In response to Perl's call for a return to Neoplatonism

The alternative to the principle that to be is to be intelligible, therefore is the nihilism which afflicts so much of contemporary thought and culture. For if being is not what is apprehended by thought, then thought does not apprehend being. This in effect means that there is no being, since whatever we call “being” is not being but a projection, interpretation, illusion—in short, nothing. If reality is not as thought must apprehend it, then there is no such thing as reality. Conversely, if thought is not the apprehension of being, then all thought, in that it never apprehends being, is illusory. Nihilism may indeed be said to consist most fundamentally in the denial of the intelligibility of being. (Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 111-2)

In his conclusion of his book on Dionysius, Eric Perl puts forth his promotion of Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism is treated as superior as opposed to what he sees as the nihilism that infects the modern world. While certainly nihilism is present in much modern thought, I do not agree that Neoplatonism is a better alternative.

Perl's argument against much of modern philosophy can be stated as follows: (1) If thought does not apprehend being, being is an illusion. (2) If thought is not the apprehension of being, then thought is illusory. (3) Therefore, if Neoplatonism is false, being and thought are illusory. (4) (Implied) Being and thought are not illusory. (5) Therefore, Neoplatonism is true. The problem comes with statements 1 and 2. Is it really true that apprehending being is necessary for the reality of thought and being?

Reality and thought are linked in Plato due to the idea of forms, in which apprehension comes about when one apprehends the form of things. One knows what fire is when one sees "fire-ness" in the object. Implicit in this view of knowledge is that the mind has access to the forms in order to apprehend an object. But is that truly how cognition works?

Let us think through a few questions: Can the mind apprehend a pink unicorn? How about a pegasus? Surely we can say that the mind can apprehend these things, but then these things are not real. But suppose it is said that their forms are derived from real forms, and thus even though the mythical creatures do not exist, the reason why we apprehend them is because the original forms exist and we can apprehend them. So let's try something different, something real. How about the wave-particle duality of photons? Can our minds apprehend the concept? I would think so. Pointing out that we can apprehend "wave" and "particle" does not help because "wave-particle" is not wave and not particle. Or from Math, can we apprehend the idea of transfinites, where again transfinites are not truly infinite and yet they compose infinite sets?

The thing is: Ever since the Scientific Revolution, the link between being and intelligibility has been strained to the breaking point. Our knowledge is not limited to what there is, as we are able to conceptualize new theories and new things. Our thought is virtually limited to what we can conceptualize. Reality of course remains the same. The world in Plato's time is more or less the same world in modern times. Photons existed as wave-particles in Plato's time just as it does in ours, except Plato did not know or understand modern physics. Thus, we see a separation between the world of being and the world of ideas. Reality remains the same, yet thought and cognition does not.

Since such is the case, I would propose that we need a separation of reality from the world of ideas. There is nothing necessarily wrong with the Platonic forms, and that objects have forms which impress themselves on the mind (Whether that is the best way to understand cognition I would not comment here). The separation however needs to happen between reality and thought. We must understand that conceptualization is a mental process that can operate apart from the world, and that has happened as we come to grips with the strangeness and counter-intuitive nature of the inner workings of reality. Reality or being is one thing; the world of ideas does have relation to reality but is able to transcend it altogether.

From a Christian perspective, we must hold to some version of that separation, since we believe in a God who is in many ways unlike us. To assert that God is a se (when nothing in reality is a se), and we are expected to understand what we mean when we say that God is a se, is already a conceptual leap from reality. We also say that there are the "secret things of God" (c.f. Deut. 29:29), which are certainly real and yet not known by us, thus we must create an extra category of real but not intelligible. Christianity therefore cuts against the identification of being and intelligibility, and those who hold to such an identification would come to face problems in their philosophies. Those holding to Platonism tend towards rationalism, while those rejecting rationalism tend towards mysticism, precisely because they continue to run with Plato's link between being and intelligibility.

If we separate being and intelligibility, we can have 3 categories: (1) Things real but not intelligible (secret things of God), (2) Things real and intelligible (most things), and (3) Things intelligible but without being (e.g. knowledge of God, Scientific paradigms). There is no need to reduce everything to intelligibility and thus become a rationalist (rejecting 1), or focus on being and thus treading the path of Dionysius (rejecting 1 and 3). If we take this paradigm, then we can reject statements 1 and 2 of Perl's argument, and therefore his case for Neoplatonism. What I suspect is happening in much of philosophy is a failure of imagination, and a stubborn clinging to the idea that unity of thought and being can be found in this world by Man.