4-D hypersphere. In Humphreys' white hole cosmology, because matter is expanding into 3-D space, there is gravitational differential between the surface of the expanding sphere of matter and its center, something which is not present in the Lambda-CDM Big Band Model since in that model, it is space itself that is expanding and there is no center of mass when 3-D space itself loops back onto itself as it is stretched upon the 4-D hypersphere (i.e. if you move in one direction across the universe, you will eventually arrive at your starting point no matter which direction you choose).

It is this gravitational differential that Humphreys focuses on with regard to gravitational and time dilation. According to white hole cosmology, the earth passed through the white hole's event horizon on day 4, during which time billions of years of stellar time eclipsed such that distant starlight could make their way to earth. Billions of stellar evolution could occur, while there is the passage of only one day on earth.

We can easily see that Poythress misrepresented Humphreys' cosmology. Humphreys is not saying that light coming from the Andromeda Galaxy is currently undergoing relativistic effects before reaching earth. Rather, the relativistic effects happened because of the near stopping of time on earth on day 4. Therefore, the light that we currently see in the sky today, according to Humphreys' white hole cosmology, is light that had traveled from distant stars for billions of years in stellar time. All the photons we see were photons that were a couple of thousand light-years away from earth when day 4 ended, having traveled a long distance by then.

Now Humphreys' white hole cosmology is not foolproof. The latest YEC cosmology after all is the one developed by John Harnett. But one should represent his white hole cosmology accurately even in disagreement, and unfortunately Poythress did not do so.

Poythress and the philosophy of science (Part 2)

The appreciation of multidimensional reality can also account for cases where later science has overturned earlier scientific theories. Copernicus's sun-centered solar system displaced Ptolemy's earth-centered system. But both systems recognized a general patten of cyclical motion in the planets. .... The system [Ptolemy's -DHC] was not wrong to notice the correlations; but it was oversimple, and to that extent wrong, in postulating a direct correlation between mathematics of epicycles and position in three dimensions. ... [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 205]

The acknowledge of multiple perspectives enable us to make some sense of the diversity of "levels" with which we may analyze the perception of a red apple. We may affirm the value both of ordinary human experience and of special modes of analysis that science introduces. ... (Ibid., 213)

Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science came about through his study of the history of science. Thus, in Kuhn's most famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn made some observations regarding the history of how science had worked in past eras, and from his historical observations, he postulated the idea of scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts.

Vern Poythress has decided to deal with the history of science in some fashion also. Using a multi-perspectival method, Poythress claims that the differences between the various eras did not come about because of differences in paradigms but merely because they looked at the scientific questions they were answering from different perspectives. He then claimed that, in the difference between the Ptolemaic and Copernican cosmologies, the differences came about because both parties have different perspectives.

In response, we first note that paradigms do include the perspectives of men. But paradigms go beyond that to include the societal and ideological backdrop of the times, so paradigms is a larger category than mere perspectives.

Secondly, and more importantly, whereas for Poythress, the various perspectives are legitimate, that is not historically how the differences between the various scientific models are seen. Those holding to the Copernican model like Kepler and Galileo did not think their model was merely a different "perspective" just as legitimate as the Ptolemaic model. Rather, they thought that the Ptolemaic model was in error. Likewise, with regards to the phlogiston theory, those rejecting phlogiston actually think that those holding to the phlogiston theory were in error, not that they merely "had" an alternative perspective. To claim that they are merely different "perspectives" cheapen the revolutionary shifts that mark the development of science. It is also rather disingenuous, I might add, to re-interpret the views and motives of especially dead people according to one's preconceived notions of how science develops.

Multiperspectivalism will not save Poythress' interpretation of the history of science, and will not save his critical realism either. The question remains how one can actually know what is true, not whether one can have an actual relation with the real world. Yes, if we "see the redness of an apple," we do see "exactly what God's word specifies that we should see" (Ibid., 204). But how do I know that I actually see the redness of an apple? This is the question Poythress has not even begin to address, and his realism will result in his overestimation of what science actually states, to the detriment of this supposed Christian project of "redeeming" science.

Poythress and the philosophy of science (Part 1)

The realist says that science describes real properties of the world "out there." Scientific knowledge objectively matches realities in the character of an objective world. The "critical" realist, in distinction from the naive realist, acknowledges that appearances can be deceptive, and in practice science is always tentative and subject to revision. But science aims at true description and explanation. Though we cannot have perfect certainty about its description in any particular case, we are traveling toward truth, and some of the descriptions are true to facts out there. ...

By contrast, the idealist says that science describes the appearance of things according to the way in which the human mind naturally organizes them. We never grasp "the thing in itself," what is out there, but only the thing as already organized by our perception and our ways of thinking. ... A description in science may be true as a description of this already-organized perception. ...

The empiricist says that science studies the events and phenomena of immediate perception, and that the theoretical constructions of science do not directly describe real entities but are a convenient way of summarizing the patterns in empirical date.

...

The pragmatist says that science does no offer direct knowledge of the world as it is, but only a practical tool or means for achieving technical mastery of the world. The value of science lies wholly in its practical success.

The postmodern relativist says that science is a social product of groups with a certain social unity of purpose and knowledge-base. "Knowledge" is relative to one's group, and groups based on different kinds of assumptions would come up with different "knowledge." There is no way to adjudicate between incommensurable groups. [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 197-8]

At first glance, critical realism might seem to offer the most compatibility with a Christian worldview. We believe that God created a world, not just human beings. The world is real. And God has so constructed us that we can know him and known about his world (creation in the image of God). This reality of the world and of God excludes the other positions. ... Idealism and empiricism and pragmatism would seem to be unduly restrictive in not allowing us to say that we know the real world out there. ...(Ibid., 198-9)

Before dealing with scientific issues, one should think about the philosophy and nature of science. Poythress in his book however places discussion of theories of science near the middle of his book, as if the topic is just not that important for scientific issues. In fact, the title of the chapter in which the discussion on the philosophy of science takes place is "Debates About What is Real." Poythress thus see the various theories of science as being a reflection of one's perception of the world, of General Revelation. Taking the critical realist position in Poythress' opinion is the only way to preserve the reality and perspicuity of General Revelation, while all others deny the reality and perspicuity of General Revelation.

It must be re-stated that Poythress is in error concerning the relationship of science to General Revelation. Thus, while there are (hopefully) no informed orthodox Christians that will dispute the reality of the external world or the perspicuity of General Revelation, it is not the same as predicating that of scientific laws and the scientific enterprise. The issue I have concerning the nature and philosophy of science is not about the ontological statuses of the objects and subjects investigated by science, but rather it concerns the human capacity concerning science and the contributions we make in the very scientific enterprise itself, which influence the way we understand science. In other words, it is epistemic rather than ontological.

Thomas S. Kuhn's theory of science asserts that science is done within various paradigms throughout human history. The paradigm informs scientists the manner to ask questions and what the goal of such questioning is. Far from science being this impersonal enterprise, scientists contribute to the scientific endeavor. First, in framing the questions in a particular manner, certain answers are ruled out of order immediately. Second, the manner of inquiry will predispose one towards certain type of answers and not others. Thirdly, expecting a certain kind of regularity that makes sense in the paradigm, there is a tendency to rule data sets that do not conform to the expected variation as "outliers" and thus the tendency is towards maintenance of the reigning paradigm. Unless there are too many "outliers" and that consistently, the tendency is to reject them as due to experimental errors. Such scientific paradigms enable "normal science" to flourish within it, until a crisis point arrive where there are too many anomalies, or when a superior alternate theory emerges that works better than the current one. Paradigm shifts then occur as the scientific community shifts from one paradigm to the other, during which the terms of discussion and manners of discussion will shift, either slightly or greatly.

We note here that Kuhn's philosophy of science does not necessarily lead one to relativism, as some might think. The most one can say is that Kuhn is an epistemic anti-realist, which is not the same as being a relativist.

Scientific epistemic anti-realism just state that one does not actually know truth in science. Rather, because of the paradigmatic dependence of science, science is always seeking but never coming to actual truth, merely at best getting a working approximation of the truth. As Gordon Clark has shown in the book The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God, science because of its inductive reasoning can never attain truth. That is why pragmatism in some form is the better option when it comes to having a philosophy of science.

Contrary to Poythress therefore, the issue is not ontological but epistemological. We agree that one actually deals with the real world, the "things in themselves" as it were. But can we actually know, actually formulate laws that are absolutely and transcendentally true? I suggest not. Our paradigmatic dependence means all scientific laws and understanding is partial, is an approximation of what is actually true, and covers only what the paradigm includes in its parameters of subject matter. So yes, we believe that God created a real world that can be known, but we dispute that science is that sole vehicle that can know the world, and also the type of knowledge God intends us to have about the world.

Science and General Revelation

Scientific law is a form of the word of God [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 25]

It suffices to observe that, in reality, what people call "scientific law" is divine. ... In thinking about law, scientists are thinking God's thoughts after him. (Ibid., 27)

[On Psalms 19 -DHC] Verses 1-6 show God's revelation through creation and providence. Verses 7-11 focus on his revelation through his law given to Israel. The first of these, general revelation, clearly has a relation to science and its study of the external world. The second, special revelation, has a close relation to the Bible and to the study of the Bible in theology. So the theology of revelation found in the Bible gives us a way of seeing the relation between science and the Bible (Ibid., 35).

In this respect, the formulations by a human scientist are more like a commentary on the Bible than they are like the Bible itself. (Ibid., 45)

Vern Poythress' reading of science is that it is like a commentary on infallible General Revelation. While science might err, it errs in the same way as commentaries on the Bible err, in that both when done right are infallible revelations of God's wisdom and might. Thus, Poythress can claim that scientific law is "a form of the word of God," and that scientists are "thinking God's thoughts after him." But is this the way we ought to regard the relationship of science and General Revelation?

Poythress would be right if he only claims General Revelation to be infallible, but he extends the reliability of General Revelation to science, which is a study of the world, and thus in some sense it is a study of General Revelation. Yet science is not THE study of General Revelation, but a particular manner of studying General Revelation. For example, a major axiom of the modern scientific enterprise is methodological naturalism, that one does not posit the divine as a factor in scientific experiments. This is not necessarily bad or "godless," for if one were to reject it, then how can one know if the results from any experiment were tampered with by God, or demons? Science would be impossible if methodological naturalism was rejected, and therefore the modern scientific enterprise requires the axiom of methodological naturalism.

Yet, by utilizing this axiom, science automatically is disqualified from investigating miracles of any sort. Miracles are not "contrary" to science as much as they are incommensurate with science; they lie outside the purview of science. Likewise, the assumption of uniformitarianism is required for the scientific enterprise, but that implies that history lie outside the purview of science. In other words, because of how science is done, science is a very restricted study of General Revelation. Science therefore is not analogous to a biblical commentary, for a biblical commentary actually deals with the text. Rather, the correct analogy for science (and math also) is that of lexicons and concordances, and word studies based upon these. Just as lexicons and concordances are tools which do not in themselves indicate the content of special revelation, so likewise science provides technical knowledge which do not in themselves indicate the content of General Revelation.

Science therefore is not General Revelation, neither is it a study of General Revelation per se. Rather, it is a restricted study of the phenomena of General Revelation which can be used as tools to understand General Revelation itself. What then are scientists? Scientists are not "thinking God's thoughts after him," but rather they are creating analogues of some aspects of God's thoughts after him. Science as such is pragmatic, not realistic, something which we will discuss later.

Law, rationality and God

Scientists in practice believe passionately in the rationality of scientific law. We are not dealing with an irrational, totally unaccountable and unanalyzable surd, but with lawfulness that in some sense is accessible to human understanding. Rationality is a sine qua non for scientific law. But, as we know, rationality belongs to persons, not to rocks, trees, and subpersonal creatures. If the law is rational, which scientists assume it is, then it is also personal.

...

Scientific law is clearly like a human utterance in its ability to be grammatically articulated, paraphrased, translated, and illustrated. Law is utterance-like, language-like. ... Language, like rationality, belongs to persons. It follows that scientific law is in essence personal. [Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming Science: A God-centered Approach (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006), 20]

Vern Poythress in his book Redeeming Science attempts to deal with science and scientific issues from a "God-centered" perspective. At the beginning, Poythress attempts to show that science presupposes the existence of God through focusing on scientific law. Now I for one do believe that science requires God to have a foundation for its operation, but does Poythress' argument actually holds?

According to Poythress, science must be personal, or rather, scientific laws must be personal, because it is rational and rationality involves people. I am singularly unimpressed by such argumentation. What is presupposed here is that of a transcendent basis for law, whereas that has not yet been proven. In an emergentist and descriptive view of law and rationality, law and rationality originate "from below." In other words, the reason why the laws are what they are could be because (1) laws must take on one of the many possible forms, and (2) we discover these forms "from below," through our experimentation. Therefore, in this view of law and rationality, scientific laws are not subjectively (i.e. as the subject) rational but rather they are rationally perceived by rational actors. In other words, rationality is not to be predicated of law but of persons, the people doing the discovering. Therefore, law is not personal.

Now, one could conceivably claim a higher view of law, such that certain scientific laws could not be otherwise (i.e. not contingent). Of course, such is rather impossible to prove. But even if one is to concede this for the sake of argument, an absolute principle is still not subjectively rational but rationally perceived. And this is the problem with Poythress' argument here: Law is objectively rational, but it is not subjectively rational. One can claim that an objective law requires a law-giver, but that cannot be merely assumed, or the argument short-circuited by jumping from objective law to the law-giver as the subject.

So how should the argument be framed? It should be framed based upon the constancy of law, and that there should be no reason why law should be constant apart from an unchanging principle supporting it, which is the workings of God. That law is held by scientists to be constant is besides the point, since there is no reason why a scientific law that "holds true" for the last millennium even should the next day operate in the same manner (which is the fallacy of induction). In other words, it is not rationality that points towards God, but constancy.

In conclusion, while I agree with Poythress' conclusion that science requires God to function, I disagree with his sloppy reasoning. This sloppiness will come up again in dealing with other aspects of science, which we will look at very soon.

Response to Justin Taylor on 24-hour creation days (Part 2)

[continued from here]

Next, we'll move on to Taylor's third argument, that "The Seventh 'Day' is Not 24 hours long." On this issue, what I will say here is at best cursory, but note here that the 4th commandment depends on the seventh day being an actual day of similar length as the other six days. The Sabbath commandment is not a command to work six days, then we rest for the rest of eternity (pun unintended). So from the 4th commandment itself, there is prima facie reason to reject the idea of an eternal seventh day.

More importantly, those who promote an eternal seventh day fail to adequately address the difference in the rationales given for honoring the Sabbath between the account in Exodus (given at the beginning of the Israelites' wondering) and the second writing of the law as described in Deuteronomy (done near the end of the Israelites' wondering). For those who are astute, one will recognize that the Exodus account grounds the command to keep the Sabbath in the creation account, complete with the discussion of 6 days of work and 1 day of rest, while the Deuteronomic account grounds the command to keep the Sabbath in Israel's redemption from Egypt. For Christians who believe in the plenary inspiration of Scripture, we cannot take the easy way out to postulate two different traditions concerning the 10 commandments. Rather, both rationales are equally valid for their specific occasions in redemptive history, the former at the beginning of Israel's rebellion and subsequent wondering, the latter just before the conquest of the Promised Land. We see here that there are two kinds of Sabbath principles at work: one of creation, and one of redemption. Or one can see them rather as having a redemptive-historical slant, the former of creation, and the latter of new creation. This shows us that the Sabbath is both of creation, and of redemption.

Therefore, when we read passages such as Psalms 95 and Hebrews 4, we agree they speak concerning the eternal Sabbath, but that is not the eternal Sabbath of creation, but rather the Sabbath of the new creation that will come: the eschatological age. Taylor's appropriation of the concept of the eternal creation Sabbath is therefore in error.

The 4th argument is that "The “Day” of Genesis 2:4 Cannot Be 24 Hours Long." But this is to fail at basic exegesis, since the phrase there is not the word yom ("day") by itself, but with the preposition בְּ (b^e), in בְּי֗וֹם (b^eyom). Taylor here remarks that this use of yom presents a puzzle for YEC, but this just show his ignorance, since we have long since addressed this issue. In the beginning, I wrote about how doctrinal disputes should be managed, and the imperative to address what the opponent is saying, instead of being ignorant especially of their counter-arguments. Here is where this issue of ignorance rears its head. Taylor shows his ignorance of the YEC counter-argument on this point, which is not a good reflection on his article and the spirit in which he writes this article.

Taylor's last argument is that "The Explanation of Genesis 2:5-7 Assumes More Than an Ordinary Calendar Day." Taylor here relies on Mark Futato's article Because It Had Not Rained, putting forward the Klinean argument that Genesis 2:5-6 supports that we are dealing very much with ordinary providence in the creation account, and thus the natural processes require more than a day. However, as I have written in another blog post, this Klinean argument is without teeth. There is a qualitative difference between the vegetation in Genesis 2 and that of Genesis 1, so Genesis 2:5-6 is not speaking of Day 3 of the creation account. Genesis 2:5-6 is therefore not promoting the operation of ordinary providence in the creation days, but rather the beginning of the processes of providence in day 6 for the growth of cultivated plants especially in Eden.

Having refuted Taylor's article, we will address Taylor's closing remarks. Taylor commented on God's condescension to us in analogical and anthropomorphic speech. That is true, but just as true is the direction of analogy. God uses anthropomorphisms as figures of speech to express what is true for our experience. The direction is always us-wards, not God-wards. Thus, to say that God is refreshed in Ex. 31:17 speaks to our understanding, not that somehow the issue of Sabbath and it being a day for rest is not somehow actually true!

In speaking of the creation days, the days are externally acted on by God, not predicated of him internally, and thus not an anthropomorphism. The direction in Scripture seems to be God using the creation days as analogies, which is the opposite flow of those advocating for analogical views of the creation days. In the former, the creation days are materially present, and THEN God uses them as an analogy for the 6-day work week and 1 day of Sabbath, from literal to analogy. In the latter however, the creation days are treated as analogical from the onset, and the literal sense is relegated (in the Framework view) to "God's work week," something that is unknown in Scripture except for the actual 6-day creation story in Genesis 1. Biblical analogy proceeds from the prior material to the spiritual, not the other way around, or worse, from spiritual (God in the "Upper Register") to spiritual (Man). After all, we see in Galatians 4 the allegorization of Sarah and Hagar, Isaac and Ishmael, all of whom were actual historical persons long before their stories were allegorized to make a doctrinal point!

In conclusion, we have answered and refuted Taylor's arguments against 24-hour creation days. Those who hold to the plain sense of Genesis 1-2 do not have anything to fear from those promoting alternative theories. It would be really helpful if the next time anyone wants to write against the 6-24 view, they would actually interact with the latest YEC arguments and counter-arguments, instead of demonstrating their ignorance of them.

Response to Justin Taylor on 24-hour creation days (Part 1)

וַיְכַ֤ל אֱלֹהִים֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִ֔י מְלַאכְתּ֖וֹ אֲשֶׁ֣ר עָשָׂ֑ה וַיִּשְׁבֹּת֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִ֔י מִכָּל־מְלַאכְתּ֖וֹ אֲשֶׁ֥ר עָשָֽׂה׃ (Gen 2:2)

Over on TGC, Justin Taylor wrote an article that claims to provide biblical reasons to reject the creation days of Genesis 1 as being days of 24 hours period, in preference to an interpretation that is more in line with the Framework Hypothesis. Taylor is welcome to hold to his position, but are his reasons actually biblical?

Before we look at the reasons given, I would like to note how we are to address issues of disagreement. In doctrinal disputes, both sides normally hold to their positions because they think that the arguments for their positions are right. Hopefully, in the course of debate and dialogue, both parties will seek to understand the arguments from the other side and then formulate counter-arguments in support of their positions. In other words, even if one side were to disagree with the other and even with her arguments, he has to take note of her arguments and attempt a response. Generally, ignorance of what the other side is saying is bad, and does not help one's case at all.

Taylor gave 5 beliefs that together combine to give rise to a belief in 6-24 creation. According to Taylor, they are

(1) Genesis 1:1 is not the actual act of creation but rather a summary of or title over Genesis 1:2-2:3; (2) the creation week of Genesis 1:2-2:3 is referring to the act of creation itself; (3) each “day” (Heb. yom) of the creation week is referring to an 24-hour period of time (reinforced by the statement in Exodus 20:11); (4) an old-earth geology would necessarily entail microevolution, hominids, and animal death before the Fall—each of which contradicts what Scripture tells us; and (5) the approximate age of the earth can be reconstructed backward from the genealogical time-markers in Genesis.

Taylor then cites some of the views of theologians concerning the interpretation of the creation days, then he gives 5 "biblical" arguments that should cause his readers to doubt the 6-24 view, which I will look at later. But back to his 5 beliefs that supposedly combine to give rise to the 6-24 view of the Genesis creation days. Are these actually integral or even a part of the argument for the 6-24 view?

"Creationist belief" #1 is rather astonishing. There may or may not be creationists who claim that Genesis 1:1 is a summary or title over Genesis 1:2-2:3, but the question is not whether some creationists might use this to support their 6-24 interpretation, but rather whether one can take the 6-24 position regardless of how one interprets Genesis 1:1. I for one do not take the position that Genesis 1:1 is a summary of Genesis 1:2-2:3, so we can discount with supposed creationist belief #1.

Taylor's "creationist beliefs" #2 and #3 are indeed held by creationists, and I think we can defend them. "Creationist belief" #4 however is really curious. I suspect Taylor actually had the term "macroevolution" in mind rather than "microevolution." Be that as it may, having an old earth is less a problem for issues such as "hominids" and "animal death before the Fall" than holding to the cosmology of an old earth, which includes the supposed evolutionary and developmental timeline for life on earth (including the "Fossil Record"). As an example, a strict day-age view would not run foul of these hot button topics IF the one making the argument would simultaneously hold that there was no animal death before the Fall in "Day 6," whenever that is. The fact that those holding on to an old-earth simultaneously hold to an old-earth cosmology including animal predation and disease before the creation of Adam and Eve is the main issue, not old earth itself. As to how one can hold to an old earth without holding on to an old-earth cosmology, that is something for those professing to believe an old earth to answer for themselves; personally I don't see any way to do so.

"Creationist belief" #5 was certainly the belief by Reformed theologians such as Archbishop James Ussher. Regardless, one does not need to hold to genealogies without gaps in Genesis 5 and 11 to hold to young-earth creationism (YEC). Even if there are gaps and even if the numbers given in the genealogies are not precise, it staggers belief that millions of years can be smuggled into those gaps; it is just not possible. The positing of gaps can at the most increase the biblical time scale a couple of thousand years at the most, and even that is stretching things. After all, if one really wants to see what a biblical genealogy with gaps look like, look at Matthew's genealogy of Christ as an example! So the issue is not about reconstructing the exact age of the earth, but rather that the Bible gives a scale concerning the age of the earth, which is in the thousands rather than millions and billions of years.

Next, we look at Taylor's citation of church theologians. We notice that, besides Augustine, every single one of the theologians are modern theologians. Now, "modern" does not necessarily equals wrong, but "modern" does mean that the charge could be made that they adopted this interpretation of the creation days due to pressure from the supposed established view of "science." Therefore, while they may be stalwarts of the faith generally, their views on the creation days do not have the same imprimatur of authority. Speaking of authority, if one wishes to count theological heads, one wonders why Taylor does not count the Reformers (both Luther and Calvin) and the Reformed scholastics who all, almost without exception, held to YEC. Archishop James Ussher was not an anomaly for his time, and YEC was the general belief in all branches of Christiainity until the beginning of Modern Geology in the early 19th century.

Regarding Augustine, while he was certainly unclear on the creation days, yet he did so due to his ignorance of Greek in Sirach 18:1. The main question concerning Augustine however was whether he held to a YEC position, and in this, we can say that he answered in the affirmative.

We now approach Taylor's 5 arguments to cast doubt on the 6-24 interpretation. Taylor's first argument is that "Genesis 1:1 Describes the Actual Act of Creation Out of Nothing and Is Not a Title or a Summary." As I have previously said, I agree with that interpretation. Genesis 1:1-2 describe the initial creative act of God at time, t=0 to establish the beginning state for creation to happen. As for Taylor's appropriation of the Framework literary view, I have repeated Andrew Kulikovsky's deconstruction of that framework here, and will not repeat it again.

Taylor's second argument is that "The Earth, Darkness, and Water Are Created Before 'The First Day.'" That however is not an issue because in my view I have said that they were created at time, t=0. After they appeared ex nihilo, then time and the creation days began. Taylor's objection to the light being created in the first day while the sun was not yet created is not an issue, for we read in Revelations 22:5 that there will be light without the sun in the new Jerusalem. Light therefore can exist apart from the sun, and in fact we prove that all the time we create and use artificial lighting in our daily lives. Regarding the purpose of the sun and astral bodies in Day 4, as I have argued, we should not confuse teleology with ontology. Questions of purpose are important, but they are not questions of being. Such confusion only serves to muddy the waters instead of dealing with the text.

[to be continued]

Justifying beliefs

Let us say that a belief is justified for a person at a time if (a) he is violating no epistemic duties and is within his epistemic rights in accepting it then and (b) his noetic structures is not defective by virtue of his then accepting it. [Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1983), 79]

"Reformed Epistemology" is a system that claims to be based upon truths in the Reformed tradition, particularly as articulated by John Calvin. In a short article dealing with the existence of God as a properly basic belief, Alvin Plantinga wrote against Classical Foundationalism and introduced his idea of properly basic beliefs, of which the existence of God is one of them. In this post, I would like to deal with Plantinga's twin criteria for justification of beliefs.

Plantinga's criteria for justification, as presented here, deal with a person's epistemic duties and a working noetic structure. I would definitely agree that one should hold to be true what is congruent with the other truths one holds to, and thus one ought to not violate his epistemic duties, but that does not help us deal with foundational beliefs, for we are just beginning to ascertain what actually are foundational beliefs. As examples of properly basic beliefs, Plantinga brings up beliefs that one acquires through sense experiences like "I see a tree," but these circumvent the issue of whether the senses are indeed reliable. Whether the senses are generally reliable or not reliable is something that has not been decided yet in the building up of one's epistemology; one cannot assume they are generally reliable from the start unless one is an empiricist (and empiricism is wrong since empiricism itself is not empirically proven to be true).

Now, of course the question might be posed as to why anyone should want to believe that the senses are unreliable. But that is besides the point here. Most people will agree, as do I, that the senses are generally reliable. But one could believe that the senses are generally reliable because of other prior beliefs that are deemed to be more basic. In other words, it is not the case that those who do not accept sense experiences as foundational would therefore distrust the senses. Thus, to posit the criterion that one's noetic structures are not defective by virtue of accepting a belief is to beg the question. How exactly does one define whether one's noetic structures is or isn't defective?

Plantinga's justification criteria for properly basic beliefs are, in this sense, properly basic, yet totally worthless. They are true to the point of tautologies, yet worthless for judging whether any belief X is properly basic, since one cannot know if one is actually violating one's epistemic duties or if one is having a defective noetic structure by holding to belief X. One can be subjectively justified to be sure, sure that one has actually fulfilled those criteria, but since the question of whether belief X truly and objectively conforms to the criteria remains, one can never be objectively justified in holding to any "properly basic belief."

The revisionist history of the New Evangelicalism

One manner of dealing with historical criticism is to refute it. Another way, the dishonest and lazy way, is to do historical revisionism and read the opposition out of the records. In the history of the New Evangelicalism, the established historiography claimed only 3 sides to the conflict: the Liberals, who compromised on doctrine, the Fundamentalists, who were so militantly opposed to compromise that they lost their love for the brethren and the lost, and the New Evangelicals, or just "Evangelicals," who stood firm on doctrine yet seek to be winsome and loving to all. Conspicuously absent from the revisionist historiography is the notion of a 4th group: Confessional Protestantism, those who stood firm on sound doctrine as taught in the Creeds and Confessions of the Church, and sought to do ministry with an ecclesial focus. We reject Liberalism for its toleration of heresy, we reject Fundamentalism for its imbalance of doctrine, AND we also reject [New] Evangelicalism for its compromise of the truth.

Justin Taylor has decided to dip his toe into the issue by speaking about the "three type of Fundamentalists and Evangelicals after 1956." As we can see however, Taylor made the same revisionist error of omitting Confessional Protestantism, whether that is due to ignorance or intentional maliciousness is another question. In the interest of correcting this deficit, I have decided to add the fourth column to his chart:

	Confessional Protestantism
Personal separation from sin	advocated
Ecclesiastical separation from liberals/ modernists	advocated
Relationship of evangelism and social action	emphasized evangelism over social action
Style of combatting Modernism	militant
Attitude towards Billy Graham	opposed (less strongly), but do not necessarily regard as apostate
Attitude towards NAE	opposed
Attitude towards self-designation of "fundamentalist"	rejected
Geographical concentration	?
Representatives	J.G. Machen, Reformed churches

By defining the Confessional Protestant position out of the picture, the New Evangelicals, or its latest reincarnation in the "New Calvinism," can claim to be the moderate position between the extremes of Liberalism and Fundamentalism. Furthermore, they can claim, and do claim, continuity with the Reformation, even though they do not belong there. In the one hand, they held up the portrayal of the Liberals, which every true Christian would reject as having compromised the faith. In the other hand, they held up the portrayal of the angry Fundamentalists, using the worst excesses of that movement as an example to tar the rest. They thus seem both strong on doctrine (contra Liberalism) yet charitable towards others (contra Fundamentalism). Confessional Protestantism however cannot be so easily tarred, so it is probably better to revise them out of the picture, since after all they are generally not a big and vocal group, and some can be co-opted into their camp.

Between Confessional Protestantism and Separatist Fundamentalists, the major difference is the balance we achieve through focusing on the historic creeds and confessions of the Church. Separatists Fundamentalists, due to the anti-intellectualism held by many of them, tend towards imbalances resulting in factions and schisms. The prevalence of Dispensationalism in many parts of separatist Fundamentalism has resulted in a cottage industry of elaborate eschatological charts, filling in the blanks where Scripture is silent. Is it not any wonder that factions and schisms will result from such doctrinal imbalances, where belief in a pre-tribulation rapture (nowhere taught in Scripture) becomes definitive of orthodoxy in some circles? Confessional Protestantism, by focusing on the pattern of sound words, do not suffer from such schisms found in Fundamentalist circles, schisms which may be exaggerated by the New Evangelicals to prove that the separatists are short on Christian charity.

The focus on the historic creeds and confessions of the Church of course means that it is less a movement than a church, thus tied to denominations. It is understandable that Evangelicalism hate denominations, but that doesn't make the link to denominations wrong. Perhaps that is another reason why Evangelicals like Justin Taylor wish to ignore Confessional Protestantism. In all fairness, Taylor is not the only one to do so; most of the histories regarding Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism in the 20th century do the same, and all of them are wrong in their omission. One wonders how many of them actually read what John Gresham Machen believed concerning ecclesiology and the Fundamentalism of his time, instead of just focusing on his battle with Modernism.

We return to the beginning of Taylor's article, where he mentions three "definitions" from Dr. Dockery. I will add in the fourth "definition," and thus we will see the different spirit in Confessional Protestantism.

An Evangelical is someone who likes Billy Graham;
A Liberal is someone who thinks Billy Graham is a fundamentalist;
A Fundamentalist is someone who thinks Billy Graham is apostate. AND
A Confessional Protestant is someone who deplores Billy Graham's compromise and lack of biblical ecclesiology, while acknowledging both the good and the bad he has done for the spread of the Christian faith.

Charlie Hebdo and the right to offend

#IamCharlie

The massacre at the office of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo by Islamic terrorists sparked outrage throughout much of the Western world. There is talk about freedom of speech and freedom of expression, even for blasphemy, of which the cartoonists most certainly were guilty of. The cartoonists were thus not exactly nice people, so even though gunning them down is wicked, some might think they deserve what they got. Even worse is the constant attack on freedom of speech and expression from certain sources like this, with the idea that we should not have absolute freedom of speech and expression.

There are two issues here: One of consistency, and the other concerning freedom. With regards to consistency, the issue is that the West is hypocritical when it comes to freedom of speech. Theirs is the "freedom" to ridicule those deemed acceptable to be mocked, but try mocking (actually only just need to disagree with) the LGBTQIA lobby and see what happens! Is there really freedom of speech in Western countries? The disgraceful dismissal of Atlanta Fire Chief Kelvin Cochran for "thought crime" certainly establishes the bigotry of the LGBTQIA agenda. So much for actual freedom of speech and expression in the West!

#IamKelvinCochran

The second issue of freedom has two aspects: civil and religious. In the civil realm we have countries that categorically deny freedom of speech and expression on principle. In the religious realm, we have the argument that blasphemy should be criminalized Either way, the idea is that there should not be actual freedom of speech and expression.

The civil aspect focuses on the idea that peace and harmony in society depends on forbidding speech that offends. Now, as a practical concern, this is certainly a factor to be considered when one implements freedom of speech, but practice is not identical to principle. One could very well affirm freedom of speech on principle, while citing practical concerns for imposing some limitations on its exercise in society. The principle however should be defended, for the main issue is this: Who gets to define what speech is offensive and what speech is not? Does the State get to determine matters of religion and philosophy? Is it even qualified for that task? Of course not! And that is the main issue here: One man's religion might be another man's blasphemy. Islam for example categorically denies the deity of Christ, whom they call Isa. In Christian theology, denial of Christ's deity is heresy and blasphemy, so should Christians insist that Muslims do not teach that Christ is not God? Most certainly not! Muslims should have the right to deny what Christians assert to be true! That the State has the capability to decide what kind of speech is and is not offensive is ludicrous to the extreme. What happens is that such determination becomes totally arbitrary and the State becomes, as it were, "God", to determine by fiat what is and what is not considered "acceptable speech."

On the religious front, yes, blasphemy is a moral sin. It angers God, and blasphemers will be punished by God, personally. But does that mean on the civil realm we should punish blasphemy? Those like Tim Bayly who argue for blasphemy laws clearly do not have a sense of Church history especially the 30 years' war, where people are killed simply because they hold to a difference confession of faith. As I have mentioned earlier, one man's religion is another man's blasphemy. Who gets to determine what blasphemy looks or doesn't look like? The State? How about Tridentine Roman Catholicism, which bathed the European continent in blood with the French wars of religion, the Dutch war of independence, and of course the 30 years' war? Perhaps Bayly would love 16th century Italy, whereby Protestants of all stripes were routinely burned at the stake for heresy? Yes, blasphemy is sin, but not all sin is to be punished by the civil government. Can anyone imagine what would happen if the State decides to punish all lying? I guess the politicians would all go to jail first, followed by the rest of the people!

So while blasphemy is a detestable sin against God, in the civil realm, there must be a right to blaspheme. Christians have the right to express outrage, to organize boycotts and so on in response, but blasphemy should never be a civil crime.

In conclusion, there should be actual freedom of speech and expression, not because that would result in an ideal society, but because the alternative to that is a society not under the rule of law but under the arbitrary whims of government. Better some blasphemy and hurt feelings, than the Orvellian society of Nineteen Eighty-Four.

The Gospel Coalition just has to prove its critics right

I think it goes to the whole structural problem in the whole young, restless and reformed thing, and that is, the guys at the top decided who was going to be allowed to make criticism, who they were going to listen to, and who they were going to ignore, and you end up, when you decide that, right at the start, you end up with a terribly, terribly potentially corrupt system. .. The truth is so rarely actually spoken into these guys' lives -Carl Trueman (10:45-11:14)

Kevin DeYoung recently wrote a hit piece attacking "internet criticism," and basically claimed that these guys aren't worth listening to. As if to prove my point, any posted criticism of DeYoung's article "miraculously" disappeared off their FB page. Now, just compare their action with what Dr. Trueman said about the entire YRR movement. Time and time again, we have been proven right, and over and over again, none of them want to listen. They rather blunder and abet more Mark Driscolls, more James MacDonalds and so on, and the train wreck continues. I had "prophesied" the train wreck, not because I possess the *gift* of prophecy, but because it was so obvious what was going to happen. Yet they ignored their critics and what we warned about came true.

This hit piece was written by Kevin DeYoung. Remember, this was the guy who hasn't apologized at all for insulting single men. When he talks about "internet critics," he means he can critique and attack anyone he wishes to, but the same is denied to those who push back against him. Evidently, to the YRR establishment, all they want is an echo chamber. Applause and accolades are welcome, but critiques are most certainly not welcome. Why they even bother with keeping up the facade of engaging in social media is anyone's guess, unless by "social media," they mean "I talk, you listen."

So here continues the New Evangelical Calvinism train wreck, coming to a town near you.